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The first decades of the 21st century have witnessed a proliferation of academic literature on  
the economically ascendant, internationally engaged states of the global South like the 
BRICS, Mexico, and Turkey. IR literature on energy has accounted for the rise of these states 
in terms of the recalibration of global hydrocarbon geopolitics, but is limited in considering 
the ways in which these advanced developing states use energy to obtain and maintain power. 
Other sub-schools of IR on middle, emerging, and rising powers pay more attention to how 
these states accrue and exercise power. One of these literatures - that on regional powers - 
provides the framework for this project. This thesis argues that IR does not pay sufficient 
regard to how energy (a key material resource) either contributes to regional power or shapes 
the agendas of advanced developing states that are also regional powers. This thesis 
consequently explores the nexus between energy and regional power for advanced 
developing states.  
Adopting a case-study approach, the thesis considers how energy and regional power were 
related for Turkey between 2002 and 2014 in the Caspian region. It argues that despite being 
disadvantaged by limited energy reserves in a region dominated by major energy states, the 
governing AKP party saw energy and regional status as intrinsically linked for Turkey. An 
examination of Ankara’s relationships with Iran and Russia - two other advanced developing 
states enables a detailed analysis of the manifestation of the relationship between energy and 
regional power in the regional context for Turkey. Overall, the thesis contends that 
acknowledging the relationship between energy and regional power for advanced developing 
states facilitates understanding of power relations between states in the global South and 







My foremost thanks to my supervisors, Dr. Charalampos Efstathopoulos and Dr. Alistair 
Shepherd, for their support and motivation over the past four years. Their (very) detailed 
feedback on every aspect of this project was instrumental in its metamorphosis from a series 
of ideas to a thesis. That they approached supervision with unwavering good humour and 
enthusiasm was an added bonus. 
My sincere gratitude to Ciara, Paul, Rosie, and Tom for proof-reading individual chapters of 
this thesis, and to Bleddyn and John for casting an eye over a couple of sections at the last 
minute. Special thanks to Prithvi for her advice on the first draft of the introduction. There are 
not quite as many pipeline puns in there as she would have liked, but I did try. 
The InterPol community provided me with support and friendship beyond measure during my 
time in Aberystwyth. Above all, my thanks to my merched - to Christine, to Dani, and to 
Katarina - for being by my side from the beginning. To Adhemar and Nick, too, for providing 
ample back up support. As my comrades in office 0.06, Adhemar and Katarina also ensured 
that work was less of a chore than it otherwise might have been. 
My thanks to Alex, Bleddyn, Catrin, Dyfan, Katja, Lydia, and Prithvi for their advice on 
navigating academic life; and for organising and participating in the many walks, cups of tea, 
castle trips, and board game nights that made the whole PhD process so much more 
enjoyable. To all the staff in the InterPol office and to the ever-friendly security guards in the 
Llyfrgell Genedlaethol Cymru: diolch yn fawr! Elsewhere, Ciara, Jim, Zoe, all the Dirty 
Muckers, and the Arklow Vikings Special Olympians provided respite from life in Wales. 
More than anything, I am grateful to my family. To my uncles, for refusing to ever take me 
seriously and yet never being more than a phone call away. To my grandparents - my Nanny 
Lillie, Nanny Eileen, Granda Matt, and Granda Noel - for something I cannot put into words 
in so short a space. To my brother, Peter, for being a generally sound human being (frog 









This thesis is dedicated to my granda,  
Matt Lambert. 
 

















Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................... iii 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................. iv 
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................... vi 
Maps, Figures, and Diagrams ............................................................................................. viii 
Acronyms and Abbreviations ................................................................................................ ix 
Glossary ................................................................................................................................... xi 
Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1 
Terminology ............................................................................................................................... 3 
Methodology .............................................................................................................................. 8 
Situating the literature .............................................................................................................. 17 
Thesis structure and main arguments ....................................................................................... 19 
1. Energy in IR: Literature Review ...................................................................................... 23 
1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 23 
1.2 Energy governance............................................................................................................. 24 
1.3 Energy sources and diversification policies ....................................................................... 31 
1.4 Energy security .................................................................................................................. 36 
1.5 Energy and geopolitics ....................................................................................................... 39 
1.6 Energy and economics ....................................................................................................... 50 
1.7 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................ 57 
2. Developing a Regional Powers Framework ..................................................................... 60 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 60 
2.2 Key contentions in the regional power literature ............................................................... 62 
2.3 Forms of regional power: three typologies ........................................................................ 71 
2.4 Regional powers and energy .............................................................................................. 80 
2.5 Turkey and regional power ................................................................................................ 87 
2.6 Conclusions ...................................................................................................................... 101 
3. Turkey's Energy Strategy, 2002-2014 ............................................................................ 103 
3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 103 
3.2 Turkey’s Energy Situation ............................................................................................... 105 
3.3 Turkey's energy agenda, 2002-2014 ................................................................................ 118 
vii 
 
3.4 Key issues in Turkey's energy region .............................................................................. 131 
3.5 Conclusions ...................................................................................................................... 148 
4. Energy in Turkish-Iranian Relations ............................................................................. 151 
4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 151 
4.2 Turkish-Iranian Relations in Historical Context .............................................................. 153 
4.3 Turkish-Iranian relations, 2002-2014 .............................................................................. 156 
4.4 Energy relations between Turkey and Iran, 2002-2014 ................................................... 164 
4.5 Iran and Turkey in the Caspian region ............................................................................. 187 
4.6 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 198 
5. Energy in Turkish-Russian Relations ............................................................................ 201 
5.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 201 
5.2 Turkish-Russian relations in historical context................................................................ 204 
5.3 Turkey-Russian relations in the AKP era ........................................................................ 208 
5.4 Energy relations between Turkey and Russia, 2002-2014 ............................................... 213 
5.5 Turkey and Russia: competition for regional powerhood................................................ 234 
5.6 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 248 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 251 
Energy and regional powers in advanced developing states: Turkey and the wider Caspian 
region ..................................................................................................................................... 252 
Key arguments: energy and regional power in advanced developing states ......................... 259 
Contributions.......................................................................................................................... 267 
Primary Source Bibliography ............................................................................................. 270 





Maps, Figures, and Diagrams 
Figure 1: The wider Caspian region 8 
Figure 2: The wider Caspian region 89 
Figure 3: Turkey's TPES, 2015  106 
Figure 4: Oil supply by source  107 
Figure 5: Turkey's transnational pipelines 108 
Figure 6: Natural gas supply by source  109 
Figure 7: The wider Caspian region. 116 
Figure 8: Energy reserves in the Caspian  117 
Figure 9: Current oil infrastructure, Ceyhan   125 
Figure 10: Proposed South Stream and Nabucco routes  141 
Figure 11: Turkey's transnational pipelines  142 
Figure 12: Iranian oil export destinations, 2017 165 
Figure 13: Azerbaijani energy infrastructure 193 
Figure 14: BTE, TANAP, and TAP routes  195 
Figure 15: The Blue Stream  207 
Figure 16: South Stream and Nabucco routes  228 
Figure 17: Turkstream  232 
Figure 18: Energy infrastructure in the Caucasus  236 
Figure 19: The semi-autonomous regions of Georgia  239 







Acronyms and Abbreviations 
AFP - Agence France Press 
AIOC - Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
AKP - Justice and Development Party 
AP  - Associated Press 
BRICS - Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa 
bcm - billion cubic metres 
bcm/a - billion cubic meters per annum 
bll/d - Barrels per day  
B  - billion 
BP - British Petroleum  
BOTAS - Turkish Petroleum Pipeline Corporation 
BSEC - Organisation of Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
BTC – Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline 
BTE - Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline 
CPC - Caspian Pipeline Consortium 
CSTO -  Collective Security Treaty Organisation 
Euratom  - European Atomic Energy Community 
EC - European Commission 
ECT  -  Energy Charter Treaty 
EIA - Energy Information Administration 
EU - European Union 
FDI - Foreign Direct Investment 
FSU - Former Soviet Union 
G8 - Group of eight 
G20 - Group of twenty 
GDP - Gross Domestic Product 
GECF - Gas Exporting Countries Forum 
IAEA - International Atomic Energy Association  
IEA - International Energy Agency 
IMF - International Monetary Fund 
IMFA - Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
IOC - International Oil Company 
ISIS - Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
IPAP - Individualised Partnership Action Plan 
IPE - International Political Economy 
ITGI - Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy 
IR - International Relations 
KRG - Kurdish Regional Government 
LNG - Liquefied Natural Gas 
m - million 
mb/d - million barrels per day 
mcm - million cubic metres 
MENA - Middle East and North Africa 
MENR - Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 
MFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Turkey) 
MoU - Memorandum of Understanding 
x 
 
mt - metric tonnes 
mtoe - million tonnes of oil equivalent  
P5+1 - permanent members of the UNSC (China, France, Russia, UK, US) and Germany 
PJC - Permanent Joint Council 
NATO - North Atlantic Trading Organisation 
NOC - National Oil Company 
NPP - Nuclear Power Plant 
NPT - Non-Proliferation Treaty 
NRC - NATO-Russia Council 
OECD - Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OIC - Organisation of Islamic Countries 
OPEC - Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PfP - Partnership for Peace 
PKK - Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
RMFA - Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
RSC - Regional security complex 
SIPRI - Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
SOCAR - State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic 
TANAP - Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline 
TAP - Trans-Adriatic Pipeline 
Tcm - Trillion cubic metres 
TIKA - Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency  
Toe - Tonnes of oil equivalent  
TPAO - Turkish Petroleum Corporation 
TPES - total primary energy supply 
UK - United Kingdom 
UN -United Nations 
UNCLOS - United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
US - United States 
USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
WTO - World Trade Organisation 











Barrel of oil: 42 US gallons (159 litres) of crude oil. Standard means of measuring oil 
volumes 
Conventional oil: Crude oil that can be produced using traditional techniques (i.e. via a well) 
without altering the natural state of the oil. 
Crude oil: Oil in its unrefined form/unrefined petroleum composed of hydrocarbon and 
organic material in a liquid state 
Downstream: The part of the oil industry concerned with transportation and refining of 
crude oil and oil products 
Energy source: Renewable or finite substances such as fossil fuels, uranium, hydropower 
and waste that provides power or heat 
Fourth corridor: Gas network planned to connect the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Middle 
East to Europe. BTE and BTC are part of the project; other proposed pipelines include TAP, 
ITGI, White Stream and Nabucco 
Liquefied natural gas: Natural gas that has been transformed to a liquid state and can be 
transported via tankers 
Nuclear fuel/material: Elements like uranium and plutonium that are capable of sustaining a 
nuclear fission chain reaction that produces heat and energy when placed enriched and placed 
in a nuclear reactor  
Peak oil: Point at which extraction of petroleum reaches maximum volumes, after which 
production begins a terminal decline. 
Petroleum: Liquid hydrocarbon mixtures such as crude oil, condensate, refined oil products 
Petroleum products: Products such as unfinished oils, gasoline, aviation fuels, and asphalt 
that are a product of the processing of hydrocarbons 
Primary energy supplies: Energy in its raw form (ie hydrocarbons or renewable material); 
secondary energy forms are those like electricity or heat that have been generated from 
primary forms 
Reserves /demonstrated reserves: Energy source that is demonstrated to exist by geological 
and engineering data, though knowledge on the precise location, volume, and grade of 
probable/indicated reserves varies  
Reserves (possible): Unproven reserves that geological surveying suggests are less likely to 




Reserves (probable): Unproven reserves that have a 50% chance of being commercially 
recoverable 
Reserves (proved): Energy sources that geological and engineering surveys demonstrate are 
recoverable under current operational and economic conditions. Certainty value of 90% 
Reserves (recoverable proved): Estimated volume of fuel that is deemed reasonably certain 
to be recoverable from known reserves under current conditions 
Seven Sisters: Cartel of seven major oil companies that dominated oil trade – particularly in 
the Middle East and Iran – from the 1940s until the oil crises of the late 1970s: British 
Petroleum, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (later Exxon), Standard Oil Company of 
New York (later Mobil), Standard Oil Company of California (later Chevron), Royal Dutch 
Shell, Texaco, and Gulf 
Spot price: Price paid for one-off energy transaction for immediate delivery of a product at 
market rates 
Stockpiling: The practice of reserving a quantity of energy or fuel for future or emergency 
usage 
Supply chain: Actors involved in transfer of energy through markets. Consists of at least a 
producer and consumer, and possibly transit states or international companies 
Total primary energy supply: The total supply of primary energy available to a state; 
calculated by adding energy production and imports and subtracting energy exports 
Unconventional hydrocarbons: sources of oil and gas that are not accessed via wells, or that 






International Relations (IR) has long differentiated between developing and developed 
countries. Since the early 2000s, a third category of states have become increasing 
prominent in international affairs: the advanced developing states of the global South. 
Representing an evolution of the international hierarchy beyond a binary North-South 
divide (Vieira and Alden, 2011), these are states that are experiencing significant 
economic growth, are pursuing influence within the international system, and that possess 
a preponderance of resources relative to other states in the global South. New acronyms 
were coined to categorise these states - the BRICS,1 VISTA,2 CIVETS,3 MINT,4 
MIKTA,5 and N116 - and IR developed new sub-schools to explain their motivations and 
strategies. Among these new research areas is that on regional powers. It is a field that 
incorporates states at all levels of development, but which focuses predominantly on those 
that are economically ascendant and internationally ambitious in the global South. Yet 
despite emphasising the role of material resources in determining and implementing 
regional power, there is no discussion within the regional powers literature on how energy 
- a key strategic resource since the early 20th century - affects regional power. 
As advanced developing states were gaining increased attention, the reorientation of 
energy trade was becoming more prominent in IR debates on global energy affairs.7 
Energy scholarship increasingly emphasises a recalibration of energy geopolitics driven by 
the emergence of rapidly industrialising hydrocarbon-based advanced developing states. 
However, in focusing predominantly on the consequence of those states’ energy policies 
for the developed world, and in failing to distinguish the energy requirements, ambitions, 
and opportunities of advanced developing states from those of developing states, many 
                                                     
1 Brazil, Russia, India, China - expanded to BRICS in 2010 after South Africa became a member 
2 Vietnam, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, Argentina (Reuters, 2007) 
3 Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, South Africa (Wall Street Journal, 2009) 
4 Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey (O’ Neill, 2012) 
5 Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, Australia (MIKTA, 2013) 
6 Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, South Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, 
Vietnam 
7 See Barnes et al (2006), Verrastro et al (2010), Pant (2016), Klare (2017) 
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scholars ignore the potential geostrategic motivations behind particular energy decisions 
for advanced developing states. This consequently limits understanding of the political and 
power dynamics of energy affairs within the global South.  
The confluence between energy and regional power is one that is underexplored in IR. In 
order to address the limitations outlined above and to contribute to the debate on advanced 
developing states more broadly, this thesis is motivated by a central research question that 
asks 
 “what is the relationship between energy and regional power for advanced 
developing states?”. 
It is an exploratory thesis (Yin, 1984) that questions how the two are mutually reinforcing 
or contradictory for a group of states with specific economic and political attributes and 
constraints. The equivalence attached to the two primary variables in the central research 
question generates two secondary questions that guide the thesis: 
a)  How does energy affect regional power for advanced developing states? 
b)  How does regional power affect the energy agendas of advanced developing 
states? 
 
This thesis consequently challenges limitations in studies of advanced developing states in 
IR by employing the nexus between regional power and energy as a lens though which we 
can interpret how these states understand, acquire, and employ power in the regional 
context. In order to address the research question in detail, it conducts a case study of 
energy and regional power in Turkey between 2002 and 2014. It considers the ways in 
which energy trade, policy, and resources affected the regional power status and capacity 
of Turkey and, conversely, the ways in which regional power impacted Ankara’s energy 
strategy.  
The first part of this introduction explores two key terms in research question - “advanced 
developing states” and “regions” - and demarcates the wider Caspian region that is the 
focus of this thesis. The second section discusses the thesis’ methodology, outlining the 
justifications for adopting a case study approach and highlighting the sources consulted for 
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this project. The third section situates the thesis within two schools of IR literature: those 
pertaining to energy and regional power. After highlighting limitations within these 
literatures, the final section outlines the thesis’ structure and highlights the main arguments 
and conclusions of individual chapters. 
Terminology 
Advanced developing states 
Despite the prominence afforded in recent IR literature to countries experiencing rapid 
growth and growing international presence,  Hart and Jones (2010:65) and Mansfield 
(2014) note that there is neither a common accepted categorisation for or definition of 
these states. Drawing on the literatures on rising, emerging, middle, and regional powers, 
this thesis proposes a category of “advanced developing states” to delineate those countries 
that are economically ascendant and possess some form of presence in the international 
system. The term “advanced developing countries” is one that occurs infrequently in IR 
literature to refer to states like the BRICS, Mexico, or Turkey that are more economically 
advanced than others in the global South (see, for example, Yang, 2003; Castro, 2012; 
Garnaut, 2012; Starkl et al, 2013). Here, the word “state” replaces that of “country” in 
order to reflect the state level of analysis applied to the relationship between energy and 
regional power for these actors. It is an empirical category that can be examined through 
different analytical frameworks depending on specific issues or contexts examined. While, 
for example, a regional powers framework is applied here to explore the relationship 
between energy and regional power in Turkey, a middle powers framework might be 
employed in researching Turkey’s participation in MIKTA. 
Commonalities in the aforementioned literatures are used to differentiate advanced 
developing states from other developing actors. Foremost among these factors are: 
1. That the state is experiencing economic growth (and influence in the international 
economic system) to a greater extent than that of other states in the global South 
2. That the state posses a preponderance of other material resources (military, 
demographic, and geographic) relative to other states in the global South, and has 
the necessary internal cohesion to utilise those recourses 
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3. The state aspires to play a more influential role in regional and global affairs 
(Hurrell, 2006; Hart and Jones, 2010; Mansfield, 2014; Patience, 2014) 
 
The term is not intended to imply homogeneity between all advanced developing states. 
Rather, like Stanley’s analytical frameworks (2012:476), it can be understood as a tool for 
categorising and reducing the “inherent complexities” of the political world. Advanced 
developing states may be democracies, theocracies, dictatorships, or monarchies; 
economic production may be dominated by primary resources, manufacturing, the service 
industry, or be balanced across multiple sectors; and states may be revisionist, reformist, or 
support the international status quo. Countries in this category include Turkey, Iran, 
Russia, Mexico, Argentina, South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Brazil, the Philippines, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. 
This list is not exhaustive, and is subject to change depending on temporal contexts. There 
is a notable exception from the list of states above that is subject to some contention in the 
regional powers literature. China, by virtue of its material capacity and global influence, is 
on the verge of becoming - if not already - a great power (Hurrell, 2006; Breslin, 2010). It 
is considered an advanced developing state in this thesis because of the frequency with 
which it manifests in the IR literature on rising and regional powers. However, frequent 
caveats will be made throughout to China’s exceptionalism in a number of areas compared 
to other advanced developing states. Similar references will be made on occasion to 
Russia. While this thesis acknowledges that several of the countries listed above - 
including Turkey - are former imperial states that may have previously occupied a 
significant position in global affairs, Russia is the only advanced developing state in the 
category to have been a superpower in the post-imperial era. Consequently, differences in 
Russia’s strategy and ambitions compared to other advanced developing states will be 
pointed out at various junctures. 
Regions 
The “region” is, at its simplest, a geographical concept (Nolte, 2010). It is a territorially 
fixed area. In international politics, regions are more complex. While geography maintains 
a role in the definition of a political region, other ideational and material factors play a role 
in demarcating specific geopolitical spaces. This thesis acknowledges that the concept is 
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widely debated and much contested in IR, and that despite attempts at definition retains an 
ambiguity that renders a common position on the constitution of a region difficult. 
Nonetheless, the definition of a geopolitical region in this thesis is informed by several 
features that recur in IR literature. Regions are frequently defined as two or more states 
that are in geographical proximity to one another; that share cultural and social similarities 
or a common history and heritage; that hold common membership of local or international 
multilateral organisations;  and that engage in patterns of conflict and cooperation - or 
amity and enmity - with each other through trade, diplomacy, warfare, and other bilateral 
and multilateral initiatives (Buzan, 1991; Mansfield and Milner, 1999; Lemke, 2002; 
Buzan and Waever, 2003; Fawn, 2009; Prys, 2010). This thesis therefore considers 
political and economic interdependence between states and shared histories, cultures, or 
social norms to be integral to the transition of a geographical space into a geopolitical 
region.  
Even where scholars agree on the region as a theoretical concept, the demarcation of 
particular regions can be affected by specific political, economic, and temporal contexts 
and agendas. Lemke (2002:82), for example, highlights the contested nature of the 
“Middle East” as a region in pointing out that term referred specifically to the Indian 
subcontinent when first coined, and that Winston Churchill “officially” designated the 
region between the Bosporus and east India as the “Middle East” in his capacity as British 
Colonial Secretary in 1920. Even accounting for the antiquated nature of those examples, 
there are notable discrepancies between contemporary understandings of what the “Middle 
East” is: scholars variously include or exclude the states of the Arabian Peninsula, the 
Levant, the Maghreb, Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan in region-based examinations of the 
Middle East (Schwarz, 2008; Jan, 2007; Fattah, 2009; and Coskun, 2010). The region can 
consist of anywhere between four and twenty three countries.  
The difficulties in applying theoretical concepts of a region to empirical studies of regions 
- and, indeed, regional power - is further encumbered by the multi-regional location of 
some states. The most prominent example is Russia’s situation between Europe and Asia, 
but smaller sub-regions offer equal - and often more complex difficulties. In their work on 
regional security complexes (RSCs), Buzan and Waever (2003) introduce the concepts of 
“buffer” and “insulator” states to define states that border different regions. However, the 
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concept allows for membership by a state of only one region. For those researching 
Turkey, this is more than a little problematic. 
Since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, scholars and policy makers alike have had 
difficulty in locating Turkey. Geographically, it spans two continents (Europe and Asia) 
and two major seas (the Mediterranean and Black Sea). Geopolitically, it borders three 
major regions - Europe, the Middle East, and the Caucasus and Central Asia - and smaller 
sub-regions such as the Levant, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. Turkey’s position as a state 
somewhat between regions therefore presents difficulty in locating it in any specific space: 
rather, it is conceptualised as a bridge between regions, a central state, or an insulator 
(Buzan and Waever, 2003: Bacik, 2006; Ozkececi-Taner, 2012; Ulgen, 2012). 
 Kardas (2014) contends that Buzan and Waever’s RSCs are sufficiently inflexible as to 
inhibit empirical studies of specific states and regional security governance. Rather, he 
suggests, those states that are deeply embedded in multiple regional systems or affected by 
threats emanating from multiple regions to similar degrees can be justifiably categorised as 
partaking in multiple RSCs simultaneously. Thus, Turkey may equally be a member of 
Middle Eastern, European, or Caspian regional systems. On a similar theme, Diez (2012) 
argues that Turkey’s RSCs are overlapping rather than insulating. This position is 
reflective of the AKP’s own tendency to position Turkey as a “central country” that can 
exercise power in multiple regions simultaneously (Onis and Yilmaz, 2009; Ulgen, 2012). 
The focus on Turkey’s regional power in the Caspian in this thesis does not, therefore, 
preclude its role as a major actor in other regions. 
The decision to focus on the Caspian rather than the Middle East or Europe stems from the 
consistent emphasis on that region by the AKP during its first three terms in office. There 
is unanimity in the literature on Turkey’s foreign policy that the strong affiliation Turkey 
held with Europe gradually diminished throughout the AKP era, and particularly from the 
party’s second election victory in 2007 (Matthews, 2009; Robins, 2013). The lack of 
consensus on the demarcation of the Middle East as a geopolitical region renders studies of 
Turkey’s role in that region more difficult. Turkey’s interaction with the region was 
limited to a small number of other states and was restricted by the presence of other 
regional and external actors (particularly after the Arab Spring) (Onis, 2014; Ozcan et al, 
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2015). Rather, this thesis proposes to study a region comprising the states of the Caucasus 
and Caspian basin that it labels the “wider Caspian region”. 
A question arises regarding the delineation of a wider Caspian region for the thesis rather 
than the Caucasus and Central Asia more broadly. As with the Middle East, there is 
ambiguity in the literature over precisely which countries constitute the Caucasus and 
Central Asian region. Some scholars position Russia externally to the region despite its 
geographical proximity to and economic, social, and political ties to the region (Aydin, 
2004; Bilgin and Bilgic, 2011), while others consider the “Caucasus” and “Central Asia” 
separately (Mankoff, 2013). Aras and Fidan’s analysis of a “Eurasia” consisting of the 
Caucasus, Turkey, Russia, and Central Asia is closer to this thesis’ definition of the wider 
Caspian region. However, in considering the characteristics that define a region this thesis 
argues that the Caucasus and Central Asia is sufficiently vast in geographic terms to cast 
doubt on the “geographically proximity” of the states at the far eastern and western reaches 
of its territory. Rather, it proposes a region around the Caspian Sea consisting of the 
Caspian littorals (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan), the non-littoral 
Caucasian states of Armenia and Georgia, and Turkey. These states fulfil the condition of 
geographic proximity, are integrated by means of political and economic agreements, and 
have shared histories and affinities congruent with the definition of region outlined earlier 
in this introduction. As chapters two and three will demonstrate, it is also an energy region 




Figure 1: The wider Caspian region 
Methodology 
The Turkish case study 
This thesis adopts a case study approach to understanding the relationship between energy 
and regional powerhood in advanced developing states. Case studies are considered 
advantageous when research is being carried out on complex phenomena that involve 
significant variables (Gummesson, 2007). Energy – embedded as it is in economics, 
security, diplomacy, development and other sub-fields of IR – is undoubtedly a complex 
issue, while regional powerhood is comprised of a broad spectrum of variables ranging 
from ideational power to role recognition to military capacity. Lijphart (1971) similarly 
indicates that intensive research on a small number of cases can yield more promising 
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results than a superficial analysis of multiple cases. By focusing specifically on Turkey, 
this thesis provides a more detailed picture of the relationship between energy and regional 
powers for advanced developing states than would a less in-depth examination of pertinent 
issues for multiple states. 
This thesis applies the central research question to Turkey during the first three 
administrations of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party), or 
AKP. It focuses on the period between the AKP’s first election victory in 2002 and the end 
of its third term in 2014. In contrast to previous administrations - which aligned Turkey 
with the West and viewed Turkey’s eastern neighbours as a source of instability (Kirisci, 
2006) - the AKP saw the Caspian as an area of opportunity (Guny and Mandaci, 2013) . 
Intensive bilateral and multilateral engagement on economic, energy, security, and cultural 
issues with other Caspian states saw Turkey become increasingly involved and integrated 
in the region during this period. The thesis therefore charts a period in which Turkey 
became more active in regional affairs at the same time as advanced developing states 
were gaining prominence in IR debates. 
Several factors contributed to the decision to select Turkey as a case study for this project. 
Firstly, Turkey is an advanced developing state. Strong economic growth in the aftermath 
of the 2001 economic crisis led financial experts to include Turkey in a wide variety of 
groups of emerging states like VISTA (Reuters, 2007), MINT (O’ Neill, 2012), MIKTA 
(2013) and CIVETS (Wall Street Journal, 2009). Including Turkey in those groups 
legitimised its claims to be a significant global actor. These claims were further bolstered 
by a proactive foreign policy that saw Turkey pursue closer economic and diplomatic ties 
with regional and other developing states, position itself as a mediator in regional and 
international conflicts, and become increasingly vocal in multilateral institutions like the 
United Nations (UN) and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (Davutoglu, 
2010). Moreover, Turkey is generally accepted by IR scholars as an emerging or rising 
power (or, in this thesis’ terminology, an advanced developing state) (Rubin and Kirisci, 
2001; Ozkececi-Taner, 2012; Oguzlu and Parlar Dal, 2013; Onis and Kutlay, 2013).  
Secondly, studies of Turkey as an advanced developing state are more limited than those 
of other actors. While the previous paragraph pointed to some academic works that 
position Turkey as an advanced developing state, this literature is nonetheless limited in 
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both volume and scope. In particular, little work has been carried out on Turkey and 
regional power partly, as the previous section of this introduction suggested, because 
Turkey spans multiple regions. Turkey’s location between Europe and Asia, between the 
Middle East, the Caspian, and the Black Sea, renders debate on Turkey’s power in a 
specific region difficult. The tendency of regional powers scholars to focus predominately 
on the BRICS in empirical explorations of regional power further detracted from research 
on Turkey. This thesis therefore addresses the question of Turkey as regional power.  
Thirdly, the presence of two other advanced developing countries in Turkey’s region 
expands the scope for exploring how these states interact with each other. This thesis 
dedicates two chapters to examining the relationship between energy and regional powers 
for Turkey within the context of Ankara’s relationship with Iran and Russia. Two primary 
factors influenced the decision to examine Turkey’s relationship with those states in more 
depth. The first was based on the research carried out for the conceptual chapters. The 
review of energy literature in chapter one indicates that energy affairs are inherently the 
remit of the state, and that energy cooperation and competition tends to manifest in 
bilateral, state-state relations more frequently and effectively than at the multilateral or 
institutional level. While the study of regional powers in chapter two acknowledges that 
multilateral institutions (themselves dominated by states) may play some role in the 
regional strategy of some countries, more direct relationship between states - in terms of 
relative balance of resources and bilateral state policies - are central to determining 
regional hierarchies and, therefore, regional power status. Given Bennet and Elman’s 
suggestion (2007) that case studies are useful for accounting for how states extract, apply, 
and react to changes to power, and the predominance afforded to both power and state-
level relationships in studies of energy and regional power, this thesis contends that a 
detailed examination of Turkey’s relationships with specific states will engender a deeper 
understanding of how the two can be understood in the Turkish context.  
Further justification emerges from the contribution of the thesis to the emerging literature 
on advanced developing states. Like Turkey, Russia and Iran are both advanced 
developing states, and - as chapters four and five will demonstrate - both can be considered 
aspiring or established regional powers. The selection of two further advanced developing 
countries through which to study the relationship between energy and regional powers will 
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contribute to a broader understanding of this relationship for a more varied group of 
advanced developing states. It also provides something of a bulwark against the potential 
for generalisation.8 Moreover, there are few studies of the relationship between these 
actors in IR literature. These chapters therefore contribute to an understanding of how non-
Western actors interact in the non-Western world and the factors that influence these 
relations. The Russian and Iranian case studies demonstrate how energy features in the 
relationship between three significant actors within the regional powers framework.  
A potential flaw in the decision to examine Turkey’s regional power-energy nexus within 
the context of its relations with Iran and Russia arises from the relative similarities 
between the cases. All three actors are former imperial powers that are significant players 
in regional politics and have nationalised energy systems. Each straddles multiple regions 
(Turkey the Middle East, Caspian, and Europe; Russia Europe, the Caspian, and Central 
Asia; and Iran Central Asia, the Caspian, and the Middle East). It could be argued that 
focusing on three states with high levels on similarity in some respects presents a skewed 
understanding on the relationship between energy and regional powers for advanced 
developing states. However, Lijphart (1971) contends that focusing on cases with 
relatively similar characteristics may be more beneficial than including substantially 
different cases because the research is more controlled. Focusing on three states with 
relatively similar historical trajectories, energy systems, and regional positions will 
contribute to a more nuanced examination of the relationship between energy and regional 
power than would a study of states with vastly differing characteristics. In addition, Linz 
and Miguel (1966) suggest that examining cases that have many characteristics in common 
while differing on some crucial elements may be more fruitful than a generalised study 
because it provides a more in-depth examination of particular criteria. Chapters three, four, 
and five highlight specific differences between both the constraints and opportunities 
afforded to each of Turkey, Iran, and Russia in terms of regional powerhood and energy. 
They therefore provide a more comprehensive examination of the relationship between 
energy and regional power for advanced developing states. These chapters will provide 
insight not only into the relationship between energy and regional power in a specific 
                                                     
8 That case studies limit the potential for generalisation is a common criticism raised in academic articles on 
the methodology of case studies (see Yin, 1984; Tellis, 1997). 
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advanced developing state (Turkey), but of the relationship between energy and regional 
power in relations between advanced developing states.  
Considering that all three states are former imperial powers that competed for influence in 
similar regions in the past, a question arises as to the degree to which historical 
relationships condition current energy affairs between the actors. This thesis does not 
contest the notion that imperial legacy or the Cold War (and post-Cold War) trajectories 
influence interstate interaction, nor that it may colour the perception of states formerly 
affected by imperial policy or competition. The empirical chapters will pay particular 
attention to how the recalibration of global geopolitics at the end of the Cold War 
contributed to energy competition in the Caspian and the strategies of both Russia and 
Turkey within the Caspian region. What is important to note, however, is that regional 
power scholars consider history to be one of many variables useful to understanding 
contemporary international policy. Brief historiographies will be provided in chapters four 
and five in order to provide historical context, and it is accepted that historical patterns of 
cooperation and enmity have some bearing on contemporary regional geopolitical 
trajectories (Turkey and Russia’s respective relations with Armenia are highlighted as a 
case in point). Yet to suggest interstate relations between the three Caspian powers are 
grounded in historical relations is overly deterministic. In the energy sphere in particular, 
the transnational nature of oil and gas pipelines and a shared desire to limit the influence of 
external powers like the US in regional energy affairs limits the replication of  historical 
patterns of enmity between the states. This thesis therefore acknowledges that historical 
regional geopolitics affect contemporary relations in the wider Caspian region, but argues 
that their influence is limited in interstate energy relations between Turkey, Russia, and 
Iran. 
This thesis uses two further analytical tools to assess the resources consulted for the case 
study chapters. The first is process tracing. George and Bennet (2005) suggest that process 
tracing is useful for identifying phenomena and assessing casual claims in within-case 
analysis. It is therefore particularly advantageous in examining the relationship between 
energy and regional power in the three case study chapters of this thesis. Collier 
(2011:823) defines process tracing as the “systemic examination of diagnostic evidence 
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selected and analysed in light of research questions…posed by the investigator”. Evidence 
may be selected based on knowledge generated from 
 conceptual frameworks (Collier, 2011) and, thereafter, from identifying themes and 
patterns in the relationship between two or more phenomena that  recur frequently (Waltz, 
1979). In this thesis, the framework developed in chapters one and two provided a lens 
through which relevant source material was identified and consulted; the recurrence of key 
features in the relationship between energy and regional power provided the basis for 
analysing the material’s relevance to addressing the central research question.  
Mahoney (2010) suggests that that careful description is central to process training. This 
thesis consequently examines specific events (such as the 2008 war in South Ossetia)  in 
detail in order to support analytical and causal claims made in the case study chapters. 
Given the centrality of quantitative sources - themselves discussed in more detail below - 
to this process,  the second analytical tool this thesis utilises is that of critical discourse 
analysis (CDA). Breeze (2011) suggests that CDA is particularly useful when applied, as 
here, to a large corpus of sources. CDA combines the study of language in talk and texts 
(that is, rhetorical devices and words used) at the micro-level with macro-level 
examinations of the context in which that language was produced (Wetherall, 2001; van 
Dijk, 2001; Fairclough, 2001). In this thesis, for example, analysis on the AKP’s emphasis 
on Turkey’s energy leadership is speeches and documents takes into consideration 
Turkey’s position in the regional energy hierarchy. Van Dijk  (2001) suggests that 
discourse can create, maintain, or reproduce political hegemony, while Fairclough  (2001) 
emphasises the utility of discourse for legitimising consensual (rather than coercive) 
power. It therefore useful in understanding how Turkey propagates and maintains a 
particular form of regional power. 
The assessment of discourse pays particular attention to the use of strategic narratives in 
Turkish policy and speech. Antoniades et al (2010:5) define strategic narratives as 
“representations of a sequence of events and identities, a communicative tool through 
which political elites attest to give determined meaning to past, present, and future in order 
to achieve political objectives”. They enable states to justify policy objectives, to frame 
policy responses to global (or regional) events, and to form alliances (Antoniades et al, 
2010). A key strategic narrative during the period examined in this thesis is the “strategic 
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depth” narrative propagated as part of Ahmet Davutoglu’s foreign policy vision: 
emphasising Turkey’s historical and geographical relations with the Caspian region served 
to justify increased political and economic activism in the region. Strategic narratives - 
Turkey as a “central state”, the Turkish energy hub, Turkey as a security provider - will be 
highlighted throughout the thesis. Turkey’s belief in the validity of these narratives was 
essential to generating the confidence (and occasionally the overconfidence) that this thesis 
suggests was essential to the self-conceptualisation of Turkish regional power. 
Antoniades et al (2010) point out that strategic narratives require audiences. Fairclough 
(2001) and van Dijk (2001) similarly emphasis the importance of the perception and 
understanding of discourse by the intended audience in CDA. The receptiveness of 
audiences to discourse and narratives play a particularly important role in this thesis given 
the prominence afford to recognition and role perceptions in determining regional power. 
CDA therefore contributes not only to this thesis’ understanding of how Turkey perceived, 
pursued, and maintained regional power, but on how it framed those practices to ensure for 
particular audiences. As the next section will highlight, the latter point is particularly 
important considering the focus in this thesis on English language documents.  
Sources 
Chapters one and two are based primarily on reviews of IR literatures on energy and 
regional power and form the basis of this thesis’ analytical framework. The empirical 
chapters (chapters three, four, and five) draw extensively on primary sources such as 
policy papers, speeches, trading statistics, and newspaper reports. Yin (1984) notes that 
case study methodologies can incorporate both qualitative and quantitative data, therefore 
allowing for a varied approach to data collection. This thesis takes advantage of this 
variation to utilise both forms of sources, and quantitative and qualitative sources begin to 
become more prevalent from chapter two.  
Qualitative sources were central to this thesis’ research agenda, and that this thesis uses 
only English language resources has implications for the analytical scope of the research. 
Linguistic limitations restricted access to domestic policy debates and discourse. There are 
therefore no discussions within this thesis on internal contestations of Turkey’s regional 
power or energy agenda; nor is any significant attention paid to the policy process beyond 
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a brief discussion in chapter three on key energy sector actors. Rather, this thesis focuses 
on discourse emanating form the outcome of domestic decision making. While this 
restriction may be problematic in research using other analytical frameworks or tools, it 
should be noted that regional powers frameworks tend to focus to a greater extent on 
external projections of power rather than internal political cohesion and organisation. This 
renders linguistic restrictions less problematic than they otherwise might be. 
This thesis also takes into consideration that English language documents may be 
selectively translated, and that interviews in international news sources may have are 
trying to project a specific image of Turkey. In other words, the resources consulted for 
this thesis have been tailored for an English speaking audience to project a particular 
image of Turkey: one that positions Turkey as a significant regional actor and aims to 
engender recognition of Turkey’s regional capabilities by other states.  However, 
understanding  how Turkey wants its regional power and energy strategies to be received- 
and why it seeks to be perceived in a certain way -  is important in assessing Turkey’s 
regional power. The study of English language resources provide insight into the image of 
Turkey as a regional power that the AKP had cultivated in order to project to regional and 
international audiences.  
In any case, English language sources from within relevant state online archives proved 
plentiful. The websites  of the ministries of foreign affairs, economics, energy, 
development, and natural resources of Turkey, Iran, and Russia provided access to the 
policy documents, interstate agreements, press releases, speeches, statements, and 
declarations in which the final three chapters are grounded. Linguistic variations within the 
wider Caspian region meant that interstate agreements and declarations were conducted 
and published primarily using English as a common language. The online archives of 
various multilateral institutions (like the United Nations) provide additional access to 
speeches, declarations, and resolutions relevant to this thesis. This thesis also draws on the 
online archives of the major newspapers of the individual states examined (such as the 
Tehran Times) well as international news sources (Reuters, Associated Press). News 
database services like Lexis-Nexis yielded further statements from and interviews with 
relevant actors. These sources provide insight into the agendas, attitudes, and behaviours 
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of particular actors and institutions relevant to the thesis, enabling a detailed analysis of the 
relationship between energy and regional power for advanced developing states.  
One of the issues this thesis is keen to address is the potential dissonance between rhetoric 
and practice in Turkey regarding, in particular, the AKP’s claims to regional power and to 
regional trade and cooperation with other states. It examines a variety of statistical 
resources to determine the balance between rhetoric and practice in regional relations. 
Energy data collected by British Petroleum (BP) and the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) are particularly useful in determining energy trends and balances. Where 
information is not available from these sources, reports complied by the Energy 
Information Agency (EIA) provided useful. Trading data was gathered from the databases 
of the World Bank, World Trade Organisation (WTO), and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), as well as from the Turkish Statistical Institute and other financial institutes in 
Turkey and Iran. Triangulating claims through both quantitative and qualitative sources 
contributes to a strengthening of the accuracy of analysis in the thesis.  
The use of both quantitative material and extra-regional sources serves an additional 
purpose. This thesis acknowledges that the extent of state control over resources and media 
in Turkey, Iran, and Russia is problematic. Available information may be propagandised or 
heavily biased. In Turkey, this issue became more problematic in the aftermath of the 
attempted coup of 2015, after which opposition news sources  - such as Today’s Zaman - 
were taken over by the government, their archives destroyed, and opposition journalists 
arrested (Johnson, 2016). The personal website of Abdullah Gul - which had been a 
valuable source for speeches and other discourse from the former president, prime 
minister, and foreign minister - was also take offline during the course of this project. 
Nonetheless, substantial numbers of documents from Gul’s archives had been downloaded 
by the time of the crackdown, and some content from Today’s Zaman and other media 
sources remained accessible via online databases like LexisNexis.  
Finally, it should be acknowledged that there is some contention regarding the accuracy of 
energy statistics. Known energy reserves and production levels are in some cases 
considered a state secret because of their strategic importance to the state, or are 
exaggerated to gain preferential energy trade deals for the producer (Bauen, 2006). In 
addition, some energy reserves may be underexplored due to internal instability or lack of 
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funds (Iraq, Turkmenistan). This thesis will utilise quantitative information available from 
the EIA and IEA as its primary source for statistical energy information (both agencies 
produce in-depth annual reports and cross-reference their statistical analysis with other 
groups and organisations), but will also consider that information in light of sources 
available from individual states and from other sources. 
Situating the literature 
This thesis draws on existing IR literature on energy and regional power. There is a large 
literature on energy in IR that encompasses broader IR themes like security, governance, 
and geopolitics. The tendency of this literature to bifurcate countries into “developed” and 
“developing” states (Mansson et al, 2014) is inconsistent with the acknowledgement in IR 
of advanced developing states in recent decades. Even those scholars that do address 
energy in advanced developing states tend to adopt similar frameworks to those examining 
energy in developing states: the global South is imagined as a homogenous block in which 
states face similar challenges and adopt similar strategies. Firstly, scholars emphasise the 
relationship between energy and economic growth and development. Energy is framed in 
international political economy (IPE) terms as an asset or objective that fuels economic 
growth and contributes to industrialisation. Secondly, the literature on energy in advanced 
developing states tends to be somewhat Western-centric. Even in states for which energy is 
acknowledged as a strategic or geopolitical asset (like Russia), emphasis is commonly 
placed on the implications of the energy strategies of advanced developing states for 
Western or developed states.  
Considering the increasingly prominent role advanced developing states like India and 
Turkey play in determining global energy flows (Barnes et al, 2006), these limitations 
prohibit the emergence of a more holistic and nuanced understanding of the role energy 
plays in IR. While clearly important for understanding the role of energy in international 
politics, this thesis posits that both the failure to differentiate between different forms of 
developing states and the focus on relations between the global North and the global South 
is to the detriment on a more refined awareness of the way energy features in South-South 
relations. The focus on economic development within the energy literature on advanced 
developing states fails to acknowledge the ambition, capacity, and willingness of those 
states to integrate energy into diplomatic or strategic agendas; to utilise energy as a tool to 
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obtain leverage in affairs with other states; or to use energy to facilitate the state’s strategic 
agenda. In short, it limits the scope for understanding the role energy plays in facilitating 
and constraining the international politics of and between advanced developing states. This 
thesis takes an empirical approach to understanding how energy politics are constructed in 
the non-Western world. A clearer understanding of the motivations and objectives of some 
of the key energy actors and the factors that inhibit and contribute to energy strategies will 
contribute to a more thorough assessment of the way in which energy manifests in 
international politics. At the same time, it expands both our knowledge of advanced 
developing states themselves and the way they influence international energy trends. 
The second literature in which this thesis is situated is that of regional power. Regional 
power is a relatively new subfield of IR. Chapter two will highlight how most theoretical 
explorations of the concept concur that material power is a prerequisite of regional power, 
with economic, military, and demographic capacity frequently portrayed as central to 
differentiating regional powers from other states (Nolte, 2010). Despite its 
conceptualisation as a material asset and tool in IR literature, it is rare for regional power 
scholars to incorporate energy into frameworks for delineating or understanding regional 
powers.9  There are no in-depth studies of the relationship between regional power and 
energy. This thesis therefore offers a new dimension to the study of regional power by 
emphasising the role energy plays in facilitating, constraining, and determining regional 
power. In addition, theoretical studies of regional power have differentiated between 
different forms of regional power (Destradi, 2010; Prys, 2010) but empirical studies of 
different forms of regional power are limited in the literature. By emphasising different 
forms of regional power adopted by each of Turkey, Russia, and Iran in the context of the 
states’ energy and regional power relations, this thesis also contributes to the empirical 
literature on regional power typologies. Together, these contributions will lend insight into 
the motivations, agendas, and strategies of regional powers - and consequently advanced 
developing states - and limit the effects of generalisation. 
Both of these literatures are ultimately concerned with power. Energy politics are 
hierarchical, with those states that control resources wielding power over those who need 
                                                     
9 Harris’ study (2006) of China’s regional hegemony is an exception in explicitly studying the role played by 
energy in Beijing’s regional strategy. 
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or desire them. The literature on emerging powers highlights consequences for the West: 
the rise of advanced developing states affects the balance of power in global affairs and 
forces a reconfiguration of the role western and developed states play in international 
politics. New global energy geopolitics are influenced by a combination of the 
unprecedented rise in energy demand in rapidly industrialising countries and the 
emergence of new regional powers in the post-Cold War era. Advanced developing states 
are increasingly moving into energy geographies that were traditionally the remit of 
Western powers. This changes not only energy flows, but the nature of relations between 
all states operating within the geopolitical system. It contributes to the balance of power 
between states in the region and between developed and advanced developing states. 
Energy is a means through which states can consolidate their power in the regional and 
international systems; a tool of foreign policy that, like economic or military power, can be 
manipulated or utilised by states. At the same time, regional power facilitates the 
acquisition and utilisation of energy as a strategic asset. In drawing energy and regional 
power together for these states, this thesis provides insight into the ways in which 
advanced developing states effect and affect power in international politics. 
Thesis structure and main arguments  
The purpose of chapter one is partly to survey the existing IR literature pertaining to 
energy and advanced developing states, and in part to create a framework for examining 
energy in those countries. It is structured around five dominant approaches to energy in the 
literature: energy governance, energy diversification, energy security, the geopolitics of 
energy, and energy and economics. Three issues of particular significance for this thesis 
are extrapolated from the energy literature review: firstly, that energy geopolitics are 
changing as advanced developing states become increasingly prominent in the global 
energy market; secondly, that the literature is limited in addressing energy as it pertains to 
advanced developing states; and thirdly, that energy is a strategic resource that influences 
the state’s capacity to exert power in political and economic systems. It is argued that 
South-South cooperation on energy affairs and the pre-eminence afforded to regional 
natural gas trade in the energy strategies of advanced developing states necessitates a 
reconfiguration of the ways in which we understand the relationship between energy and 
international politics. The chapter concludes that energy’s utility as a strategic asset - as a 
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tool for domestic development, alliance building, or power projection - is dependent on the 
agenda, capacity, and willingness of the state to incorporate energy into its broader 
strategy, and that that strategy in turn must facilitate the state’s energy agenda. 
The second chapter focuses on regional power. It first examines the literature on regional 
powers and regional power theory and develops a set of characteristics for identifying 
regional powers. Adhering to Destradi’s division of regional powers into imperialist, 
hegemonic, and leadership forms of power, this second section highlights how regional 
powers are differentiated on the basis of the form of power they exert (material/ideational) 
and the extent to which their policies towards other regional states are considered coercive 
or cooperative. The third part of chapter two considers the relationship between regional 
powers and energy. It contends that regional powers literature fails to account for the role 
played by energy in determining the balance of power between states or the capacity of 
states to accumulate regional power. It is proposed that energy is both a tool and an 
objective for regional powers, and that energy can both contribute to and constrain 
regional power. The final part of this chapter outlines the case for Turkey as a regional 
power in the wider Caspian region. Chapters two and three together form the conceptual 
framework through which chapters three, four, and five examine the relationship between 
energy and regional power for Turkey. 
Chapter three is the first empirical chapter. It examines Turkey’s energy strategy between 
2002 and 2014 and, in applying the regional powers framework to the AKP’s energy 
discourse, suggests that Turkey’s energy strategy was congruent with regional hegemony. 
The chapter highlights how the AKP saw energy as means through which it could enhance 
its geostrategic significance and extend its regional influence despite Turkey’s lack of 
domestic energy reserves. It is argued that ensuring domestic energy security by way of 
regional security initiatives was a way to both enhance Turkey’s regional power 
credentials and ensure the economic growth that was essential to the state’s regional power 
agenda. Pipeline projects were at the heart of this agenda because of their role in 
generating interdependencies and highlighting Turkey’s geostrategic location between the 
energy rich Caspian region and global markets (particularly in Europe). The chapter 
suggests that the AKP saw pipeline trade as a means of contributing to regional security 
and strengthening perceptions of Turkey as a regional security provider. However, it 
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concludes that attempts to augment Turkey’s regional status through energy cooperation 
were often undermined by a failure to acknowledge the geopolitical implications of 
supporting particular pipeline projects and an overestimation of Turkey’s capacity to 
influence regional affairs. 
The fourth chapter examines the relationship between energy and regional powers in 
Turkey in the context of the state’s relationship with Iran. It contends that Ankara’s 
approach to Iran was that of a benevolent regional hegemon, and suggests that bilateral 
relations had the potential to yield significant benefits in terms of both energy security and 
regional powerhood. It is argued that by engaging in extensive diplomacy and 
demonstrating a desire to facilitate reconciliation between Iran and the international 
system, Turkey generated goodwill with Iran that was conducive to advancing Turkey’s 
energy agenda. It highlights how acting as an emissary for Iran - both with regards to 
Tehran’s incorporation into regional energy projects and in terms of resolving the Iranian 
nuclear dispute - was necessary to ensure the realisation of Turkey’s energy hub agenda 
and, consequently, for Turkey’s regional power. It is also argued that the AKP’s Iranian 
policy demonstrated to other regional actors that Turkey was a reliable partner. An 
examination of Tehran and Ankara’s energy cooperation in the Caspian and Iran’s own 
energy agenda in the region demonstrates limitations to Turkish-Iranian energy 
relationship, particularly with regards to Turkey’s attempts to integrate Turkmenistan into 
the region by means of energy cooperation. The chapter concludes that Turkey, by virtue 
of its integration into regional energy and trade systems, ultimately occupied a higher 
position in the regional hierarchy than Iran despite the latter’s extensive energy reserves. 
Finally, chapter five looks at the ways in which Russia occupied a central role in Turkey’s 
energy strategy and considers the ways in which Moscow’s energy and regional strategy 
affected Ankara’s capacity to fulfil its regional agenda. It asserts that Turkey’s dependence 
on Russian energy resources limited the AKP’s capacity to pursue a more assertive 
regional strategy that would have enhanced Turkey’s regional power credentials in the 
Caspian. The chapter points out that Turkey’s hub and diversification agendas were 
incompatible with Russia’s regional agenda, and that Turkey’s continued pursuit of 
Russian energy projects undermined Ankara’s own energy agenda. It suggests that this 
incongruity between the hub agenda and growing energy cooperation with Russia was part 
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of Turkey’s tendency to underestimate the geopolitical motivations of and consequences of 
particular pipeline projects in a manner that was detrimental to its regional power status. 
The chapter also contends that Turkey’s dependence on Russian energy - both on a day-to-
day basis and to make up for shortfalls when other supplies were impeded - skewered the 
balance of power between the two and acted as a constraint on Turkey’s regional power 
projection. Similarly, it constrained Turkey’s response to Russia’s regional aggression. 
Finally, this chapter suggests that the type of regional power pursued by Turkey and 
Russia (benevolent hegemony and coercive hegemony/empire respectively) played a 
significant role in determining the states’ responses to developments in the regional energy 
system. Overall, the thesis argues that there is a strong, clear overlap between energy and 
regional power for the advanced developing states of the Caspian. In order to develop 







1. Energy in IR: Literature Review  
1.1 Introduction 
Energy, Strange (1988:191) asserts, occupies a “disciplinary no man’s land”. It manifests 
in every field from physics to public policy. In IR, it features in literature on development, 
geopolitics, regime security, international political economy (IPE), and many more. 
Energy plays an important role for states at all levels of economic development: it 
facilitates industrialisation and development, shapes patterns of cooperation and conflict 
between states, and integrates states into the international economy. This chapter will 
survey IR literature in order to gain a clearer understanding of the ways in which energy 
manifests in the discipline. It therefore contributes to the development of a framework for 
conceptualising the ways in which energy features in the regional power strategies of 
advanced developing states. The chapter is organised around five dominant trends in the 
IR literature on energy: energy governance, energy type and diversification, energy 
security, the geopolitics of energy, and the IPE of energy.  
The first section of this chapter looks at the literature on energy governance at the 
multilateral and state level and suggests that IR frames energy as a form of statecraft that 
can be utilised to gain advantages in international affairs. The second section examines the 
different types of energy that manifest in the literature. Noting the frequency with which 
diversification features in debates on energy type and policy, it considers the relationship 
between the benefits of pursuing specific fuels and achieving a diversified energy mix.  
Energy security is a topic that recurs in a significant percentage of literature on energy in 
IR. The third part of this chapter therefore investigates the ways in which energy security 
is conceptualised and manifests in the literature. On a related theme, the fourth section 
concerns the geopolitics of energy. It focuses on three debates that manifest in IR 
literature: energy and geopolitical conflict, energy and geopolitical cooperation, and the 
regionalisation of energy geopolitics. Considering the focus on energy in Turkey’s region 
throughout this thesis, this final discussion area in particular literature to a framework for 




The final section of this chapter explores IR literature that takes a political economic 
approach to energy. It looks first at the differences between neo-mercantilist and liberal 
IPE approaches to energy in the literature before considering the association between 
energy and development. It argues that the simple binary between developed and 
developing states in political economic literature on energy is insufficient to account for 
the energy requirements, motivations, and constraints of advanced developing states.  
This chapter will refer to the “contextual” nature of energy, or to the abundance of issues 
that are debated in relation to the role played by in IR. Among the issues that influence 
energy debates are: 
• fuel types; 
• specific actors (states, international institutions, energy companies); 
• the position of the actor in the energy chain (producer, consumer, transit state); 
• transportation methods (pipelines, sea tankers, road tankers); 
• energy uses (industrial output, electricity conversion, heat); 
• and the specific political, economic, and social contexts in which energy is 
analysed.  
While many of these contexts will be discussed in more detail throughout the chapter, it 
should be pointed out that the way in which they interact and are framed by scholars has a 
significant impact on the way in which energy is discussed. The next substanstantive part 
of this chapter look at the intersection between energy and politics by examining the 
literature on energy governance. 
1.2 Energy governance 
This section considers how energy governance manifests in IR literature at the multilateral 
and state levels. The majority of discussions on the former energy governance pertain to 
inter-governmental organisations like the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) or inter-governmental groups like the Group of Eight (G8) that debate or 
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coordinate energy issues  (Goldthau and Witte, 2009; Barrett Meredith, 2014). Scholars 
tend to stress the quintessential need for institutions to regulate global energy affairs while 
simultaneously pointing out the problematic nature of contemporary multilateral energy 
governance architecture. Lesage et al (2009), for example, argue that the “urgency and 
complexity” of international energy systems require multilateral governance and 
regulation. At the same time, they suggest that contemporary institutions are fragemented, 
weak, and fail to address contemporary energy concerns like climate change. While Florini 
(2011) insists that the complexities of energy trade and management is something that can 
only be governed at the global level, she also points out that global energy governance 
currently consists of “inadequate and uncoordinated” mechanisms attempting to achieve 
“fragmented and prioritised objectives”. Similarily, Goldthau and Witte (2009) suggest 
that the rules governing energy need to be significantly strengthened if they are to be 
effective. In short, it is argued that multilateral energy governance is necessary, but that 
current mechanisms fail to deal with global energy issues in an effective or efficient 
manner.  
Literature on energy affairs in the European Union (EU) illustrates both the benefits of and 
problems with multilateral energy governance. The EU features quite a bit in this project 
by virtue of its energy trade with Russia and interest in expanding energy trade with 
hydrocarbon rich states of the Caspian region. It also features strongly in Turkey’s energy 
strategy both because of the necessity for Turkey to harmonise its own energy policy with 
that of the EU in adherence with accession criteria and because of the state’s desire to 
become a major conduit for energy flowing from Asia to Europe. A brief discussion on the 
benefits and limitations of multilateral energy governance in the EU context will therefore 
contribute both to the debate on multilateral energy governance and to a more thorough 
understanding of Turkey’s energy agenda later in this thesis. 
The EU has its roots in energy cooperation. The establishment of the Eupopean Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) by six Euopean states in the aftermath of WWII paved the way 
for the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957.10 The EEC was 
ser up in conjunction with the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) - an 
                                                     




organisation legally distinct from the EU today, but which continues to focus on 
developing nuclear energy specifically within EU states. In recent decades, the EU’s drive 
to diversify its energy supply base has seen it engage at the institutional level with a wider 
range of energy producing states through initiatives like the INOGATE11 programme 
(Cleutinx and Piper, 2008). As this thesis was being written, the European Commission 
adopted a new strategy aimed at building an “Energy Union” with the aim of connecting 
energy networks, enhancing the roles of renwables in the EU, decreasing import 
dependency, and diversifying energy sources (Euopean Commission, 2017b). 
These final two aims are closely related to a central theme that drives attempts to 
institutionalise and standardise energy policy in the EU. Alongside sustainability and 
competitiveness, energy security a key part of what Youngs (2009) and Szulecki et al 
(2016:549) refer to as the EU’s “energy policy triangle”. Most scholars concur that the 
EU’s dependence on oil and gas imports from Russia is at the heart of the institution’s 
energy strategy (Claes, 2013; Kuzemko et al, 2016). IEA data shows that in 2012, the EU 
relied on Russia for a third of its oil and natural gas imports (IEA, 2014). Russia’s alleged 
use of the “energy weapon” is discussed elsewhere in this chapter, but it can be noted at 
this stage that scholars agree that Russia’s utilisation of its energy leverage is detrimental 
to Europe’s energy security (Umbach, 2009; Rutland, 2008; Roth, 2011; Schmidt-
Felzmann, 2011). The EU consequently looks to diversify the sources and routes of energy 
imports. This is of pivotal importance to this thesis because, as chapter three contends, the 
EU’s energy security and diversification agendas influenced the way in which Turkey 
viewed energy during the period under consideration. Turkey’s geostrategic utility as a 
conduit for energy supplies from the Caspian region to Europe  - bypassing Russia in the 
process - was a core theme of the AKP’s energy strategy between 2002 and 2014, and was 
predicated on the EU’s continued perception of Russia as detrimental to its energy 
security.  
Maltby (2013) notes that the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 was 
instrumental in institutionalising EU-wide agendas on issues like energy security and a 
common energy market. Recent literature therefore acknowledges the contibution of 
                                                     
11 An initiative focusing on energy cooperation between the EU and Caspian and Black Sea littorals that ran 
between 1996 and 2016 
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multilateral energy governance to the energy policies of individual member states 
(Andersen and Sitter, 2015). Nonetheless, there remains considerable divergence in the 
energy policies of individual states that restrict the implementation of a common energy 
agenda. Szulecki and Westphal (2014), for example, write of a clear divide between  pro-
nuclear states like France and the UK and those like Germany, which has plans to phase 
out its nuclear plants. Judge and Maltby (2017) claim that different methods and 
understandings of energy securitisation by individual EU members constrain the 
development of a effective common energy agenda. A particularly relevant example of 
internal EU policy divergence for this thesis was the decision by Germany and Finland in 
2007 to construct with Russia the Nord Stream, a new gas pipeline to import Russia 
resources via the Black Sea, despite the pipeline being at odds with the EU’s  desire to 
limit reliance on Russian energy resources. Acknowledging both the EU’s desire on an 
institutional level to diversify its sources away from Russia and the simultaneous 
continued pursuit of new Russian pipelines by individual member states is important in 
terms of recognising the difficulties Turkey faced in positioning itself as an conduit for 
non-Russian supplies to the EU. Overall, the EU case illustrates the struggle in governing 
and managing energy at the multilateral level. It demonstrates the difficulty in coordinating 
policy objectives even within a relatively homogeneous group of states, and illustrates how 
discrepancies between institutional objectives and national policy implementation can 
undermine a unified approach to energy issues. As such, it highlights the extent to which 
energy governance is limited at the multilateral level in a way that means the states 
reamins the primary actor in energy governance. 
A final point to consider for this discussion on multilateral energy governance is the 
legitimacy issue that stems from the failure by multilateral insititutions to incorporate the 
policies and concerns of developing states into the governance agenda. Karlsson-
Vinkhuyzen (2010), Goldthau and Witte (2009), and Florini (2011) note a clear divide 
between the global North and South on key issues like the future of hydrocarbon that limit 
the sucessful development of a truley global energy agenda within multilateral institutions. 
There have been some concessions to the agendas of developing states in these institutions: 
Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen (2010) highlights how the ninth and fourteenth meetings of the 
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) debated issues pertinent to developing 
states like energy poverty and nuclear power development. Overall, however, major and 
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Western powers continue to dominate multilateral enegry governance (Lesage et al, 2009; 
Florini, 2010). For advanced developing states like Turkey, energy governance - the rules 
and regulations that govern policy development and implementation - are best understood 
through state-level policy analysis. 
Current energy literature is limited in its discussion of the energy policies of individual 
states in the global South. Section 1.6 will discuss in more detail the tendency to focus on 
the relationship between political economy and energy to the detriment of a more 
comprehensive debate on the factors that influence and affect energy governance in those 
states. In order to evaluate the themes that manifest in the literature on state-level energy 
governance, this section focuses on the literature on two states that are more prominent in 
the literature: the US and China. Those states have generated a significant volume of 
energy-related literature that can be examined in order to determine how energy is 
governed at the state level. This exploration does not indicate a equivalence between US 
and China - both major, and potentially great, powers - and advanced developing states in 
terms of energy governance; but rather shows how energy manifests in and interacts with 
different policy areas within the context of national governance. In addition, it provides 
context for the discussion on Turkey’s regional energy agenda elsewhere in this thesis: 
both the US and China demonstrated an interest in Caspian energy affairs between 2002 
and 2014. This section therefore demonstrates the ways in which energy strategy is 
incorporated into governance at the state level, and contributes to understanding and 
contextualising the factors facilitating and obstructing Turkey’s energy policies in its 
region.  
The introduction to this chapter pointed out that energy is multidimensional. Garrison 
(2009) indicates that China’s energy strategy incorporates multiple needs and interests and 
crosses security and developmental lines which, Rosen and Houser (2007) argue, means 
that national energy policy must be coordinated with the state’s broader agenda. Similarly, 
scholars suggest that issues like economic security (Kerschner et al, 2013), economic 
growth (Geri and McNabb, 2011), and national security (Lovins, 2005) influence how the 
US conceptualises energy. Most of the literature also acknowledges that the difficulty in 
balancing these factors contributes to inconsistencies in US and Chinese energy strategies 
(Andrews-Speed, 2003; Zweig and Jianhai, 2005; Deutch, 2011). Chapter three will 
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similarly argue that the AKP’s inability to harmonise domestic and international energy 
agendas proved detrimental to maximising the benefits of energy for the Turkish state. 
Considering the focus within this thesis on regional foreign policies, it is worth examining 
in more depth the amalgamation of energy and foreign policy in the US and China. 
Literature that incorporates energy and foreign policy generally utilises a 
geopolitical/security framework and focuses not only on energy as a foreign policy 
objective, but as a tool of foreign policy. Tsakiris (2004:309), for example, construes 
energy security policy as a “form of statecraft” that is a powerful foreign-policy making 
instrument. The relationship between energy as a tool for foreign policy - and particularly 
for the realisation of geopolitical objectives - is discussed in more depth in section on 
geopolitical approaches to energy. 
Despite a focus by both on renewable energy in the past two decades, the literature 
highlights how both the US and China have continued to place oil, gas, and coal at the 
heart of energy policy because of its utility for economic growth, industrialisation, and 
military capacity (Byrne et al, 1996; Glaser, 2013; Raphael and Stokes, 2014). For Zweig 
and Jianhai (2005), growing energy needs have had “serious implications” for China’s 
foreign policy because access to foreign resources is necessary for continued economic 
growth and social stability. Dannreuther (2011) points out that China began 
internationalising its national oil companies (NOCs) in the mid-1990s, but that efforts to 
source foreign resources were limited until after the 2008 financial crisis. Since the late 
2000s, however, China’s energy strategy in the Middle East and Central Asia has 
manifested in a multilateral policy aimed at engaging regional energy producers through 
initiatives like infrastructural investment in producer companies or energy diplomacy 
(Jaffe and Lewis, 2002; Liao, 2006). Yeti and Lu (2007) contend that such a level of 
diplomatically and economic engagement is highly beneficial to Beijing in terms of energy 
security and its geopolitical role in the regions: it helps generate regional goodwill towards 
China, create revenue for the Chinese economy, and offset any balance-of-payments 
deficit created by large oil purchases (Jaffe and Lewis, 2007). Leverett and Barrett (2005) 
indicate that the reciprocity of those states reluctant to engage with Western IOCs – like 
Turkmenistan- to Chinese NOCs is primarily due to China’s policy of non-interference in 
the domestic affairs of sovereign states. The notion that interdependencies in non-energy 
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sectors create goodwill that can be used to leverage access to energy reserves is a key 
argument throughout this thesis. Drawing on the contention in chapter two that 
interdependence is central to regional power strategies, this thesis contends that the 
goodwill obtained by facilitating economic and political interdependencies was central to 
Turkey accruing leverage in Caspian energy equations. 
While China’s international energy policy has only gained prominence in the last couple of 
decades, the literature on the relationship between energy and foreign policy for the US is 
more expansive. The US’ Middle Eastern strategy and its relationship to regional energy 
reserves is a dominant theme in the literature (Barnes and Jaffe, 2006; Stokes, 2007, 
Karim, 2011; Sovacool and Sidorstov, 2013). Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the US’ 
policies in the Caspian, Central Asia, and the Caucasus have also received attention from 
energy scholars (Raphael and Stokes, 2011, 2014). Bluth (2014), for example, cites energy 
resources as one of four major factors driving US interest in the Caucasus and Caspian 
region. He argues that the prominence affixed to energy by the US is predicated on the 
interaction between global energy security and geopolitics, and, similarly to Kardas 
(2011), contends that it is part of a grand strategy to counter Russian and Iranian influence 
in the regions. Tekin and Walterova (2007) and Winrow (2004) note the US has 
consistently promoted Turkey as a reliable energy conduit for Caspian and Central Asian 
resources as part of the fourth corridor project. Chapter three will argue that the 
propagation by the US of Turkey centrality to Central Asian-European energy transit 
systems was an important factor in the AKP’s belief in Turkey’s geostrategic importance 
in regional energy affairs.   
The US and Chinese cases highlight several features that are relevant to this thesis. Firstly, 
energy is considered inherently connected to economic growth by policy makers in both 
states. Ensuring sufficient, secure supplies of energy is paramount. The focus on ensuring  
security of supply in the AKP’s energy rhetoric (highlighted in chapter three) is illustrative 
of this point. In addition, those advanced developing states seeking to either export or 
import hydrocarbons must operate in an increasingly complicated “energeopolitical” 
(Barnes et al, 2006) environment. Rising powers like China are increasingly active in 
energy affairs in Western-aligned regions. This alters not only energy flows, but the nature 
of relations between all states operating within the geopolitical system. States must 
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therefore reconfigure their foreign policy agenda to new geopolitical realities if they are to 
successfully implement international energy strategies. It can also be deduced from this 
examination that states can perceive energy can be a tool of foreign policy; an element of 
statecraft like economic or military power to be manipulated and utilised by states to gain 
political or economic concessions. However, the extent to which energy is entangled with 
economic and foreign policy in particular forces states to make trade offs in energy policy 
formulation. Among the factors states must take into consideration is the extent to which 
they are dependent on particular sources and producers or consumers. The next section 
will discuss this diversification in more detail. 
1.3 Energy sources and diversification policies 
Within the IR literature on energy, diversification strategies are often considered the 
cornerstone of ensuring supply continuity for both producer and consumer states (Vivoda, 
2009; Kiriyama and Kajikawa, 2014). Disruptions to supply can pose a threat to economic, 
political, and social stability. For energy producers, a diversified consumer base is 
necessary to ensure market stability in the event of instability in a consumer states (Yergin, 
2006) and to limit the impact of oil price shocks (Bayramov and Orujova, 2017). For 
consumer states, diversification is considered essential in terms of fuel type (Kruyt et al, 
2009), in the geographical source of resources (Sovacool and Saunders, 2014), and in the 
chain of transit (Verrasatro and Ladislaw, 2007) in order to ensure security of supply.12 
The latter is particular true for diversification of gas supplies, where alternative routes may 
be necessary to compensate for pipelines that transit through unstable third countries 
(Cohen et al, 2011). An overview of some of the forms of energy considered as part of 
diversification strategies is important for this thesis considering the centrality of 
diversification to the AKP’s energy strategy between 2002 and 2014 (Balat, 2010; Han, 
2011). Chapter three will argue that diversification was a key theme in Turkey’s energy 
strategy. Consequently, the aim of this brief literature review of energy sources is to 
discern the specific attributes of three prominent fuel types in the AKP’s energy agenda in 
order to understand why they were incorporated into Turkey’s diversification strategies. 
                                                     




Availability of supply is identified in section 1.4 of this chapter as a key feature in debates 
on energy security. The depletion of conventional oil deposits means that accessing 
reserves is becoming increasingly difficult. The decline of shallow oil supergiant fields in 
easily accessible locations necessitates the extraction of deeper or offshore deposits that 
require more technologically advanced and expensive equipment. Some authors suggest 
that fears over depleting oil resources can be tempered by technological advances that are 
enabling the development of unconventional, difficult to access energy resources (Klare, 
2017). These unconventional resources have grown in importance for major energy 
consumers (Kim and Blank, 2014) but, in comparison to unconventional forms of gas like 
shale or liquefied natural gas (LNG), there is only limited debate on unconventional 
sources of oil like oil sands. Because they are restricted to only a few states, most scholars 
focus on states with the highest levels of proven unconventional oil reserves like Canada, 
or on those states that import high volumes of unconventional oil supplies like the US. Oil 
sands are not particularly important for this thesis because of their geographical distance 
from the wider Caspian region. Nonetheless, it is notable that tropes that dominate debates 
on conventional oil resources - such as policy trade offs, environmental impact, and energy 
dependence - also dominate the literature on oil sands (Clarke, 2009; Levi, 2009; Hoburg, 
2013). It should be acknowledged in any case that there is a more limited focus on 
diversification of conventional sources of oil in the literature because the ways in which oil 
is transported makes it less susceptible to interruption. Oil can be transported via pipelines, 
by sea, or overland within tankers, and is easier to replace via spot deals or short term 
contracts than are other resources. Rather, the primary focus of energy diversification 
debates in on gas. 
1.3.2 Gas 
Gas is viewed as a viable alternative to oil and features strongly in literature on the 
changing trends in global energy trade. Bahgat (2015) points out that natural gas is the 
fastest growing fossil fuel in the 21st century. Bridge and Bradshaw (2017) highlight how 
gas consumption grew by 25% between 2007 and 2017 as a result of large discoveries of 
conventional gas, the “shale revolution” in the US, and major infrastructural investment. 
For Smil (2015:10), natural gas is an "exceptional source of primary energy for all modern 
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economies” because it is relatively cheap, plentiful, and less polluting than oil. That 
natural gas is a matter of international politics is reflected in Bahgat’s assertion (2011) that 
the relationship between states at various stages of the supply chain determines the 
viability of gas trade. LNG trade notwithstanding, international gas trade is primarily 
dependent on integrated pipeline networks. Yegorov and Wirl (2008) and Gjetlen (2012) 
point out that differences in trading infrastructure means that gas is a more regional 
resource than the globalised oil. Chapter three will illustrate how natural gas gained a 
“special place” in Turkish energy strategy from the early 21st century that was maintained 
in the AKP era (MoD, 2000:165; MENR, 2009, 2014), and which necessitated Turkey 
engage with its Caspian neighbours to realise its energy ambitions.  
For those states pursing gas trade, diversification of suppliers is considered an essential 
policy response to limit dependence on particular suppliers of gas (Vivoda, 2009). Cohen 
et al (2011) argue that diversification of sources can simultaneously reduce the market 
power of a supplier – thus lowering the risk of high prices bought on by market 
monopolisation – and reduce the vulnerability to supply disruptions from particular 
sources. As chapter three will argue, therefore, a significant aspect of Turkey’s 
diversification strategy was based on limiting dependence on Russian gas (Tanchum, 
2015). It should also be noted at this point that natural gas, which can only be transported 
via pipelines, is more difficult to transport than either oil or unconventional forms of gas 
(Winrow, 2004). Gas pipelines are costly and can be dependent on stability that is beyond 
the control of either the supplier or consumer when pipelines cross third party states. States 
contemplating a natural gas policy therefore need to balance the economic benefits of 
natural gas with potential political barriers (including embargoes or threats to suspend 
supplies) that could emerge from an evolving geopolitical context. Understanding the 
difficulties of natural gas trade is particularly important for this thesis considering the 
emphasis placed by the AKP on natural gas as a means to fulfil Turkey’s own energy 
requirements and ambitions. 
The decision by many states to pursue unconventional forms of gas is altering the way 
some scholars understand the role of energy in IR. Smil (2015) examines changing 
patterns in gas trade, looking at how LNG and shale gas - both of which have become 
increasingly important in the past decade - have impacted on natural gas trade. Stevens 
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(2010) points out that its cost-competitiveness and greater flexibility mean that LNG can 
contribute to the security of energy supplies. At the same time, Winrow (2004) notes that 
processes for the liquefaction of natural gas are relatively expensive and time consuming. 
For Turkey, it has contributed to a diversification of its energy supplies: as of 2015, LNG 
constituted 16% of Turkey’s gas imports (EIA, 2017d). LNG storage capacity remains 
limited, however, and the majority of Turkey’s gas supplies remain in the form of natural 
gas. 
Literature on shale gas has also grown in recent years. Hulbert and Goldthau (2013) infer 
that shale is inherently political. In the European case, shale is often positioned as a 
geopolitical issue. Johnson and Boersma (2013), for example, suggest that developing 
European source of shale gas could reduce the region’s reliance on Russian imports and 
hence its geopolitical vulnerability. However, Siddi (2006) notes that both the tendency to 
over-estimate shale reserves and the difficulty and expense of extracting shale gas has 
contributed to the slow pace of gas development in Europe. At the same time, concerns 
over the environmental impact of the hydraulic fracturing technique employed to extract 
gas from shale (LaBelle and Goldthau, 2013; Kuzemko et al, 2016) has led to European 
states including Germany and France to ban the process. Understanding the shale agenda 
in Europe is of particular relevance to this thesis considering the argument in chapter three 
that contributing to Europe’s natural gas supplies was a major ambition of the AKP 
government. Development of European shale reserves would limit the necessity for the 
region to import additional natural gas supplies from Central Asia and the Caspian region. 
This, in turn, would restrict the capacity of Turkey to utilise its geostrategic location as a 
gas conduit which, chapter three argues, was essential to elevating Turkey’s status in 
regional and global energy systems. 
1.3.3 Nuclear power 
While nuclear power has been the subject of academic research since the 1950s, there has 
been a proliferation of publications on the topic in recent years. This is, in part, attributable 
to the decline in conventional fossil fuels; as Macfarlane and Miller (2007) and Jewell 
(2011) point out, proven uranium reserves are both plentiful and underdeveloped. That 
nuclear power is also relatively low carbon has led scholars such as Sims et al (2007) and 
Pacala and Socalow (2004) to frame nuclear energy policies as a response to climate 
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change. Akcay (2009) also postulates that nuclear power is economical because electricity 
generated by nuclear power plants is cheaper than conventional power sources. It is 
unsurprising, then, that nuclear power has been proposed as a means through which 
advanced developing states can enhance their energy security. The nuclear power 
strategies of developing and advanced developing states Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil and 
Nigeria have increasingly become a focus of energy scholars in the past couple of 
decades.13 Nuclear energy does play a small role in this thesis: Turkey has pursued nuclear 
power since the mid-1960s (Akcay, 2009), but it was only under the AKP that the state’s 
nuclear ambitions began to make progress.  
 At the same time, Erdogdu (2007) notes that nuclear energy evokes a level of public 
concern that renders it unique among energy sources. Qualms over nuclear accidents, 
disposal of nuclear waste, and the weaponisation of nuclear technology are at the heart of 
these concerns (Bodansky, 2004). Fears over the weaponisation of nuclear material in Iran 
is a key topic of debate in chapter four. However, the literature omits debate on how 
dependence on external states for nuclear materialor technology contibutes to an imbalance 
in inter-state relations similar to that evident in other energy trade relations. Chapters four 
and five argue that Ankara and Tehran’s dependence on Russia for the construction and 
operation of nuclear power plants in Turkey and Iran - and for the provision and disposal 
of nuclear material in Iran’s case - created power imbalance between the states in Russia’s 
favour. In Turkey’s case, it is argued, the dependence reinforced Turkey’s already 
significant dependency on Russia in the energy sector and undermined Turkey’s regional 
power power status.Thus, this thesis argues that an accurate assessment of the 
consequences of incorporating nuclear power into a state’s energy mix must take into 
account not only the economic and environmental benefits of nuclear production, but the 
geopolitical ramifications on reliance of external sources for the realistion of nuclear 
ambitions.  
Most authors concur that diversification plays a major role in a state’s energy strategy 
(Bahgat, 2007; Kalicki, 2007; Mansson et al, 2014). At the same time, several scholars 
warn against overplaying the role of diversification in a state’s energy agenda. For Lesbirel 
                                                     
13 See Su’ud (2003), de Carvahlo and Sauer, (2009), Jun et al (2009), and Jewell (2010) for case studies 
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(2004), diversification is constrained because it only addresses problems with regards to 
specific actors rather than general global or economic risks to security of supply. Vivoda 
(2009) points out that diversification policies can be restrained by geography, political 
relations between and within states, infrastructural availability, and resource capacity (that 
is, having the necessity political, institutional, economic, and potentially military capacity 
to carry out a diversification agenda). Based on the literature consulted for this chapter and 
for the discussion on Turkey’s energy policy in chapter three, this thesis proposes that 
energy diversification is a major element of the energy strategies of advanced developing 
states. While diversification is often considered a means to ensure energy security, it is 
important to note that the two are not synonymous. In order to better understand why 
diverisification might feature as a means to mitigate insecurity in energy strategies, the 
next section of this literature review will look more broadly at the concept of energy 
security. 
1.4 Energy security 
Energy is an essential tool for states at every level of economic development. It facilitates 
economic growth and industrialisation; provides a level of comfort to societies in the form 
of heat and electricity; and enables state institutions like hospitals, universities, and public 
transport systems to function. It is unsurprising, therefore, that energy has increasingly 
come to be viewed as a security issue by states at every point of the supply chain. 
Disruptions to global energy trade during the 1973 oil embargo by the Gulf States and 
unprecedented high oil prices in 2008 illustrate the cost of an insecure energy supply to 
global economic and political systems. Energy security maintains significance on national 
and international agenda, and analysis of the broad concept of “energy security” has 
generated a significant volume of academic literature. 
It is also a problematic concept because of the dynamism of both energy markets and 
international politics: understandings of what matters in energy security changes even 
within a subset of actors depending on the specific contexts. Vivoda (2009) postulates that 
variations in time frames and threats to energy security analysed mean definitions are 
highly contextual. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern specific trends in energy security 
literature over the past number of decades. In its earliest manifestations, the concept of 
energy security was sufficiently narrow to be considered synonymous with a secure supply 
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of oil (Kruyt et al, 2009). The framework for understanding energy security was rooted in 
realist interpretations of IR, thus ensuring that concepts like the geopolitics of scare 
resources and the relationship between energy and military preparedness dominated the 
literature (Deese, 1979). While some scholars (Willrich, 1975; Lieber, 1980; Deese and 
Nye, 1981) did adopt liberal approaches to energy security (institution building and 
interdependence foremost among them), realist conceptions of national security, conflict, 
and global economic security continued to define energy security into the 1980s. The 
narrow perception of energy security was compounded by a focus on Western developed 
importing states (Deese, 1979, 1981).  
The broadening of the concept of security in the latter part of the 20th century, together 
with the receding threat of another oil crisis, has led to a reconfiguration of the term 
“energy security” in the past two decades. Orttung et al (2009) and Mansson et al (2014)  
suggest that energy security analysis has expanded to incorporate new threats (like climate 
change) and new actors, including rising powers like China and Russia. Moreover, energy 
security literature has expanded from a limited focus on oil to encompass gas (Mavrakis et 
al, 2005), renewables (Bauen, 2006), and nuclear power (Corner et al, 2011) as the global 
energy mix has become more varied. The broad nature of energy security is important to 
acknowledge considering its centrality to Turkey’s energy strategy and, by extension, its 
economic, foreign, and geopolitical agendas. Chapter three argues that energy security was 
pivotal to sustaining the economic growth that contributed to Turkey’s global and regional 
status, and in particular in enabling the state to adopt a trade-based foreign policy to 
integrate the state further into its region. Furthermore, the next section of this chapter - on 
energy and geopolitics - will argue that energy is vital to the economy of military 
operations. Considering the military conflict in three of Turkey’s neighbours (Georgia, 
Iran, and Iraq) and the campaign by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey and its 
neighbours, military readiness was a necessity throughout the period under examination. 
While renewable and nuclear energy were both perceived as possible solutions to Turkish 
energy insecurity, the chapter positions hydrocarbon pipeline imports as the primary 
source of Turkey’s energy security concerns. Consequently, IR literature on the security of 
oil and gas supplies will be at the centre of the remainder of this literature review. 
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While the myriad of contributions to IR literature on energy security fail to agree precisely 
on what energy security is or how it should be dealt with, a general conceptual framework 
incorporating more specific contextual nuances can be discerned in the energy security 
literature. Yergin (2006) defines energy security as the assurance of “adequate, reliable 
supplies of energy at reasonable prices and in ways that do not jeopardise major national 
values and objectives”. Bahgat (2011) suggests that the term refers to “ensuring adequate 
and reliable supplies at reasonable prices in order to sustain economic growth”. For Fattah 
(2009), energy insecurity emerges from the conjunction of import dependency and threats 
of interruption. Finally, Vivoda (2009) equates measures to ensure energy security to 
insurances against risks of harm or destruction, while Winzer (2012) suggests the concept 
should exclude economic agendas and strategies and focus exclusively on the continuity of 
supply relative to demand.  
Several commonalities recur within this general framework of energy security theorisation. 
Firstly, there is a consensus that energy security is highly contextual. Definitions of what 
constitutes a security risk or threat for both governments and academics changes 
depending on the type of energy actor, timeframe, and issues considered, as well as the 
conceptual lens through which security is being examined (Sovacool and Saunders, 2014; 
Kruyt et al, 2009). Thus, Kiriyama and Kajikawa (2014) argue that indicators for energy 
security change or are manipulated depending on political context, while Pascual and 
Elkind (2010) contend that notions of energy security hinge on the perspective of 
particular governments in a specific timeframe. The contextual nature of the subject means 
that, even within IR, energy security is intertwined with a multitude of other disciplines 
and sub-disciplines like development studies, political economy, war studies, and 
sociology. Specific threats to energy security also span multiple disciplines, and various 
academic works have categorised those risks thematically. Winzer (2012) divides risks 
into human (deliberate or accidental sabotage), technical (system failure), and natural 
(earthquakes or other natural disasters) threats, while Bahgat (2011) suggests that threats to 
energy security are geological, geopolitical, economic, or environmental. In other words, 
anything from declining reserves to interstate war to recession to typhoons can be 
considered a threat to energy security. Specific threats will be discussed in more detail in 
the sections on energy and geopolitics and energy and economics later in this chapter.  
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Secondly, energy security in IR literature tends to be comprised of three primary 
components: availability, affordability, and continuity of supply. The first pertains to the 
physical availability of energy supply. This can refer to the ability of a state to access 
domestic energy supplies (through the acquisition of technical knowledge and economic 
capacity, for example), or via energy trade with another state (Cordesman and al-Rodham, 
2006; Mansson et al, 2011). The second relates to the ability of the state to purchase 
energy resources at a reasonable, stable rate (Pascual and Zambetakis, 2010; Sovacool and 
Saunders, 2014). The third, to the guarantee of a reliable flow of energy from producer to 
consumer free from both long and short term interruption (Elkind, 2010; Toft, 2011). 
Yergin (2006) further notes that for energy exporters, stable energy demand is a significant 
security issue. However, the emphasis placed on each element - and the associated 
potential threats and mitigation strategies - varies between authors. While the entire supply 
chain is often the subject of energy security analysis, focusing exclusively on either the 
provider or the consumer will yield differing definitions, threats, and strategies. The 
ubiquitous nature of energy means that the variables adopted by scholars are so numerous 
as to prevent a concrete definition of energy security emerging. As Turkey is an importing 
state, this thesis will focus primarily on issues pertaining to affordability, availability, and 
continuity of supply. The first will be referenced in the section on energy and economics in 
the final part of this chapter, while availability and continuity of energy supply form part 
of the discussion on energy and geopolitics. 
1.5 Energy and geopolitics 
Global hydrocarbon reserves are territorially fixed, asymmetrically distributed, and traded 
across borders, regions, and seas (Aribogan and Bilgin, 2009). Consequently, Tekin and 
Williams (2011) argue, hydrocarbons are inherently geopolitical. Scholars debating the 
relationship between energy and geopolitics contend that states use economic and political 
strategies like diplomatic bargaining, strategic alliance formation, and military action to 
ensure access to secure supplies of energy. At the same time, energy is characterised as a 
strategic tool that can be deployed in the international system to fulfil economic or 
political agendas. Considering the emphasis on hydrocarbons - and particularly imported 
sources of gas and oil - in Turkey’s energy mix and the state’s desire to utilise energy to 
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advance its geostrategic agenda (see chapter three), a clear understanding of the 
relationship between energy and geopolitics is warranted for this thesis.  
Two issues emerge repeatedly in geopolitical approaches to energy. The first is the 
relationship between energy and security that was discussed in the previous section. 
Because energy trade is inherently vulnerable to both deliberate and accidental 
interruption, the potential geopolitical threats to energy security are almost inexhaustible 
and encompass everything from regime change to transnational terrorism to interstate war 
(Florini and Sovacool, 2011:61). Secondly, the literature contends that constraints on the 
availability of energy supply have been amplified by an ever more crowded energy 
consumer market (Peters, 2004; Orttung and Wenger, 2009). Established powers and 
developing states have increasingly had to vie with advanced developing states for access 
to energy resources in the last number of decades (Hayes and Victor, 2006). Some scholars 
argue that the development of unconventional oil and gas reserves and the emergence of 
new producers (like those in the Caspian) mitigate the impact of competition for resources 
(Sen and Babali, 2007; Goldthau and Witte, 2009). Both this section and the remainder of 
this thesis contest this notion: the energy demands of new consumers far outstrips the pace 
of new resources development. The thesis therefore considers the myriad of consumers 
interested in and invested in Caspian resources as an example of the proliferation of energy 
competition in the 21st century. 
These issues will be examined in the context of three trends in the literature on energy and 
geopolitics. The first characterises energy as inherently realist and mercantilist; as part of a 
zero-sum game controlled by the state that leads to or facilitates conflict. The second trend 
is more positive-sum, and focuses on the relationship between energy cooperation, 
interdependence, and stability. The final trend concerns the recalibration of energy 
geopolitics in the 21st centry as a response to the emergence of new actors and forms of 
energy in the international system.  
1.5.1 Energy and conflict 
In surveying the literature on the relationship between energy, geopolitics, and the “logic 
of war”, Cuita (2009) identifies two distinct strands of analysis. The first investigates 
energy as an instrument of war, while the second considers energy to be a cause of war. 
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Because both strands frame energy as a strategic asset that facilitates the state’s grand 
strategy, control over a secure supply of resource is considered necessary by any measures 
possible.  
The concept of the “energy weapon” dominants the first strand. The concept is rarely 
studied in depth; instead, it tends to be a feature within broader discussions on energy 
security. It is almost exclusively studied from the point of view of the energy consumer 
(Yergin, 2006; Rutland, 2008). This is partly because of the focus on Western consumer 
states in the energy security literature, and partly because the primary energy security issue 
stemming from the invocation of the energy weapon is to the security of the consumer’s 
supply. However, the energy weapon is generally perceived as a means through which 
energy producers use their control over energy supplies to manipulate or coerce political 
and/or economic concessions from consumers (Smith Stegen, 2010). It takes two primary 
forms in the literature: the suspension of supplies to energy suppliers and the blockade of 
energy trade routes. The latter form focuses on the security of major energy transit routes 
like the Strait of Malacca, Strait of Hormuz, and Bab el-Mandeb (Le Billon and El Khatib, 
2004; Rodrigue, 2004; Moran and Russell, 2008), but is of limited relevance to this thesis 
because of its focus on pipelines and over-land forms of energy transit. The former is of 
greater relevance because of the extent to which Russia - a key actor in this thesis - 
features in the literature. US and EU perspectives dominate the literature on the purposeful 
suspension of energy supplies. Despite US energy policy and global energy markets 
evolving significantly since the oil crises of the 1970s, literature relating the energy 
weapon to US energy security tends to be retrospective and primarily grounded in the use 
of the oil weapon by OPEC in 1973 (Hirsch, 1987; Greene, 2010). EU-centric literature 
has always paid attention to the prospective uses of a gas weapon by Russia, but this has 
become much more pronounced since repeated disruptions to Russian-Ukrainian supplies 
in the mid-2000s (Yergin, 2006; Rutland, 2008).  
Luft and Korin (2009) suggest that threats by states like Iran and Russia to interrupt energy 
supplies or increase energy prices to consumers to gain leverage in political situations are 
indicative that the energy weapon remains a threat to hydrocarbon consumers. Similarly, 
Rodrigue (2004) indicates that, as oil becomes increasing scarce, its strategic importance 
will encourage states to use the energy threat more frequently, while Aribogan and Bilgin 
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(2009) contend that the essentiality of energy to economic and military affairs means that 
it retains importance as a political weapon. However, in a comprehensive study of both 
academic literature on the topic and empirical instances of Russia’s alleged use of the gas 
weapon – for example, in 1993 against Estonia and in 2006 and 2009 against Ukraine - 
Smith Stegen (2011) makes a clear distinction between “empty” and “real” threats, and 
concludes that attempts to wield the “energy weapon” have been largely ineffective. Other 
scholars suggest that the interdependence engendered by the interconnectedness of energy 
systems, new energy sources, and the flexibility of the oil market restricts both the 
application and effectiveness of the energy weapon (Perovic, 2009; Colgan, 2013). The 
ease with which Turkey accessed alternative energy supplies when it experienced 
suspensions of oil and gas supplies between 2002 and 2014 (see chapters four and five) 
appear to bear out this final point. However, the applicability of the energy weapon 
depends on the relative balance of power and extent of interdependency between consumer 
and producer states. As chapter five will argue, Russia was unlikely to utilise the energy 
weapon against Turkey in the way it did Ukraine because of Turkey’s relative power in 
comparison to the latter’s historical and contemporary dependency on Russia in energy 
and other spheres. This thesis therefore acknowledges that the energy weapon is a potential 
threat to the security of supply of consumer states, but reiterates that assessments of the 
extent of that threat must take into account the broader historical, political, and economic 
relationship between the consumer and producer. 
In addition, this thesis argues that energy can, on occasion, be used by consumer states as 
leverage in interstate relations. Consumer states and international institutions can target 
energy production in producer companies via economic and political sanctions. The 
implementation of energy sanctions against Iran in response to its nuclear activities and 
against Russia after the 2014 annexation of Crimea - discussed in chapters four and five 
respectively - are relevant examples of this. However, Tsakiris (2004) contends that 
sanctions tend to be difficult to implement because of the difficulties in convincing other 
states to comply. It may be precisely because of a state’s energy capacity that others are 
unwilling to impose sanctions: it is argued in this thesis that Turkey was reluctant to 
impose sanctions on Iran and refused to sanction Russia in part because of Turkey’s 
energy relations with those states.  
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In the second strand of analysis on energy, geopolitics, and conflict, energy is perceived as 
a cause of war. Securing energy resources is considered a geostrategic imperative, and 
coercion and/or military responses are framed as acceptable strategies for ensuring access 
to energy resources. Energy war theorisation tends to be deeply rooted in traditional 
geopolitical understandings of international relations, referencing the struggle between 
major powers for control over resources to generate economic and military advantage 
(Klare, 2004). References to a new “great game” (Gokay, 2001:23) between the US, 
China, and Russia in Central Asia and the Caspian region dominate the literature on energy 
wars.14 While this material is of interest to this thesis considering its focus on energy 
affairs in the wider Caspian region, it should be noted that energy wars literature tends to 
be predominantly speculative. It focuses on the possibility of future conflict, whereas this 
thesis is grounded primarily in recent history. During the period under examination, there 
were no conflicts that that could be classified as an energy war. Chapter five will argue 
that Georgian sources perceived energy competition to be a motivating factor for Russia 
during the 2008 South Ossetian war (Parfitt et al, 2008), but there is a lack of evidence to 
corroborate those claims.  
In addition to direct war over resources, actual or potential military intervention in 
resource rich countries by external powers is often linked to access to energy. Deese 
(1979) writes of the relationship between global energy security, the oil crises, and the 
possibilities of US military intervention during the 1970s, but intervention in the Persian 
Gulf constitutes the most significant part of this literature. Williams (2007), for example, 
frames both the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequent US involvement in the Gulf War 
in terms of energy conflict. More recently, scholars have suggested that military posturing 
by states including China and the Philippines in the South China Sea is driven by the 
desire to control energy reserves in the region (Klare, 2001; Singh, 2012; Buszynski, 
2012). However, the lack of a framework for establishing the extent to which conflict can 
be attributed to resource competition (Colgan, 2013) restricts scholarly assessment of the 
causal link between energy and military intervention. The Gulf War notwithstanding, 
therefore, energy conflict rarely manifests in the literature as full-scale traditional warfare; 
nor is energy ever depicted as the sole issue over which states go to war. Rather, the 
                                                     
14 See, for example, Kleveman (2004), Jafar, (2004), and Kim and Blank (2015) 
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examples above suggest that conflict in which energy plays a role tends to be part of a 
wider geopolitical strategy for power. 
These analyses directly conceptualise energy as a major aspect in warfare as a tool or a 
cause of war. Energy also plays a major, though less direct, role in war regardless of the 
casus belli. Firstly, energy is a necessary component of military readiness. Both Yergin 
(1991) and Kaldor et al (2007) pinpoint the evolution of internal combustion engines 
during World War I as intrinsic to the emergence of oil as a significant military and 
strategic commodity. According to Yergin (1991), the utilisation of combustion engines in 
tanks and combat aircraft changed “every dimension of warfare”. The continued centrality 
of oil to military machinery is one of the primary factors linking energy to national 
defence: without sufficient volumes of oil to maintain a state’s military, the state is left 
vulnerable to external attack. For states like Turkey that border unstable regions (Iraq, 
Syria, and Iran), sufficient supplies of oil products like aviation fluid are essential to 
national security. 
Secondly, energy can be a target of warfare. If energy is a strategic resource, then targeting 
energy infrastructure can have a detrimental impact on the capacity of the producing state. 
Similarly, for countries that depend on energy income to fuel their economies, attacks on 
essential energy infrastructure can damage the national economic capacity. Attacks by Iran 
on Iraqi energy infrastructure during the Iran-Iraq war demonstrated the vulnerability of 
essential infrastructure during conflict (Bahgat, 2011). During the South Ossetian war, 
Georgia accused Russia of targeting essential energy infrastructure including the pipeline 
that brings natural gas from Azerbaijan to Turkey (AFP, 2008a). Even if energy 
infrastructure is not directly targeted, conflict can still have a major impact on energy 
security. Fattah (2009) argues that wars and conflict are more likely to have medium and 
long term impacts on energy trade as states lose the ability to produce and export oil and 
gas. Toft (2011) suggests internal conflict creates an unfavourable environment for 
external investment and exploration, which in turn limits post-conflict energy trade. In 
other words, even short-term conflicts can have long-term security implications for both 
producers and consumers. For this thesis, the susceptibility of energy infrastructure to 
attack during conflict and the impact of conflict on energy access are important to 
understanding the extent to which the AKP related regional stability to domestic energy 
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security. With the exception of those transiting the Blue Stream pipeline,15 all of Turkey’s 
energy imports either originate in or pass through regions that experienced conflict 
(Eissler, 2012). As a result, chapter three argues, pre-emptive efforts to mitigate conflict 
were essential to Turkey realising its energy ambitions. This thesis therefore argues that 
Turkey attempted to adopt a positive-sum approach to energy and geopolitics. This 
approach will be detailed in the next sub-section of this chapter. 
1.5.2 Energy and cooperation 
The literature on the interaction between energy security, geopolitics, and conflict is based 
on an inherently realist, zero-sum interpretation of the relationship between those states 
that produce energy and those that consume or require additional energy resources. A 
competing narrative in the literature adopts a more liberal approach to energy security, 
emphasising the role of cooperation in ensuring a secure global supply of energy with the 
assumption that global energy security will facilitate the energy security of the individual 
state. As with the first approach, energy is considered a strategic imperative for the state. It 
is the means adopted to ensure access to supplies that differs. 
Barnes et al (2006) point out that consumers and producers of energy have an interest in 
each other’s stability - instability in one is detrimental to the energy security of both. It is 
for this reason that Pascual and Zambetakis (2010) suggest that natural gas pipelines 
contribute to overall security: the financial and technological aspects of pipelines create 
long-term mutual dependencies that militate against confrontational acts. Sen and Babali 
(2007) emphasise the necessity for cooperation between all members of the supply chain to 
ensure security of supply. Addressing the potential for conflict between states operating in 
the same energy system, Hayes and Victor (2006) argue that a stable relationship between 
consumer, transit, and producer states is easier to maintain if the states have a broader, pre-
existing relationship. Similarly, Correlje and van der Linde (2006) suggest that the risk of 
disruption to supplies is more likely if the cooperation between producers and importers is 
strained. Cuita (2009) suggest that this contributes to a subsistence approach to energy 
security that moves beyond realist conceptions of security. The multiplicity of issues and 
actors that define energy security mean that policy approaches to ensuring energy security 
                                                     
15 The Blue Stream transports natural gas from Russia to Turkey through a pipeline under the Black Sea 
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are more varied. While war is not entirely dismissed as a means through which states can 
fulfil their energy objectives, it is considered a very final resort. 
There are two issues pertinent to this thesis in this literature. The first is the notion that 
interdependence begets stable energy trade, while the second concerns the impact of 
energy on regional stability. It will be argued in this thesis that political goodwill arising 
from diplomatic engagement and the formation of economic interdependencies can play a 
role in the establishment and maintenance of energy relations. Both the relationship 
between interdependence and energy trade, and between energy trade and stability, are 
discussed at length in chapter three. Analysis of AKP discourse demonstrates the party’s 
tendency to stress the benefits of pipelines for regional security and conflict mitigation and 
of integration and security initiatives as a means to develop energy cooperation. It ensures 
that the suppliers will be more likely to engage in mediation with Turkey in the event of 
any bilateral dispute as both states have an economic stake in maintaining positive 
relations – the pricing disputes between Turkey and Iran discussed in chapter four is a case 
in point. However, this thesis argues that Pascual and Zambetakis’ claim (2010) that 
pipelines mitigate confrontational acts is an overstatement that fails to account for the 
broader geopolitical context in which pipelines are constructed. Chapter five will discuss 
Russia’s military campaigns in Georgia and Ukraine: both are consumers of Russian 
energy and Ukraine is a major transit route for Russian supplies to Europe, but that did 
little to restrict Russia’s military campaigns in those states. Based on the discussion in this 
chapter on energy and conflict and the discussions in chapters three, four, and five on 
energy relations between states, it is apparent that the ability of energy trade to mitigate 
conflict is dependent on a balance between a variance of factors including the role of 
energy in a state’s geopolitical agenda, the relative balance of power between the states, 
and the extent of asymmetry in the states’ interdependencies. 
The competition that guides energy war logic also manifests as a major factor in this 
cooperative geopolitical approach to energy. Often, this competition is framed as a 
political-economic issue of supply and demand, but Verrastro et al (2010) suggests that the 
emergence of an increasingly crowded consumer base has tested the nature of existing 
energy geopolitics. He posits that rather than leading to conflict, competition for resources 
can contribute to the formation of new geopolitical alliances that challenge the status quo. 
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The challenge posed by China’s increased energy activity in both Central Asia and the 
Middle East to Russia and the US’ influence in the respective regions is cited as a core 
example of the reorientation of energy geopolitics.  
1.5.3 The reorientation of energy geopolitics  
This reorientation of energy geopolitics is at the centre of the final trend in the IR literature 
on geopolitical approaches to energy. This literature emphasises two contributory factors: 
the emergence of the advanced developing states that are at the heart of this thesis, and the 
growing relevance of gas in the international energy mix. For Carter (2014:42), there is 
"no other fuel more significant" to the future of geopolitics than national gas. Gjelten 
(2012:43) suggests that “fresh perspective on geopolitical trends” can be obtained by 
looking at the world “through the lens of natural gas trade”, and that energy trade is a 
significant determinant of the global balance of power. Barnes et al (2006) similarly 
suggest that the proliferation of gas deals in the 2000s has contributed to a “geopolitical 
shift” in which new alliances are being formed both to facilitate and respond to new trade 
patterns. The natural gas policies of advanced developing states are central to this new 
trade and the “shift” in energy geopolitics. Energy data collected by the EIA (EIA, 2016e, 
2015f ) and IEA (2010, 2016, 2017) indicates that states such as Turkey, China, Indonesia 
and Argentina have all significantly increased the share of imported gas from states and 
regions that could be considered susceptible to geopolitical instability (such as Central 
Asia and the Caucasus) in the past decade. In contrast, the share of natural gas as total 
primary energy supply (TPES) has decreased in most developed states over the same 
period.  
The emergence of natural gas as a significant competitor to oil in the international energy 
mix has also generated literature on the regionalisation of energy relations, particularly in 
those regions in which there are substantial supplies of gas. It was noted section 1.3 of this 
chapter that international gas trade is primarily dependent on integrated pipeline networks. 
Consequently, several scholars note that spatial aspects are more important in natural gas 
than for oil or other fuels because the distance over which gas can be transported is limited 
by the distances and geography (Yegorov and Wirl, 2008; Gjetlen, 2012). The same 
authors point out that differences in trading infrastructure means that gas is a more 
regional resource than the globalised oil. Understanding regional interstate interactions are 
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essential, therefore, to both understanding contemporary energy politics and for examining 
the relationship between regional power and energy for advanced developing states. 
The “great game” for resources and influence in the wider Caspian region that is 
commonly referenced in the literature on energy conflict generally focuses on energy 
competition between China, Russia, the US, and Europe (Klare, 2001; Jafar, 2004; 
Hoogeveen and Perlot, 2007; Raphael and Stokes, 2014). Considering the regional nature 
of energy trade in the natural gas era, this thesis contends that the literature overlooks the 
potential for competition between specifically regional powers. This is partly attributable 
to the tendency of IR literature to focus on major powers. Each of Russia, Iran, and Turkey 
have specific interests in regional energy affairs that relate to their foreign, economic, 
developmental, and military powers and which contribute to both cooperation and 
competition between the three (Gokay, 2001; Tanchum, 2015; Souleimanov and Kraus, 
2012). Though there are exceptions (Flanagan, 2013), the competition between the three 
states for influence in regional energy affairs is usually discussed within the framework of 
competition between Russia and the US. Turkey, in particular, is considered either a pawn 
or balancing force in Russian-US competition rather than a strategic player in its own right 
(Iseri and Dilek, 2011). In exploring the ways in which energy featured in international 
politics for Turkey between 2002 and 2014, this thesis will assess the ways in which 
energy featured in bilateral relations with both Russia and Iran and therefore consider the 
relationship between energy and Turkey’s regional influence. The nature of this regional 
influence - and, more specifically, Turkey’s role as a regional power - will be discussed in 
more depth in chapter two.  
The first geopolitical approach to energy in IR depicts energy as a zero-sum game. 
Obtaining access to secure energy sources is a national prerogative that forces states into a 
form of bilateral competition that can lead to military conflict. The second body of 
literature characterises the relationship between actors in the energy supply chain as less 
anarchic. Integration of energy systems, bilateral agreements to combat perceived security 
threats, the globalisation of the energy market, and producer-consumer interdependence 
are central to this perspective. It is more limited than the first body of literature. 
Considered in conjunction with the argument concerning the inefficiencies of multilateral 
energy governance in section 1.2 of this chapter, this thesis argues that cooperation on 
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energy affairs is limited outside of bilateral relationships that benefit specific states. 
Energy is used as a cooperative measure primarily in the self-interest of the state rather 
than as a means of contributing to regional development. The final part of this section 
highlighted how the emergence of new energy actors and the proclivity of these states 
towards natural gas is contributing to a recalibration of the nature of energy geopolitics. 
The approaches to energy outlined in this section, while differing considerably on a 
number of matters, contain a number of commonalities. Each focuses almost exclusively 
on the state as the primary facilitator of energy policy, and each considers states to be 
rational actors that seek to maximise domestic energy security. Few states adhere 
stringently to either approach, and the complexity of the energy system as a whole – taking 
into account various fuel types, state and non-state actors, transit systems, and, most 
importantly, other political objectives – cannot be categorised according to one approach 
or the other. Of importance to this thesis is the recurrent indication that energy is a 
strategic asset. Energy can be deployed to political, military and economic advantage and 
thus affect the distribution of power in the international system, and can be used to foster 
cooperation between states. In that regard, it can be central to determining the balance of 
power between competing states at the global (oil) and regional (gas) levels. Based on the 
examination of literature both in this chapter and in chapter two on regional powers, it is 
argued that understading how energy may be framed and employed by a state with regards 
to its strategic utility is dependent on the political and economic needs and capacity of the 
state. In addition, the perception of the state’s position within the energy system by both 
itself and other actors in that system is essential to the effective utilisation of energy as a 
tool. Thus, understanding the global and regional agendas of actors and those states’ 
relationship with energy security and each other is essential to understanding power in IR. 
The limitations within the literature regarding South-South energy relations and the 
geopolitics of energy security among those states are to the detriment of a more holistic 
understanding of energy in IR. 
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1.6 Energy and economics 
1.1.6 The IPE of energy: liberalism and neo-mercantilism 
Energy and economics are intrinsically entwined. For Stoddard (2013), energy is one of 
the few sectors of a state’s economy that has the capacity to fundamentally shape both 
political and economic systems. Energy is a commodity that can be traded bilaterally 
between states or in international markets. Energy trade is controlled by market-based 
forces of supply and demand, while the extent of that demand is based both on the 
essentiality of energy to economic growth and on the mismatch between energy resources 
production and consumption that stems from the asymmetrical global distribution of 
resources (Fantazzini et al, 2011). Considering the extent to which energy is traded at the 
international and regional levels, these market forces are not just domestic, but 
international: as Cordesman and al-Rodham (2006) note, energy trade is susceptible to 
macroeconomic fluctuations, and issues such as global economic health and the state’s 
capacity to invest in energy technologies and exploration have an impact on the 
availability of energy supplies. Threats to domestic and international energy systems have 
potential security implications for the affordability of energy supply. Deese (1979) argues 
that sudden energy price increases can lead to energy insecurity, which may prompt 
national and international economic crises. Further emphasising the relationship between 
energy politics and energy economics, Pascual and Zambetakis (2010) posit that price 
shocks can lead to economic hardship, inflation and, potentially, political instability for 
energy producing states.  
There is a consensus in the literature that these economic energy issues are closely related 
to IR themes such as the relationship between states (Willrich, 1975; Kuzemko at al, 
2016), power distribution (Cohen, 2005; Stoddard, 2009), and policy formulation 
(Cordesman and al-Rodham, 2006). Economic themes in the literature on energy in IR 
adhere to two dominant frameworks adopted from international political economy (IPE) 
theory: liberalism and neo-mercantilism. The first espouses the benefits of free markets 
and international energy governance. Hence, the focus of research is broadened from a 
state-centric approach to incorporate markets, institutions, and private companies 
(Goldthau and Witte, 2009, Caiser, 2011). Liberal IPE theorists argue for greater market 
freedom and limited state intervention in economic affairs. Significant faith is placed in the 
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ability of markets to regulate energy trade. Neo-mercantalist approaches, on the other 
hand, frame the state as the primary actor in energy affairs and suggest a strong link 
between energy and national security. The first part of this section will focus on liberal 
approaches to energy in IR, and notes the emphasis on the role of markets and 
international oil companies (IOCs) in the literature on energy and economics in IR. After 
arguing that liberal approaches underplay the extent to which energy trade is interwoven 
with states’ political agendas and the geopolitical context in which energy trade occurs, it 
discusses neo-mercantilist approaches to energy. The final part of this section looks at the 
relationship between energy and economic development. It notes that there is a dichotomy 
in the literature between the energy in developed and developing states, but argues that the 
advent of advanced developing states in the past two decades necessitates a new 
understanding of the ways in which energy and development are related for those states.  
Market-based approaches to energy in the IR literature look beyond the state to explain 
patterns in energy affairs. Considering the transnational nature of energy trade and 
security, investment from commercial and political actors from multiple states is often 
considered integral to resource development (Florini and Sovacool, 2011). Central to these 
debates is the role of international oil companies (IOCs). Kuzemko et al (2016) argue that 
IOCs have fostered technological innovation and been the “backbone” of the oil industry 
for the best part of a century. From Standard Oil’s pioneering petroleum development in 
the late 19th century through to the era of the Seven Sisters in the mid-20th century, IOCs 
were instrumental in the development of the energy industry (Yergin, 1991; Samson, 
1991). In states in which energy is privatised – the US and UK, for example - IOCs 
continue to play a major role in resource development. Several sources point out that the 
role of IOCs in global energy management has been diluted by increasingly assertive 
producer states, two waves of resource nationalisation in the 1980s and 2000s, and a series 
of agreements in the 1970s and 1980s that recalibrated the balance between energy 
producers and IOCs (Sampson, 1991; Yergin, 1991; Claes, 2013). Nonetheless, it is 
important to note the continued role international market actors play even in nationalised 
energy markets. Bryce (2010) postulates that most new oil discoveries are made by 
international consortiums comprised of a multitude of IOCs, national oil companies 
(NOCs), and often with funding from interested national governments. Likosky (2009) 
notes that IOCs have re-entered exploration via contractual arrangements with states that 
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previously nationalised their resources, while Marcel (2006) points out that IOCs have 
formed alliances and exchange technical expertise with national oil companies (NOCs). 
The Kuwaiti government, for example, has legislated to allow the nationalised energy 
system enter into technical assistance contracts with IOCs (Le Leach, 2013).  
As this thesis will demonstrate, IOCs play a more limited role in most of the states of the 
wider Caspian region16. Each of the three major regional actors examined (Turkey, Russia, 
and Iran) have nationalised energy systems, and attempts by Turkey and Russia to 
introduce energy liberalisation legislation led to only limited market diversification (Cetin 
and Oguz, 2007). Nonetheless, acknowledging the model introduced above is important 
considering the extent of Turkey’s interactions with Azerbaijan, where major IOCs - and 
particularly BP- are heavily involved in energy development. Moreover, cooperation 
between IOCs and NOCs on technical matters and investment by international actors in the 
Turkish energy market were important to developing Turkey’s limited energy market 
infrastructure in the period under examination (IEA, 2010; Ozturk et al, 2011). This thesis 
suggests that Turkey’s situation is not unique, but can be applied to other advanced 
developing states. It is notable, for example, that both Mexico and Indonesia have opened 
domestic markets to limited IOC involvement in recent years, and that other advanced 
developing countries like Nigeria and South Korea have long permitted restricted IOC 
involvement in national energy management (EIA 2016k, 2015g, 2016j, 2017e). 
Considering that many emerging states lack the necessary technical expertise to develop 
energy reserves, this thesis therefore argues that cooperation with IOCs through varying 
degrees of collaboration (rather than the previous domination by IOCs) can be beneficial to 
the development of essential resources and energy infrastructure.  
In addition to the focus on IOCs, liberal IPE frameworks also tend to emphasise markets 
and institutions as bulwarks against geopolitical threats to energy security. This 
assumption is generally founded on two tenets of international economic theory: Kant’s 
economic peace theory (1795), which asserts that market participation reduces the 
incentive for international conflict and that trade is incompatible with war; and 
interdependence theory, which postulates that cooperation in one sector will lead to 
                                                     
16 Azerbaijan is an exception - major IOCs like BP and Statoil have been heavily involved in energy 
development in Baku since the 1990s 
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cooperation in other sectors, thereby contributing to a convergence of interests and 
militating against conflict (Barbieri, 1996). Thus, Goldthau and Witte (2009) postulate that 
a more open global oil market has changed the nature of energy trade from a mercantilist, 
zero-sum game to a positive sum market that deters political conflict. Similarly, Caiser 
(2011) argues that energy markets present an opportunity to promote a common good that 
constrains destabilising geopolitical activity. This thesis contends that, for the most part, 
these arguments oversimplify the nature of international energy trade, attributing too much 
influence to international markets (particularly when it comes to states with nationalised 
energy systems) and underestimating the impact of the broader international and 
geopolitical context in which energy trade develops. The application of economic peace 
and interdependence theories to energy in IR underplays the extent to which states may use 
energy as a coercive tool for the accumulation of power. It is highlighted throughout this 
thesis that Russia, in particular, has engaged in military conflict with essential energy 
partners like Georgia and Ukraine. Nonetheless, the notion that cooperation in one 
(energy) sector can contribute to cooperation in other sectors is important for this thesis. 
Many authors argue that during the AKP era, energy was closely tied to economic 
cooperation in other sectors and was perceived as a means through which Turkey could 
create new interdependencies with other states (Kutlay, 2009, 2011; Kardas, 2012). 
Chapter three will argue that primary documentation shows a major focus on energy as a 
tool for regional integration and cooperation by the AKP. In contrast to liberal approaches 
to energy in the IR literature, however, these arguments are primarily based around the 
conception of the state - rather than markets, institutions, or private companies -as the 
dominant actor in energy affairs. 
The second IPE framework utilised by energy security scholars adopts a neo-mercantilist 
approach. Neo-mercantilism is differentiated from traditional mercantilist and realist 
perspectives by the acknowledgement that non-state actors also play a role in economic 
matters (Gilpin, 2001). In comparison with liberal approaches, the state - rather than 
international markets or private companies - is considered the primary driver and 
controller of domestic and international economic matters. International trade is considered 
a zero-sum game of relative gains in which states rely on protectionism and relative 
powers to increase wealth and influence economic outcomes (Gilpin, 2001; Cohen, 
2005).This thesis argues, however, that the liberalisation of some energy markets and the 
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necessity for cooperation between states in specific forms of energy trade – particularly 
those that use pipelines as the primary method of transportation – outlined in previous 
sections of this chapter, along with the willingness of some states to cooperate in 
international institutions means that the extent to which energy can be considered a wholly 
zero-sum game is limited. 
Resource nationalisation is a recurring feature in neo-mercantalist approaches to energy in 
the IR literature. Many states at various levels of the political and economic spectrum have 
pursued resource nationalism to some extent. The decision to nationalise resources can be 
based on a number of factors. Gustafson (2012), for example, suggests that the tendency 
by some states to frame energy as a political or geopolitical resource can be a driving 
factor in the decision to nationalise resources. Stevens (2010) proposes that the ideological 
belief that undue IOC influence over resource management dilutes the sovereignty of the 
state encourages governments to limit the role of IOCs in order to reassert control over the 
national economy. Finally, the literature notes that close ties between the state and NOCs 
mean that NOC policy is guided by non-commercial objective like foreign policy and 
national wealth creation to a significantly greater extent than their privatised counterparts 
(Harris, 2007; Baker, 2007). Considering that most of the states discussed in this thesis - 
including Turkey, Iran, and Russia - have predominately nationalised energy systems and 
close ties between the state and energy companies, a brief discussion on the literature on 
resource nationalisation here will contribute to discussions on the topic in the empirical 
chapters. 
Carbonnier and Brugger (2013) point out that the nationalisation policies can vary from a 
stronger role for state-owned companies in resource development to full-scale resource 
control by the state. The primary focus in the literature is on developing producer states in 
which full or partial nationalisation has been linked to political corruption, the 
asymmetrical development of national industry, and over reliance on energy income (for 
example, see Beblawi, 1990; Domjan and Stone, 2010; Wilson, 2015). This “resource 
curse” is a frequent theme in this literature, and is central to the almost universally critical 
approach scholars take to nationalised energy systems. Some authors argue that the 
unilateral development of energy resources at the expense of economic diversification can 
increase social tension between the small group of workers in the energy sector and the 
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rest of the population, (Muller-Kranner, 2007). Others point out that the lack of necessity 
for taxation in rentier states creates autonomy for the state from societal demands 
(Schwartz, 2008). Thus, various authors call attention to the relationship between rentier 
policies and political or economic issues like high corruption level (Dietz et al, 2007), 
human rights abuses (Le Billon and El Khatib, 2004), autocratic governance (Franke et al, 
2009) and government repression and placation of opposition via oil wealth (Sandbakken, 
2006). Bad policy decisions - such as the failure of a developing government to manage 
resources adequately or underinvestment in infrastructure -  lead to the failure of energy 
systems and increased energy prices for both producers and consumers (Elkind 2010). 
Consumer states must therefore account for potential political, economic, and societal 
security risks associated with the resource curse into their risk calculations when 
developing energy trade with rentier states. Acknowledging the potential negative aspects 
of resource nationalisation is particularly important for this thesis: not only does Turkey 
have a predominately nationalised energy system itself, but the majority of states from 
which it imports energy sources have nationalised energy systems. Among the major 
issues this thesis will focus on is how energy nationalisation facilitated an overlap between 
each of Turkey, Russia, and Iran between 2002 and how, in Russia’s case at least, 
nationalised energy companies became agents though which the state could expand its 
regional power. Given the economic constraints on advanced developed states relative to 
their developed counterparts, a key prerogative of thesis nationalised energy sectors is to 
contribute to economic development. This development is the subject of the final part of 
this chapter. 
1.6.3 Energy and development 
There is a clear dichotomy between developed and developing states in the IR literature on 
energy because, as Mansson et al (2014) point out, developing and developed states have 
different energy priorities and opportunities. There is a consensus in the literature that, for 
consumer states, affordability of supply and the economic consequences of disruption to 
energy supplies are potentially severe (Smil and Knowland, 1980; Muller-Kranner, 2007). 
This is particularly true for states in the global South for whom energy is intrinsic to 
economic development and, by association, political and social stability. Kuik et al (2011) 
suggest that in developing countries, energy security extends beyond economic growth to 
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incorporate access by all sectors of society to energy supplies in order to ensure a basic 
standard of living. Van Groenendaal (1998) similarly argues that developing technically 
sound and economically efficient energy system is crucial for economic development. 
Energy is, therefore, intrinsically connected to developmental agendas. Pascual and Elkind 
(2010) stress that failure to access sufficient supplies of energy is detrimental to the 
development agenda of developing countries. On a similar theme, Muller-Kranner (2007) 
and Bauen (2006) are particularly adamant that energy poverty - the inability of a state to 
afford a secure supply of energy - is a major block to development. Deese (1981) adds that 
supply disruptions to those states can contribute to domestic economic down-turns that 
increase the possibility of political instability. 
Despite the acknowledgement of the differences between energy in developed and 
developing countries in the IR literature, it would be remiss to suggest that there is a 
simple binary of states when it comes to energy policy. The rapid emergence over the past 
decade and a half of advanced developing states that are simultaneously amassing 
economic and political power demonstrates the necessity to expand the discussion of the 
IPE of energy policy in non-developed states beyond existing debates on rentier states, 
energy poverty, and IOCs. Advanced developing states have greater capacity than 
developing states to bargain in international energy affairs for access to supplies and with 
regards to price setting. By virtue of their ascendance in international affair, they may also 
possess the capacity to use energy not merely to alleviate energy poverty or to fund 
domestic development, but as a tool to elevate the states’ status in the international system. 
It is for this reason that this thesis focuses on energy’s role as not just a developmental 
objective for advanced developing states, but on its capacity as a tool through which power 
- both economic and political - is consolidated. At the same time, the thesis acknowledges 
that advanced emerging state may be more limited in carrying out its energy agenda than 
its developed counterparts because of restrictions to its economic capacity and technical 
expertise.   
 A core contention of this thesis is that the connection between development and energy is 
central to understanding energy in advanced developing states. Chapter two argues that 
continuous, stable economic development is crucial to advanced developing states in both 
maintaining and expanding their influence in regional and international politics. The role 
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played by energy in facilitating development in other economic sectors - particularly 
industry and electricity generation - is pivotal to ensuring domestic economic and political 
stability, and for enabling states to carry out foreign policy agendas. Understanding the 
connection between energy and development is crucial to understanding why, as chapter 
three argues, fulfilling Turkey’s ever-expanding energy requirements was a priority during 
the AKP’s first three terms in office.  
1.7 Conclusions 
A number of conclusions can be derived from the review of IR literature on energy. 
Firstly, energy governance remains the remit of the state. This is in part due to the 
centrality of energy to the political, economic, and security of the state, and partly on 
account of the inefficiencies of international energy governance. At the same time, 
markets, actors, and national and international energy agendas policy are increasingly 
intertwined and cannot be considered in isolation.  Consequently, while the state remains 
the dominant actor in energy governance, domestic energy policy is embedded in the 
international context. 
Secondly, energy is a key strategic good. It is a means through which power and wealth 
can be accumulated. Secure access to and effective utilisation of energy resources 
contributes to the state’s capacity to exert power in energy, economic, and political 
systems. The continued centrality of energy to economic production and  military 
manoeuvrability means that energy resources are necessary to generate economic and 
military advantages between competing states. To this end, energy can affect the relative 
balance of capabilities between states and therefore contribute to the distribution of power 
in the international system.   
Finally, a new pattern of energy flows has emerged in recent years driven by the energy 
policies of advanced developing states like the BRICS, Turkey, Indonesia, and Mexico. 
These states, which have primarily nationalised energy systems (with some degree of 
liberalisation) have both actively pursued natural gas resources at a far more intense rate 
than their more developed counterparts and engaged in energy cooperation with other 
states in the global South. This has resulted in a reconfiguration of energy geopolitics 
wherein regional energy trade and South-South energy relations have increasingly 
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supplemented the North-South relations and global oil narratives that dominated energy in 
the twentieth century. Considering the ways in which energy geopolitics influence power 
distribution and patterns of cooperation and confrontation, these states are increasingly 
shaping not only energy systems, but geopolitical and international systems as a whole.   
The final point is of particular importance to this thesis. The IR debate has, in previous 
decades, focused on major and Western powers at the expense of advanced developing 
states. While this has begun to change in recent years with the advent of emerging powers 
and developmental literature, non-Western actors remain underexplored in the energy 
literature despite a clear distinction in the constraints and opportunities facing advanced 
developing states in comparison to other actors. While the energy agendas of these groups 
of states may be relatively similar, a major differentiating factor is the capacity of 
advanced developing states to access and utilise energy resources in the international 
context.  
This thesis hopes to contibute to bridging the gap deficit of literature on energy and 
emerging powers. Energy’s utility as a strategic asset – as a tool for domestic economic 
development, regime security, alliance building, or power projection – is dependent on 
both the capacity of the state to obtain and utilise it, but also the willingness of the state to 
do so. Advanced developing states no longer play a secondary role to major powers in 
international energy, but are significant actors in their own rights. If energy is a strategic 
resource for states, and the utilisation of economic and political resources is integral to 
ensuring sufficient supplies of energy, then a clearer understanding of the relationship 
between power resources and advanced developing states is necessary to better understand 
the role of energy in the international politics of those states.  
In addition, the acknowledgement in the literature of the increasing regionalisation of 
energy trade suggests that more emphasis on the regional aspect of energy systems is 
required than either global geopolitics or energy security explanations provide. Regional 
power theories form a major strand of new scholarly work on advanced developing states. 
While strongly evoking elements of geopolitical and security theory, regional power 
theory goes beyond those concepts in explaining the strategies and power resources of 
emerging powers in the regional context. The next chapter will examine the literature on 
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regional power theory before explaining its relevance to the relationship between energy 




2. Developing a Regional Powers Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
 A major theme in debates on advanced developing states in IR in recent decades has 
pertained to the role of those states within specific regions (Pederson, 2002; Buzan and 
Waever, 2003; Hurrell, 2006). The concept of regional power was frequently employed to 
characterise the position advanced developing states held within specific regions, but until 
recently was rarely applied with analytical rigour.17 Scholars conducted research without a 
concrete analytical framework either for differentiating regional powers from other actors, 
or for examining the strategies through which regional powers established their status and 
exercised their power. Theoretical approaches to regional powerhood have only begun to 
emerge in recent years, with scholars developing analytical tools for defining regional 
powers (Nolte, 2010) and understanding their foreign policy strategies (Destradi, 2010), 
role in regional security (Buzan and Waever, 2003), and in multilateral institutions (Nel, 
2010). The purpose of devising these frameworks is not just to understand the regional 
powers themselves, but to facilitate scholarly understanding of the impact of those powers 
on traditional conceptualisations of regional systems and international order. As the 
introduction noted, the regional power concept is employed in this thesis both to denote 
states that possess a preponderance of power within a geopolitical system and as a 
framework through which the behaviour of states can be analysed.   
In order to answer this thesis’ central research question, this chapter will examine how 
regional power manifests in IR literature. It consists of four sections. The first explores key 
assumptions framing debates on regional power. It focuses on defining central terms like 
“region” and “power”, and briefly outlines three elements that recur within the majority of 
the literature on regional powers: role perceptions, regional security, and multilateral 
                                                     
17 See, for example, Onis (2001) and Erickson (2004) on Turkey, Lopez-Lucia (2015) on Nigeria and Brazil, 
and Furtig and Gratius (2010) on Venezuela. It will be demonstrated throughout this chapter that the majority 
of empirical research on regional powers pertains almost exclusively on advanced developing states and, 
within that broad categorisation, almost entirely on the BRICS: see De Lima and Hirst (2006) and Spektor 
(2010) on Brazil; Flemes (2007) on India; Harris (2006) on China;  Bava (2010) on India;  Alden and Viera 




institutions. Extrapolating the major themes from this examination of the literature on 
regional power, the final part of this section outlines key conditions determining regional 
powerhood and briefly highlights the ways in which scholars have adopted regional 
powers frameworks for empirical studies of advanced developing states.  
This thesis acknowledges, however, that the criteria for defining and recognising regional 
powers are quite broad. They do not account for variances in the material and ideational 
power capacities of regional powers, or the different ways in which regional power may 
manifest. Consequently, the second section of this chapter focuses on regional power 
typologies. Paying particular attention to the work of Sandra Destradi (2010) and Miriam 
Prys (2010), this section will consider three potential forms of regional power: empire, 
hegemony, and leadership. The tendency to categorise regional powers is a relatively new 
phenomenon and scholarly literature on the topic is limited, but drawing on the wider IR 
literature on empire, hegemony, and leadership facilitates a clear understanding of the 
variances between different forms of regional power.  
The third section of this chapter departs from theoretical conceptualisations in considering 
the overlap between regional powers and energy for advanced developing states. Chapter 
one argued that energy was a significant material resource and strategic asset for states at 
all levels of development. Yet despite the prominence affixed to material capabilities in the 
literature on regional powers, energy is not incorporated into empirical or theoretical 
studies of regional powerhood. Similarly, there is no literature that utilises a regional 
powers framework to understand energy policy. Considering that the purpose of this thesis 
is to examine how energy and regional powerhood interact for advanced developing states, 
the conclusions of this section are pivotal to the thesis’ central argument. The fourth and 
final section of this chapter applies the regional power characteristics outlined in section 
2.2 to Turkey and proposes that between 2002 and 2014, the state fitted the criteria of a 
regional power in the wider Caspian region.  
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2.2 Key contentions in the regional power literature 
2.2.1 Underlying assumptions of regional power debates 
Establishing an analytical framework for regional powers has proved difficult. 
Contestation of the terms “region” and “power” are major barriers to the clarification of 
the “regional power” concept. Nolte (2010:883) postulates that both “regions” and 
“power” are so debated in IR literature as to ensure a significant variability in the possible 
meaning of “regional power”, and renders research on regional powers  “complex and 
multifaceted”. This thesis frames regions as two or more states that are in geographical 
proximity to one another and are shaped by social, political, economic, and historical 
constructs and interactions (Mansfield and Milner, 1999; Fawn, 2009; Prys, 2010). Having 
examined the conceptualisation of regions in IR in the introduction, this chapter focuses on 
the idea of power in the regional context. 
While Barnett and Duvall (2005:67) argue that “no single concept can capture the forms of 
power in international relations”, regional powers literature tends to adhere to Nye’s 
definition of power as “the ability to affect the behaviour of others to get the outcomes you 
want” (2008:27). Power is most tangible in its material form; as the state’s demographic, 
military, and economic superiority relative to others (Nolte, 2010). However, factors like 
as a common history and shared values can also contribute to the power of a state (Beck, 
2010). This ideational aspect – the projection through foreign policy of a common agenda, 
goal, or value that has a symbolic, psychological, or subjective dimension – also plays a 
role in defining power (Flemes and Nolte, 2010). For both strong and materially weaker 
states, ideational power can provide a means to influence the behaviour of other states.  
The underlying premise of all conceptualisations of regional power is that the system level 
of analysis used to explore and explain power at the international level can be applied to 
the regional level (Hurrell, 2007; Destradi, 2010). Lemke (2010) argues that the 
hierarchical nature of the regional systems is structurally similar to that of the international 
system. Distributions of power and perceptions of regional status quo orientations are 
considered central to understanding how states view each other and why they favour 
particular foreign policy strategies in different contexts. Polarity - as determined in terms 
of the relative material capacity between states - is therefore a key feature in debates on 
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regional power (Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll, 2010). A region may not have a dominant 
unilateral power, but rather be a multilateral system where major and aspiring regional 
powers compete for regional predominance (Flemes, 2010; Hurrell, 2010). Nolte (2010) 
points out that balances of power within regional hierarchies are not stable, and that the 
state’s regional power status may be subjected to challenges and contestation from other 
states in the regional hierarchy. Smaller emerging states may also have regional power 
ambitions that compete with larger regional powers for access to resources and influence. 
Turkey’s energy ambitions in the Caspian are highlighted throughout this thesis as an 
example of the competition with Russia, a much larger regional power, for regional 
influence. Power shifts can contribute to instability - in the case of challenges to unipolar 
order in particular - or produce new patterns of cooperation and contestation and new 
hierarchies within the region. Acknowledging the fluid nature of regional hierarchies is 
important for this thesis considering the competition by Russia, Turkey, and Iran for 
regional powerhood in the Caspian: while the conclusion determines that Russia remained 
the preeminent regional power in the Caspian throughout the 2002-2014 period, it will be 
argued that both Turkey and Iran’s regional policies had the potential to reshape the 
regional hierarchy    
2.2.2 Role perceptions and engendering legitimacy: self-identification, followership, 
and external validation  
The possession of resources does not in itself make a state a regional power: the state must 
also recognise and be willing to exercise its power, and its position in the regional 
hierarchy must be acknowledged by other actors. According to Lopez-Lucia (2015), a 
state’s own understanding of its identity, resources (and capacity to utilise those resources 
effectively), and position in the regional system is essential to regional power. Similarly, 
Nolte (2010) suggests that the conceptualisation by elites like government officials or 
policy makers of the state’s position in the regional hierarchy are essential to classifying a 
state as a regional power. Without acknowledgement by elites of the state’s material and 
ideational superiority to other actors in the regional system, the self-belief or willingness 
of the state to implement regional power strategies is curtailed. 
The classification of a state as a regional power is also dependent on the recognition of the 
state’s role in the regional hierarchy by other regional states. In the regional powers 
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literature, recognition is closely related to debates on followership and legitimacy. Luke 
(1986) argues that power is most effective when willing compliance is secured from 
subordinate states by influencing “receptions, cognitions, and preferences” “in such a way 
that they accept their role in the existing order of things”. The extent to which compliance 
is willing is essential to determining the legitimacy of the regional power and to 
differentiating between the forms of regional power outlined elsewhere in this chapter. For 
the imperial regional power, compliance is achieved through coercion and the state has 
limited legitimacy among its subordinates; conversely leadership models tend to employ 
ideational power to generate acceptance by subordinates of the regional power’s superior 
position in the regional hierarchy and posses high levels of legitimacy (Schirm, 2009; 
Nabers, 2010). These arguments will be expanded upon in section 2.3. 
Destradi (2010) suggests that in certain circumstances, followers may be instrumental in 
elevating the status of a state by proposing or promoting it as a regional power. 
Consequently, as Schirm (2009) points out, the limited capacity of coercion to engender 
support means that states must provide incentives to ensure acceptance by subordinate 
states. Adopting Schirm’s hypothesis on conditions for the acceptance of emerging powers 
to conceptualisations of regional powers, it can therefore be determined that the “the 
incorporation of potential followers’ interests and/or ideas” into the regional power 
strategy can be considered necessary in order to “neutralise potential resistance and 
simulate support” (2009:199). Thus the empirical chapters will argue that Turkey’s 
rhetoric concerning the common energy security agenda of the Caspian states was crucial 
to its claim to energy leadership in the region.  
In addition to common interests, regional powers may need to consider the impact of 
historical inter-state regional relations on contemporary receptiveness to regional 
powerhood, and frame those relations in such a way that they are palatable to subordinate 
states (Flemes and Wehner, 2012). Nabers (2010) argues that the necessity for the state to 
maintain legitimacy means that followers may place constraints on the actions of regional 
powers. At the same time, however, section 2.3 of this chapter indicates that the degree to 
which subordinate states rely on the regional power for the provision of public goods such 
as security may limit the capacity of subordinates to curtail the policies of the regional 
power. Chapter five, for example, notes that dependence by eastern European states on 
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Russian energy supplies limited the extent of the response to Russia’s suspension of 
energy supplies to Ukraine in 2006, 2008, and 2009. 
Finally, acceptance by global actors of the role played by regional powers is considered 
important both in its own right and as a means to legitimise the regional power to its 
subordinates. The integration of the regional power into interregional and international 
institutions where it articulates both its own interests and acts as a representative of 
regional interests can engender recognition for regional powers from international actors 
and legitimise the state among its subordinates (Nabers, 2010; Nabers, 2010). Sever and 
Oguz-Gok (2016) suggest that the UN is a particularly significant institution for regional 
powers looking for recognition of their status from extra-regional powers. Similarly, 
integration into a particular region through participation in regional governance 
mechanisms, strong relations with other regional actors, and contributions to regional 
security can be integral to acceptance by regional subordinates of the regional power’s 
status. The next sub-section of this chapter will discuss the role of integration and 
institutions for regional powers in more depth. 
2.2.3 Generating regional power: integration, security, and institutions 
This thesis’ introduction proposed that cultural, economic, and political integration was a 
key factor in differentiating a geographical region from a geopolitical one.  Beck (2010) 
suggests that the quality of relations with regional neighbours is crucial to whether or not 
an aspiring regional power will develop into an actual one, and argues that regional 
integration is integral to maximising relations between states at every level of the regional 
hierarchy. Integration in the region is also important to legitimising the position of the 
regional power in two ways: firstly, in terms of regional membership – that is, being 
considered a constituent player in a specific region – and secondly, in terms of developing 
leverage or bargaining power in regional issues. Initiatives such as free trade agreements 
or joint security initiatives facilitate integration in a way that contributes to 
interdependence between states (Prys, 2010). Conceptualisations of integration in regional 
powers debates tend to reflect Keohane and Nye’s characterisation of complex 
interdependence,  highlighting a blurring of domestic and international (or, in this case, 
regional) policy and the declining use and effectiveness of military force (Keohane and 
Nye, 1977). Interdependence does not infer the absence of a hierarchy between states; 
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indeed, Keohane and Nye (1977:10) point out that asymmetrical interdependencies are 
“most likely to provide sources of influence for actors in their dealings with one another”. 
The role of the state in influencing regional security is a key example of both the overlap 
between domestic and regional policy for regional powers and integration processes. 
Challenges to the regional status quo aside, geopolitical instability can have a detrimental 
effect on the regional power’s domestic security. Nolte (2010) therefore argues that 
regional powers have a special responsibility for regional security. The regional power is 
perceived as a regional peacekeeper – as a facilitator, negotiator, or mediator. The premise 
for the role of regional powers in regional security stems from the concept of regional 
security complexes (RSC) (Buzan, 1988; Buzan and Waever, 2003). RSC theory 
hypothesises that security issues are increasingly region-based. Relations between states 
themselves are established and reinforced by patterns of amity and enmity resulting from 
close geographic proximity (Buzan and Waever, 2003). The interdependence between 
states and the transnational nature of some security threats means that insecurity can only 
be tackled through regional cooperation that is facilitated by dominant regional states. 
Both RSC and regional powers theory contend that a dominant power with a 
preponderance of material resources relative to other states in the system should play a 
central role in regional security. Nolte and Flemes (2010), for example, argue that regional 
powers must combine material capabilities and leadership in order to maintain the regional 
order. 
Nolte (2010) and Frazier and Stewert-Ingersoll (2003) go beyond Buzan and Waever’s 
inherently realist depiction of RSCs and incorporate a social constructivist perspective that 
emphasises role perception. Nolte (2010) claims the state’s willingness to act as regional 
peacekeeper or peacemaker, along with the acceptance of the state’s position in the 
regional security hierarchy, are central to defining a regional power’s influence on regional 
security. Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll (2003) apply Wendt’s (1987) understanding of the 
role of social processes in shaping state identity to RSCs. They consider the perception by 
a state of its role in the regional system as a regional security leader, a custodian of 
regional peace, or “protector” of the region from external forces to be instrumental in 
determining the effectiveness of a regional power in constructing and maintaining a 
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regional security order. The regional power is therefore tasked with both enabling and 
sustaining regional security cooperation.  
For the most part, this thesis adopts the conceptualisation of the relationship between 
regional powers and regional security outlined above. However, the literature referenced 
above places too great an emphasis on the regional power as the benign facilitator of 
regional cooperation on security issues. The discussion on imperial and coercive 
hegemonic regional powers later in this chapter suggests that states may also have a 
negative effect on regional security: the projection of military or coercive power against 
other states can contribute to regional instability. Where the regional power is particularly 
dominant, it may define regional security by preventing subordinate states from 
cooperating on security issues that are not in its interest. This thesis therefore points out 
that regional powers may influence the delineation of the regional security system through 
coercion as well as cooperation depending on whether the state adopts a leadership, 
hegemonic, or imperial regional strategy. In discussing Turkey’s role in regional mediation 
efforts and Russia’s incursion into South Ossetia in 2008, chapter five will highlight the 
ways in in which states can both positively and negatively affect the delimitation of the 
regional security system.  
One means of both facilitating regional security and integration more generally is through 
participation in regional governance and, particularly, through engagement with 
multilateral institutions. Institutions, Hurrell (2010:3) writes, are “sites of power” that 
reflect and entrench power hierarchies and the interests of powerful states. For Pederson 
(2002), an active role in regional institutions can enhance the state’s influence over the 
affairs of subordinate states, thus enabling the state to maintain the regional status quo in 
its favour.  As Lopez-Lucia (2015) points out, however, not all regional powers may 
support the development of regional governance structures: most empirical studies of 
Brazil’s regional power ambitions indicate that it has little interest in leading or 
participating in regional institutionalisation (Banfeira, 2006; de Lima and Hirst, 2006; 
Flemes and Wehner, 2012; Lopez-Lucia, 2015).  
For those studying regional powers, multilateralism extends beyond the region and into 
international institutions. Chapter one argued that major powers dominate multilateral 
energy governance. Scholars such as Nel and Nolte (2010) and Flemes (2010) contend that 
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Western and major powers retain predominance in international institutions more 
generally, but suggest that regional powers that can articulate both their own and their 
regions’ interests are becoming more important in international forums. Nel and Nolte 
attribute this new-found significance to a dissatisfaction on the part of developing states 
regarding the omission of specific regional interests from the international decision making 
process. Flemes (2010) similarly argues the leaders of “southern” regions will play a 
pivotal role in transforming the international system into a multiregional order. Ilgit and 
Ozkececi-Taner (2013:31) suggest that regional powers adopt a “soft-balancing” approach 
in international institutions that calls for coalition building and the pursuit of common 
interests. The attempt by Turkey to negotiate a solution to Iran’s nuclear agenda in the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) - discussed in depth in chapter four - is 
conceptualised by this thesis in terms of a regional power both pursuing a regional agenda 
and reform of the international status quo. 
However, chapter four also points to several factors - including energy security and 
Turkey’s territorial integrity - that highlight the significance of self-interest in determining 
the trajectory of Turkey’s position on Iran’s nuclear programme. Hyde-Price (2008) states 
that regional powers look to shape the international system to ensure that it is favourable to 
their economic and security interests. Consequently, the consequences of interdependence 
may not always be benign. Multilateral institutions may both enhance regional integration 
and provide a platform for the dominant regional actor to boost their power and reassert 
their dominance (Nabers, 2010; Kardas, 2013). Hurrell (2010) and Malanund (2011) both 
emphasise the overlap between regional and international agendas and suggest that 
regional powers may regard multilateral leadership as a means through which they can 
gain recognition at a global level. In short, participation in a multilateral structure can be 
beneficial both for the regional power itself and/or for the region as a whole depending on 
the agenda of the regional power. Yet Sever and Oguz Gok (2016) also contend that the 
inability of institutions to constrain the role and unilateral impulses of major states may 
limit regional power influence at the international level. Turkey and Brazil’s failure to 
mediate the Iran nuclear crisis in the United Nations Security Council is cited in chapter 
four as an example of the limited capacity of some regional powers to influence decision 
making at the international level even when - as in Turkey’s case - it is in the state’s own 
and regional interest. Thus, this thesis suggests that regional powers may garner 
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recognition of their regional power or influence when participating in international 
organisations, but may remain constrained in their capacity to affect international change 
beneficial to the region in the context of those institutions.  
2.2.4 Conditions determining regional powerhood 
Based on these core assumptions and the debates on the central features of  regional power 
in IR, it is possible to outline a set of criteria for recognising regional powers. Regional 
powers are states that: 
1. Belong to a geographically, economically, and politically defined and socially 
constructed region 
2. Are economically, politically, and culturally integrated in the region 
3. Possess superior material capabilities relative to other states in the region 
4. Possess ideational assets that enable them to influence regional norms and values 
or to express a collective agenda for the region that is acceptable to other regional 
states 
5. Define and influence regional security 
6. Articulate a self-identification as a regional power and are accepted as such by 
other states both within and external to the region  
7. Influence the geopolitical delineation of the region in a way that also reflects the 
national interest and maintains the regional hierarchy in favour of the regional 
power 
8. Exert influence via regional and international governance structures in both its own 
and regional interest  
9. Have the requisite organisational, political, and ideological capacity to mobilise 
resources and project power (Neumann, 1992; Schrim, 2009; Destradi, 2010; 
Flemes and Nolte, 2010; Nolte, 2010) 
It should also be noted that although most authors develop theoretical frameworks with 
reference to states that are assumed to be regional powers, these criteria are equally 
applicable to states that aspire to become regional powers. Based on the literature, a key 
argument of this chapter is that regional power is not only dependent on the capacity and 
ambitions or intentions of the state, but also on the willingness of the state to act in a 
manner congruent with regional powerhood. In short, the state must not only actively 
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position itself or aim to be a regional power and have the material and ideational capacity 
to carry out its agenda. It must also possess the willingness to utilise those capabilities to 
fulfil its ambitions.  
However, it would be erroneous to assume that all current or aspiring regional powers have 
identical ambitions or regional powerhood strategies. Regions are heterogeneous: they 
may, for example, consist of varying numbers of states and regional powers and 
experience different degrees of regionalisation or interference from states external to 
region. Thus the role, strategy, and legitimacy of the regional power may vary 
significantly. The applicability of the criteria outlined above is dependent on the individual 
regional power, the regional system, and specific policies and issues. Consequently, 
Destradi (2010) introduces three forms of regional power to account for variances in the 
strategies and degrees of legitimacy of specific regional powers: imperial regional powers, 
hegemonic regional powers, and regional leaders.  
The use of these models is not without its limitations. Firstly, each typology is 
conceptualised based on existing debates on imperialism, hegemony, and leadership in the 
global context in the IR literature. Traditional understandings do not account for the 
specially regional context of power relations and, in particular, of the impact external 
actors like great global powers and multilateral institutions may have on determining the 
form of regional power the state adapts or pursues. Alliances with other major powers or a 
strong history of cooperation with other regions may compliment and facilitate the state’s 
capacity to act as regional hegemon rather than a leader (as this thesis argues is the case for 
the AKP). Similarly, enmity between a state and external great power (Iran and the US in 
this thesis) can constrain the capacity of the state to become a regional hegemon. This 
thesis consequently takes care to consider the ways in which external influences affect the 
form of regional power adopted or pursued by Turkey, Iran, and Russia. Indeed, one of the 
thesis’ central conclusions focuses on the necessity of understanding the interplay between 
the international and regional systems in assessing the relationship between energy and 
regional power. 
Secondly, the extent of overlap between the three typologies renders it more challenging to 
ascribe a particular form of power to individual states. This same overlap hinders the 
categorisation of specific strategies within specific typologies. While foreign policy 
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analysis may be more useful in understanding the strategies of particular regional powers 
in other studies, this thesis’ primary focus is energy: something that can be considered an 
element of foreign policy, but which is also deeply intertwined with other policy areas like 
development and defence. Foreign policy analysis is therefore somewhat limited in 
understanding the role energy, specifically, plays in regional power.  
This thesis addresses typological overlaps in two ways. Firstly, it pinpoints definitive 
factors that distinguish between different forms of regional power (military force in the 
case of regional imperialism, for example). These differentiating factors are key to 
categorising states within the typologies. Secondly, it assumes that the typologies are not 
fixed. States may shift between typologies depending on specific geopolitical and temporal 
contexts. Thus, a state may fluctuate between regional hegemony and regional leadership. 
Finally, it should be pointed out at this point these models are ideal types: states are 
unlikely to adhere fully to specific criteria at all types. Nonetheless, the typologies are an 
appropriate analytical tool for categorising the strategies and agendas of regional powers 
and are a useful construct for assessing the balance of power and  relative positions of 
competing regional powers within the regional hierarchy. The next section of this chapter 
will discuss each of these models in turn. 
2.3 Forms of regional power: three typologies 
2.3.1 Regional imperialism 
Of the three forms Destradi (2010) suggests regional powers may adopt, that of empire is 
most limited in terms of applicability to this thesis. Nonetheless, a brief discussion on the 
relationship between empire and regional powers is warranted given the debates in chapter 
five on Russia’s proclivity towards the use of military force against regional subordinates. 
It is important to note from the offset the inherent overlaps between imperial and 
hegemonic forms of regional powers. The predominant objective of imperial strategy is the 
unilateral pursuit of the national interest, which does not in itself differentiate imperial 
regional powers from other forms of regional powers. Similarly, the tendency towards 
exceptionalism and coercive foreign policy strategies (Destradi, 2010) are not unique to 
imperial regional powers strategies: they also feature in debates on hegemonic regional 
72 
 
powers later. Rather, the distinguishing feature of imperial power strategies is the role 
played by the use or threat of military force to ensure compliance among subordinate states 
(Galtung, 1971; Doyle, 1986; Rapkin, 2005).  
The imperial regional power described by Destradi has little legitimacy among other states 
in the region. The state derives a sense of exceptionalism from its dominance in terms of 
material capabilities over its neighbours, systematically rejecting rules and values that 
contravene its own and striving to impose its own agenda onto other states (Destradi, 
2010). The perception of exceptionalism also encourages the state to act unilaterally, and 
often leads to the rejection of system rules or order that contravene the state’s own interest. 
On the international level, Rapkin (2005:399) refers to the US’ failure to participate in the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) as a form of unilateralism that “severed” the state from 
the provision of public goods that is associated with hegemonic forms of power. The 
illegitimacy of the imperial power, Destradi (2010) suggests, begets fear and resentment 
among subordinate states. This may lead to either resistance by subordinates or perpetual 
regional instability. 
The contentious nature of “empire” in contemporary IR literature casts some doubt on the 
usefulness of the term in terms of conceptualising regional powers. Destradi (2010) asserts 
that the definition of “empire” has evolved beyond the occupation or subjugation of a 
sovereign peripheral state by a dominant central state through coercive military, political, 
and economic means. Rather, she advocates for “informal empires” (Destradi, 2010:910) 
based on “relationships of political control imposed by some political societies over the 
effective sovereignty of other political societies” (Doyle, 1986:19). In many regards, 
Destradi’s characterisation of imperial regional powers is closely aligned to Prys’ concept 
of the “regional dominator”: a form of regional power that “commands and extracts 
involuntary tributes from subordinate states under a constant threat of force” (Prys, 
2010:489). Yet in a broad discussion on the notion of empire, Prys and Robel (2011:251) 
are dismissive of the reconceptualization of “empire”. They suggest that extracting the 
necessity of territorial conquest from definitions of empire limits the concept to the extent 
that it becomes commensurate with hegemony. In that regard, Prys and Robel warn against 




This final point is of significance to this thesis. Pederson (2002) associates regional 
imperial strategies with great powers - whether current like the US, or former great powers 
like the UK. Indeed, Pyrs and Robel’s discussion on empire is founded on the debate that 
ignited in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq,18 while Destradi’s own work cites 
only the US in debating the nature of contemporary empire. The prominence afforded to 
material - and particularly military - capacity casts doubt on the applicability of “empire” 
model to advanced developing states given the constraints on military and economic 
capabilities in comparison with major powers. This thesis accepts that an advanced 
developing state may adopt an imperial regional strategy if it possesses sufficiently 
superior material resources to its neighbours, but contends that regional multipolarity and 
the variances in and fluctuations of regional powerhood discussed earlier in this chapter 
mean that imperial strategies are unlikely to be wholly successful. At the same time, this 
thesis is wary of confusing empire with hegemony. It should be reiterated that the use or 
threat of military force is the primary feature that differentiates imperial regional power 
strategies from hegemonic or leadership campaigns. Consequently, while the utilisation of 
the “energy weapon” discussed in chapter one could be framed as a policy to coerce 
subordinate states that are reliant on a regional power for essential resources, it cannot be 
considered an imperial regional power strategy unless accompanied by the threat or 
utilisation of military force. Russia’s campaigns in South Ossetia and Crimea - discussed 
in chapter five-  are, perhaps, the most plausible example of the implementation of an 
imperial regional powers strategy by an advanced developing state in the period under 
consideration. Considering the limitations both on the applicability of imperial strategies 
and on the material capabilities of advanced developing states relative to others in their 
region, it is necessary to consider alternative forms of regional powerhood.  
2.3.2 Regional hegemony 
Scholarly research on hegemony embraces a broad range of ideologies, strategies, and 
agendas whose analytical, empirical, and normative content is highly contested (Prys and 
Robel, 2011). The extent of this work renders a holistic examination of the various debates 
and perspectives on hegemony beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, this section offers a 
                                                     
18 They focus primarily on the work of scholars like Cox (2003), Ikenberry (2004), and Neumann (2004), 
each of whom examines the notion of a US “empire” 
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brief discussion of salient themes in debates on hegemony in the context of regional 
powers. While Destradi (2010) proposes three forms of hegemony - hard, intermediate, 
and soft - in her work on regional power typologies, this thesis focuses on the two forms 
that dominate IR literature on hegemony: benevolent hegemony and coercive hegemony. 
Three caveats need to be applied to this discussion on hegemonic regional powers. Firstly, 
as Prys (2010) notes, the majority of IR literature on hegemony pertains to that at the 
international level and does not account for external factors - such as international 
institutions or extra-regional states - that may exert influence or proffer constraints or 
opportunities for specifically regional hegemonies. These factors therefore need to be 
taken into consideration when assessing individual regional hegemons. Secondly, the 
extent to which a hegemon can be considered either coercive or benevolent is dependent 
on both context and the perspective of individual states: as Prys and Robel (2011:265) 
note, hegemony may appear “a blessing to some and a curse to others”. In chapter five, for 
example, Russia’s regional hegemony will be framed in coercive terms in relation to its 
hegemonic policies towards Georgia and benevolent in terms of its Armenian and 
Azerbaijani strategies. Thirdly, both forms of hegemony are ideal types: it is possible that 
states may conform more strongly to either coercive or benevolent hegemony, or oscillate 
between the two. This thesis will argue that Turkey pursued benevolent hegemony in the 
Caspian, but occasionally implemented coercive strategies. 
 Unlike imperial regional powers, hegemonic regional powers have no singular defining 
characteristic (Destradi, 2010; Flemes and Nolte, 2010). The hegemonic regional power 
may pursue a range of policy options from the provision of material incentives through the 
propagation of norms to the exertion of pressure via the imposition of sanctions. 
Nonetheless, there are several hegemonic characteristics on which there is a broad 
consensus in IR and which are present to varying degrees in both coercive and benevolent 
hegemony.19 Firstly, the state must be dominant in terms of material resources relative to 
other regional states, and be willing and capable of employing material and ideational 
resources to maintain its position in the regional hierarchy. The utilisation of material 
resources takes the form of the provision of public goods within the hegemon’s system: 
                                                     
19 See Kindleberger, 1973; Gilpin, 1981; Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990; Destradi, 2010; Prys, 2010 
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traditional understandings of hegemony focus on the provision of security, stability, and 
open trading systems that facilitate both the interests of the state and regional integration. 
Ideationally, the promotion of common norms, values, and goals can contribute to 
hegemonic power. Secondly, hegemonic powers are inherently self interested: the notion 
of the common regional good may be prominent in the state’s rhetoric, but the state’s 
agenda is guided to a greater extent by its own interests than by those of the region. This is 
the predominant feature distinguishing hegemony from leadership, and will be discussed in 
greater detail later in this section. Third, their position in the regional system is 
acknowledged and acceptance in a way that endows the state with some form of 
legitimacy: Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990:95) suggest that “some degree” of consensus is 
necessary to ensure hegemony. The extent to which the hegemon adheres to each of these 
features, and the way particular power resources are employed, determines whether the 
state can be considered a coercive or benevolent hegemon. 
Power is understood and exercised primarily via material means in coercive hegemonies, 
with the role of the hegemon determined by a significant asymmetry between the sum of 
the material resources of the power and those of its subordinates (Pederson, 2002; Prys and 
Robel, 2011). At its most extreme, the coercive hegemon dominates the region through 
coercion and the exploitation of regional subordinates (Cox, 1996). Coercion is more 
subtle than in imperial powers, with scholars suggesting that economic sanctions, the 
suspension of foreign aid or military cooperation, restrictions on trade, or the suspension of 
diplomatic cooperation can be employed to ensure the hegemon’s regional dominance 
(Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990; Lake, 1993). A central argument of this thesis is that 
energy can be added to these lists: as chapter one argued, producer states may suspend 
energy supplies or manipulate prices in order to generate political concessions from 
consumer states. Energy becomes a tool through which regional powers can develop, 
maintain, and assert their status among other regional states. Chapters four and five will 
argue that both Turkey and Russia have utilised such as strategy against transit or 
consumer states in the wider Caspian region.  
The coercive nature of the hegemon and its focus on material power restricts its legitimacy 
among subordinate states: weaker states comply not because they accept the hegemon’s 
position or values, but because they do not have the capacity to counter it. In some cases, 
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the hegemon may be sufficiently dominant and the dependence on the public goods 
provided by the hegemon - such as Turkey’s dependence on Russian energy - sufficiently 
great that it restricts the capacity of subordinates or weaker regional powers to challenge 
the hegemon. In others, this lack of legitimacy, coupled with “quasi-automatic balancing 
behaviour of non-hegemonic states” (Prys and Robel, 2011:261) contributes to instability 
within the system and renders the hegemon’s position unstable. The coercive hegemon’s 
position is therefore volatile. In order to maintain pre-eminence within the system when 
challenged by subordinate states, the hegemon may either resort to force - thus adapting an 
imperial power strategy - or inject some form of legitimacy into its status through the 
provision of public goods or the propagation of collective ideas and interests.  
Kindleberger (1973) proposes that system stability is determined by the ability of a 
hegemon with a preponderance of power to develop and enforce rules. This willingness of 
the hegemon to enforce rules conducive to stability stems from the hegemon’s “sense of 
responsibility” towards its system (Prys and Robel, 2011:260): the perceived necessity for 
the hegemon to contribute to the system for the benefit of all regional actors. Even if the 
interests of the regional power and its subordinates are not fully compatible, the regional 
power’s agenda is presented as part of a common good in order to generate acquiescence 
among subordinate states for the benefit of the regional power. A rhetorical commitment to 
the common regional good is evident in the strategies of both coercive and benevolent 
regional hegemons, but the discrepancy between rhetoric and policy that contributes to the 
common good is greater in coercive hegemons (Destradi, 2010) - the coercive hegemon 
continues to act unilaterally to ensure its position in the regional hierarchy despite framing 
initiatives as mutually beneficial for all regional states. The coercive hegemony may also 
oblige subordinates to contribute resources to projects it frames as part of the common 
good (membership fees for regional security organisations, for example) or risk being 
excluded from those projects (Gilpin, 1981). 
When the hegemon focuses on the collective good and allows the subordinate states to take 
advantage of stability (Kindleberger, 1973) it may be considered benevolent. Rewards or 
incentives like institutional power sharing or preferential trade deals in return for 
compliance with the hegemon’s agenda are central to power projection by benevolent 
hegemons (Pederson, 2002). Stability is maintained as the hegemon utilises its resources to 
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provide public goods within a system. As with coercive hegemons, the benevolent 
hegemon’s primary goal is its own self-interest: even when providing public goods that it 
frames in terms of the regional interest, the hegemon’s primary goal is to establish a stable 
environment for itself. As Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990:57) note, the processes initiated 
by the hegemonic regional power are used to manipulate behaviour and “alter normative 
orientation and practices….without sanctions, inducements, or manipulation”. In contrast 
to the coercive hegemon, however, there is a more limited discrepancy between the 
rhetoric of and polices implemented by the benevolent hegemon in terms of their 
contribution to the common good: initiatives may benefit the hegemon, but they also 
contribute to the region.  
Benevolent hegemons places greater emphasis on utilising ideational power to alter the 
norms and values of other states in the regional system than do their coercive counterparts. 
Hegemony is established through socialisation, discursive, and cooperative practises, and 
the hegemon is often seen as an integrative power (Pederson, 2002; Hurrell, 2007; Prys 
and Robel, 2011). Wiener (1995) suggests these processes occur at two levels. The first, at 
the structural level, involves the creation of normative or cooperative organisations (such 
as cultural organisations, free trade areas, or joint working groups). Turkey’s role in 
founding BLACKSEAFOR (a naval organisation involving Black sea states) and 
TURKSOY - a multilateral institution that promotes cooperation on the arts and culture in 
Turkic states - are examples of such initiatives. The second is behavioural leadership at the 
level of the state, where common values - like democratisation - are promoted in order for 
the hegemon to gain acceptance (Wiener, 1995). In both cases, the hegemonic state frames 
the initiatives or behaviour in terms of the common good. Both processes require the 
investment of resources by the hegemon. Power sharing in multilateral institutions may 
constrain the capacity of the hegemon to exert power, while the diplomatic and economic 
cooperation generate material costs for the state. Material losses accrued may be balanced 
by the consensual followership gained through these processes that legitimises the 
benevolent hegemon to a greater extent that coercive hegemons, solidifying and stabilising 
their position in the regional hierarchy. While regional subordinates may not be wholly 
supportive of the position of the hegemony, cost-benefit analyses that consider the 
contribution of the hegemon to the regional system limit non-compliance with the 
hegemon’s agenda (Destradi, 2010). 
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The balance between coercion and benevolence in hegemonic strategies is not merely of 
concern for IR scholars but equally, according to Prys and Robels (2011), presents a 
difficulty for hegemonic states in maintaining their role: the greater the coercion, the closer 
the state aligns to imperial understandings of power; the more benevolent the state, the 
more it adheres to regional leadership. The means employed to obtain hegemony 
distinguish it from empire: the hegemon may employ coercive measures, but does not use 
military power. There is greater contestation in the literature regarding the overlap between 
hegemonic and leadership forms of power. Both forms of hegemony indicate that some 
form of leadership is essential to stable hegemony. Wiener (1995:237) suggests that 
hegemonic leadership involves a form of leadership that structures a system out of 
anarchy. The regional security systems discussed earlier in this chapter are an example of 
such a structure: Turkey’s desire to lead to the energy-geopolitical delineation of Caspian - 
which will be discussed at length in chapter three - is another. This should not imply, 
however, that hegemony and leadership are synonymous. Leadership may be an element of 
hegemony, but leadership-style regional powers are not necessarily hegemons. Destradi 
argues that the “goals” of the regional power are the key feature distinguishing regional 
hegemony and regional leadership; that the hegemon “aims to realise its own self-
interested goals by presenting them as common with those of subordinate states” leader 
(2010:921). The regional leader, in contrast, “guides…a group of states in order to realise 
or facilitate the realisation of their common objective” (Destradi, 2010:921). In other 
words, the extent of congruency between self-representation as an actor for the common 
(regional) good and the motivations of the actor are central to discerning between 
hegemonic and leadership styles of regional power. The next section will explore 
leadership in more detail. 
2.3.3 Regional leadership 
Similarly to conceptualisations of hegemony and empire, “leadership” is a contested term 
in IR.  Several conceptualisations of leadership are useful for demarcating a state as a 
regional leader. While Narliker (2013:568) defines leadership as “the willingness to 
contribute to the provision of ... public goods”, Cooper et al (1991:398) contend that 
leadership denotes the embodiment of some form of “greater good” that may or may not be 
contingent on the provision of public goods. Young (1991), in an in-depth analysis of 
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leadership in international institutions, proposes three forms of leadership: structural 
leadership (the application of power derived from material resources to obtain bargaining 
leverage in specific matters), intellectual leadership (“the power of ideas to shape the 
intellectual capital available to those engaged in institutional bargaining” (1991:300)) and 
entrepreneurial leadership (the capacity of a state to set the agenda by overcoming 
stalemates or acting as a mediator and facilitator for deliberations). The leader therefore 
places a strong emphasis on ideational power to help a group “create and achieve shared 
goals” (Nye, 2008:5). Applying these definitions of leadership to regional power theory, 
leadership becomes a means through which a state utilises its ideational or material 
resources to influence regional norms, debates, and outcomes, or to represent the collective 
agenda of the region. 
From this definition, three factors can be discerned that distinguish leadership from other 
forms of regional powerhood. The first concerns the goal of the state and, in particular, the 
role played by Cooper et al’s “greater good” in motivating the state’s actions. In contrast to 
hegemons, who mask self-interested goals and strategies with rhetoric concerning a 
collective need or agenda, leaders guide states “to realise or facilitate the rise of their 
common objectives” (Destradi, 2010:921).  Destradi considers it “unimaginable” for states 
to act against either their self-interest or for wholly altruistic reasons (2010:925). Spektor 
(2010), for example, attributes Brazil’s invocation of ideational leadership to a desire to 
promote the national economy and manage regional disagreement in order to shape 
regional politics and accumulate power. Therefore, it can be argued that the balance 
between self-interest and the common good - or the prominence afforded to one over the 
other - is crucial to distinguishing leadership from benevolent hegemony. 
 The pre-eminence afforded to ideational power is a second variable through which the two 
can be differentiated.  Flemes and Nolte (2010) emphasise the role of ideational power in 
boosting the regional power’s credibility. Thus, Destradi (2010) envisages the ideal 
leadership strategy of a regional power as the pursuit of common goals through a 
cooperative socialisation process. The emphasis on ideational power doesn’t necessarily 
preclude a preponderance of material resources in the leader state. Rather, it indicates that 
the state has sufficient legitimacy to render the employment of material power - especially 
in a manner congruent with coercion and domination - unnecessary (Cooper et al, 1991). 
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A focus on joint gains and the provision of services to subordinates without exception of 
payment or reciprocity are thus of central importance to leadership (Young, 1991; 
Destradi, 2010). Flemes and Lemke (2010) cite South Africa and Brazil as states that have 
accrued regional power credentials through the propagation of ideational leadership; both, 
the authors argue, have exerted regional leadership by proposing ideas, guiding 
discussions, and pushing collective responses on issues like democracy, sustainable 
economic growth, and regional solutions to regional problems. In short, the promotion of 
common narratives enabled the states to solidify claims to regional leadership and enhance 
their candidacy for regional powerhood.  
In contrast to imperialism or coercive hegemony, where followership may be founded on 
submission or acquiescence acquired through dominance and coercion, followership in 
leadership models is based on the extent to which followers accept the leader as 
legitimately warrantying support for its actions or values and trust the leader to act on their 
behalf (Cooper et al, 1991). In other words, the appearance of followership does not 
necessarily compute to leadership unless following states accept the propagation of a 
common interest or goal. Nabers (2010) refers to this strategy as the projection of power in 
its “unobservable form”.  
This legitimacy is the third factor that differentiates regional leaders from other regional 
power typologies. While the previous section indicated that followership was, to varying 
degrees, important to regional hegemons, there is a consensus in debates on leadership in 
IR as to the essentiality of followership for regional leaders (Destradi, 2010). Schrim 
(2012) argues that regional powers must define their regional role by articulating a claim 
for leadership, but that legitimisation of leadership is predicated on the incorporation of 
potential followers’ interests and beliefs into the state’s agenda. Consequently, cooperation 
is considered key to the role and agenda of regional powers. Chapter three highlights the 
AKP rhetoric that framed Turkey’s desire to lead regional pipeline projects in terms of the 
advantages it had for regional integration and stability as an example of this.  
2.4 Regional powers and energy 
The discussion thus far in this chapter has focused primarily on the central themes in 
regional powers debates. It has highlighted how both developed and advanced developing 
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states may be considered regional powers based on their capacity relative to others in 
specific regional systems, and pointed out that the majority of scholarly research focuses 
on advanced developing states. Yet the analytical focus of empirical studies of regional 
powers focuses primarily on the BRICS at the expense of other potential regional powers 
with lesser material and ideational capabilities. Hence, considerations of the material 
resources of regional powers tends to emphasise economic - and in the case of imperial 
regional powers, military - capacity. Moreover, the discussion within the literature 
regarding the provision of public goods by the regional power also focuses primarily on 
monetary goods (in the form of free trade arrangements) and security initiatives. This 
thesis contends that a more expansive discussion that goes beyond the economic/military 
sphere is necessary in order to understand the motivations and role of regional powers in 
the global South. Chapter one argued that energy is a strategic resource and a material 
necessity for advanced developing states, yet it is rarely incorporated into debates on 
regional powerhood or regional power strategy. While this omission is largely congruent 
with the limitations in IR literature on energy and advanced developing states highlighted 
in chapter one, it is nonetheless puzzling considering the regionally focused, natural-gas 
driven energy policies of advanced developing states. This thesis therefore proposes an 
examination of the ways in which energy features in the regional power strategies of 
advanced emerging states. By doing so, it intends to both address the gap in the IR 
literature pertaining to energy in advanced developing states and to contribute to 
understanding the relationship between energy and regional powerhood for those states. 
This section will examine the relationship between  regional powers  and energy. It will 
explore how particular energy policies relate to the regional power typologies outlined 
above, and will consider how the position of the state in the energy chain (whether it is a 
producer, consumer, or transit state) affects its capacity to incorporate energy into a 
regional power strategy. The final part of the chapter considers the application of the 
characteristics of regional powerhood outlined in section 2.2.4 to Turkey, before the 
remainder of the thesis brings these three elements – Turkey, energy, and regional power – 
together. 
Harris’ 2005 examination of China notwithstanding, there are no comprehensive studies 
into the relationship between energy and regional power in advanced developing states. 
Similarly, despite the preponderance of geopolitical examinations of energy and the 
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growth of regionalised energy trade in the literature on energy, regional powers 
frameworks are not utilised to explain the energy decisions of states. Nevertheless, this 
thesis considers regional power literature to be particularly useful for understanding the 
uses and role of energy for rising powers in geographically delineated regions. Taking into 
consideration the conditions determining regional powerhood and the strategies adopted by 
states to consolidate regional power status, in conjunction with the increasing focus on 
regional patterns of energy trade in the energy literature, a clear case can be made for the 
integration of regional powers theory into a framework for understanding the relationship 
between energy and advanced developing states.  
Energy can be a means to an end for those states seeking to achieve or consolidate regional 
power. Chapter one characterised energy as a strategic good through which a state could 
amass wealth and power and exert influence in political, economic, and security systems. 
Cuita (2010) points out that energy resources can alter the balance of capabilities between 
states and, therefore, affect the distribution of power. In the regional powers context, 
producer states can utilise energy resources to establish dominance in a region and 
compete with non-energy rich actors.  Large domestic energy reserves may endow states 
with the means to exert political influence over smaller, importing states within the region. 
. 
Considering the way in which energy is used by the producer in its relations with regional 
subordinates (and, indeed, with other regional powers) is useful in determining which 
regional power typology the state most closely adheres to. Energy producing states can use 
energy as a means to generate and maintain regional hegemony. Asymmetrical 
interdependence that results from overdependence on by a consumer state on a producer 
can facilitate the hegemonic regional agenda of the producer by endowing it with leverage 
over the consumer. The form that hegemony takes depends on the agenda of the regional 
power. If leverage is used to further the regional power’s integration into regional 
economic and energy systems, or to influence the consumer to partake in new bilateral 
security or political ventures that benefit the producer, then it may be considered a form of 
benevolent hegemony.  The application of the “energy weapon” described in chapter one - 
in the form of threats to suspend energy trade or increase prices - can be considered a 
coercive hegemonic strategy. . In more extreme cases, the literature on energy wars is 
83 
 
congruent with an imperial regional powers strategy: there is a focus in both on states 
seeking to enhance material capabilities through force or intervention, acting unilaterally 
and in the national interest.  
Moreover, energy can be considered a tool for obtaining other forms of resources that can 
be deployed to fulfil regional power agendas. The previous chapter indicated that energy is 
a commodity and, as such, generates revenue for energy producers. While the economic 
benefits of energy production can in themself be considered a material asset within the 
regional powers framework, energy income can also be used to purchase other strategic 
assets - including military assets (Zhang, 2011, 2012) – that contribute to the accumulation 
of regional power. For producer states, then, energy is an asset that facilitates the 
developing of the necessary capacity to carry out assertive hegemonic or imperial 
strategies. At the same time, the review of energy literature highlighted how some major 
energy producers depended disproportionately on energy income to fund state activity. It 
pointed out that this also makes those states more vulnerable to energy security risks. If the 
regional power depends on energy income to fund assets that are essential to its regional 
states, then price shocks or the suspension of trade due to instability can have an impact on 
the regional power’s resources. This may curtail the capacity of the state to carry out a 
hegemonic strategy, diluting its regional power or forcing it instead to adopt a more 
benevolent regional strategy. Farzanegan (2011), for example, determined that Iran’s use 
of oil income to fund its military led to reduced military spending during price shocks.  
At the same time, it should be recalled that the discussion on types of regional powers 
earlier in this chapter suggested that a combination of material resources (energy, in this 
case) and ideational power were necessary to generate followership and legitimise the role 
of a regional power within the system. Furtig and Gratius (2010:186) argue, for example, 
that while Venezuela under Hugo Chavez used its considerable oil reserves to generate 
some regional influence through policies like the provision of oil subsidies for consumer 
states, Chavez’s revisionist ideological vision failed to attract support from “medium-
sized” actors in South America and restricted the state’s regional role. Energy resources 
must, therefore, be applied in conjunction with a more comprehensive regional strategy in 
order to successfully contribute to the state’s regional power.  
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The adoption of energy as a tool to advance regional power ambitions is not only the remit 
of producer states. Should they possess sufficient other resources (particularly in economic 
terms), importing states can develop energy strategies that contribute to regional leadership 
or hegemony Turkey, for example, aspires to become a regional hub for the transit of gas 
from the Caucasus and Central Asia to Europe (Bilgin, 2010; Eissler, 2012). Chapter one 
referred to three distinct categories of energy states: producers, consumers, and transit 
states. As a transit state, Turkey has variously been referred to as an energy “corridor”, 
“bridge”, or “crossroads” (Han, 2011:614). Each of these concepts emphasise the 
transition of energy through a specific territory. The state may receive transit fees or tariffs 
from consumer and producer countries, and the consumer may be affected by any 
suspension of supplies due to a political disagreement between the transit state and 
producer, but its ability to benefit from or influence energy trade is limited (Roberts, 2010; 
Han, 2011). Becoming an energy transit state therefore has limited advantages in terms of 
advancing a regional powers agenda: it engenders neither leadership nor hegemony, and 
ensures the balance of power remains with the producer state. 
The hub concept is significantly broader. It conflates the position of the transit state within 
the regional or international energy system with its geopolitical and geo-economical 
ambition. Roberts (2010:42) defines an energy hub as “a trading hub; an arena in which, 
ideally, multiple suppliers meet multiple customers in an open, transparent marketplace”. 
Turkish energy analyst Kivanc Zaimler (in Roberts, 2010:42) expands on this, claiming 
that a hub offers consumers and producers a balance between “financial trading on one 
hand and physical trading on the other”. Bilgin (2010) argues the “hub” concept implies 
not only an ability to influence transit terms (including tariffs), but also re-exportation 
conditions. It is centre not just for the physical transportation of energy, but an energy 
trading centre where “multiple (energy) suppliers meet multiple customers in an open, 
transparent marketplace” (Roberts, 2010:43). The hub must also have geographical 
proximity to both resources and a resource market, sufficient infrastructure to store energy, 
and must be capable of maintaining political relations with both parties to ensure the 
continued sale and purchase of supplies. The regional integration and diplomacy that are 
prerequisites to regional powerhood are also, therefore central to the development of an 
energy hub. In contrast to transit states, hub countries have additional control over energy 
infrastructure and prices that can be utilised as a foreign policy tool after the infrastructure 
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is built (Bilgin, 2010).  Hubs are, therefore, closely tied to regional foreign policy and 
geopolitical agendas: regional cooperation is necessary to both develop and maintain the 
hub, while the extent of control exercised by the hub state over infrastructural security, re-
export routes, price setting, and trading endows it with strategic advantages over other 
countries in the energy system. Each of these factors augments the regional power of the 
hub state. None of the literature suggests that hub states must have domestic energy 
reserves. The development of a Turkish energy hub would increase Ankara’s status in the 
regional energy system, further integrate it – and therefore inflate its legitimacy – in the 
region, and would endow it with increased financial resources through transit and trading 
fees. Consequently, this thesis argues that energy hubs can be a means through which 
energy poor states utilise energy as a strategic asset and through which they may 
consolidate regional hegemony. 
At the same time, energy’s essentialness to economic and military systems and as a 
regional power tool can place constraints on consumer states that are - or seek to become - 
regional powers. Flemes and Wehner (2012) suggest that dependence on a regional power 
for key material resources can shape the responses of subordinate states to the power’s 
regional strategies. Consequently, dependence by one regional power on another to fulfil 
essential energy needs can limit the independence of the former in implementing regional 
power strategies. Chapter five will argue that Turkey’s capacity to enact a hegemonic 
regional strategy was constrained by its dependence on Russia resources: it restricted 
Turkey’s ability to respond to Russian regional aggressions in a manner congruent with 
regional hegemony. It can similarly be argued that dependence by regional powers on 
resources in subordinate states can limit the ability of the former to enact a more coercive 
hegemonic or imperial strategy towards subordinate states because of the potential 
implications for the security and continuity of energy supplies. In addition, energy 
producing advanced developing states may depend on cooperation with external actors to 
develop or finance the development of reserves. That in turn may restrict its capacity to 
implement certain policies.  
Chapter one argued that regional stability is integral to energy security. Ensuring secure 
relations between various actors in the supply chain is essential to security of supply, and, 
as Buzan and Waever (2003) suggest, cooperation between all actors is necessary to ensure 
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regional security. In this regard, the argument that regional powers should define and 
influence regional security is tied to the advanced developing state’s own energy security 
strategies: to maximise domestic energy security and guarantee security of supply, the state 
must ensure regional stability. Taking into account the emphasis on natural gas by 
advanced developing states and the high risks associated with pipeline transit within 
specific geographic regions, this thesis contends that facilitating and shaping regional 
security is pivotal to the successful implementation of those states’ energy agendas. 
Cooperative energy security initiatives- such as those between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and 
Turkey in relation to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline - also serve to integrate 
states into the region and enable them to contribute to defining and influencing regional 
security. Consequently, energy security can also be framed as a common goal by the 
regional power in order to enhance its regional leadership, further progress regional 
integration, and engender goodwill from other regional states that may be conducive to 
regional hegemony.  
Finally, acknowledging the multipolar nature of most regions and the patterns of 
cooperation and contestation that emerge as states compete for regional power status is 
useful for understanding the energy agendas of and relations between states in specific 
geographic regions. The increasingly fraught competition highlighted in chapter one 
between China, Malaysia, and Japan in the South China Sea for that region’s resources can 
be analysed in terms of both regional power and energy dynamics. In the Caspian, an 
established regional power – Russia – competes with aspiring regional powers – Turkey 
and Iran for access to the region’s energy resources. For Russia and Iran, the legal status of 
the Caspian Sea is central to establishing control over its hydrocarbon resources. Russia 
and Turkey have both competed for access to Azerbaijan’s substantial oil and gas 
resources, while Turkey and Iran have developed something of a mutual dependency in 
terms of energy trade. The empirical chapters will show how all three have significant 
resources in comparison to their neighbours, have articulated desires to play significant 
roles in the region, and have attempted to influence the region in a way that reflects their 
national interest. Considering that the remainder of this thesis will focus on the 
relationship of energy and regional powers for Turkey, the final section of this chapter will 
outline the argument for Turkey as a regional power. 
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2.5 Turkey and regional power 
By virtue of its economic growth in the 21st century, regional and international activism, 
and participation in organisations such as the Group of 20 (G20) and MIKTA – the group 
composed of Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia - Turkey’s position 
as a rising economic power was repeatedly asserted during the first three AKP 
administrations. The introduction to this thesis highlighted how IR scholars recognise 
Turkey’s regional credentials. There has also been an increasing tendency within the 
literature to refer to Turkey under the AKP as a “regional power” to contextualise 
Turkey’s foreign policy strategy. Walker (2007), Hill and Taspinar (2006) and Larrabee 
(2007) consider Turkey to be either a regional power or emerging regional power on 
account of specific foreign policy strategies. In each of these analyses, the term regional 
power was used without conceptual or analytical rigour. Turkey was considered a regional 
power, but a regional powers framework was not utilised to explain Turkey’s motivations, 
actions, or relative standing in the regional and international systems. There was little 
debate on whether or not Turkey was, indeed, a regional power, or how it was 
differentiated from other actors in the system that may or may not be considered regional 
powers. In other words, there was limited conceptual or systemic debate concerning 
Turkey’s regional power credentials.  
There are, however, some exceptions that do analyse Turkey’s regional power through a 
regional powers framework. Kardas (2007) determines that Turkey can be considered a 
regional power in multiple regions - including the Middle East and the Caucasus - by 
virtue of its activism in regional and international affairs. Bank and Karadag (2012, 2013) 
argue that the AKP’s domestic consolidation in the mid-2000s facilitated regional activism 
that contributed to Turkey becoming a regional power in the Middle East in the pre-Arab 
Spring era. Onis (2014) applies a regional power framework based on Fleme’s (2007) 
definition of the concept in claiming that Turkey has been relatively ineffective as a 
regional power in the Middle East since the onset of the Arab spring. Despite the 
prominence affixed to energy in Turkish policy under the AKP (something that will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter three), little or no space is attributed to understanding 
energy in Turkey through a regional powers framework. 
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This thesis argues that the literature's focus on Turkey as a regional power in the Middle 
East demonstrates inconsistencies with the conceptual framework for regional powerhood 
outlined earlier in this chapter. Turkey’s engagement with the Middle East under the AKP 
primarily focused on engagement with the Levant; its policies towards the southern Middle 
East (particularly the Arabian Peninsula) were comparatively limited. The continued 
influence by major and great external powers in the region, the role of those states in 
affecting the regional balance of power (particularly militarily), and the sheer number of 
potential regional powers in the region itself (Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iran, and prior to the 
Arab Spring, Egypt and Syria) limited Turkeys relative power and capacity to act in the 
region. The enmity that existed among Arabian states towards Turkey in the pre-AKP 
years20 (Kirisci, 2006; Tocci, 2013) also limited the extent to which Turkey could be 
conceivably framed and accepted as a regional power. Rather, this thesis argues that the 
wider Caspian region - extending from the Caucasus through the western Central Asian 
states and incorporating Iran and Russia – is the region in which an examination of 
Turkey’s regional power credentials is most pertinent based on both the degree to which 
Turkey is integrated in the region and the extent of its regional engagement with other 
regional actors between 2002 and 2014. The following paragraphs will apply the 
characteristics of regional powerhood outlined in section 2.2.6 of this chapter to Turkey 
under the AKP and position Turkey as a regional power in the wider Caspian region. 
1. Regional powers are states that belong to a geographically, economically, and 
politically defined and socially constructed region 
The delineation of a wider Caspian region (see figure 2 below) in which Turkey was 
affiliated was justified in this thesis’ introduction. The geographic proximity of the states 
of the region, as well as the extent to which they were integrated and historically, 
culturally, and politically linked, was highlighted. The following points in this section will 
further expand on regional interdependencies and illustrate the extent to which Turkey is 
economically, politically, and culturally integrated in the region. 
                                                     
20 This enmity stemmed from Turkey’s alliance with the West, support for Israel, historical Ottoman 
occupation of Arab states, and a national security outlook controlled by that viewed Turkey’s Arab 




Figure 2: The wider Caspian region 
2. Regional powers are economically, politically, and culturally integrated in the region:  
Turkey shares “historic, linguistic, and religious ties with a wide range of countries along 
the ancient Silk Road”21 (Davutoglu, 2013). Like Turkey, both Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan are ethnically and linguistically Turkic. Islam is the predominant religion in 
each of Turkey, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan (Aydin, 2004).  The Ottoman 
Empire’s conquests of the Caspian states and competition with Russia and Iran for territory 
and power during the imperial era contribute to Turkey’s shared history within the region 
                                                     
21 The Silk Road was a network of trading routes connecting Asia to Europe; the primary land route passed 
through Central Asia and Iran before transiting Turkey 
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(Fuller, 2008; Fisher Oner, 2009). Bilgin and Bilgic (2011) theorise the extent of historical 
ties between Turkey and the region encouraged the AKP to purse relations with the former 
Soviet Union states of the Caucasus and Central Asia “to the highest level” from the early 
2000s.  
In contrast to their predecessors’ characterisation of Turkey’s neighbours as a source of 
chaos and instability (Aras and Fidan, 2009:197), the AKP viewed its neighbourhood as an 
area of opportunity (Guny and Mandaci, 2013). That Erdogan’s first trip abroad after the 
AKP’s 2002 general election victory was to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan 
(Batuman, 2017) is indicative that the AKP sought to engage in the region from early in its 
first term. Politically, the AKP sought and achieved integration in the Caspian through two 
mechanisms: participation in and leadership of regional institutions (discussed in more 
detail below) and bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Thus, strategic partnerships with 
states like Azerbaijan (2011) and Russia (2011) and Iran (2014) and multilateral 
partnerships such as that between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan (MFA, 2014a, 
2014b) were pivotal in entrenching Turkey within its region. Turkey also engaged with 
Armenia in an attempt to develop diplomatic relations with that state (Larrabee, 2010).  
 Integration into the region was primarily established through economic policies (Kirisci, 
2006, 2009; Kutlay, 2011; Onis and Kutlay, 2013). These will be discussed in greater 
detail in the empirical chapters, but it is important to note at this stage that the extensive 
bilateral trade deals pursued by the AKP were instrumental in facilitating Turkey’s 
regional integration. In addition, the introduction of more liberal visa policies (Kirisci, 
2006) that facilitated business, trade and tourism further integrated Turkey economically 
and socially into the region. Integration was also essential for creating the 
interdependencies that Davutoglu believed would resolve conflicts, mitigate regional 
tensions, and consequently contribute to regional “order” (Kirisci, 2011:42). Each of these 
integrative measures in the cultural, economic, and diplomatic spheres contained elements 
of ideational and material power projection by Turkey, and are congruent regional power. 
Earlier in this chapter, it was argued that the provision of public goods was essential for 
regional power strategies. Turkey provided developmental funds to the region via the 
Turkish International Cooperation and Development agency (TIKA): Aras and Fidan 
(2009) note that in 2007, TIKA contributed $420 million to civil society, education, health, 
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and economic programmes in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Of more relevance for this 
thesis is the emphasis on the facilitation of regional infrastructural initiatives – and 
particularly regional energy and transport projects like the fourth (energy) corridor and the 
middle (transport) corridor (Erdogan, 2007; MFA, 2018b) – as a means to integrate Turkey 
into the Caspian region. Reflecting the debate on the integrative nature of pipelines in 
chapter one, this thesis argues that these initiatives enabled the state to form physical 
connections to other states in the region and encouraged cooperation between regional 
members. These pipeline projects will be the subject of significant discussion in chapter 
three, but it can be noted at this point that Turkey’s participation in the projects was 
closely related to its ambition to enhance  status in regional energy geopolitics (and thus its 
regional power).  
3. Regional powers possess superior material capabilities relative to other states in the 
region 
Turkey has possessed significant military and demographic capabilities relative to most of 
its neighbours since before the AKP’s 2002 election victory. Turkey has a similar 
population size to that of Iran (82 and 80m respectively) but a far smaller population than 
that of Russia (142m) (World Bank, 2017b). In the Business Insider’s comprehensive 
comparison of global military power - which takes into consideration numbers of active 
personnel, tanks, aircraft, aircraft carriers, submarines and nuclear warheads - Turkey 
ranks 8th, behind Russia in second but ahead of Iran in 22nd place (Bender, 2015).  
While the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)’s Military 
Expenditure database shows that both population growth and military expenditure and 
power have remained relatively steady throughout the AKP’s three terms in office (SIPRI, 
2017), the AKP’s most substantial contribution to Turkey’s material resources was in 
terms of economic growth. In 2014, Ankara’s GDP was similar to that of Iran and greater 
than any state in the Caspian except for Russia (World Bank, 2017c). Ozkececi-Taner 
(2012:190) suggests that economic power was essential to Turkey because it enabled it to 
“buy” influence and become a regional power. After the domestic economic crisis in 2001, 
Turkey’s economic capacity in its regions had been negatively affected by high domestic 
inflation, the devaluation of the lira and low economic growth that necessitated IMF 
intervention. Under the AKP, however, data shows that Turkey’s GNP increased from 
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$240 billion (bn) in 2002 to $934 bn in 2014, reaching a high of $951 bn in 2013 (World 
Bank, 2017a). Foreign direct investment (FDI) increased from $1 bn in 2002 to a high of 
$22 bn in 2007, after which the global financial crisis saw a decline in FDI to $13 bn in 
2014 (World Bank, 2017a). Considering that the majority of this increased trade was 
within its region (Kutlay, 2009), this thesis argues that the AKP’s focus on economic 
growth not only increased its material capacity but also contributed to its integration in its 
locale. In other words, a regionalised trading focus augmented the regional power that 
Turkey held by virtue of its preponderance of material resources. 
Finally, though it is not mentioned in the regional powers literature as a dominant material 
factor, Turkey’s geostrategic location contributes to its regional power. Turkey lies on 
energy and trade routes between the Middle East, Central Asia, and Europe. In terms of 
regional powers, Turkey’s power lies in its capacity act as a conduit for the export of 
resources from the Caspian to Western markets. Its capacity to facilitate the flow of goods 
between the regions increases its importance in particular to land-locked states like 
Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan. A particular theme of the the era under examination in this 
thesis was the AKP’s rhetoric concerning Turkey’s capacity to facilitate energy trade 
between east and west. The remaining chapters of this thesis will argue that Turkey’s 
geostrategic location is a significant asset in redressing its dependence on energy imports 
from Caspian states like Iran and Azerbaijan.  
4. Regional powers possess ideational assets that enable them to influence regional norms 
and values or to express a collective agenda that is acceptable to other regional actors 
The AKP’s Islamic background and the Turkish state’s balance between an Islamic society 
and secular democratic governance were ideational assets during the period under 
consideration. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a “Turkish Model” of secular 
democracy, economic liberalisation, and Islamic society was promoted to counter the 
theocratic Iranian model (Aydin, 2004; Bilgin and Bilgic, 2011:186). Between 2002 and 
2014, the AKP placed additional focus on its religious ties with the Muslim world 
(Barysch, 2010) which, within the Caspian region, included Iran, Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan.  In addition, the effective merger of Islam and democracy 
in the AKP party itself was an asset in projecting Turkish power throughout its regions. 
Consequently, Onis and Yilmaz (2009:12) contend that the AKP adapted a “new 
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discourse” that highlighted a “moral/normative” aspect that transcended self-interest. They 
suggest that this is most evident in Turkey’s participation in the multilateral institutions. 
Common values aside, the AKP’s pursuit of a foreign policy independent of Western 
influence (Duzgit and Tocci, 2009; Onis, 2011) was important to showcase Turkey as an 
autonomous actor rather than as a Western proxy. Previous administrations had closely 
aligned Turkey’s foreign policy with that of its allies in the EU and US. In contrast, the 
AKP emphasised the expansion of Turkey’s engagement with its eastern neighbours. Onis 
and Yilmaz (2009:13) refer to this access shift as a move from “Europeanism” to “soft-
Euroasianism” - a process that Onis (2011) suggests accelerated after the AKP won its 
second term in office. Indeed, there is a strong consensus in the literature that Turkey’s 
European project experienced something of a rupture around the start of its second term. 
On one hand, the decision by the EU to freeze eight central chapters of the aquis 
communautaire in 2006 contributed to a decline in Turkish interest in the EU project 
(Oner, 2013). On the other, the 2007 election victory and the defeat of a constitutional 
indictment the following year increased the AKP’s self-confidence. This contributed to the 
increasing disinterest in the EU accession process and a strong belief in the state’s ability 
to influence regional affairs (Onis and Yilmaz, 2009; Bank and Karadag, 2012; Ozpek, 
2012). During this period, Turkey became increasing proactive in projecting its regional 
power (Aras, 2009; Burga Kanat, 2010; Robins, 2013). Yet Turkey’s relationship with the 
West was also an important asset in demonstrating the country’s normative power in 
bridging gaps between the developed and developing states, or between the non-Western 
world and the West (Aras, 2009). In that regard, relations with the EU, UN, or US were 
beneficial in projecting the image of a Turkey who could act and affect change in the 
interests of regional states. As chapter three will argue, Turkey’s relationship with EU was 
particularly advantageous in the development of an east-west energy corridor between the 
Caspian and the West.  
This thesis also suggests that the AKP’s “visionary” (rather than crisis-orientated) 
approach to regional security issues (Davutoglu, 2010) can be construed as an ideational 
resource. Murnison (2006:953) indicates that Turkey’s status was enhanced by attempts to 
position the state as a “just and impartial arbiter” in regional politics by virtue of the focus 
on meditation and pre-emptive security cooperation in the AKP’s foreign policy. Overall, 
94 
 
however, this thesis concurs with Onis and Yilmaz’s claim that pragmatic relations based 
on economic – rather than ideational – factors have been the backbone of Turkey’s foreign 
policy in the region (2009). The propagation of democratic norms, for example, was a 
dominant feature of AKP rhetoric towards the Middle East in the immediate aftermath of 
the Arab Spring (Ulgen, 2012) but was largely absent from Turkey’s relations with the 
Caspian states. The empirical chapters will illustrate how Turkey’s relationships with 
states in the wider Caspian region were primarily based on economic cooperation. 
5. Regional powers define and influence regional security 
 The AKP was proactive in attempting to shape regional security patterns in its first three 
terms. A policy of “proactive and pre-emptive diplomacy” (Davutoglu, 2010) emphasised 
the necessity of dealing with potentially destabilising events before they emerged or 
reacting immediately to security threats. This policy placed significant emphasis on 
regional stability in Turkish foreign policy strategy and was instrumental in the 
formulation of several regional security institutions (Davutoglu, 2010, 2012, 2013). 
Turkey positioned itself as a mediator or problem solver in both the Iranian nuclear crisis 
and the South Ossetian War (Barysch, 2010). It also prioritised the resolution of frozen 
conflicts like that in Nagorno-Karabakh (Aras and Fidan, 2009). Focusing on regional 
conflict resolution had the potential to define the regional security order on Turkey’s terms 
and projected the image of Turkey as a facilitator of regional security (thereby increasing 
its standing in regional and international communities). This thesis will show that many of 
these initiatives were not entirely successful. Nonetheless, this thesis considers the AKP’s 
regional security strategy to be indicative of a self-perception of regional power. Its 
leadership in some regional security initiatives (BLACKSEAFOR) and in cultural and 
diplomatic programmes intended to pre-empt or limit regional antagonism can also be 
framed as contributing to regional stability in a manner congruent with regional power. 
The extent of perceived threats to Turkey’s domestic security facilitated what Snyder 
(1999:114) calls “co-operative security” on a regional level. The dilution of military 
influence in the policy making apparatus in comparison to previous decades enabled policy 
makers to frame neighbourhood security issues in a manner that was significantly different 
to the previous defensive, military-focused framework (Larrabee, 2010; Yesiltas, 2013). 
Rather, the new government sought to stabilise its neighbourhood through the creation of 
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economic and political interdependencies (Davutoglu, 2010). Kirisci (2010) argues that the 
AKP saw interdependence based on a series of interlocking economic and political 
processes as a functionalist tool for conflict resolution and peace building. By maintaining 
positive relations and creating interdependencies with all regional states, Turkey believed 
it could prevent the escalation of conflicts and pre-empt and contain emerging threats in a 
manner that increased its leverage in regional affairs. It should also be reiterated at this 
stage that Turkey’s interest in security affairs in the Caspian did not preclude it from 
playing a similar role in other regions: throughout the first two AKP terms (between 2002 
and 2011). Turkey also placed significant emphasis on de-escalating tensions and 
facilitating peace in the Middle East,22 and focused particularly on instability in its Iraqi 
and Syrian neighbours in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.  
It would be erroneous to suggest that Turkey’s regional security interests were based 
entirely on securing the interests of the region as a whole. Regional insecurity was 
detrimental to Turkey’s territorial integrity and national security and posed a risk to its 
economic agenda (Barysch, 2010). As well as providing regional leadership in the security 
sphere, therefore, the policy was essential to ensuring domestic security and preventing the 
escalation of conflict in states with which Turkey had significant trade relations. This in 
turn contributed to the stability of Turkey’s regional power. In addition, chapter one 
concluded that regional stability is particularly important for the transportation of natural 
gas. Turkey’s policy of ensuring “zero problems with neighbours” (MFA, 2018c) therefore 
benefited its energy agenda. For example, had Turkey contributed to the resolution of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict– a key objective of Turkey’s regional foreign policy (MFA, 
2015h) –Turkey’s regional power credentials would have been enhanced and a new transit 
route opened for Azerbaijani gas supplies via Armenia.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
6. Regional powers articulate a self-identification as a regional power and are accepted as 
such by other states both within and external to the region 
 The term “regional power” became increasingly prominent in the Turkish lexicography 
during the first three AKP administrations. Key government actors referred repeatedly to 
                                                     
22 See, for example, Croft’s report (2010) on mediation between Israel and Syria  
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Turkey’s potential as a regional power (Babacan, 2008c; Davutoglu, 2009, 2013) or as a 
current regional power (MFA, 2013a). Turkey also emphasised its key role as a provider of 
regional security and public goods in its application to the UNSC, suggesting that it was in 
the process of realising a “vision of peace, stability, and economic prosperity for the 
region” (Erdogan, 2007). Thus the AKP had strong perceptions of the regional power role 
it believed Turkey should and could play (Kardas, 2012; Oguzlu and Parlar Dal, 2013). 
This thesis argues that the enhanced emphasis placed by the ruling party on foreign policy 
in Eurasia after the second election victory in 2007 and declining interest in adhering to 
Western - and particularly EU - foreign policy agendas (Onis and Yilmaz, 2009; Onis, 
2011; Robins, 2013) is indicative of an increasing confidence by the AKP in its ability to 
influence regional geopolitical equations without external help. 
There was recognition from within the region of Turkey’s status as a regional power from 
both Russia (Lavrov, 2005; Putin, 2008, 2010) and Azerbaijan (Azerbaijani MFA, 2004, 
2011). Officials from external states including Germany (MFA, 2015h) have also referred 
to Turkey as a “regional power”. Emphasising regional issues like the Iranian nuclear 
programme in international institutions like the UNSC also facilitated a degree of 
acceptance by regional and global powers of Turkey’s regional status (Kardas, 2013; Sever 
and Oguz Gok, 2016). Thus, as Walker (2007:30) argues, under the AKP Turkey became 
less a “bridge” or “barrier”, and more a catalyst for regional change: in other words, a 
regional power. 
Yet Turkey’s role in the region was not entirely uncontested. Chapters four and five will 
show that, while outwardly recognising Turkey’s major role in the region, both Iran and 
Russia repeatedly pursued policies that undermined Turkey’s position in the regional 
hierarchy. In particular, Russia’s regional and international energy objectives - with their 
emphasis on regaining predominance in former Soviet Union energy markets and 
controlling energy flows from the former Soviet sphere to Europe - were entirely at odds 
with Turkey’s energy hub and regional power ambitions. As such, the implementation of 
the Moscow’s energy agenda placed it in direct competition with Ankara. However, the 
ability to do so successfully was in some cases curtailed by the reluctance of Azerbaijan in 
particular to develop stronger bilateral ties with Russia. Iran, as chapter four will argue, 
was incapable of challenging Turkey’s role in the region in any meaningful way because 
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of its limited regional integration and dependence on Turkey as a energy conduit to 
external markets.  
The subordinate states of the Caspian were similarly restricted in challenge the positions of 
either Turkey or Russia in the regional hierarchy. The dependence by the Caucasian states 
on Ankara and/or Moscow for trade and security cooperation and as conduits to Europe 
limited their ability to contest Ankara and Moscow’s roles in the region. Azerbaijan in 
particular was required to engage with one of the two states in order to export its 
substantial hydrocarbon resources to energy markets. The subordinates’ agency lay 
primarily in bandwagoning: by engaging with Turkey, they contributed to the further 
dilution of Russia’s influence in its backyard and elevated Turkey’s strategic importance; 
in favouring Russia, they contributed to a Russian stranglehold over the region and limited 
Turkey’s role in the region. It was to Turkey’s benefit, therefore, that reducing Russian 
dependency was a key objective of most regional subordinates. While the 2002-2014 was 
not without challenges from regional subordinates , this thesis argues they were largely 
accepting of  Turkey’s role in the region. 
Finally, recognition of the region itself should be taken into account when considering the 
acceptance or contestation of Turkey as a regional actor. For states in the Caspian, this 
contestation stems in large part to the multiregional location of key actors. Like Turkey, 
Iran and Russia border multiple regions: the former on the cusp of the Caspian and the 
Middle East, and the latter between the Caspian and Europe. Both also border Central 
Asia, with Russia maintaining a strong interest in the former Soviet states in the region and 
Iran an interest in the ethnically Persian, Shi’ite Tajikistan and its near neighbour, 
Afghanistan. The complexity of interplay between these regions for each of the three 
regional powers contribute to ambiguity in the definition of specific regions in national 
discourse; as chapter three will demonstrate, Turkey itself rarely explicitly defined the 
Caspian region outlined in this thesis. Rather, it is in the extent of cooperation and 
contestation of regional issues specific to the Caspian - particularly in terms of energy 
flows, frozen conflicts, and the demarcation of the Caspian Sea - that make the wider 
Caspian area a geopolitical region. 
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7. Regional powers influence the geopolitical delineation of the region in a way that also 
reflects the national interest and maintains the regional hierarchy in favour of the regional 
power 
The influence of major and Western powers has been relatively limited in the wider 
Caspian region compared to that in Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbourhood. The AKP’s 
emphasis on regional solutions to regional problems in its foreign policy meant that 
Turkey’s foundation of groups such as the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform 
(CSCP)23 or Operation Black Sea Harmony24 were intrinsic not only to demonstrating 
Turkey’s power capacity, but to maintaining regional and Turkish security and the 
country’s position in the regional system. The final point was particularly important in 
terms of Turkey’s capacity to retain its regional power: in a discussion on Turkey’s foreign 
policy in the Middle East that is equally applicable to the wider Caspian region, Aras and 
Yorulmazlar (2014) argue that Turkey’s regional agency is dependent on maintaining the 
regional status quo. In chapter five, it will be argued that maintaining the existing regional 
hierarchy was particularly important to Turkey in order to ensure the security of its energy 
supplies and to develop its energy hub ambition.  
8. Regional powers exert influence via regional and international governance structures in 
both its own and regional interest 
Turkey’s “deep commitment to multilateralism” (Bayer and Keyman, 2012) was evident 
throughout its first three terms in office. Among the key features of the party’s foreign 
policy between 2002 and 2014 was the concept of “rhythmic diplomacy” (Davutoglu, 
2010, 2013, 2014). Defined by Ahmet Davutoglu, the “intellectual architect” of Turkish 
foreign policy (Aras, 2009:147), as active interaction with international institutions on 
matters of international importance (Davutoglu, 2010), rhythmic diplomacy saw Turkey 
pursue a more active role in regional and international institutions. Though participation in 
regional institutions such as Operation Black Sea Harmony, the Caucasus Cooperation 
Platform, and the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States, Turkey sought to exert 
                                                     
23 A regional stabilisation organisation proposed by Turkey in the aftermath of the South Ossetia War  
24 A naval cooperation organisation established in 2004 comprised of the Black Sea littorals 
99 
 
political, economic, and cultural influence in its region in a manner that corresponds to 
theoretical depictions of a regional power. 
In addition, Turkey participated in and sought reform of multilateral organisations such as 
the UNSC and Organisation for Islamic Countries (OIC), and was successful in instigating 
some reform in the latter (Ozcan, 2007). The UNSC was an important arena in which 
Turkey could showcase its regional power credentials, and Turkey’s election as an non-
permanent representative  in 2009-10 demonstrated the willingness of the state to take a 
leading role in multilateral institutions. In addition, the receptiveness of other states to 
Turkey’s election bid25 highlights the acceptance of Turkey’s capacity to act in a 
multilateral institution. More specifically in terms of regional power, chapter four 
concludes that Turkey’s decision to take a prominent position in negotiations on the 
Iranian nuclear issue demonstrated the state’s willingness and capacity to represent and set 
the agenda on issues that affected its own region (Sever and Oguz Gok, 2016). However, 
Sever and Oguz Gok (2016) argue that while regional states accepted Turkey’s role as an 
agenda setter in the UNSC, chapter five shows that it gained only minimal acceptance 
from global players and its overall influence was limited. 
9. Regional powers have the requisite organisational/political and ideological capacity to 
mobilise power resources and project power 
Relative domestic stability in comparison to the short-lived governments and frequent 
coups of previous decades and economic resurgence in the aftermath of the 2001 economic 
crisis enhanced the capacity of the AKP to mobilise its resources in the regional security, 
infrastructural, and governance projects discussed elsewhere in this chapter. In addition, 
the new foreign policy doctrine advocated by the AKP government was a key factor in 
Turkey developing the requisite ideological capacity to enhance its regional power 
credentials (Aras and Fidan, 2009). Here, the interaction between domestic and foreign 
policy in Turkey becomes evident: there is a consistent argument in the literature on 
Turkish foreign policy that the dilution of military-bureaucratic influence on policy 
formulation in the late 1990s had enabled the AKP to develop a foreign policy more 
                                                     
25 151 out of 192 voting members of the UN General Assembly voted for Turkey in the 2008 election for one 
of two “Western European and Others” seats on the UNSC (UN, 2008)  
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focused on regional cooperation and economic engagement rather than national security 
(Murnison, 2006; Barkey, 2010; Larrabee, 2010; Tur, 2013). Moreover, the AKP’s 
emphasis on asserting an independent foreign policy endowed Turkey with more agency to 
carry out its regional foreign policy than under prior Western-allied administrations. 
The organisational capacity of the AKP was also enhanced by the party’s growing self-
confidence following a consolidation of power in the 2007 general election victory 
(Keyman and Gumuscu, 2014). The literature on Turkish foreign policy provides a clear 
delineation between three political periods eras during the first twelve years of AKP rule: 
2002-2007, when the AKP began to focus increasingly on its region; 2007-2011, when 
Turkey became increasingly assertive in its region; and 2011-2014, when Turkey’s 
activism in the Middle East became constrained as a result of the Arab Spring, the Syrian 
Civil War, and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Burga Kanat, 2010; 
Robins, 2013). This last point does not apply to this thesis given that Turkey’s policies in 
the Caspian remained relatively consistent between 2007 and 2014. Consequently, this 
thesis recognises two eras of Turkish regional power in the Caspian: one of increased 
regional engagement in the pre-2007 period, and one of self-assuredness and assertiveness 
after 2007.  
Based on the discussion above, this thesis contends that Turkey was a regional power in 
the wider Caspian region between 2002 and 2014. However, it would be remiss to suggest 
that Turkey is the only regional power in the Caspian: both Russia and Iran also have 
considerable power and influence in the region, and the former’s material resources dwarf 
those of Turkey. Ozkececi-Taner (2012:199) suggests that Turkey must maintain a 
“juggling act” with other powers that balances action, rhetoric, acquiescence and 
cooperation in order to retain its status. The empirical chapters will consider the forms of 
regional power adopted by Turkey first in its energy strategy and, consequently, in its 
engagements with Iran and Russia.Energy, as the next chapter will discuss, is one of the 
primary factors determining geopolitical trajectories and power in the Caspian region. 
Turkey’s meagre domestic energy reserves pale in comparison with regional states like 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan; they are virtually non-existent in comparison with those of 
Iran, Russia, and Turkmenistan. If energy and power are intrinsically linked and regional 
power can vary from issue to issue, then Turkey’s energy strategy must necessarily 
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account for its relative lack of regional power with regards to that particular resource. 
Nonetheless, chapter three will argue that the AKP saw energy as a strategic tool. It 
postulates that the AKP’s energy agenda between 2002 and 2014 was conflated with a 
foreign policy narrative that emphasised integration, regional security, and Turkish 
regional power. It is this convergence that facilitates this thesis’ contention that the AKP 
considered energy not merely as an economic necessity, but as a tool for the accumulation 
of regional power.   
2.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has explored the concept of regional power. It determined that three primary 
conditions facilitate regional powerhood: the material and ideational capacity of the state; 
the willingness to utilise those resources in manner beneficial to the state’s position in the 
regional hierarchy; and the perception that the state is a regional power. Nine further 
characteristics for identifying regional powers were extrapolated from an examination of 
the literature. It was acknowledged that not all regional powers have the same capacity, 
ambitions, or regional power strategy. Three regional power typologies based on the IR 
concepts of empire, hegemony, and leadership where then outlined. Each stressed specific 
characteristics and regional power strategies. It was argued that regional powers may 
oscillate between typologies depending on specific contexts.  
After pointing out that empirical studies of regional powers were largely restricted to 
major advanced developing states like the BRICS, the chapter highlighted the failure of 
existing literature to incorporate energy as a significant material resource. It argued that 
energy was a tool and an objective for regional powers at every stage of the supply chain, 
and that energy could both constrain and contribute to broader regional strategies. At the 
same time, it suggested that specific energy policies – such as those to ensure energy 
security – can be understood though a regional powers framework when the centrality of 
energy to economic growth, military functionality, and regional integration was taken into 
account.  
The final section of this chapter situated Turkey as a regional power in the wider Caspian 
region between 2002 and 2014.  It indicated that Turkey’s limited energy reserves meant 
that the state was at a disadvantage in a region in which other regional powers - like Iran 
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and Russia - compete with emerging energy providers like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and 
Kazakhstan for access to and control over energy markets and systems. Examining the 
ways in which Turkey conflated its energy needs and ambitions with regional powerhood 
in a regional system dominated by energy affairs is the purpose of the remainder of this 
thesis. Chapters four and five will look specifically at this convergence in terms of 
Turkey’s relations with Iran and Russia. First, however, chapter three will take a broader 
look at Turkey’s energy strategy in the AKP era and determine the form of regional power 




3. Turkey's Energy Strategy, 2002-2014 
3.1 Introduction 
Turkey’s energy strategy between 2002 and 2014 was shaped by the state’s dependence on 
energy imports to fuel the domestic economy and the AKP’s desire to play a more active 
role in the regional energy system. With its emphasis on bilateral cooperation, pipeline 
politics, and development, Turkey’s energy strategy assumed geopolitical and economic 
importance. Energy become a priority not only for the Ministry for Energy and Natural 
Resources (MENR), but also for the Ministry of Development (MoD) and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA). Explicit in energy discourse during this period was a desire to 
elevate Turkey’s role in regional energy systems, and to manipulate these systems to 
encourage regional integration and stability. Consequently, this thesis argues that energy 
was not just a strategic necessity for Turkey in terms of fulfilling economic and societal 
energy requirements domestically: it was also conceptualised as a tool through which 
Turkey could advance a broader geopolitical agenda. 
While a focus on energy security and diversification remained relatively consistent in 
Turkey’s energy strategy between 2002 and 2014, this thesis demarcates three specific eras 
of energy policy and rhetoric. These periods overlap with the three foreign policy eras 
outlined in chapter two. The first, between 2002 and 2006, was founded on the necessity 
for Turkey to increase its energy imports to facilitate economic growth. This period 
highlighted the party’s interest in engaging with its eastern neighbourhood in a manner that 
corresponds to regional power. The second began with the inauguration of the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in 2006 and lasted until 2012. It was argued in chapter two that 
self-confidence in the aftermath of the 2007 election victory strengthened the AKP’s belief 
in its capacity to affect regional affairs, and this thesis contends that that confidence 
extended into the energy sphere. During this period, the government adopted a more 
hegemonic style of energy governance that emphasised Turkey’s capacity to shape 
regional energy affairs and utilise energy as a power resource to augment the state’s 
regional power status. Finally, this thesis asserts that geopolitical upheaval in the aftermath 
of the Arab Spring afforded the wider Caspian region a greater prominence in Turkey’s 
energy strategy between 2012 and 2014. The Syrian Civil War, the rise of ISIS and 
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continued instability in Iraq rendered Turkey’s plans to enhance its energy relations with 
its southern neighbours unrealistic. Engagement with energy rich Caspian states became a 
prerequisite to the realisation of Turkey’s ambitions, and section 3.4.3 of this chapter will 
demonstrate that it was during this period that inter-regional energy negotiations reached 
an apex.  
The first section of this chapter examines the energy situation in Turkey between 2002 and 
2014. It explores Turkey’s energy mix in terms of fuel type and source, and will look at the 
core actors involved in policy formation. Considering the extent to which regional energy 
imports contributed to the state’s energy mix, this section will also consider the role 
geography played in determining Turkey’s energy policy. In doing so, it will introduce the 
reader to the energy situation in the wider Caspian region. 
The second section will focus on Turkey’s energy agenda during the same period. Based 
on a study of documents from relevant Turkish ministries, it highlights three “themes” 
relevant to IR  in the state’s energy policy: energy security, energy diversification, and the 
development of a Turkish energy hub. This section also assesses these issues in relation to 
regional power, arguing that they had the potential to position Turkey as a key actor in the 
regional energy system. In stressing the benefit for Turkey of the AKP’s regional energy  
agenda, it will argue that the state’s energy strategy between 2002 and 2014 is congruent 
with regional hegemony.  
The final section of this chapter will examine two issues that both facilitated and impeded 
the Turkey’s energy strategy. First, this section will examine the relationship between 
regional instability and energy strategy. It argues that while interstate and frozen conflicts 
in the Caucasus posed a threat to Turkey’s energy security, the AKP believed it could 
position itself as a regional security provider by utilising its position as a regional energy 
power to encourage cooperation and integration. The second part of this chapter’s final 
section looks at resource competition in the Caspian and argues that the extent of 
interference from other states in regional energy debates limited  the application of the 
AKP’s energy agenda. Instead, Turkey often became a secondary player in the energy 
ambitions of other states to the detriment of its regional power ambitions. It is argued that 
the AKP underestimated the geopolitical motivations behind the competition between 
other actors with regards to the construction of regional pipelines. The chapter therefore 
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asserts that Turkey’s consequent support of all pipelines transiting Turkish territory 
regardless of source, route, or sponsor is emblematic of the inconsistencies that riddled 
Turkey’s energy policy. These inconsistencies, it is argued, undermined the potential 
contribution of energy to Turkey’s regional power. 
3.2 Turkey’s Energy Situation 
Energy consumption in Turkey grew substantially between 2002 and 2014. This growth is 
generally attributed to a combination of demographic changes in Turkish society and rapid 
economic growth in the years following the 2001 economic crisis (MENR, 2009, 2014; 
IEA, 2016). The World Bank (2017a) indicates that Turkey’s GDP increased in all but two 
years during the period under examination, with average growth of 6% reaching a high of 
11.1% in 2011. During the same period, the population grew by 10% and the country 
experienced both rapid urbanisation and a significant migration from rural to urban areas 
(MoD, 2014b; IEA, 2016; World Bank, 2017a). These factors placed pressure on existing 
energy systems and ensured that energy was a priority for the new AKP government. 
Turkey’s low self-sufficiency in terms of energy provision placed an additional urgency on 
the need to implement of a comprehensive energy strategy. Domestic reserves of oil had 
been declining since reaching peak production in 1991 (EIA, 2005), and fulfilling 
Turkey’s energy requirements had required successive governments to increase 
dependence on foreign imports. This section will explore the energy system in Turkey 
between 2002 and 2014. It looks firstly at the sources of Turkey’s energy supplies and the 
routes through which imported fuel reaches the Turkish market. It then highlights the 
dominant actors involved in formulating and implementing the AKP’s energy policy. The 
final part of this section focuses on geography: firstly, on the role Turkey’s geostrategic 
location played in its energy strategy; and secondly, on the energy geography of Turkey’s 
region. 
3.2.1 Energy supplies and sources in Turkey 
Turkey’s energy usage increased substantially between 2002 and 2014. Energy data 
compiled by the IEA (2016:213) shows that Turkey’s total primary energy supply (TPES) 
grew from 75.96 million tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe) in 2000 - two years before the 
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AKP’s first election victory - to 121.54 mtoe in 2014. Despite successive policy proposals 
stressing the necessity to invest in renewable energy resources (MoD, 2006; MENR, 2009, 
2014b) fossil fuels continued to account for the majority of primary energy supply during 
the first three AKP administrations. Indeed, the share of fossil fuels in Turkey’s TPES 
actually grew slightly from just over 86% in 2002 to 90% in 2014 (IEA, 2016). While the 
share of coal in TPES remained stable throughout the AKP era because of high levels of 
domestic production and supplemental imports from countries including China, Russia, 
and Australia (IEA, 2009, 2016), the biggest shifts in energy use during the period under 
consideration occurred in the oil and gas sectors. 
 
Figure 3: Turkey's TPES, 2015 (IEA, 2016:23) 
The majority of oil and gas consumed by Turkey during the AKP era was imported. The 
Oil and Gas Journal’s annual survey of energy reserves showed that Turkey held 296 
million barrels of oil (mb) in domestic reserves in 2014 (Oil and Gas Journal, 2014:32).26 
It produced 61,000 barrels of oil in 2014, but consumed over 83, 000 barrels. Exploration 
for new reserves off Turkey’s Black Sea coast has proved unsuccessful (EIA, 2015b), and 
Turkey consequently imports over 90% of its oil supplies (EIA, 2017d). Iran and Iraq 
                                                     
26 For comparison, Venezuela - which ranks first in terms of proven reserves of oil - holds  301 billion 




combined supply just over 60% of Turkey’s oil, with Russia, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, 
and Colombia contributing an additional 26% (EIA, 2017d). Turkey maintained a 
relatively diversified oil supply mix in terms of both source country and route despite 
market dominance by its southern neighbours. Those oil supplies reached Turkey over land 
(Russia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan), and via sea tankers (Russia, Colombia, Saudi Arabia, 
Kazakhstan), and - most pertinently for this thesis because of their association with 
regional politics - through pipelines.  
 
Figure 4: Oil Supply by Source (IEA, 2016; EIA, 2017d) 
As of May 2018, Turkey has three fully operational oil importing pipelines. The first, the 
Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, began transporting oil from Iraq to Turkey’s Mediterranean port 
of Ceyhan in 1978 (IEA, 2016). It took 20 years to conclude negotiations for a second oil 
pipeline. In 1997, Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan signed an intergovernmental 
agreement to transfer 1.2 million barrels of oil per day (mb/d) from Baku to Ceyhan via a 
new Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline (EIA, 2017d). Construction of the pipeline 
began in 2002 - after the AKP’s first election victory - and the project became operational 
in 2006. According to the IEA (2009), the BTC began incorporating Kazakh oil from 
2008. The pipeline was the first concrete manifestation of the fourth corridor, a US- and 
EU-supported initiative that will be discussed in greater depth later in this chapter. During 
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the AKP’s second term, Turkey concluded an agreement with the autonomous Kurdish 
Regional Government (KRG) of Northern Iraq to construct a pipeline linking oil-rich KRG 
territory to the Kirkuk-Ceyhan line. The pipeline was completed in 2013, and began 
transporting oil to Turkey in 2014 (Swint, 2014). 
 
Figure 5: Turkey's transnational pipelines. (EIA, 2017) 
The AKP era coincided with an exponential increase in Turkey’s gas usage and an 
accompanying marginal decrease in oil as a percentage of TPES. IEA data (2016) shows 
that in 2002, oil accounted for circa 42% of Turkey’s primary energy supply. By 2015, that 
figure had decreased to 30.1%. Natural gas consumption in the same period rose by almost 
400% from 12.58 billion cubic metres per annum (bcm/a) to 48.1bcm/a (IEA, 2016)as the 
AKP increasingly focused on natural gas in its energy strategy (this will be discussed in 
more detail later in this section). Turkey has only very limited domestic supplies of natural 
gas, and lack of domestic production meant that 99% of natural gas supplies were 
imported. The latest data from the EIA (2017d) shows that in 2015, Russia contributed 
56% of Turkey’s domestic supplies, Azerbaijan 11%, and Iran 16%. The remaining 16% 
of gas imports in the Turkish market consisted of LNG trade with Algeria, Qatar, Nigeria, 




Figure 6: Natural gas supply by source (IEA, 2016; EIA, 2017d) 
While LNG imports grew throughout the AKP era (IEA, 2016), technical and 
infrastructural limitations in the Turkish energy sector meant that gas was primarily 
transported to Turkey through four natural gas pipelines. Gas first began flowing to Turkey 
from Russia in 1987 via a Trans-Balkan pipeline that passed through Ukraine, Moldova, 
Romania, and Bulgaria (EIA, 2017d). In 1996, Turkey agreed to purchase 10bcm/a from 
Iran via a new Eastern Anatolian pipeline (MENR, 2017a). The pipeline was constructed 
relatively quickly, and operational in December 2001. In 1997, Russia and Turkey signed 
an agreement to construct a natural gas pipeline beneath the Black Sea. Russia and Turkey 
have no shared borders and, according to Russia’s national natural gas company, Gazprom 
(2017a), the decision to build the pipeline underneath the Black Sea was partly driven by a 
desire by the states to bypass third party transit countries.27 While the Blue Stream 
agreement has never been made available publicly, each of the EIA (2017d) and Gazprom 
(2017a) have stated that the total capacity of the pipeline is 16 bcm/a, with the EIA 
(2015b) further suggesting that the pipeline was intentionally constructed with 138bcm 
                                                     
27 Chapter five will argue that even though  restricting Turkey’s dependency on Russian imports was a 
priority for the AKP, the state’s growing energy needs and the failure to develop any energy relations in the 
former Soviet regions in the 1990s had been major factors in encouraging previous administrations to 
increase energy trade with Russia 
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spare capacity. It is through this spare capacity that Russia was able to increase supplies to 
Turkey via the Blue Stream when supplies from other states were interrupted during the 
AKP era.28 The pipeline became operational in 2003, and initial flows of 1.3bcm gradually 
increased to a high of 14.7bcm in 2014 (Socor, 2009b; Gazprom, 2017a). Finally, the 
discovery of the Shah Deniz giant gas field off Azerbaijan’s Caspian coast in 1999 led to 
an intergovernmental agreement to carry Azerbaijani natural gas from Azerbaijan to 
Turkey via Georgia in 2001. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE)29 pipeline became 
operational in 2007, and has a total capacity of 8.4bcm (EIA, 2016h). Like the BTC, the 
BTE is part of the fourth corridor project and its construction received substantial political 
support from the EU and US. 
The proliferation of natural gas pipeline agreements in the 1990s and their initiation in the 
early 2000s was a key factor in the rise of natural gas as the dominant energy source in 
Turkey during the AKP era. Other justifications for focusing on natural gas originated in 
the pre-AKP era but were readily adopted by the party after its 2002 election victory. In 
outlining the national developmental agenda in 2000, Mustafa Bulent Ecevit’s coalition 
government had argued that natural gas had a “special place” in Turkey’s energy strategy 
and, because of its “advantages regarding price, productivity and the environment”, 
increasing the share of natural gas within overall energy consumption was a “priority” 
(MoD, 2000:165). These “advantages” were  repeatedly brought up in discourse during the 
AKP era, with additional emphasis placed of the utility of natural gas supplies for 
generating the electricity necessary for maintaining economic growth and for ensuring 
energy security (MoD, 2006, 2014b; MENR, 2009, 2014). The discovery of new natural 
gas fields in the wider Caspian region in the late 1990s and throughout the 2000s (EIA, 
2013a) and growing prominence of natural gas in the international energy system more 
generally (see chapter one) also contributed to increased focus on natural gas supplies and 
agreements during the first three AKP administrations.  
Both natural gas and oil took on an additional dimension in the AKP era as a tool for 
foreign policy. Energy was perceived not just as a material objective to ensure the 
                                                     
28 Supplemental Blue Stream supplies were used to make up shortfalls after an explosion on the Eastern 
Anatolian pipeline interrupted Iranian supplies in 2012 (Soldatkin, 2012). 
29 The BTE is sometimes referred to as the South Caucasus Pipeline, and is marked as such on some of the 
maps used in this thesis 
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continued functioning of the state, but as a means to forge interdependencies with regional 
states and to enhance regional integration. This focus on energy as a tool for the realisation 
of Turkey’s regional ambitions will be discussed in greater detail in the second section of 
this chapter. First, however, section 3.2.2 will examine the key actors involved in energy 
policy formulation in the AKP era in order to gain a more nuanced understanding of why 
particular policies or agendas were afforded prominence. 
3.2.2 Domestic actors 
The introduction of a natural gas market liberalisation law in 2001 created a complicated 
energy bureaucracy in Turkey (Natural Gas Law, 2001). Nonetheless, the Ministry for 
Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) remained the main body responsible for 
overseeing the formulation and implementation of the state’s energy agenda between 2002 
and 2014 (IEA, 2016). Several state-owned public companies were responsible for 
managing various aspects of energy under the auspices of MENR. Most relevant for this 
thesis are Turkey’s Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS) (which is responsible for oil 
and natural gas transportation, natural gas trade, and LNG infrastructural operations) and 
Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), the body in charge of upstream activities in the 
domestic and international oil sectors. While Natural Gas Market Law No. 4646 (2001) 
obliged BOTAS to reduce its share of the natural gas market to 20%, the EIA (2017d) 
reports that BOTAS maintained its dominance throughout the AKP era. By 2014, it 
continued to account for 80% of natural gas production and almost all domestic 
distribution. Similarly, TPAO retained control of 72% oil production in 2014 (EIA, 
2017d). The apparent reluctance of the AKP to fully implement liberalisation legislation 
meant that state interests maintained a stranglehold on technical aspects of energy policy - 
such as pipeline and transportation networks and energy reserve development - in Turkey 
throughout the AKP era.30 
                                                     
30 The failure to fully implement the legislation can be attributed to legislative and bureaucratic weaknesses 
in Turkish energy governance. New distribution companies entering the market are obliged to purchase 
supplies from at least two different sources (Natural Gas Market Law No. 4646), but limited domestic 
supplies and BOTAS’ market domination restrict the opportunities available to interested parties. Moreover, 
the lack of repercussions for BOTAS’ failure to adhere to unbundling legislation is indicative of weaknesses 
within both the legislation and the bureaucratic structure of the national energy apparatus. The EIA (2017) 
points out that timelines for BOTAS unbundling were not binding and were repeatedly extended. Without 
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The discussion on resource nationalisation in chapter one indicated that greater state 
ownership over resources often endows the state with more control over the national 
economy, and increases the extent to which energy policy is determined by or used to 
facilitate other national agendas. This thesis consequently argues that continued state 
ownership of resources and pipeline and distribution networks during the AKP era 
enhanced Turkey’s capacity to merge energy strategy with other policies. Most prominent 
among the ministries for which energy was a concern under the AKP were the Ministry of 
Environment and Urban Planning, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the 
Ministry of Development (MoD). The latter two departments are of most relevance to this 
thesis because the former focuses primarily on the implementation of domestic climate 
change and renewable energy policy. Considering the strong relationship between energy 
and development highlighted in chapter one, it is unsurprising that energy was a recurrent 
feature in the MoD’s discourse. The MoD is responsible for planning Turkey’s 
development policies and coordinating between various ministries, actors, and groups to 
“spur Turkey’s economic and social development and achieve stable and sustainable 
development” (MoD, 2014a:5). Forecasts for continued economic growth in Turkey in the 
2002-2014 period indicated that that pressures on existing energy supplies and 
infrastructure needed to be addressed with supplemental energy sources (IEA, 2010). That 
the majority of new energy supplies were expected to benefit power plants and industrial 
users (EIA, 2015c) was indicative of the core link between economic growth and energy 
demand. Throughout the AKP era, a strong economy was at the centre of Turkey’s broader 
strategic goals (MoD, 2006, 2014b): it would endow Turkey with the material resources to 
enact its foreign policy and to elevate its global status. Consequently, energy was a core 
developmental goal for Turkey.  
However, it was the MFA that became most involved with energy policy process during 
the AKP’s tenure. The extent of cooperation between the the MFA and MENR led Foreign 
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to declare in 2011 that Turkey’s energy strategy had been 
“integrated” with its foreign policy strategy (Davutoglu, 2011). Discourse emanating from 
both departments highlights an overlap between the themes and terminology evoked by the 
two. The emphasis on geography and Turkey’s geostrategic position that had traditionally 
                                                                                                                                                                
reprimand for failure to adhere to the National Gas Market Law, BOTAS has little incentive to unbundle and 
open up the domestic market to competition. 
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dominated foreign policy rhetoric manifested in MENR’s five-yearly Strategic Plans. 
Those documents pointed to the “advantages brought by [Turkey’s] geostrategic position” 
(2009:29) and the role of the state’s “geopolitical position” in enabling Turkey to become 
an “active actor” in regional energy markets (2014:74). Similarly, Energy Minister Taner 
Yildiz (2010:16) stressed Turkey’s “indispensable geopolitical position” in global energy 
markets”. Equally significant, however, was the focus in both MENR and MFA discourse 
on the development of pipeline infrastructure. Drawing on the regional power debates in 
chapter two, the next section of this chapter argues that new pipelines would 
simultaneously encourage regional integration and stability and elevate both Turkey’s 
credentials in the regional energy system and its geostrategic significance more generally. 
Pipelines were therefore not only crucial to Turkey’s energy policy, but were perceived as 
a means through which the AKP could advance a foreign policy agenda correspondent to 
regional hegemony. The prioritisation of energy by the AKP and the incorporation of 
energy into the foreign policy narrative was evident from the first foreign trip by the AKP 
hierarchy after its 2002 election victory: the incoming Turkish president not only bought 
the energy and foreign ministers with him on a trip to Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and 
Kazakhstan, but media reports from the trip show that the president repeatedly referred to 
energy matters in discussions with reporters (Lowe, 2003). 
The following sections draw on a wide range of sources but focus primarily on documents 
and discourse from the MENR, MFA, and MoD to provide an in-depth understanding of 
the factors that shaped Turkey’s energy agenda during this period between 2002 and 2014. 
MENR’s Strategic Plans - detailed policy proposals published every five years outlining 
the development of Turkey’s national and international energy agenda - are central to 
analysis in this chapter. Two of these Strategic Plans (2009, 2014) will be consulted in 
depth; the third - published in 2004 - was found to be unattainable. Statements from Hilmi 
Guler and Taner Yildiz, ministers for energy and natural resources from 2002-2009 and 
2009-2015 respectively, will also be included. The MFA publishes less detailed documents 
on energy, but its Energy Strategy (MFA, 2015b) and other relevant publications will be 
referenced. Of more significance from a foreign affairs perspective is the discourse of the 
three foreign ministers of the period: Abdullah Gul (2002-2007), Ali Babacan (2007-
2009), and Ahmet Davutoglu (2009-2014). All were vocal on energy issues during their 
tenures, and each also held other positions during the period under consideration that are 
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relevant to energy policy. Gul, for example, was president of Turkey between 2007 and 
2014, Babacan served as minister for economic affairs between 2002 and 2007, and both 
Gul and Davutoglu served as prime minister. Finally, the MoD is responsible for the 
formulation and publication of Turkey’s five-year development plans, of which the eighth, 
ninth, and tenth bear relevance for this thesis. The following sections of this chapter will, 
therefore, consult these three National Development Plans (2001, 2006, 2014b) in 
assessing energy strategy in the AKP era.  
3.2.3 Turkey’s energy geography 
Before moving on to discuss Turkey’s energy strategy in more depth, it is important to 
highlight the central role Turkey’s geography played in energy policy formulation. Bilgin 
(2007:742) argues that in Turkey, 
 “the discourses of seemingly diverse actors collude with one another to produce 
one assumption: that Turkey’s geographic location is more unique than others are, 
and that it has more deterministic power over Turkey’s policies than in some other 
countries”. 
 While the legitimacy of that assertion may vary in other policy areas, primary sources 
demonstrate that the uniqueness of Turkey’s geopolitical location was an omnipresent 
feature in energy discourse throughout AKP era. In a 2009 interview, Gul stated that 
Turkey lay “in a unique and strategic location in-between the countries that hold two thirds 
of the world's proven natural gas reserves and major Western energy markets” (2009). 
Thus, MENR highlighted the “advantages offered by the geostrategic position of [Turkey] 
as a major opportunity for the realisation of Turkey’s energy agenda” (MENR, 2009:9). In 
the same way, the MFA suggested that Turkey’s “privileged natural bridge position” 
provided the state with “both opportunities and responsibilities” with regards to energy 
security, and that it intended to “strengthen [that] unique role given by its geostrategic 
location” (MFA, 2017c). The MoD (2006:83) suggested that making “efficient” use of 
Turkey’s geostrategic location within the parameters of the state’s energy agenda would 
strengthen that geostrategic position “even more”. Similarly, Yildiz (2010:17) wrote that 
Turkey had an “indispensable geopolitical position” in terms of transporting energy. 
115 
 
Each of these quotes emphasise that Turkey’s geostrategic position is derived from its 
location between the energy rich east and resource poor Europe, though there is a lack of 
consistency in terms of referring to particular regions. The MoD (2007:20) referred 
broadly to Turkey’s strategic location in international energy markets in “both east-west 
and north-south directions”, and more specifically to Turkey’s capacity to transport oil and 
gas to Turkey from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. In the 2010-
2014 Strategic Plan, MENR (2009) highlighted the state’s proximity to the Middle East 
and the Caspian Basin on one hand and Europe on the other.  
The introduction to this thesis outlined a “wider Caspian region” stretching between the 
Caspian and Black seas. Both the extent of energy reserves in this region and the 
geographical and geopolitical realities of the region played a major role in the AKP’s 
tendency to stress Turkey’s geographic position during the period under examination. 
Geopolitical issues affecting the implementation of Turkey’s energy agenda will be 
debated in section 3.4 of this chapter. In order to illustrate why the wider Caspian region 
played such a key role in Turkey’s energy agenda - particularly in relation to the continued 
emphasis on Turkey’s geostrategic position - the following paragraphs will briefly outline 





Figure 7: The wider Caspian region. 
The wider Caspian region consists of eight states: Turkey, Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Armenia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. Of the eight, Turkey, Armenia, and 
Georgia have negligible reserves of fossil fuels and import a significant percentage of their 
energy requirements (EIA, 2013b, 2017c, 2017d). The Caspian region’s energy riches lie 
in its riparian states. Total oil reserves of the five Caspian littorals stand at 276 billions 
barrels, while total proven gas reserves are 93.9 trillion cubic metres (tcm) (see figure 8 
below). Russia and Iran have the largest reserves of natural gas in the world, are among the 
top ten states globally in terms of oil reserves, and have been producing oil and gas for 
decades (EIA, 2015d, 2016g). While the other littorals also have significant energy 
reserves, the focus by the central Soviet government on developing north western Siberian 
oil and gas fields meant that energy resources in the former Soviet republics went largely 
unexplored until relatively recently (EIA, 2013a). Similarly, international sanctions on Iran 
and the state’s economic difficulties in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war limited the 
financial or technical capacity of Tehran to develop its considerable oil and gas reserves 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s (see chapter four). When the AKP came to power, then, 
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there were significant untapped energy reserves in the region that the energy hungry 
Turkey could exploit.  
 Oil (billion barrels) Gas (trillion cubic metres) 
Russia 102 32 
Azerbaijan 7 1.1 
Kazakhstan 30 1 
Iran  158 34 
Turkmenistan 0.6 17.5 
Littoral Total 275.6 93.9 
Figure 8: Energy reserves in the Caspian (BP, 2017c) 
The most significant impediment to bringing the energy reserves of the Caspian littorals to 
international energy markets was the states’ geographical location. Of the five littorals, 
only Russia - through its European borders and maritime routes in the Baltic and north 
Pacific - has any significant access to energy markets. Each of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
and Turkmenistan are landlocked, effectively ruling out the transportation of oil or LNG 
resources by sea tanker. Their geographic remoteness from significant energy markets in 
south and east Asia and Europe makes pipeline construction expensive and, because of 
regional instabilities, often insecure. Further difficulty arose from the reluctance of former 
Soviet states to engage in energy relations with Russia: as chapter two pointed out, many 
of the former Soviet states were eager to limit dependency on Russian infrastructure, trade, 
and technical expertise in order to assert their economic and political independence. In the 
energy sphere, Babali (2010) writes, former Soviet states sought to bypass Russian energy 
systems and routes when exporting energy. As chapter four will argue in more depth, 
Iran’s failure to realise its proposal to construct a natural gas pipeline to India via 
Afghanistan and Pakistan and its limited LNG facilities restricted its capacity to export 
natural gas to global markets. Thus Turkey, with its apparent geostrategic exceptionalism 
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and access to European markets, was primed to offer those states an outlet for the 
transportation of their resources to international markets. This geographic advantage was 
central to the regional power ambition that that will be examined in the next section. It 
contributed to the formulation of an energy strategy that utilised geography as a means to 
address the role of energy as both a strategic necessity and a geostrategic tool. Yet it will 
also be argued that overconfidence regarding the extent of Turkey’s geostrategic 
significance almost undermined the implementation of the energy agenda. The next section 
considers this agenda in more detail. 
3.3 Turkey's energy agenda, 2002-2014 
3.3.1 Key themes 
While geography played a significant role in the AKP’s energy rhetoric, MENR’s energy 
strategy between 2002 and 2014 was broad. It incorporated issues as diverse as corporate 
responsibility in the energy sector and the introduction of new research and design 
initiatives in the renewable sector (MENR, 2009, 2014). Overall, however, three themes 
dominated Turkey’s energy agenda. The first was driven by the necessity to ensure 
domestic energy security. Related to the energy security agenda, and the second dominant 
theme in the AKP’s energy strategy, was the drive to diversify Turkey’s domestic energy 
market and ensure a more varied selection of sources and routes for Turkey’s energy 
imports. The diversification agenda was necessary for the realisation of another major 
energy ambition: the creation of a Turkish energy hub where oil and gas could be 
imported, traded, and exported. The three themes were closely related. A secure supply of 
energy through a diversified energy system was necessary to fulfil the hub agenda, and the 
energy hub was often espoused by key actors as a means through which security could be 
maximised. This section will first briefly examine the ways in which energy security 
dominated energy discourse exploring the diversification and hub agendas. It will then 
look at the ways in which Turkey’s energy strategy can be understood through a regional 
powers framework. 
Energy security was a core issue that guided Turkey’s strategy between 2002 and 2014. 
The energy minister’s statement in the introduction to the 2010-2014 Strategic Plan that 
the main target of Turkey’s energy agenda was “to provide the energy resources to all 
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consumers adequately, with high quality, at low costs, securely, and in consideration of the 
sensitivities about the environmental matters” (MENR, 2009:1) is largely congruent with 
the definition of energy security developed in chapter one. The MoD similarly argued that 
energy security was the “main objective” in terms of energy policy because of the 
necessity to “supply the energy required for economic and social development in a 
continuous and secure manner at minimum cost” (MoD, 2006:82), while the MFA 
explicitly stated that Turkey’s “ primary aim” was “to realise its own energy security” 
(MFA, 2015b). Security was evidently a dominant factor underlying energy policy in this 
period, and understanding the perceived threat to energy security is, therefore, essential to 
any assessment of Turkey’s energy policy. Section 3.3 of this chapter will look in depth at 
four of those security issues that played a significant role in Turkish energy policy between 
2002 and 2014: affordability of supply, geopolitical threats, external influences in regional 
energy systems, and competition for access to supplies and control of pipeline routes in 
Turkey’s neighbourhood. It is argued that these “threats” are all founded on the 
dependence on external sources of energy to fulfil Turkey’s energy agenda. 
The first section of this chapter drew attention to the central role played by energy in 
sustaining Turkey’s economic growth. It also noted the extent to which Turkey was reliant 
on external supplies of oil and gas to fulfil those energy requirements. Throughout the 
AKP’s first three administrations, dependence on external hydrocarbon resources to fulfil 
the state’s energy requirements was often cited as a key concern in policy documents 
(MoD, 2001, 2006; MENR, 2009, 2014). Consequently, a significant proportion of each of 
MENR’s Strategic Plans (2009, 2014), MoD’s Development Plans (2000, 2006, 2014b) 
and the MFA’s Energy Strategies (2015a, 2017d) focused on the necessity to alleviate 
perceived risks of energy dependency in order to maximise energy security. Common 
policies advocated by all three departments to enhance energy security included the 
development of domestic resources (both renewable and finite), a reduction in energy 
intensity, energy market competitiveness, and increased energy efficiency.  
Most pertinent for this thesis, however, was the persistent emphasis on energy 
diversification and the necessity to diversify energy resources and routes. Chapter one 
argued that diversification, though not synonymous with energy security, is a prominent 
strategy for importing states seeking energy security. During the period under examination, 
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the AKP pursed diversification both domestically and in terms of imported resources. As 
the first section of this chapter noted, the AKP were successful in diversifying Turkey’s 
renewable base between 2002 and 2004: IEA statistics show that each of wind, hydro, 
geothermal, and solar energy increased during the AKP’s first three terms (IEA, 
2016:214). At the same time, however, it was noted early in this chapter that Turkey’s 
hydrocarbon consumption also increased in this period. Chapter one argued that natural 
gas and oil are irreplaceable in terms of transportation and industrial development, 
particularly in advanced developing countries that may be industrialising rapidly and be 
without existing renewable energy infrastructure. Finding new sources of natural gas and 
oil were therefore central to the AKP’s energy security strategy.   
 Each of MENR, the MFA, and the MoD demonstrated an awareness of limitations of 
domestic resources development and the inevitability of continued reliance on 
hydrocarbon imports. Each advocated the diversification of external energy sources and 
routes. The acknowledgement of “ the relative insufficiency of the domestic resources [of 
Turkey] especially in terms of oil and natural gas in proportion to the rising energy 
demand” (2009:13) by MENR in its 2010-2014 Strategic Plan indicates that while 
domestic exploration was a priority, obtaining new and diversified external sources of oil 
and gas was the department’s primary objective. The Strategic Plan (2009:16) therefore 
focused extensively on diversifying “resources, routes, and technologies” “for the purpose 
of increasing the energy supply security”. The MoD’s ninth Development Plan (2006:82) 
suggested that in order to enhance security of supply, “a balanced resource diversification 
on the basis of primary energy resources and country of origin” should be guaranteed, 
while the tenth Development Plan emphasised “a more balanced resource diversification 
on the basis of primary energy resources and differentiation of origin countries” (MoD, 
2014b:104). Similarly, Gul’s statement that the main objectives of Turkey's energy policy 
were “to strengthen national supply security, and ultimately, help diversify our 
own...routes and resources” (Gul, 2009) drew attention to the connection between security 
and diversification.  
Aside from contributing to Turkey’s energy security, developing new energy links with 
regional actors would further integrate Turkey in the region and create new 
interdependencies that, chapter two argued, were essential to regional powerhood. As the 
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instigator of that integration, Turkey would also elevate its regional power status. 
Simultaneously, drawing on the discussion of regional power in the previous chapter 
indicates that providing an outlet for energy resources from those former Soviet states that 
sought to dilute Russia’s influence in their national economies would enhance Turkey’s 
utility to, and leverage over, those states. Moreover, creating new energy relationships 
with states like Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan - which, it was argued earlier in this chapter, 
had plentiful natural resources as a result of underdevelopment in domestic energy systems 
- had the potential to reduce Turkey’s reliance on competing regional powers like Russia 
and Iran for essential energy supplies. Chapter two argued that dependence by one regional 
power on another for essential services - like energy - weakened the claim to regional 
powerhood, and rendered the state more susceptible to attempts by supplier states to utilise 
the service to wield political or economic influence. Section 3.4 of this chapter will discuss 
these points in more depth with reference to relevant literature.  
The success of the diversification agenda was dependent on Turkey utilising its 
geostrategic significance to develop energy trade with a varied selection of energy 
producing countries. This geostrategic significance was also essential to the perception that 
Turkey was a strategic energy conduit between east and west. Despite this thesis’ focus on 
the Caspian region, the introduction pointed out that Turkey belonged to or participated in 
multiple regions. Turkey’s geostrategic importance in the energy sphere was predicated on 
the state’s multi-regionalism and, particularly, the intersection of its energy policies in the 
energy rich Caspian and Middle East and the energy-hungry Europe. This section 
postulates that the energy hub agenda, Turkey’s geostrategic position between energy 
markets and suppliers, and the acceptance by EU actors of Turkey’s utility to Europe’s 
energy strategy elevated the state’s regional status in the Caspian. To better understand 
why this was the case, a brief deviation into Turkish-EU energy relations is necessary. 
 Chapter one pointed out that the EU – and particularly states located in the geographic 
centre and east of the union - is dependent on gas imports from Russia, and that the 
diversification of gas sources and routes were central to the EU’s gas strategy. Turkey had 
been earmarked by the US as a strategic player in the EU’s energy security as early as 
1999 (Bryza, 2007) and was portrayed as playing a “pivotal role in diversifying resources 
and routes for oil and gas transit from neighbouring countries to the EU” (EU 
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Commission, 2004:117). In part founded on the EU’s increasing interest in energy security 
in the 21st century, cooperation between the EU and Turkey on energy projects in the AKP 
era were also prompted by the necessity for Turkey to comply with common energy 
standards as part of its EU accession bid31. 
Erdogan highlighted Turkey’s commitment to energy projects between east and west in his 
first foreign trip as President of Turkey in 2003, telling reporters during a visit to Baku that 
Azerbaijani gas would “be delivered through Turkey to Europe” (Lowe, 2003). With the 
inauguration of the BTC - the first Caspian-European pipeline to transit Turkey - in 2006, 
rhetoric regarding Turkey’s role as a conduit for supplies to Europe intensified and became 
more geopolitical. Then-president Ahmet Necdat Sezer suggested that that the BTC 
highlighted Turkey’s geographic position at the centre of the world’s “new strategic oil 
and gas transport corridors” (BBC, 2006). From an EU perspective, EU Commissioner for 
Energy Andreas Piebalgs (2007) argued that the project had “decisive geopolitical 
importance” and stated that Turkey was the “link, the corridor, the bridge to those 
regions”.  The proposal by the EU in its Second Strategic Energy Review (European 
Commission, 2008c:4-5) to construct a “southern energy corridor” to transport resources 
from the Caspian and Middle East and ensure the union’s energy security further 
emphasised the EU’s necessity to engage in energy dialogue with Turkey. 
Despite the rupture that chapter two suggested had occurred in Turkey’s Europeanisation 
project after the AKP’s second election victory in 2007, the party continued to emphasise 
Turkey’s importance as an energy bridge between Europe and Asia. The MFA wrote in 
2009 that becoming a corridor for the transfer of gas to Europe constituted one of the 
“substantial elements” of Turkey’s energy strategy (MFA, 2009b). Rhetoric also 
increasingly emphasised the role Turkey could play not just as an energy transit route, but 
as a provider of energy security. Thus Babacan argued that Turkey would “contribute more 
and more to the energy policy of the European Union” (Babacan, 2008), and that Turkey 
had “a lot to do” with ensuring the EU’s energy supply security” (Babacan, 2009). 
Similarly, the MFA’s energy strategy prioritised Turkey’s “contribution to Europe’s 
                                                     
31 Energy markets aside, Turkey’s relationship with Europe and its EU membership application lies primarily 
outside of the remit of this thesis. For an overview of Turkish-EU affairs, see Onis (2003, 2008),  Kutuk 
(2006), Zucconi (2009), Morozov and Rumelili (2012), Yesilda (2013), or Robins (2013) 
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energy security” (2015). The Nabucco project in particular was perceived as a means 
through which Turkey could contribute to Europe’s energy agenda because, according to 
the MFA, it would “vastly contribute to the strengthening of...energy security through 
route and source diversification” (MFA, 2009b). While Turkey’s self-conceived role as a 
provider of energy security to Europe does not have significant bearing on the 
classification of the state as a regional power in the Caspian, it is nonetheless reflective of 
the augmented self-confidence of the AKP in the post-2007 era. 
The perceived centrality of Turkey to European energy security and Ankara’s involvement 
in EU-sponsored projects like Nabucco32 had the potential to lend legitimacy to Turkey’s 
claims of geostrategic significance. Indeed, in 2014 Kenan Yavuz - the president of the 
State Oil Company of  the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) - attributed Turkey’s growing 
role in regional stability to Turkey’s position as “the bridge between the Caspian region 
and Europe” (Badalova, 2014). Throughout the period under examination, actors including 
the European Commission (2004a, 2004b), foreign ministers of Sweden and Italy (Bildt 
and D’Alema, 2007), and Luxembourg’s head of state (Hurriyet, 2013c) referred to Turkey 
as a key actor in the EU’s energy security agenda. The validation of Turkey’s claims to be 
a key stable energy partner for Europe demonstrated to consumer states that Turkey had 
the capacity to forge energy relations with those states to which Caspian countries wished 
to export energy. By providing gas-rich states with a route to energy markets, Turkey 
enhanced its significance to Caspian states. This thesis argues that this was congruent with 
the assertion in chapter two that validation of claims of significance by relevant external 
actors can boost the perception of (aspiring) regional powers by subordinate states, and 
thus contribute to the state’s regional status. Moreover, it posits that the necessity for 
Caspian states to engage with a reliable transit state with access to energy markets 
endowed Turkey with some leverage over those states. This was particularly the case for 
landlocked states that are highly dependent on energy revenue to fund their domestic 
economies. The International Monetary Fund, for example, reports that oil activity 
accounted for three-quarters of Azerbaijan’s GDP and 90% of exports during parts of the 
2000s (IMF, 2016). Ensuring access to markets was therefore crucial for Azerbaijan to 
maintain its domestic economic growth and ensure economic stability. This thesis 
                                                     
32 A proposed pipeline project that would bring natural gas from the Caspian region to Europe via Turkey, 
Nabucco will be discussed in more depth in section 3.4 
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contends, therefore, that Turkey’s relations with external actors were essential to its 
capacity to utilise energy as a strategic tool and to augment its regional power; and, more 
specifically, to contribute to its status as a benevolent regional hegemon. Considering that 
Turkey’s lack of energy reserves placed it at a significant disadvantage in a region in 
which energy was a key factor in determining regional polarity and interstate relations, 
external validation proved beneficial in asserting Turkey’s position in the regional energy 
system.  
Emphasising its geographic location enabled the AKP to impress on other regional and 
external actors Turkey’s preferential position in the regional energy system. By repeatedly 
referring to Turkey’s geography, the state was drawing attention to Turkey’s access to the 
resource-poor European markets and the international shipping lanes of the Mediterranean. 
This emphasised Turkey’s strategic utility as both an energy consumer and transit state to 
its landlocked neighbours. The party was consequently positioning Turkey as an 
indispensable state in regional energy equations. By doing so, it was simultaneously 
integrating itself into the region and enhancing its status as a central actor in the region, 
both of which chapter two suggested were traits associated with and essential to regional 
powers. The most discernable policy manifestation of the AKP’s understanding of the 
geopolitical possibilities of Turkey’s geostrategic location and energy relations with both 
the Caspian states and the EU was in the propagation of the energy hub agenda. 
Throughout its first three administrations, key actors repeatedly asserted the AKP’s 
intention to develop the southern Mediterranean port of Ceyhan into one of the most 
important energy terminals in the world. Both of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan and BTC pipelines 
terminate in Ceyhan, and the port possesses facilities for processing and exporting of the 
Russian, Iraqi, and Central Asian oil supplies that transit Turkey by road. In announcing a 
plan to “make Ceyhan an analogue of Rotterdam” (RIA Novosti, 2005), Guler effectively 
stated the government’s intention to expand Ceyhan into one of the busiest energy 
terminals in the world. The MoD suggested in 2007 that the port would be “targeted to be 
one of the main distribution points in international markets and one of the main important 
places in setting oil prices” (MoD, 2006:83), while a key target of MENR’s Strategic Plan 
was the transformation of Ceyhan into “an integrated energy terminal, where...crude oil 
may be offered for international markets” (MENR, 2009:31). Gas, as well as oil, would 
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flow to and through Ceyhan: Yildiz, then Minister for Energy, specified in 2010 that the 
intention was to route “about three to four percent of global natural gas supply, and about 
five to six present of global oil supply” through the port. (Yildiz, 2010:17). The 
development of Ceyhan was closely linked to Turkey’s continuous pursuit of new pipeline 
projects. The MFA, for example, suggested that oil pipeline projects would make Ceyhan 
“a major energy hub” and “the largest oil outlet terminal in the Eastern Mediterranean” 
(2015b). A key motivation behind the Ceyhan development was the expansion of Turkey’s 
influence in not only regional, but global energy systems: according to Gul (2009), the 
infrastructure to be built in Ceyhan would “help Turkey play a much more important role 
in access to the world markets”. As this section will illustrate, the Ceyhan hub was 
demonstrative of the AKP’s intention to utilise energy as a strategic asset to enhance both 
its energy and geopolitical influence regionally and its role in global energy systems.  
 
Figure 9: Current oil infrastructure, Ceyhan (IEA, 2016:80) 
In chapter two, this thesis argued that Turkey’s lack of domestic resources was highly 
disadvantageous given the extent to which energy determined geopolitical trends in the 
wider Caspian region. At the same time, however, section 3.2.3 of this chapter has already 
highlighted the extent to which Turkey’s geographic location was considered a strategic 
asset for the realisation of the country’s energy agenda. The AKP’s agenda extended 
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beyond the notion of Turkey as a consumer or transit state or as a facilitator of regional oil 
and gas projects, envisioning instead the state’s “leading role” (MENR, 2009:29) in 
determining energy routes and prices in the wider Caspian region. As this section will 
demonstrate, the conceptualisation of Turkey as an energy “leader” (MENR, 2014) was 
primarily predicated on the realisation of Turkey’s energy hub ambitions. The advantages 
of this policy for Turkey in terms of enhanced regional status and material (particularly 
financial) benefits leads this thesis to argue that regardless of the AKP’s specific use of 
“leadership” discourse, Ankara’s energy agenda reflected a hegemonic regional powers 
strategy. 
Chapter two argued that energy hubs - as differentiated from transit states or energy 
corridors - can endow resource-poor consumer states with a strategic capacity in energy 
relations more usually associated with producer states. Hub states can operate energy 
markets in which they control re-exportation conditions and collect fees and tariffs beyond 
those that transit states may impose. They also adopt an additional geostrategic 
significance in energy supply chains.  In outlining a desire to turn Turkey “into an energy 
hub and terminal by using [Turkey’s] geo-strategic position effectively within the 
framework of the regional cooperation processes” (2009:29), MENR’s Strategic Plan for 
2010-2014 both directly stated Turkey’s hub agenda and used language that reflected the 
definition of energy hub outlined in chapter two. The MFA employed similar rhetoric in its 
foreign policy synopsis, suggesting that Turkey was “an emerging energy terminal and 
transit country” (2017a). While the MoD made no reference to an energy hub in its eighth 
development plan and only referred to Turkey’s geostrategic potential as a transit hub in 
the ninth, the suggestion in the tenth plan (MoD, 2014b:105) that Turkey should “be 
brought into the position of a transit and terminal country between energy producing and 
consuming countries through effective utilisation of its existing geostrategic location” 
(emphasis added) adhered more closely to the concept of the energy hub.  
The discourse emanating from various political actors in Turkey was less consistent in 
referring to Turkey’s hub ambitions. Rhetoric tended to evoke the notion of an energy hub 
interchangeably with that of a corridor or bridge. During an energy summit in 2013, for 
example, Turkey’s trade and customs minister Hayati Yazici referred to Turkey as both a 
“corridor” and a “bridge” despite the the summit focusing specifically on Turkey’s hub 
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ambitions (Aydogan, 2013). At other times, actors alluded to the concept of a hub despite 
not explicitly using the term. Yildiz (2010:17) wrote in 2010 that Turkey aimed to be a 
“terminal country”, which he described as the state “attaining the position of transporting 
and ensuring secondary supply resources in energy geopolitics”. Nonetheless, the word 
“hub” was increasingly visible in the party’s energy discourse from the second AKP 
administration onwards. Former Turkish ambassador to the UN, Baki Ilkan spoke of the 
Turkey’s role as both a “transit country and an energy hub” because of its “unique 
geographical location between the Middle East and the Caspian regions on one hand and 
the energy consuming markets on the other” (Ilkan, 2006b). Foreign Minister Ali Babacan 
referred in 2008 to Turkey’s transformation into a “major global energy hub” and to 
“increasing Turkey’s role as an important energy hub in the region” (Babacan, 2008b), 
while then-president Gul suggested in 2013 that Turkey was an “important hub in 
transporting and marketing” gas (Jones, 2014). Both the increasing prominence of the hub 
agenda in non-energy specific documents and the proliferation of energy agreements from 
2009 highlighted throughout this thesis indicate that mid-way through the AKP’s second 
term, Turkey’s energy strategy effectively shifted from a focus on becoming an east-west 
energy corridor to becoming a hub. Such a shift is not only indicative of the growing 
overlap between foreign, development, and energy policy, but of an increasingly self-
confident AKP that believed it could attract and manage regional pipeline projects. It also 
suggests that the party believed that energy rich states would accept Turkey as a major 
player in regional energy systems despite its deficit of natural resources. This increased 
confidence manifested in the 2010-2014 Strategic Plan with the introduction of a “key 
theme” that emphasised Turkey’s regional and global influence in the field of energy” 
(MENR, 2009:29-31). In short, it indicated a growing perception that Turkey could be a 
regional energy power and utilise energy to elevate the state’s status to that of a hegemonic 
regional power. 
3.3.2 Turkey’s energy agenda: a regional powers perspective 
Both the diversification and hub agendas have implications for this thesis’ examination of 
the relationship between regional powers and energy in advanced developing states. The 
increase in energy hub rhetoric coincided with the announcement in MENR’s 2010-2014 
Strategic Plan of Turkey’s energy “leadership” ambitions. It stressed that the utilisation of 
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Turkey’s geostrategic position “within the framework of the regional cooperation process” 
would turn Turkey into an “energy hub and terminal”, thus increasing the state’s influence 
in regional and international energy affairs (MENR, 2009:29). The Strategic Plan outlined 
how MENR had been “taking the leading role in significant oil and gas projects ” 
(2009:29). Moreover, it stressed, Turkey was “giving importance to interconnections 
within the neighbouring countries bilaterally and as multi-parties (i.e. through regional 
multilateral mechanisms)” in order to contribute to the “supply of adequate energy without 
any interruption of adequate energy and at high quality” to other states (2009:29). 
Consequently, Turkey was  
“aiming at playing a significant role in the…development (of) the global energy 
sector and, within the framework of the advantages bought by its own private 
geostrategic condition, in the provision of the supplier countries for its own energy 
security, as well as leading a significant role in the transfer of the rich hydrocarbon 
resources to the growing market and especially the EU market” (2009:29).  
Implicit in these extracts from the Strategic Plan are several components that are relevant 
to regional power. It was argued in chapter two that regional powers had a special role in 
shaping regional security complexes and in facilitating regional security. In its references 
to energy security, Turkey was positioning itself as a regional security provider both 
explicitly in terms of energy and implicitly in terms of geopolitical security. This second 
aspect will be discussed in further detail of the next section of this chapter. The hub 
ambition was closely related to this energy supply security agenda. On one hand, energy 
security was necessary to ensure Turkey would obtain sufficient supplies to fulfil its 
energy needs. On the other, chapter two suggested that energy hubs were conducive to 
engendering regional hegemony. Positioning itself as a secure transit hub and recognition 
by energy producing states of Turkey’s role in regional energy systems would enhance 
Turkey’s legitimacy as an energy hub to supplier and consumer states and, therefore, 
elevate its position in the regional hierarchy. Thus, Guler outlined Turkey’s intention to 
provide “a safe route for the transmission of the oil and gas resources to the western 
markets”. It was suggested that contributing to supply security “in the region and in the 
world” (MENR, 2009:29) and facilitating the “supply of adequate energy” to other states 
(MENR, 2009:29) would augment Turkey’s position in regional energy systems. 
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Moreover, the emphasis by MENR (2009, 201) and MFA (2015b) on Turkey as a 
“reliable” transit state highlighted Turkey’s ability to contribute to security of supply 
endowed it with advantages in comparison to other, less stable, transit states. 
Secondly, “giving importance to the interactions” (MENR, 2009:9) with neighbouring 
countries both bilaterally and within multilateral regional frameworks implied that Turkey 
could use energy as a means to strengthen regional integration and interdependencies. The 
construction of new pipelines was integral to this outcome. Based on the frameworks 
developed in chapters one and two, it can be asserted that the bilateral cooperation 
necessary to conduct pipeline agreements would facilitate the political and economic 
interdependencies essential to regional power. The pipeline itself would create a tangible 
connection between states. In a 2013 speech, Davutoglu emphasised that pipelines could 
provide opportunities for “furthering regional integration” (Davutoglu, 2013). The focus 
on pipeline projects by the MFA (for example, Davutoglu, 2008; MFA, 2015b) highlights 
the extent to which this aspect of energy policies was seen as particularly congruent with 
the AKP’s foreign policy strategy. Turkey, as a central actor facilitating these pipelines 
through “interactions” with regional states, would simultaneously further integrate itself in 
its region and contribute to the region’s geopolitical delineation. Chapter two suggested 
both were integral to regional power. Considering the extent to which Turkey was 
presenting these projects as mutually beneficial for the region (i.e. through enhancing 
regional integration and stability) and to which its own energy security and geostrategic 
importance were dependent on the pipelines’ success (invoking a high level of self 
interest), this thesis argues that the AKP’s agenda can be framed as a hegemonic regional 
powers strategy. 
Finally, and of significant relevance to this thesis, was the explicit and repeated reference 
to “leadership” in the Strategic Plan. MENR’s 2010-2014 Strategic Plan was detailed and 
outlined a comprehensive energy strategy that incorporated energy types and source, 
domestic bureaucratic structures, and infrastructural projects at home and abroad. The plan 
was constructed around one central “vision”: to make Turkey “the leader of its region in 
energy and natural resources” (MENR, 2009:10). That Turkey intended to take a “leading 
role” (MENR, 2009:29) in regional energy projects implied a desire to shape the trajectory 
of regional energy flows. The notion that Turkey could be an energy “leader” was largely 
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absent from discourse during the AKP’s first term between 2002 and 2007. However, both 
policy documents and political rhetoric indicate a growing confidence from the second 
term that insinuated that Turkey would not just participate in regional pipeline projects, but 
that it could shape the region’s energy agenda. In a speech following the inauguration of 
the BTC pipeline, Ilkin (2006b) postulated that Turkey stood as a “key country” in 
ensuring energy flow and security. Babacan’s comment that Turkey was “destined to play 
an important role in the diversification and security of world energy supplies” (2008c) 
demonstrates the extent to which Turkish elites saw the state as a fundamental actor in 
determining global energy trends. For Guler, Turkey had a “special mission” in the region 
in terms of facilitating energy trade both politically and financially. Guler’s assertion that 
“what Turkey does in the field of energy is of interest to the whole world” (Anadolu 
Agency, 2009) denoted a new form of exceptionalism in the AKP’s rhetoric. Considering 
that this new self-perception manifested at the same time as the hub agenda became more 
prominent in the state’s energy agenda, it can be argued that the period from 2007 onwards 
marks a recognition by the AKP that even states with limited domestic resources could 
utilise energy as a strategic asset to elevate its status in the regional, and consequently, 
international, systems. The AKP therefore began to perceive itself as a pivotal actor not 
only as a major player in regional energy equations, but in those at the global level. Later, 
this thesis will argue that this confidence was misplaced and represented an overestimation 
of Turkey’s place in regional - never mind global - energy affairs. 
Chapter two argued that the recognition of a state’s status by others within the region and 
by relevant states outside the region is central to determining regional power; that the 
state’s claim to regional powerhood must be considered legitimate by other relevant actors. 
For Turkey to legitimise its claims to regional power and successfully leverage energy as a 
resource in a way reflected regional power, it needed to ensure energy security, to be able 
to compete financially and politically with other states for access to supplies, to attract and 
contribute to the financing of new pipeline projects through its territory, and to influence 
other states in the supply chain. Each of these conditions was determined not just by 
Turkey’s role in regional energy systems, but in the regional system more generally. The 
realisation of Turkey’s regional power was tied up with its capacity to meld energy 
diplomacy with bilateral and regional relations and to compete with other regional and 
external powers for influence. In other words, Turkey would have to mitigate a raft of 
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geopolitical and security issues both directly and indirectly related to energy  to realise its 
energy ambitions. Conversely, the implementation of the energy “leadership” agenda 
would enhance Turkey’s legitimacy in the region,  endowing it with the necessary capacity 
to further influence regional affairs. In that regard, energy “leadership” and regional 
powerhood were intrinsically connected. Yet despite rhetoric explicitly promoting 
Turkey’s “leadership” in regional energy relations, this thesis argues that the extent to 
which self-interest and material concerns and policies drove the AKP’s energy strategy 
meant that it was more congruent with a hegemonic form of regional power.   
The final section of this chapter will bring together the key energy strategies discussed in 
this section in the regional context. It will explore how three specific issues - geopolitical 
instability, the demarcation of the Caspian Sea, and resource competition - affected the 
implementation of the energy strategy. In doing so, it will focus on empirical examples of 
Turkey’s attempts to diversify its sources and realise its energy hub agenda, and assess the 
relationship between the energy strategy and Turkey’s regional power. 
3.4 Key issues in Turkey's energy region 
3.4.1 Geopolitical instability 
Turkey is situated in region beset with geopolitical issues. Between 2002 and 2014, the 
majority of its energy imports originated in or transited through states that experienced 
conflict or domestic instability. The frozen conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over 
Nagorno-Karabakh, the Iranian nuclear crisis, the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia 
over South Ossetia, Russian-Ukrainian tensions between 2006 and 2009, and Russia’s 
annexation of the Crimea in 2014 all involved states that were either suppliers of energy to 
Turkey or located on major transit routes. Dependence on energy imports from 
neighbouring states meant that geopolitical instabilities had the potential to negatively 
impact Turkey’s energy agenda and, during the period under examination Turkey suffered 
disruptions to its energy supplies because of geopolitical conflict on multiple occasions. 
Media reports show how during the South Ossetian war (discussed in chapter five), for 
example, the BTC and BTE were closed for several days (Fineren, 2008). Supplies were 
also suspended several times through the BTC, Kirkuk-Ceyhan, and Eastern Anatolian 
pipelines on account of PKK attacks on essential infrastructure both within and outside 
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Turkish territory (Irish Times, 2006; Hurriyet, 2008a; Trend Daily News, 2011; Al-
Jazeera, 2012). 
There was a clear acknowledgement by the government that these threats were closely 
related to Turkey’s energy security. For Ilkin (2006b), guaranteeing “secure and 
uninterrupted flow of hydrocarbon resources from the Greater Caspian Region” was a key 
“challenge”. The MFA (2015b) noted that “any faults in the source countries or countries 
en-route... [could] lead to periodic imbalances between supply and demand” in Turkey. 
Pipeline closures not only interrupted secure supplies to the Turkish energy market - thus 
threatening the state’s economic productivity and the effective functioning of the state - 
but required Turkey to purchase additional energy supplies from Russia to compensate for 
lost supplies. Following an explosion on the Eastern Anatolian pipeline in 2012, for 
example, Russia increased gas flows through the Blue Stream to make up for short falls in 
Turkey’s domestic system (Soldatkin, 2012). This had multiple implications for Turkey’s 
energy and regional power agendas. Firstly, the requirement to purchase additional oil 
from Russia added to Turkey’s energy bill, therefore negatively impacting on the state’s 
ability to use those funds to pursue other projects beneficial to increasing Turkey’s 
regional power status. Secondly, that Turkey had to request additional supplies specifically 
from Russia reinforced the notion introduced in chapter two that Turkey relied on Russia 
to ensure its own energy security and, consequently, skewered the balance of power 
between the two in Russia’s favour (both the reliance by Turkey on Russia energy supplies 
and the regional balance of power will be discussed in greater detail in chapter five). Early 
in the first AKP administration, Turkey had stated a desire to limit its reliance on Russian 
imports, with Guler reported as suggesting Russia should account for no more that 30% of 
Turkey’s total energy supply (Lelyveld, 2003). The diversification agenda in particular 
indicated a desire to limit Russian influence on new sources. However, reliance on Russia 
to supplement energy shortages undermined the intention to restrict Russia’s role in 
Turkey’s energy system and reinforced the asymmetry between the states in the energy 
sphere. 
Geopolitical instability threatened not only the continuity of existing supplies, but the 
development of new energy projects and, consequently, the realisation of Turkey’s energy 
hub ambitions and its status within the region. Chapter one argued that geopolitical 
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instability was detrimental to energy security and deterred investment in regional energy 
systems. In the Strategic Plan, MENR (2009:9) highlighted the threat posed by “political 
instabilities in [Turkey’s] region” to the realisation of the state’s energy agenda. The 
notion of an energy hub, it was argued in chapter two, is predicated not only on the ability 
of the hub state to construct the necessary physical and financial infrastructure, but to 
guarantee the security of supplies transiting through its territory. By extension, then, the 
state must also ensure that supplies to the hub are secure. Consequently, Turkey had a 
vested interest in ensuring stability in both existing and potential source and transit states 
on account of its domestic and international energy polies.   
The necessity to ensure sufficient levels of regional stability and cooperation to realise 
pipeline projects required Turkey to pursue the regional security provider role discussed in 
chapter two. Gul’s 2008 statement on regional security and regional energy transportation 
demonstrates the way in which regional (in)stability, energy trade, and geostrategic 
location necessitate that Turkey facilitate regional conflict resolution: 
 “To our west we have the Balkans. To our east, we have the Caucasus. Both of 
these regions and their stability are important for us because if you have stability in 
the Caucasus, and added to that if you have trust and confidence, then you have the 
right climate for economic cooperation. And the Caucasus are key as far as energy 
resources and the safe transportation of energy from the east to the west. That 
transportation goes through Turkey. That is why we are very active in trying to 
achieve an atmosphere of dialogue, so there is the right climate to resolve the 
problems. If there is instability in the Caucasus, it would be sort of like a wall 
between the East and West; if you have stability in the region, it could be a gate” 
(Gul, 2008). 
Gul therefore explicitly links the “safe transportation of energy” (inherently related to 
domestic security and the hub ambition) to Turkey’s facilitation of the “right climate” in 
which to resolve regional problems. Chapter two argued that defining and influencing 
regional security was a key attribute of regional powers. Without “stability in the region” 
and “the right climate for economic cooperation”, Turkey could not realise its energy 
agenda. By facilitating regional stabilisation through mediation and rapprochement efforts 
- as it attempted to do between Georgia and Russia in 2008 over the South Ossetian 
134 
 
conflict (see chapter five), between itself and Armenia in 2009 (Tait, 2008), and with Iran 
in 2010 during the nuclear crisis (as discussed in chapter four) - Turkey was 
simultaneously enhancing its regional power credentials and contributing to the viability of 
its own energy agenda. In addition, playing a central role in regional stabilisation projects 
had the potential to open new routes for the transportation of energy supplies to Turkey. 
Resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – a key objective of Turkey’s regional 
foreign policy (MFA 2017e) – would simultaneously enhance Turkey’s credentials as a 
mediator and potentially open up a new transit route for Azerbaijani gas supplies via 
Armenia. Regional foreign policy and particularly regional security initiatives were 
therefore perceived as a means to facilitate Turkey’s energy ambitions. MENR’s 2010-
2014 Strategic Plan (2009:9) cited the “rise of regional cooperation opportunities” as a key 
asset for the realisation of Turkey’s energy agenda. The congruency between collective 
regional security interests  and the realisation of Turkey’s energy agenda is indicative of a 
hegemonic regional powers strategy.  
Conversely, however, it should also be noted that energy was framed as a tool that could 
contribute to regional integration and security in a way that contributed to Turkish regional 
hegemony. In the discussion on cooperative geopolitics and energy in chapter one, it was 
suggested that pipeline projects in particular could contribute not only to regional security, 
but could enhance regional integration and interdependence. Using energy to facilitate 
interdependence predates the AKP in Turkey - the Eighth Development Plan (2000:56) 
describes energy as a “core principle” of Turkey’s economic engagement with other states 
- but became increasingly prominent in policy and rhetoric throughout the AKP era. The 
AKP repeatedly stressed the benefits of energy projects for regional integration and 
prosperity and simultaneously acknowledged the role regional integration played in 
facilitating Turkey’s energy agenda. Then-Minister for Energy Hilmi Guler suggested that 
Turkey would contribute to strengthening economic cooperation among regional countries 
as part of its regional energy strategy (Guler, 2005). The focus on cooperation broadened 
beyond the economic sector during the AKP’s second term in office to encompass other 
areas: Erdogan, for example, expressed his belief that pipeline projects would “bring 
prosperity to the area” and contribute to the creation of “a new silk road in the energy 
sector” (AFP, 2007c). Chapter one pointed out that energy infrastructure projects like 
pipelines require significant political and economic cooperation between participating 
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states to mitigate security risks and ensure successful integration, and the AKP placed 
particular emphasis on the role that pipeline negotiations could play in facilitating regional 
stability. Gul (2009) suggested that energy pipeline projects could be “cooperative 
processes [that bought] together regional powers, big companies, and players”. For 
Davutoglu (2013), transnational pipeline projects were an “opportunity” for “enhancing 
energy security and furthering regional cooperation”. 
The dual approach to regional integration and energy project development was closely tied 
to what Yildiz (2010) refers to as Turkey’s “proactive energy diplomacy”.33 In other 
words, Turkey sought to encourage regional cooperation to the pipeline construction that, 
policy makers believed, would enhance regional integration. Again, the simultaneous 
emphasis on regional integration and self-interest is indicative of  hegemonic regional 
power. Both the facilitation of regional energy security and further integration of and into 
the region would solidify Turkey’s position as a major regional actor. If, as the AKP 
suggested, Turkey intended on playing a “leading role” (MENR, 2009:29) in regional 
energy equations, then the policies used to attain that status - particularly in terms of 
pipeline diplomacy and regional stabilisation - would enhance its position in the regional 
hierarchy. The review of regional powers literature suggested that recognition by states 
external to the region could enhance the status of the regional power by subordinates, and 
an enhanced status in region would increase global status. By increasing its influence in 
the region, Turkey would increase its global status; enhanced legitimacy at the 
international level would elevate Turkey’s position regionally, enabling it to enhance its 
geopolitical influence and affirming its position as an energy power. 
Rhetoric on energy as a means to enhance regional stability is particularly evident in 
discourse from the MFA, suggesting that the department saw energy trade not merely as an 
objective in itself, but as a tool of Turkish foreign policy. Gul, for example, stated in 2008 
that he “strongly believe[d]” that “regional cooperation in the field of energy, beyond 
addressing the energy supply security, [would] make significant contributions to the 
regional stability, peace and prosperity” (Gul, 2008). Consequently, by aspiring to lead 
pipeline projects, Turkey was also positioning itself as a facilitator of regional stability and 
                                                     
33 Ulugag et al (2013) describe energy diplomacy as the process of encouraging regional and bilateral 
through diplomatic methods like high-level state visits that facilitate the state’s energy agenda  
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security. This, chapter two argued, was key characteristic associated with hegemonic 
regional powers. 
There were no large scale or prolonged security issues in the period under examination in 
the wider Caspian region, but constant tension and short conflicts nonetheless constituted a 
security concern. Externally to the Caspian region, the failure to develop a planned Syrian-
Turkish extension of the Arab Gas Pipeline34 on account of instability in the Middle East 
in the aftermath of the Arab Spring (EIA, 2017d) demonstrates the extent to which 
transnational pipelines are determined by regional insecurities. However, regional 
instabilities were not the only detriment to the realisation of Turkey’s energy ambition: 
competition from other advanced developing and developed states for access to and 
control over resources and the continued interference by external powers in regional 
geopolitics also proved problematic. These issues will be the topic of discussion of the 
final part of this chapter 
First, however, it is important to outline the ways in which the failure to delineate the 
Caspian Sea impeded Turkey’s energy agenda. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
there has been significant disagreement between the Caspian littorals over ownership of 
natural resources. This dispute stems primarily from a lack of legal clarity as to whether 
the Caspian was a sea or lake (Bahgat, 2007).35 Without clarification, the allocation and 
exploitation of offshore Caspian resources were limited (EIA, 2013a). If classified as a 
“sea”, then under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) each littoral 
would obtain sovereign rights over an exclusive economic zone based on a median line 
that is equidistant from the neighbouring state’s shore. Due to their relatively short 
Caspian coastlines, however, such a division would severely limit Russia and Iran’s claims 
to offshore resources. Iran in particular has been more supportive of classifying the 
Caspian as a lake. Under international law, this would mean that the Caspian would be 
delineated and governed based on international or bilateral agreements (such as by a 
median line) (EIA, 2013a). Ziyadzade (2015) notes that while the position of individual 
states did not remain entirely consistent - a variety of bilateral deals on the governance of 
some areas of the Caspian sea in the 1990s and 2000s encouraged slight amendments, for 
                                                     
34 Built to export gas from Egypt to Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, the Arab Gas Pipeline is currently suspended 
35 The deliniation and legal status of the Caspian remain unresolved at the time of writing (May 2018) 
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example, to the Russian and Kazakh positions - each state has generally supported the 
solution that endows it with the greatest portion of off-shore natural resources. Thus Iran 
(which would have extremely limited access to hydrocarbons under an equidistant 
solution) has supported the construction of a median line that would endow each littoral 
with a 20% share of the Caspian and its resources, while Kazakhstan - the Caspian state 
with the longest riparian border - has favoured an equidistant solution (Bahgat, 2007; EIA, 
2013a; Ziyadzade, 2013). Because of the lack of unanimity on the Caspian’s status, 
development of particular areas of the Caspian have been dependent on a mixture of  
unilateral actions and bilateral deals between the littorals based on economic and political 
differences (EIA, 2013a).  
Turkey has not taken a specific position on the demarcation of the Caspian. It supports the 
resolution of the dispute because of the belief that legislating for the sea’s status would 
facilitate the construction of an offshore trans-Caspian pipeline that would provide 
additional energy supplies to both Turkey and Europe. Officials including Guler and 
Erdogan also consistently courted Turkmenistan in order to secure Turkmen gas supplies 
for pipeline projects like Nabucco and TANAP that would necessitate the construction of a 
trans-Caspian pipeline (Neff, 2007; Gurt, 2014). News reports throughout the period under 
examination suggest that Caspian littorals retained an intention to construct a trans-
Caspian pipeline as part of the fourth corridor project (see, for example, Alexander, 2008; 
UPI, 2012; Trend Daily News, 2013). Ilkin (2006b) saw the BTE as the “first leg” of the 
development of a trans-Caspian pipeline that would transport Kazakh and Turkmen gas to 
Europe through Turkey. Gul stated in 2008 that he hoped that “one day” it would be 
possible to transport natural gas from the East shore of the Caspian Sea to its West shore 
the same way the Kazakh oil has been carried through BTC”(Gul, 2008; Hurriyet, 2012b). 
Creating an export route for Turkmen supplies would integrate Turkmenistan into regional 
energy systems and create a new interdependency between the state and Turkey, and 
arguably position Turkey as a regional energy power.  
The failure to delineate the Caspian therefore had an adverse affect on Turkey’s regional 
power aspirations. In restricting Turkey’s capacity to access additional energy sources, it 
negatively affected Turkey’s energy security, diversification, and hub agendas. However, 
the delineation of the Caspian was not the only factor complicating Turkey’s intention to 
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incorporate the former Soviet states of the Caspian region into east-west energy equations. 
The struggle to introduce a legal regime to the sea can be partly understood in terms of the 
broader competition for Caspian resources highlighted in chapter one. Primary sources 
show that Russia repeatedly stated its opposition to any trans-Caspian project, while the 
US and EU simultaneously reiterated support for the same (Blagov, 2006; Alexander, 
2008; Badalova, 2011). The final section of this chapter will demonstrate how competition 
for control of the region’s resources provided an impediment to both the AKP’s energy 
agenda and its regional power. 
3.4.2 The competition for Caspian resources 
Chapter one argued that growing competition for energy resources posed a threat to the 
ability of advanced developing states to access the oil and gas reserves necessary to fuel 
economic growth. In the Caspian region, Turkey competed for access to essential 
resources not just with regional powers like Russia, but with external advanced developing 
states like China and developed states in Europe. Russia’s interest in the region lay partly 
in a desire to ensure that new Caspian energy resources did not compete with Russia’s own 
energy agenda (this point will be explored in significantly more detail in chapter five). 
Chapter one pointed out that China’s own energy reserves were insufficient in the face of 
significant economic growth, and it looked to its neighbours in Central Asia to fulfil its 
energy requirements. The EU sought to enhance its own energy relations with Caspian 
states in order to reduce its reliance on Russian resources and to enhance its energy 
security (Tekin and Williams, 2009). In addition, the US - while not interested in accessing 
Caspian supplies for its own energy market - had actively supported the construction of 
pipeline projects between the Central Asia and Europe since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in the hopes of diluting Russia’s influence in the region, while increasing its own 
presence in former Soviet states, and contributing to the security of energy supplies for its 
European allies. Consequently, there were a significant number of actors with which 
Turkey had to engage in cooperation or competition with in order to realise its regional 
agenda.  
The MoD’s tenth development plan acknowledged the geopolitical competition for energy 
resources. It suggested that significant changes in global energy production and 
consumption behaviour were leading to a “redefinition of global economic and 
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geostrategic balances that necessitated a recalibration of energy security policies in the 
regional and global systems” (MoD, 2014b:14). MENR (2009:9) considered resource 
competition to be a security issue, highlighting the “foreign influences in the use of trans-
boundary resources” and the “contradiction” of other states’ energy agendas with that of 
Turkey in its list of “threats” to the realisation of the state’s energy agenda. This section 
will highlight how Turkey - as part of its diversification and hub agendas - sought to 
participate in all regional pipeline projects, regardless of source countries, potential transit 
states, or project sponsors. It will be argued while that this policy could have contributed to 
Turkish energy security and its continued integration into the region, the AKP’s refusal to 
acknowledge the geopolitical motivations and ramifications of contradictory pipeline 
projects undermined the state’s hub agenda and its ability to influence regional pipeline 
trajectories. It also draws attention to the contradictions between Turkey’s energy rhetoric 
and the policies it actively pursued. Consequently, this thesis argues that while Turkey’s 
support for competing pipeline politics could have contributed to domestic energy system, 
the same competition restricted Turkey’s capacity to influence the trajectory of regional 
energy systems.  
The US and Russia’s competing pipeline ambitions are the primary focus of this section. 
However, it would be remiss to discuss regional energy competition without a brief word 
on China considering that state’s gradual encroachment into the region. Chapter one 
determined that the eastern Caspian littorals were among those states with which China 
sought energy trade in order to facilitate Beijing’s economic growth. During the period 
under consideration, Beijing significantly expanded its energy relations with the Caspian 
states of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, and demonstrated particular interest in new 
pipeline projects linking Central Asia to China. In 2006, a new pipeline began transporting 
oil from Kazakhstan to China (EIA, 2015f).  With the initiation of the Central Asia-China 
pipeline in 2009, natural gas began pumping to China from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, 
and Uzbekistan for the first time (EIA, 2015f). The construction of two parallel pipelines 
in 2010 and 2014 increased the volumes of natural gas transiting east from Central Asia. 
Consequently, Babali (2010) notes, energy reserves earmarked by Turkey for trans-
Caspian projects were diverted to China. This restricted Turkey’s capacity to fulfil its 
energy agenda and limited its opportunities to integrate the eastern littorals into the 
regional system via pipeline systems. While China has no geographical advantage over 
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Turkey in terms of proximity to Central Asian resources, its financial resources were a 
considerable asset that Turkey was simply incapable of matching. Thus, for example, 
China was able to invest in Turkmenistan’s limited upstream energy system in exchange 
for access to energy supplies (EIA, 2015f), and rail and road infrastructure in Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan (Farchy and Kynge, 2016). Chapter two suggested that the ability to invest 
in and develop interdependent relationships with resource rich countries could generate 
goodwill for the investing state and grant it leverage in energy negotiations. Turkey was 
unable to match the extent of China’s financial endeavours in the eastern Caspian states. 
Consequently, this thesis argues that China’s economic capacity endowed it with an 
advantage over Turkey in regional energy negotiations that was realised with the initiation 
of the trans-Central Asian pipeline in 2009. At the same time as that pipeline was realised, 
however, a significant battle was on-going between the West and Russia for the control of 
energy flows in the western Caspian region. 
4.4.3a Regional pipeline competition, 2007-2014   
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US-supported fourth corridor project has been 
the main root of competition between the US and Russia in the Caspian and Central Asian 
regions. Its aim was to carry oil and gas via new pipelines from the former Soviet states of 
the Caspian region and Central Asian to Europe while circumventing Russian 
infrastructure and excluding Iran, thus limiting both states’ roles in the region (Bolukbasi, 
1998; Kardas, 2012). Turkey supported the project from the outset, and because of its 
geographical location and long-standing strategic alliance with the West, was considered 
the most likely conduit for supplies transitioning from east to west. The BTC and BTE 
were the first tangible manifestations of the fourth corridor. Throughout the first three 
AKP administrations, the party continued to pursue all gas pipelines related to the project 
that passed through Turkish territory (MFA, 2015b). The project highlighted Turkey’s 
viability as a transit state for the exportation of regional energy resources to Western 
markets, and consequently reinforced the concept that Turkey was an essential actor in 





Figure 10: Proposed South Stream and Nabucco routes (Eke, 2009) 
With the BTC recently operational, the BTE under construction, and new pipeline projects 
stalling, the AKP’s first term witnessed little new pipeline activity in the Caspian region. 
That changed in the early years of the second term. Both the announcement of the Russia-
EU South Stream project in 2007 and the suspension by Russia of natural gas supplies to 
Ukraine and Belarus - key transit countries between Russia and Europe - on several 
occasions between 2006 and 2009 contributed to a new intensity in regional energy 
negotiations and competition between 2008 and 2014. Rather than undermining Turkey’s 
energy strategy, however, the competition for routes to Europe had the potential to benefit 
Turkey’s hub agenda, and the AKP had no qualms about engaging with both sides. Despite 
its desire to diversify its imports and reduce its reliance on Russia (MENR, 2009), Turkey 
continued to support all east-west energy projects passing through its territory throughout 
the AKP era. Both Russian and non-Russian projects sought to utilise Turkey’s 
geostrategic position in new pipeline equations. Even while the Nabucco bill was passing 
through Turkey’s parliament in 2010, Russia and Turkey signed a comprehensive energy 
deal that included the re-routing of the South Stream through Turkish territorial waters and 
the construction of a new Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline to carry Russian oil from northern 
Turkey to Ceyhan (Anadolu Agency, 2010; Russia Today, 2010). As waning EU interest 
was making the  Nabucco project look increasingly unviable, Turkey and Azerbaijan 
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signed an agreement in 2011 to construct a Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) to 
“feed” from the South Caucasus line and carry gas to the Turkish-Greek border (Hurriyet, 
2015). Months later, Turkey and Russia agreed to construct a “TurkStream” pipeline that 
effectively rerouted the South Stream through Turkish territory.  
 
Figure 11: Turkey's transnational pipelines (EIA, 2017d) 
Turkey’s policy towards regional energy projects is summed up by the MFA’s statement 
that Turkey was “ready to positively consider any energy project in its region that is 
economically feasible” (MFA, 2017c). There were several advantages to adopting such a 
policy. Firstly, it maximised the number of energy pipelines running through Turkey, 
thereby contributing to the energy security and diversification agendas that this chapter has 
ascertained were necessary for the realisation of the hub agenda. It was argued earlier in 
section 3.3.3 of this chapter that the development of a hub had multiple advantages in 
terms of Turkey’s integration into the region, its role as a regional security provider, and 
its role in regional energy equations. Consequently, participating in all energy projects in 
the wider Caspian region had the potential to augment Turkey’s position as a major 
regional actor, and endow it with additional legitimacy that could facilitate the state in 
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carrying out a hegemonic regional agenda. Even without the development of the hub, 
Turkey would benefit financially from transit fees for the transportation of energy through 
its territory. 
This thesis does not therefore argue that resource competition was wholly detrimental to 
Turkey’s energy agenda. Russia and the US and its European allies, because of other 
geopolitical agendas, attempted to utilise Turkey’s geostrategic location to route essential 
supplies to the energy hungry markets of Europe. Russia, because of growing tensions with 
Ukraine, saw Turkey as an alternative route to southern and Eastern Europe, while for the 
US engaging with Turkey was essential to reduce Russia’s influence in both the Caspian 
region and European energy systems. This competition had the potential to be 
advantageous to Turkey’s hub and diversification agendas, and thus facilitate Turkish 
regional hegemony. At the same time, it partially legitimised Turkey’s claims to 
geostrategic exceptionalism and as an indispensable actor in regional energy systems. 
However, this thesis argues that the extent of interference from both sides in regional 
energy affairs limited Turkey’s capacity to act as a regional energy power. Turkey had 
neither the financial nor political capacity to influence regional energy affairs to the same 
extent as did the US and Russia. It did not have sufficient infrastructural capacity to 
support the pipelines that it intended to transit through its territory. Even if the projects had 
been realised, the failure to enact successive market liberalisation bills ensured that Turkey 
also failed to develop the necessary market conditions to evolve from an energy transit 
route to a hub. 
The notion that Turkey’s support for all economically viable projects transiting its territory 
offered a “win-win approach for all parties” (MFA, 2017c) was indicative of a refusal to 
acknowledge the geopolitical motivations behind contradictory pipeline projects and the 
zero-sum nature of international pipeline politics (see chapter one). In particular, Yildiz’ 
attempt to encourage the EU to make the South Stream part of the Southern Corridor 
project (Hurriyet, 2012c) ignored the fact that the Corridor’s primary goal was to reduce 
EU reliance on Russian gas. The benefits of the amalgamation of the South Stream and 
Southern Corridor for Turkey in terms of transit fees and its role in regional energy 
systems indicate that the policy was congruent with a hegemonic regional powers strategy; 
the focus on a “win-win” outcome for all partners and insistence that South Stream and 
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Nabucco were not political (Erdogan, in Vucheva, 2009) or rival projects (Yildiz, in 
Hurriyet, 2012c) despite arguments to the contrary is reflective of the hegemony outlined 
in chapter two.  Yet Turkey’s capacity to influence regional energy flows in a manner 
congruent with regional hegemonic power was limited. Chapter two indicated that the 
AKP grew increasingly self-confident in the aftermath of its 2007 election victory. This 
contributed to an increasingly assertive foreign policy that emphasised Turkey’s capacity 
to affect regional change. regional foreign policy. This confidence also manifested in the 
energy sphere, but was somewhat misplaced: Turkey lacked the necessary capacity to 
influence regional energeopolitical trends in its favour. At the same time,  pipeline 
competition between Russia, China and the West was not the only arena in which Turkey 
tried - and failed - to implement an energy strategy congruent with hegemony.  
3.4.3b Azerbaijan: Cooperation and Competition 
Competition between external powers aside, Turkey’s position in the regional energy 
system was challenged by the growing assertiveness of smaller energy producing states in 
the region. The extent to which energy, competition, and regional relations overlap in the 
wider Caspian region can be illustrated by the 2009 natural gas pricing dispute between 
Turkey and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is integral to Turkey’s energy security and hub 
ambitions. Two of the three new import pipelines completed in the AKP era carry 
Azerbaijani oil and gas, and a 2012 intergovernmental agreement saw construction begin 
on a third in 2015. Azerbaijan was also one of Turkey’s most consistent allies in the 
Caspian region: Turkey was the first county to recognise Azerbaijani independence in 
1991 (MFA, 2015g), and since the 1994 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan has 
consistently sided with Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. The inauguration of 
the BTC pipeline in 2006 strengthened the relationship between the two states further and 
increased their respective roles in the regional energy system. Aliyev commented that the 
BTE would bring Turkey and Azerbaijan “ever closer” and “increase the importance of 
both...countries” (BBC, 2006).  However, attempts to translate Turkey’s increased self-
confidence in its second term to regional policy came close to jeopardising energy and 
strategic affairs between Ankara and Baku. Two other regional states - Armenia and 
Russia - played passive roles in events that demonstrated the limitations to power 
projection by importing regional powers in a region dominated by pipeline politics.  
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As part of the MFA’s “zero problems with neighbours programme” referenced in chapter 
two, Turkey began to seek rapprochement with Armenia - a state with which it had never 
had diplomatic relations. In October 2009, following a year of diplomatic initiatives that 
included the first ever visit of a Turkish head of state to Armenia in September 2008, 
Turkey and Armenia signed two protocols on the formation of diplomatic relations (MFA, 
2015c). Continued animosity between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the disputed Nagorno-
Karabakh region, and Azerbaijani dissatisfaction surrounding rapprochement between its 
closest regional ally and a state with which it was technically at war proved to be a 
challenge for Turkey’s zero problems with neighbours agenda (Robinson and Villelabeitia, 
2009). Despite Erdogan’s insistence that it was “out of the question” that Turkey would 
“take any steps that [would] harm our Azeri brothers” (AFP, 2009), tensions escalated 
between Baku and Ankara. This manifested in a deterioration of diplomatic relations, most 
noticeably in a move that “hurt” Turkey (Erdogan, in AFP, 2009) when a Turkish flag was 
removed from a graveyard in Baku where Turkish soldiers who had died defending Baku 
in World War One from Bolshevik and Armenian forces were buried.  
Energy relations began to suffer at the same time. The original BTE agreement had 
proposed a review of the price Turkey paid for Azerbaijan gas – as well as tariffs for the 
transportation of gas through Turkey – one year after the BTE became operational (South 
Caucasus Gas Pipeline Sale and Purchases Agreement, 2001). Azerbaijan attributed the 
dispute that emerged over tariffs in October 2009 to Turkey proposing a new pricing 
system that Baku believed requested too high a transit fees and offered too low a payment 
for Azerbaijani natural gas. It should be noted that Azerbaijan’s objection to Turkish tariff 
proposals were first articulated in October 2009 - just as the Armenian-Turkish protocol 
was publicised - despite Turkey submitting its proposal in July of that year. In the interim, 
the two states signed gas deals to bring Azerbaijani gas through Turkey to both the Azeri 
enclave of Nakhchivan36 and to Syria. In a statement that clearly indicates the 
contributions of gas trade to the broader foreign policy agenda, the former was declared to 
by Yildiz to “spell the merging of two peoples...(and) be a declaration of the will to 
strengthen the understanding of 'one nation, two states” (UPI, 2009).  
                                                     
36 An autonomous region of Armenia separated from the main state and located between the borders of 
Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Nakhchivan will be discussed in greater detail in chapter four in relation 
to energy swaps between Azerbaijan and Iran 
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Despite the continued development of gas trade between the countries after the tariff 
submission by Turkey, Aliyev argued that the dispute had been a long-term problem for 
Azerbaijan: 
We have tried not to highlight this [the negotiations with Turkey on gas transit to Europe] 
and resolve everything through negotiations over the past two years. But our resources 
have been exhausted, and we will never accept the proposals given to us. We need to 
explore alternatives. There are countries in need of energy resources all around us 
(Aliyev, in Ukraine General Newswire, 2009). 
Again, it is important to note that Baku failed to articulate strong concerns about price 
negotiations until after the signing of the Turkish-Armenian protocols, implying a 
connection between the political rapprochement and the deterioration in energy relations. 
The statement by Vafa Guluzade, who was a foreign affairs advisor under Haydar Aliyev 
(Azerbaijan’s previous president) that Azerbaijan was “looking at the opening of the 
Turkish-Armenian border as a betrayal” by their “main partner” in the region (Schliefer, 
2009) exemplifies the position of the Azerbaijani  political elite regarding the 
rapprochement. However, the inference in Aliyev’s statement that Azerbaijan could pursue 
alternative transit routes also suggested that Turkey was not indispensable to Azerbaijan’s 
energy ambitions. Aliyev later suggested that Azerbaijan could transport gas through 
alternative Black Sea ports, indicating that Baku had had “serious discussions” with 
Romania and that talks with Bulgaria were also a possibility (Russia and CIS Oil and Gas 
Weekly, 2009). That Turkey appears to have considered neither the potential impact of its 
rapprochement on relations with Azerbaijan nor the prospect of an alternative route for 
Azerbaijani exports is indicative of the overconfidence of the second AKP administration. 
While it was eventually resolved,37 the 2009 dispute illustrates how deeply intertwined 
political and energy relations are in the region. In addition, it suggests a failure by foreign 
policy makers in Turkey to recognise that “zero problems with neighbours”, while 
                                                     
37 Armenia suspended the ratification of the protocols in April 2010, effectively ending the rapprochement; 
Turkey and Azerbaijan subsequently signed a MoU on gas supply and transit on 7th June 2010 (Mehtiyeva, 




laudable in theory, presupposes reciprocity of intention by Turkey’s neighbours. It failed 
to acknowledge the diverging interests and agendas of other states and overestimated its 
role and power in respect to regional energy relations. Furthermore, Yildiz’s statement that 
Turkey’s “Azeri brothers” shouldn’t charge Turkey market prices for gas because Turkey 
had always supported Azerbaijan in times of trouble (Russian Oil and Gas Report, 2009) 
suggests that the AKP assumed a special position for or leverage over Azerbaijani gas 
trade based on historic relations.  
 It was suggested earlier in this chapter that Turkey adopted an increasingly assertive 
hegemonic regional powers strategy during its second term. However, the failure to 
renegotiate tariffs and the willingness of Azerbaijan to seek alternative transit routes was 
indicative of overconfidence on the part of the AKP as to Turkey’s regional influence and 
leverage. Furthermore, despite clear indications that foreign policy and energy policies had 
become much more closely associated in this period within Turkey, the lack of insight by 
the AKP into Azerbaijan’s own energy ambitions and interests was clearly evidenced 
during the pricing dispute. This, in conjunction with the failure to pre-empt Azerbaijan’s 
less than amicable response to rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia, was 
indicative of a naivety on Turkey’s behalf in relation to both its influence in and the impact 
of geopolitical enmity on regional energy equations.  
Turkey’s policy on competing pipeline projects can be understood as an attempt to bridge 
continued energy cooperation with the West with the maintenance of strong relations with 
Russia, and to manipulate both in a way that would be beneficial to its own energy agenda 
and regional hegemony. However, events in 2009 indicate that Turkey simultaneously 
underestimated the strength of the Azerbaijani-Turkish relationship and overestimated 
Turkey’s own capacity to use its geostrategic position as leverage in negotiation. In both 
the Azerbaijani case and in respect to its position on competing regional projects, Turkey 
failed to accurately assess the geopolitical importance attached to pipelines by other actors 
and overestimated its own strategic significance as a transit state. It did not have the 
capacity to pursue a wholly hegemonic energy strategy in the region because of the 
constraints placed on its capacity to maximise its position in regional energy systems by 
other regional actors. Additionally, in supporting infrastructural projects like the South 
Stream and Turk Stream that reaffirmed Russia’s role as a leading energy contributor to 
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Europe, Turkey undermined both the agenda of its European partners and its own claims to 
be a provider of energy security for Europe. Similarly, chapter five will argue that attempts 
by Turkey to negotiate Nabucco or any Russian pipeline in a way that would be congruent 
with an energy hub (that is, by ensuring re-exportation rights) consistently failed. These 
policies were representative of an energy strategy replete with contradictions and 
inconsistencies that undermined rather that strengthened Turkey’s regional power. Indeed, 
leader of the opposition Kemal Kilicdaroglu stated that Turkey had “shot [itself] in the 
foot” with regards to the hub ambition after a 2010 energy agreement with Russia because 
it simultaneously sounded the death knell for Nabucco and increased Turkey’s dependence 
on Russian gas (Hurriyet, 2011b). This, along with Turkey’s tendency to underestimate the 
relationship between geopolitical events and energy negotiations, the dominance of 
regional pipeline projects by other actors, and Turkey’s failure to manipulate regional 
energy equations to its advantage, both highlights limitations to Turkish hegemony and 
suggests that Turkey was far from the energy “leader” the AKP’s discourse suggests that it 
sought to become.   
3.5 Conclusions 
Energy policy in the first three AKP administrations wedded economic, developmental, 
and foreign policy narratives in a way that placed energy security and geostrategic 
ambition at the heart of Turkish energy strategy. Obtaining secure supplies of energy to 
fulfil economic and social requirements was a priority; those same supplies were perceived 
as an instrument through which Turkey could enhance its geostrategic significance and, 
consequently, its regional influence. Simultaneous economic and population growth and 
regional energy ambitions forced policy makers to balance domestic security and demand 
with geopolitical issues such as regional security and integration. This contributed to a 
regional energy strategy that revolved around three themes: energy security, 
diversification, and development of a Turkish energy hub. Through the implementation of 
policies related to these themes, the AKP aspired to assume a “leadership” role for Turkey 
in regional energy equations - one that corresponded to the definition of regional 
hegemony outlined in chapter two.  
It was argued that this agenda had the potential to generate significant benefits for Turkey. 
From a regional powers perspective, it offered an opportunity for Turkey to encourage 
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regional integration and cooperation in a way that would augment the state’s regional 
status. By positioning Turkey as a regional security provider and highlighting the state’s 
geostrategic significance as an outlet for regional energy supplies to global consumer 
markets, the AKP were attempting to highlight Turkey’s indispensable role in regional 
energy equations. The party successfully melded regional geopolitical issues including 
frozen conflicts to energy policy, arguing that energy development could facilitate regional 
stability and development and, conversely, that Turkey could mediate regional conflicts to 
enable energy development. 
Nonetheless, there is evidence that Turkey simultaneously overestimated its regional 
influence and failed to understand regional energy geopolitics. This was made particularly 
clear in the final section of this chapter. It was argued that Turkey’s tendency to hedge its 
bets by supporting all economically viable east-west pipelines was counterproductive in 
terms of the state’s energy agenda. Not only did it undermine the hub agenda, but it failed 
to account for the contradictory geopolitical motivations behind and ramifications of 
specific pipeline projects. Attempts to manipulate pipeline equations in Turkey’s favour 
tended to have little impact. This thesis contends, therefore, that while Turkey’s energy 
strategy did account for the role of energy as both a strategic objective and an tool through 
which Turkey could realise other agendas (particularly in terms of development and 
foreign policy), inadequacies in policy implementation and insufficient acknowledgement 
of the ways in which geopolitical competition influenced pipeline politics in the region 
restricted Turkey from the potential benefits from the AKP’s energy strategy. Turkey’s 
energy policy emphasised regional energy “leadership” and its policies and rhetoric 
corresponded to regional hegemony. Regardless, the state was limited in its capacity to 
affect change within the regional system. Finally, this chapter demonstrated that while 
energy may be both an objective and tool for even energy poor advanced developing 
states, limitations in terms of economic capacity and regional geopolitical assessment can 
undermine the state’s agenda. Nonetheless, energy and regional power were undoubtedly 
interrelated for Turkey during this period. The remainder of this thesis will look at the 
ways in which relations with each of Iran and Russia affected Turkey’s regional and 
energy strategies. In doing so, it will also consider the forms of hegemony - benevolent 






4. Energy in Turkish-Iranian Relations 
4.1 Introduction 
The relationship between Iran and Turkey in the AKP era was characterised by the triumph 
of pragmatism in the economic and energy spheres over competing ideological agendas. 
Bilateral diplomacy and economic cooperation were facilitated in the early years of the 
AKP’s first term by Turkey’s ambition to exert its strategic autonomy from the West and 
Iran’s bid to counterbalance US-induced international isolation. Common threat 
perceptions in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and a shared desire to incorporate 
Iranian gas into the fourth corridor project meant that security and energy rhetoric 
dominated cooperative efforts. Claims of competing agendas and contesting ideologies 
between the states rarely manifested in the Caspian region in the way they did in the 
Middle East in part because Iran’s capacity to exercise its power in the Caspian was more 
constrained than in other regions. This chapter will argue that Turkey’s energy cooperation 
with Iran contributed to its regional power status. While bilateral agreements and 
cooperation rhetoric rarely metamorphosised into tangible projects, attempts to integrate 
Iran into regional and international systems - particularly during the 2010 nuclear 
negotiations - nonetheless demonstrated Turkey’s willingness to act as an regional 
representative and  integrative force.  
Chapter three argued that energy and regional powerhood were interrelated for Turkey. 
This chapter expands on the role played by energy in Turkish-Iranian relations, and 
considers the ways in which Iran affected Turkey’s regional and energy strategies. That 
energy played a significant role in bilateral relations is unsurprising given Turkey’s energy 
requirements and Iran’s substantial energy reserves. It is argued that limitations to the 
willingness of other Caspian states to engage in substantial energy trade with Iran, 
Turkey’s pivotal geostrategic role in the fourth corridor project, and Tehran’s desire to 
export natural gas to Europe endowed Turkey with greater significance in regional energy 
systems than its energy producing partner. Building on the previous chapter, Turkey is 
framed as a benevolent regional hegemon: energy and political engagement with Iran was 




Both Iranian and external factors constrained the implementation of Turkey’s energy 
agenda to the detriment of its regional status. Iran’s position on Caspian delineation and 
the erratic nature of Turkmen-Iranian energy relations impeded the integration of 
Turkmenistan natural gas reserves into regional energy projects. Beyond the restrictions 
placed on Turkey’s diversification agenda, Iran’s position undermined attempts by Turkey 
to demonstrate its significance in regional energy equations and restricted the integration 
that chapter two suggested was essential for regional powerhood. In addition, Iran’s anti-
status quo agenda and nuclear policies contributed to Tehran’s ever increasing isolation 
from the international community during the third AKP term in particular. The imposition 
of EU sanctions in 2012 effectively curtailed Turkey’s aim of supplementing Azerbaijani 
natural gas supplies to Europe with Iranian gas and demonstrated a failure by Turkey to 
assess to accurately assess both the geopolitical climate of the time and Turkey’s own 
ability to influence it. While this chapter ultimately concludes that Turkey possessed a 
more significant status in the Caspian region than Iran, it acknowledges that Iran’s actions 
had a detrimental effect on Turkey’s energy ambitions and, consequently, Turkey’s status 
within the Caspian region. 
The first section of this chapter briefly examines historical relations between Turkey and 
Iran. It illustrates how the 1996 agreement to construct a natural gas pipeline between 
Tabriz and Ankara constituted the highpoint of bilateral energy cooperation in the pre-
AKP era. The second section of this chapter focuses on Turkish-Iranian relations between 
2002 and 2014. It focuses in particular on the failure to translate rhetorical commitments 
into increased bilateral cooperation. The third section of this chapter examines bilateral 
energy interactions in more depth. It notes that despite competing for regional power, the 
states recognised that cooperation was necessary to ensure the realisation of their 
respective energy ambitions. However, this section also points out that energy rhetoric 
rarely translated into practice. Among the factors constricting concrete new cooperation 
was the response of the international community to Iran’s nuclear programme. The nuclear 
issue is examined in some detail in this section.  
The final section of the chapter looks at energy cooperation between Turkey, Iran, and 
other regional actors. Based on examinations of Iran’s energy engagement with 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Armenia, it argues that Turkey and Russia remained the 
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dominant powers in the Caspian by virtue of their relations with other regional states 
during the period under examination. It also considers the role Turkmenistan’s significant 
natural gas resources played in the regional agendas of both Turkey and Iran. The chapter 
concludes that Turkey’s energy relationship with Iran had the potential to contribute to the 
AKP’s energy security, hub, and diversification strategies and, consequently, to its 
regional power status. However, the effective merger for Ankara of Iranian energy and 
Turkish regional power was constrained by a significant discrepancy between rhetoric and 
outcomes in bilateral relations and Iran’s strained relationship with the international 
community. This limited Turkey’s capacity to assert a benevolent hegemonic regional 
agenda, and illustrates the inconsistencies that plagued Turkey’s energy strategy. Finally, it 
asserts that Turkey occupied a higher position in the regional hierarchy than did Iran by 
virtue of its integration with regional subordinates and its geostrategic utility for the energy 
producing states of the Caspian. 
4.2 Turkish-Iranian Relations in Historical Context 
4.2.1 Bilateral relations in the pre-AKP era 
Historical relations between Turkey and Iran were characterised by animosity and conflict. 
While the Turkish-Iranian border remained more or less constant following its demarcation 
in the 17th century (MFA, 2018), the imperial period was defined by competition for 
territory and religious influence in the Caucasus and Iraq. The advent of Russian and 
Western imperial forces into the region in the 18th and 19th centuries hastened the decline 
of the Persian and Ottoman empires. However, it was the dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire and the modernising reforms implemented by Kamal Ataturk in Turkey and Reza 
Shah Pahlavi in Iran in the aftermath of World War One that signalled the end of the 
imperialist era for both states. The assimilation of the Caucasus and Central Asia into the 
Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s both solidified Russia’s position as the unilateral 
regional power in the Caspian and severely limited Turkish and Iranian influence in the 
region. Both aligned with the West during the early years of the Cold War, with Iran’s 
considerable energy reserves and Turkey’s geostrategic location endowing the states with 
strategic significance for the West.  
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The 1979 Islamic Revolution was a catalyst for geopolitical change in the region. Turkey 
became the West’s preeminent ally in west Asia, while US sanctions and aggressive 
rhetoric concerning the exportation of the Islamic revolution from (Shi’ite) Iran to the 
(Sunni) Middle East saw Iran become increasingly isolated (Ozel and Ozcan, 2011). 
Nonetheless, there is a consensus in the academic literature that Ankara quickly realised 
the benefits of maintaining relations with both the West and Iran (Walker, 2007; Jenkins, 
2012; Robins, 2013). While Turkey’s military bureaucratic elite feared a campaign to 
export the Iranian revolution to Turkey (Aras and Polat, 2008), pragmatic considerations 
generally overrode any potential ideological dispute (Ayman, 2012). The next part of this 
chapter will highlight, for example, how Ankara’s decision to remain neutral during the 
Iran-Iraq war rather than siding with its Western allies and Iraq enabled Turkey to become 
an indispensable trading partner for both Iran and Iraq. 
A new source of competition arose in the 1990s with the collapse of the USSR. The 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 left a vacuum in Turkey and Iran’s imperial 
heartland that both sought to fill. The move by Azerbaijan and the five Central Asian 
former Soviet republics to join the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) signalled 
the states’ willingness to engage in regional integration initiatives with Turkey and Iran.38 
As chapter two noted, however, political and ethnic unrest and limited reciprocity in the 
newly independent states of the Caucasus and Central Asia undermined Turkish and 
Iranian attempts to supplant Russia’s dominance in the region. At the same time, bilateral 
relations continued to be unstable. Turkish elites frequently accused Iran of providing 
logistical support to the PKK (Xinhua General News Services, 2005a). While the states 
reconciled somewhat during the brief tenure of the Islamist Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) 
of Necmettin Erbakan in Turkey in the mid-1990s, tensions grew in the final years of the 
20th century: Bulent Ecevit, the Turkish prime minister, accused Iran of “continuing its 
efforts to export its revolution and of supporting the PKK” as late as 1999 (Ecevit, in 
Olson, 2000:876). Iran also overtly condemned Turkey’s commitment to the separation of 
                                                     
38 Established as the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in 1964 by Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan 
and suspended in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, the ECO in 1991 expanded to incorporate 
Afghanistan and the former Soviet states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan (ECO, 2018). Its primary objective is to “pave the way to a territory of integrated and 
sustainable economies as well as free trade area achieved by highly educated societies and improved 
governance through enhanced cooperation” (ECO, 2017:1). Among the organisation’s primary interests are 
trade, transport, and energy. 
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state and religion, with Foreign Minister Kemal Kharrazi stating that Iran “did not like 
Turkey’s secular policies” (Kharrazi, in Olson, 2000:876). The final decade of the 20th 
century was therefore characterised primarily by bilateral tensions and limited cooperation. 
The energy sphere proved an exception to this rule. 
4.2.2 Energy relations in the pre-AKP era 
Coksun (2009) notes that Iran’s substantial oil resources have been a source of 
international interest since at least the early years of the 20th century. Between 1908 and 
1951, the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) effectively controlled oil 
development in Iran (Samson, 1991). Oil nationalisation in 1951 meant that Iran’s oil 
resources were explored and developed by Tehran from the mid-20th century, but the West 
remained Iran’s primary energy consumers until 1979. The dominance by Western states 
of Iran’s oil market and lingering mistrust between Iran and Turkey limited bilateral 
energy trade prior to the Islamic Revolution, but energy proved a means of bilateral 
cooperation during the geopolitical upheaval that followed the revolution. Turkey’s 
neutrality during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 enabled it to become an essential trading 
partner to the otherwise besieged Iran. Jenkins (2012) notes that in both April 1981 and 
March 1982, Turkey and Iran signed agreements under which Iranian oil was exported to 
Turkey in return for foodstuff and manufactured products. In ensuring that transit routes 
remained operational, Turkey also demonstrated that it was a stable transit state and viable 
option for further pipelines and tanker routes. Three years after the end of the war, the 
states signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with a view to conducting 
feasibility studies for the construction of a pipeline that would carry Iranian natural gas 
through Anatolia to Europe (Jenkins, 2012). Both the MoU and Turkish-Iranian relations 
during the Iran-Iraq war indicate that bilateral relations were underscored by Turkey’s 
geostrategic location between the isolated Iran and global markets. The relationship 
between Turkey’s geography and Iran’s international confinement is a theme that will 
recur throughout this chapter. 
Despite competition for influence in Central Asia after the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, there was a recognition by both Turkey and Iran of the role the energy-rich states of 
the region could play in contributing to trans-Caspian and Eurasian pipeline projects. In 
the early 1990s, therefore, both states consulted with Turkmenistan in particular with 
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regards to Ashgabat’s participation in a Caspian-European pipeline project (Kalicki, 2001). 
While the government of Tansu Ciller had signed an outline agreement for a natural gas 
pipeline in 1995 (Robins, 1997), it was under the short-lived Erbakan administration that 
the first concrete pipeline agreement was struck between the countries. During a trip to 
Tehran in 1998, Erbakan signed a 25-year agreement valued at $30 billion (bn) to import 
230bcm natural gas from Iran (EIA, 2005). The construction of the Tabriz-Ankara pipeline 
was a turning point in energy relations, representing as it did a departure from the 
traditional focus on oil trade and bringing to the fore the possibility of integrating Iran into 
regional energy systems. 
While engaging Iran in energy affairs contravened the US and its allies’ efforts to isolate 
Iran through initiatives like the fourth corridor project, it nonetheless made strategic sense 
for Turkey. In 1996, Turkey had a rapidly growing economy that required supplemental 
energy resources and was which highly dependent on Russian energy supplies. As chapter 
three pointed out, both undermined Turkey’s energy security and contributed to efforts to 
acquire new sources of energy. With the development of fourth corridor projects stymied 
by Russian opposition and unrest in the former Soviet states (see chapters three and five), 
the proposed Tabriz-Ankara pipeline offered an opportunity for bolstering both domestic 
energy security and relations with one of Turkey’s most powerful neighbours. The 
pipeline, originally due to be completed in 1999, was initiated in 2001. 39 It signalled the 
beginning of an era of bilateral cooperation - particularly in the economic sphere - that 
would be the focal point of the AKP government in the formative years of the 21st century. 
4.3 Turkish-Iranian relations, 2002-2014 
4.3.1 Bilateral diplomacy in the AKP era 
Iran’s transformation from monarchy to theocracy in the post-revolution era was in stark 
contrast to Turkey’s strictly secular form of government. While the brief historiography 
above indicated that Turkey’s approach to Iran was predicated on pragmatism rather than 
ideology, diverging opinions on the separation on governance and religion - along with 
                                                     
39The EIA (2005) cites a number of reasons given by Turkish and Iranian officials for the delayed initiation 
of the pipeline, including economic recession in Turkey, financing issues, and US sanctions 
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Turkey’s pro-Western stance and the state’s highly securitised foreign policy40 - 
contributed to tensions between the two. As the previous section noted, Turkey’s military-
bureaucratic elite harboured suspicions about Iran’s intentions to export the Islamic 
Revolution to Turkey. By 2007, however, Abdullah Gul was clear in stating that tensions 
over accusations that Iran was seeking to undermine Turkey’s secular system were “a thing 
of the past” (AFP, 2007b). This section will outline how proactive diplomacy, the 
changing security situation in the Middle East, and increased economic cooperation were 
central to the reconfiguration of Turkey’s foreign policy approach to Iran. It will also stress 
how the regional power typology Turkey adhered to oscillated in its relationship with Iran 
but ultimately conformed to benevolent hegemony.  
The AKP’s 2002 electoral victory coincided with the designation of Iran, Iraq, and North 
Korea as an “axis of evil” (Bush, 2002) by the US, Turkey’s long-standing strategic 
partner. Chapter two outlined how foreign policy in the AKP’s first term was concerned 
with demonstrating strategic autonomy from the West. The extent of rapprochement with 
Iran was in stark contrast to the US’ containment policies, and demonstrated the 
willingness of the AKP to prioritise regional relations that were beneficial to Turkey over 
compliance with Western agendas. Analysed through a regional powers/energy 
framework, there are two clear benefits to this strategy. Firstly, it created the necessary 
independence and stability to advance Turkey’s energy strategy. As section 4.4 will argue, 
diplomatic engagement was essential to engendering goodwill and leverage in energy 
engagement with Iran. Secondly, it demonstrated to all Caspian states Turkey’s 
commitment to prioritising regional engagement over long-standing alliances with great or 
developed powers. Considering that the former in particular was driven by self interest 
considering the advantages for Turkey’s energy domestic energy security and geostrategic 
significance, this thesis considers Turkey’s rapprochement with Iran to be part of a 
hegemonic regional powers strategy. The emphasis on diplomacy and cooperation in order 
to enhance Turkey’s role in the region corresponds more specifically to benevolent 
hegemony. 
                                                     
40There is a large literature on the securitisation of Turkey’s foreign policy in the late 1990s and 2000s, but 
this thesis lacks both the scope and space to discuss it. Kirisci (2006) and Aras and Polet (2008) are among 
those who debate the topic at length 
158 
 
A new era of high-level engagement was evident from early in the AKP’s first term. 
Cagaptay (2004) notes that in 2003 alone, four high-level visits took place from Turkey to 
Iran and six between Iran and Turkey. Diplomatic relations reached their apex during the 
AKP’s second term. Government press releases showing almost twenty high-level 
ministerial meetings were held between the states between 2008 and 2009. Despite 
condemnation from the West over the severity of the post-election crackdown on 
protesters, Erdogan and Gul were among the first to congratulate President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad on his re-election victory in 2009 (Tait, 2009b). In an interview with the 
Guardian in the aftermath of the election, Erdogan declared that there was “no doubt” that 
Ahmadinejad was a “friend” with whom Turkey had “good relations” (Tait, 2009b). More 
indicative of Turkey’s policy towards Iran, however, was Erdogan’s statement in the same 
interview that he would not raise the matter of post-election protests with Tehran because 
it would represent “interference” in Iran’s domestic affairs. A policy of non-interference in 
the sovereign affairs of other states was a theme of Turkey’s policy in the Caspian 
throughout the period under examination, and its application to Iran was important to 
cultivating both bilateral relations and the image of Turkey as a fair and impartial 
adjudicator of regional affairs. This, chapter two asserted, was integral to Turkey’s 
legitimacy in the region. It propagated the image of Turkey as a benevolent regional 
hegemon. 
Diplomatic cooperation was also spurred by growing international concern over Iran’s 
nuclear programme. Turkey’s role in negotiating between the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) and Iran will be debated later in this chapter, but it should be 
acknowledged that Ankara’s diplomatic engagement with Iran placed significant emphasis 
on the nuclear issue from the mid-2000s. Turkey was insistent from the outset that 
dialogue was pivotal to resolving international concerns. In January 2006, a spokesperson 
for the MFA stressed that Iran should ensure that it “rapidly enter[ed] full and transparent 
cooperation with the EU ... and the IAEA” (AP, 2006). A month later, Turkey’s Minister 
for Justice Cemil Cicek called on Iran to be “more transparent for the sake of the region, 
the (sic) humanity, and Iran itself” (AP, 2006c). In doing so, Cicek positioned Turkey as 
an envoy for each of Iran, the region, and the international community (“humanity”) in a 
manner indicative of the increased self-confidence that chapter two suggested was a 
hallmark of Turkish foreign policy from the mid-2000s. Iran was quite receptive to 
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Turkish diplomacy on the issue. In June 2006, Iran’s Foreign Minister Hamid-Reza Asefi 
highlighted how, even though the AKP had yet to approach Iran directly about the nuclear 
issue, Turkey was a country with a “friendly approach” to Iran (IMFA, 2006). He noted 
that Iran’s nuclear programme would be a topic of discussion during a visit by Abdullah 
Gul (IMFA, 2006). That Iran’s nuclear negotiators travelled to Turkey immediately after 
two rounds of negotiations with the P5+1 (AP, 2006d; AP, 2008) also indicates a keenness 
on Iran’s behalf to involve Turkey in the negotiations.   
From mid-2006, Turkey also began promoting itself as a possible mediator in the dispute. 
Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gul travelled to Tehran in August of that year to offer 
himself as a “facilitator” in resolving tensions over Iran’s nuclear programme (AFP, 
2006e). In 2008, Gul again repeated in a joint press conference with Ahmadinejad that 
Turkey could help solve the problem and end sanctions (UPI, 2008). The willingness to act 
as a representative on issues important to other regional states (in this case Iran) was 
conceptualised as a form of leadership in chapter two. However, given the extent of self-
interest involved in the issue for Turkey regarding its domestic security, place in the 
region, and status on the international stage, this thesis considers Turkey’s position to be 
more congruent with benevolent regional hegemony. 
As tensions over the nuclear issue continued to escalate, Turkey became more involved in 
international dialogue on the issue. In an interview in 2009, Foreign Minister Ali Babacan  
pointed out that the nuclear issue had received significant attention in meetings between 
both Erdogan and Babacan and Ahmadinejad and with Susan Rice and Sergi Lavrov in 
2008 (Babacan, 2009). Babacan also alleged that Iran had requested Turkey play a role in 
negations, and Erdogan similarly stated in a 2009 interview with the Guardian that Iran 
had requested Turkish participation in negotiations (Babacan, 2009; Tait, 2009a). If 
Babacan and Erdogan’s statements are to be believed, then calls by Iran for Ankara’s 
involvement in negotiations represents an acceptance by Tehran of Turkey’s mediatory 
capabilities within the international system and its role as a regional envoy. Chapter two 
suggested that acceptance by other regional states- and particularly other regional powers - 
was a key attribute of regional powers.  
Turkey’s role in mediating the conflict climaxed with its joint appointment with Brazil by 
the UNSC to negotiate a deal with Iran in 2009 (which will be discussed in greater detail in 
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section 4.4.6). Based on the prominence afforded to the nuclear issues in bilateral 
discourse, this thesis contends that both the intensive diplomacy between Turkey and Iran 
in years preceding the negotiations and Turkey’s policy of non-interference in Iranian 
affairs - and particularly the refusal to condemn the violent crackdown on anti-
Ahmadinejad protesters in the aftermath of the 2009 Iranian general election -  were 
instrumental in creating a relatively amicable relationship between the states that 
contributed to Iran’s reciprocity to Turkish involvement in UNSC negotiations on the 
nuclear issue. In other words, it engendered the legitimacy that chapter two suggested was 
the trademark of non-imperial forms of regional power.  
A convergence on geopolitical threat perceptions also spurred bilateral diplomacy. The 
2003 invasion of Iraq was an early litmus test of the AKP’s commitment to finding 
regional solutions to regional problems, but it also provided a context in which Turkey and 
Iran could highlight the necessity of bilateral cooperation within the region.41 Both Turkey 
and Iran share a border with Iraq. News reports show that from early in the AKP’s first 
term, shared concerns about Iraq featured frequently in bilateral discussions (Xinhua 
General News services, 2003a; AFP, 2003b; IMFA, 2004b). The states shared a fear that 
the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region of northern Iraq would declare independence in the 
upheaval that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein. Erdogan’s declaration that the 
“territorial integrity and political unity” of Iraq had to be preserved (AFP, 2003b) is 
representative of the position taken on Iraq. The prospect of Kurdish independence fuelled 
fears that the PKK would resume the armed struggle for independence in both Turkey and 
Iran. In the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, the group were reimagined as a common 
enemy. Yet it was not until 2017 when they began sharing military intelligence (Daily 
Sabah, 2017b) that Turkey and Iran actually implemented a joint campaign against the 
PKK.  
Both Turkey and Iran were consistent in claiming that joint cooperation could prevent 
destabilisation and solve regional crises throughout the period under consideration. 
Resentment of external interference in regional affairs - and particularly in regional 
                                                     
41There is insufficient space here to debate the impact of the 2003 invasion on the regional hierarchy in the 
Middle East or its impact on Turkey and Iran’s respective regional power ambitions in that region; scholars 
such as Ayman (2012) discuss these issues in more detail 
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security issues - was a major driver of this rhetoric. External - and particularly Western - 
interference in the region undermined Turkey’s attempts to demonstrate strategic 
autonomy and regional hegemony. Iranian rhetoric repeatedly portrayed regional 
involvement by external powers as having a destabilising effect on regional stability (see, 
for example, Larijani in BBC (2005) and Asefi in IMFA (2006)). Of relevance to this 
thesis is former Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs Kamal Kharrazi’s suggestion that the 
“presence of foreign powers” in Central Asia and the Caucasus is not “in the best interests 
of regional security” (IMFA, 2004a). Accusations of regional competition between Iran 
and Turkey were also attributed to external interference (Salehi, 2012). Despite proactive 
diplomacy and rhetoric on bilateral security cooperation, the states were repeatedly forced 
to deny that they were competitors in the Middle East. In 2009, Iran’s ambassador to 
Turkey Bahman Hosseinpour stated that Iran and Turkey were “not rivals” and that they 
“complete[d] each other” in a way that enabled them to “act in parallel on regional issues” 
(Hurriyet, 2009). These rebuttals became more frequent in the aftermath of the Arab 
Spring and the onset of the Syrian civil war.42 The benefits of cooperation for regional 
stability were again frequently evoked as a means of renouncing competition. Davutoglu, 
for example, suggested in 2013 that bilateral cooperation was the “backbone of regional 
stability (Browder, 2013). Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Sarif similarly 
suggested that cooperation would “contribute to regional stability and peace” (Today’s 
Zaman, 2014). Cooperation on regional stability - a key indicator of regional power and 
one essential to realising Ankara’s energy agenda - through dialogue and in its own 
interest is indicative of Turkey’s pursuit of benevolent regional hegemony.  
Chapter two argued that a state’s ability to shape regional security complexes is a feature 
of regional power, while interference by external powers in regional affairs can limit the 
capacity of states to implement a regional powers agenda. It was proposed that in Turkey’s 
case, external interference affected the state’s ability to demonstrate strategic autonomy 
and regional hegemony in both its own interests and those  of subordinate regional actors.  
While Turkish-Iranian cooperation did not directly affect either states’ position in the 
regional hierarchy in the Caspian region, joint efforts within the Middle East set 
precedence for bilateral cooperation with other states: it demonstrated Turkey’s 
                                                     
42Aras and Yorulmazlar (2014) and  Halehsar (2013) consider the respective roles and interests of Turkey 
and Iran in Syria and the MENA region more broadly post-2011 in more detail 
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willingness to work with regional partners to resolve regional conflict. As chapter two 
pointed out, cooperation in and control of on security matters was a prerequisite for 
regional power.  
Despite these claims, however, there is little evidence that Iran and Turkey developed any 
form of concrete cooperative policy on regional security initiatives outside of those related 
to the PKK. This is representative of the discrepancy between rhetoric and practice that 
this thesis argues plagued Turkish-Iranian relations. Regardless of the extent to which Iran 
articulated a desire for regional integration and increased cooperation with Turkey, internal 
distrust of external actors prohibited any extensive integration. This was particularly 
evident during the Ahmadinejad administration, where a return to the securitised and 
resolutely anti-status quo rhetoric that had characterised the Khomeini era became more 
prominent again.43 Yet at the same time, if - as chapter two argued - influence in regional 
security affairs is a prerequisite to regional power, then it made little strategic sense for 
Turkey to exclude Iran from its security equations (even if cooperation was limited to 
rhetoric). Minimising competition and problems with Iran was necessary for the successful 
application of the “zero problems with neighbours” policy and regional power ambitions. 
The next section will examine how cooperation in the economic sphere further contributed 
to the strengthening of relations between Turkey and Iran. 
4.3.2 Economic cooperation 
It was in the area of trade that the most substantial progress was made in Turkish-Iranian 
relations during the AKP’s first three terms in office. World Bank data shows that total 
bilateral trade increased from $1.2 bn in 2002 - the year the AKP took power - to $13.8 bn 
in 2014 (World Bank, 2017a). Bilateral trade reached a high of $22 billion dollars in 2012, 
but subsequently contracted as Turkey implemented UN sanctions against Iran. This 
decline notwithstanding, the rise in bilateral trade and trade agreements between the states 
indicates that economic relations were at the heart of the Turkish-Iranian relationship 
between 2002 and 2014. The AKP era also witnessed significant private sector investment 
                                                     
43 See, for example, Ahmadinejad’s comments regarding Israel on 2005 (MacAskill and McGreal, 2005), or 
his speech to the UN General Assembly the following year  (Ahmadinejad, 2006) 
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by Turkish companies in Iran, especially in the ethnically Turkish East Azerbaijan region 
of northern Iran (Iranian Ministry of Economic and Financial Affairs (MEFA), 2014).  
Bolstering bilateral trade was a prerogative for the new AKP government from its earliest 
years in power. During the AKP’s first meeting of the Turkey-Iran Joint Economic 
Commission (JEC) in April 2003, Erdogan and Iranian First Vice President Rezza Aref 
agreed to commence negotiations on a preferential trade and tariff system (Xinhua General 
News, 2003b). Even at the height of international tensions around Iran’s nuclear 
programme, Turkish officials were both consistent and unequivocal about the desire to 
increase trade with Iran: in 2006, Iran’s First Vice-President Mohammad-Reza Rahimi 
suggested that the states had agreed to increase trade threefold to $30b within five years 
(Xinhua General News Service, 2009). Similarly, in 2010 an AP journalist quoted 
Erdogan’s intention to triple Iranian trade volumes within the following five years 
(Hacaoglu, 2010). The extent of Erdogan’s ambition was revealed in his declaration that he 
envisioned an “unimpeded trade mechanism” with Iran akin to that that Turkey had with 
Europe (Hacoglu, 2010). Yet the similarities between the 2006 and 2010 statements and 
the fact that trade did not increase by any significant in the interim is again indicative of 
the chasm between rhetoric and practice in Turkish-Iranian relations. 
It was in terms of the exportation of Turkish products to Iran that Turkey made the greatest 
inroads in economic cooperation in the period under consideration. In 2002, Turkey’s 
exports to Iran were worth $338m (World Bank, 2017b). Turkey was Iran’s 17th largest 
import market and represented less than 2% of Iran’s total imports (OEC, 2017a). The 
implementation of EU sanctions on Iran and Turkey’s pursuit of Iranian markets meant 
that by 2014, Turkey was Iran’s fourth largest import market, with Turkish exports to Iran 
worth $3.8b (World Bank, 2017). OEC data shows that Turkey’s primary exports to Iran 
were textiles, metals, and machinery (OEC, 2017a). From 2012, however, precious metals 
became Turkey’s predominant export to Iran, with gold trade in particular experiencing an 
exponential increase: gold exports jumped from 53m - or 1.4% of total exports - in 2011 to 
$6.53b in 2012, accounting for 67% of exports. Various reports indicate that the 
implementation of international sanctions that restricted trading with Iran in dollars or 
euros led Turkey to pay for energy imports in gold (Dombey, 2013; Kandemir, 2013). 
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Oil dominates Iran’s global exports. It accounted for 81% (or $25.4bn) of total Iranian 
exports in 2002 and 73% ($37.2bn) in 2014 (OEC, 2017a). Given Turkey’s significant 
energy requirements and its geographic proximity to Iran, as well as the limited 
diversification of Iran’s export markets beyond energy (OEC, 2017a), it is unsurprising 
that oil was also the number one export from Iran to Turkey for most of period under 
consideration. At its peak in 2005, oil represented 90% of Turkey’s Iranian imports. Total 
mineral products (including natural gas and refined products) accounted for $2.2bn (or 
93%) of imports from Iran. The implementation of strict sanctions saw this figure plummet 
to 15% in 2014, with minerals (particularly copper and aluminium) and petroleum by-
products like ethylene polymers occupying a growing role in imports (OEC, 2017a). OEC 
data shows that this represents a decrease in the value of mineral trade from $2.2bn in 
2005 to $250m in 2014 - a decline of almost 90%. (OEC, 2017a) Nevertheless, Turkey 
remained Iran’s fifth largest export market.  
Bilateral trade had significant implications for both states. Economically isolated as a 
result of US sanctions, Turkey was a conduit for Iranian goods and services to the rest of 
the world prior to the implementation of EU and UN sanctions. Chapter two claimed that 
the formation of economic interdependencies that contribute to wider regional economic 
structures is important to regional power. The extent to which Iran was dependent on 
Turkey as a conduit skewered the balance of power between the states in Turkey’s favour 
despite the bilateral trade balance favouring Iran (this will be discussed in more depth in 
the next section of this chapter). The remainder of this chapter will highlight how it was 
also essential for the realisation of Turkey’s energy hub ambitions. The significance of 
energy in Turkey-Iranian trade cannot therefore be understated. The next section will 
examine in depth the trajectory of bilateral energy relations between Turkey and Iran 
between 2002 and 2014. To provide context for these relations, it will first highlight key 
features of Iran’s energy situation.  
4.4 Energy relations between Turkey and Iran, 2002-2014 
4.4.1 Iran: an energy superpower? 
Based on its hydrocarbon reserves, Iran should be one of the most significant actors in 
global energy markets. British Petroleum’s (BP) annual survey of global energy supplies 
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shows that Iran holds 158 billion barrels (bbl) of oil and 33.5 trillion cubic metres (tcm) of 
natural gas (BP, 2017c). Its proven oil reserves are the fourth largest in the world and 
account for 10% of the global total, while its natural gas reserves are second only to those 
of Russia (BP, 2017c). The 3.8 million barrels of oil per day (mb/d) produced in 2014 
(2.8mb/d of which was crude oil) made Iran the seventh largest oil producer in the world 
(EIA, 2015d; BP, 2017c). China, India, Japan, and South Korea accounted for 98% of the 
1.4mb/d crude oil exported by Iran in 2014 (EIA, 2015d; OEC, 2017). BP data shows that 
natural gas production amounted to 186bcm in 2014, the majority of which was consumed 
domestically (BP, 2017c). Turkey is Iran’s largest gas export market, and purchased 92% 
of the 8.4 bcm of gas exported in 2016 (BP, 2017c). Armenia and Azerbaijan purchased 
the remaining 0.7 bcm (BP, 2017c; EIA, 2018). Iran also imported 6.7 bcm from 
Turkmenistan and 0.2bcm from Azerbaijan (EIA, 2015d); the former in order to meet peak 
seasonal demands, and the latter as part of a natural gas swap deal that will be discussed in 
greater detail in section 4.5.2 of this chapter. Iran is also highly dependent on energy 
income: oil exports accounted for 75% of Iran’s total export income of $51 bn in 2016 
(OEC, 2017). The extent to which Iran is financially dependent on international energy 
income meant that energy was intertwined with economic, foreign, military, and national 
security policy. 
 














There is a clear discrepancy between Iran’s substantial hydrocarbon reserves and its 
position in the global energy hierarchy. Despite holding the second largest natural gas 
reserves in the world, Iran accounts for less than 1% of global supplies (EIA, 2015d). 
While its oil sector fares better, it too is underdeveloped (IEA, 2010). There are several 
potential explanatory factors for this discrepancy. That Iran reached peak production in 
1979 indicates a correlation between the Iranian revolution and oil production trends: 
sanctions and political and economic uncertainty affected the state’s capacity to develop 
oil reserves. A protectionist energy market and concerns about domestic and regional 
instability restricted foreign direct investment further limited energy development in the 
aftermath of the Islamic Revolution.44 Significant subsidies for domestic energy 
consumers placed limitations of the profitability of energy production and, therefore on the 
financial resources available for reinvestment in energy exploration and development. 45 
It is, however, impossible to evaluate Iran’s failure to realise its energy potential without 
considering the effect of international sanctions. Sanctions were originally imposed on Iran 
by the US in the aftermath of the 1979 Tehran hostage crisis and were extended on several 
occasions. The EU and US began implementing sanctions on Iranian trade, financial 
assets, and personnel during the dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme (World Bank 
2015). Energy proved a target for successive sanction regimes: the US’ Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act (1996) threatened to penalise private companies that invested more than $20 
million in the Iranian energy sector, while the UN and EU froze the assets of individuals 
involved in energy (UNSC Resolution 1747; UNSC Resolution 1929; European Council, 
2012). 
The implementation of multilateral UN sanctions in 2010 -which will be discussed in more 
detail later in this chapter - and the consequent EU embargo on Iranian oil had a 
particularly detrimental effect on Iran’s energy trade. IMF (2014) and OEC (2017) data 
                                                     
44 Iran’s energy sector is fully nationalised, and domestic energy and investment policies played a large role 
in limiting its successful development. While international oil companies (IOCs) can participate in 
downstream activities in the energy sector, constitutional limitations on foreign ownership of natural 
resources prohibit involvement in downstream management. The inclusion of buy-back clauses in energy 
contracts as a result of these restrictions offer an uncompetitive rate of return for foreign investors and, 
consequently, contribute to an uncompetitive energy market. 
45 Subsidies in 2007/8 cost the Iranian government around $100bn, or the equivalent of 27% of GDP - far 
higher than any other OPEC state (IMF, 2008). An extensive subsidy reform programme implemented in 
2013 did, however, reduce subsidies to about 4% of GDP in 2014 (IMF, 2015) 
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shows that Iran’s oil and gas revenue declined from $118bn at the end of the 2011/12 
fiscal year to $41bn at the end of 2014. Total oil exports declined by almost 50% from 
2.6mb/d in 2011 to 1.4mb/d in 2014 (EIA, 2015e). The direction of exports was also 
significantly altered by the EU oil trade embargo. In 2011, Europe purchased 29% of 
Iran’s crude petroleum exports. By 2014, 99.4% of Iran’s exports were destined  for Asia 
(BP, 2017c). Considering the contention in section 4.4.4 of this chapter that the AKP 
sought to incorporate Iranian hydrocarbons into east-west energy projects in order to 
enhance the viability of a Turkish energy hub, this thesis asserts that that reorientation was 
detrimental to the party’s energy strategy. Before expanding on that issue, however, the 
next sections will look more generally at energy relations between 2002 and 2014 in order 
to gain a clearer perspective of the factors influencing bilateral energy trade. 
4.4.2 Bilateral energy trade 
Section 4.3.2 of this chapter outlined the prevalence afforded to oil in trade relations 
between Turkey and Iran. Aside from constituting the bulk of exports to Turkey, Iranian 
hydrocarbons also occupied a predominant position in Turkey’s energy mix. As chapter 
three pointed out, Iran is a major supplier of oil to Turkey, and accounted for 27% of 
Turkish oil imports in 2014 (EIA, 2015b). Iran’s share in Turkey’s oil import market 
remained high throughout the 2002-2014 period, with Iran surpassing Russia to become 
Turkey’s single largest supplier of crude oil in 2010 (BP, 2017c). Energy data shows that 
Iran maintained a consistent overall share in Turkey’s oil market throughout the AKP’s 
first three terms (BP, 2017c; OEC, 2017a). 
Iranian natural gas was pivotal to Turkey’s energy mix. Iran was Turkey’s second largest 
supplier of natural gas in 2014 after Russia, providing 20% of Turkey’s total gas 
requirements through the Tabriz-Ankara pipeline (EIA, 2015b). The previous section of 
this chapter highlighted how 90% of Iran’s gas exports were destined for Turkey during 
the period under examination. The volume of Iranian gas exports increased year on year 
during the AKP’s first three terms in office (IEA, 2013; BP, 2017c). 46 Trade statistics 
show that the volume of gas traded between Iran and Turkey did not fall after the 
                                                     




implementation of UN sanctions (BP, 2017c). Consistency in natural gas imports and 
continued - if significantly reduced - oil imports despite the sanction regime can be 
attributed to exemptions from some sanctions for Turkey in return for limiting oil imports 
and the circumvention of others by paying for oil and gas in gold (Tatersall, 2012).47  
Turkey and Iran’s desire to increase bilateral energy trade made sense politically, 
economically, and geographically, and had the potential to be mutually beneficial. Chapter 
one suggested that multidimensional bilateral relations are beneficial to successful energy 
diplomacy. In this regard, the extensive diplomacy carried out between the states and the 
long-standing nature of bilateral relations were a facilitating factor in energy trade 
negotiations. That Turkey and Iran share a border negated the need to engage a transit state 
in any pipeline project, which in turn limited potential security threats emanating from 
third party actors. The geographic proximity of the two states provided economic benefits, 
too: chapter one pointed out that gas pipelines tend to be costly projects, so those projects 
that cover shorter distances can be more viable than longer-distanced pipelines. For 
Turkey, obtaining access to new Iranian supplies would both alleviate the pressure on 
domestic energy markets that were increasingly strained as a result of continued economic 
growth and would aid the diversification of energy imports away from Russia. Iran would 
benefit from energy income from Turkey and, importantly, Turkey could facilitate the 
transportation of Iranian gas to Europe. Turkey, therefore, had a strategic value for Iran in 
terms of transit routes to European markets that contributed to redressing the imbalance 
caused by asymmetrical trade imports with Iran. Finally, integrating Iran successfully into 
regional energy systems would not only increase the perception of Turkey as a regional 
power, but it would do so in an area (energy) in which Turkey is at a significant 
disadvantage in terms of relative capacity in the region. More importantly, it would 
demonstrate to other energy rich states that Turkey had both the capacity and willingness 
to facilitate the transportation of energy resources to European markets. This, then, would 
substantiate the perception of Turkey as a benevolent regional hegemon. However, this 
section will demonstrate how Turkish-Iranian energy relations were replete with 
inconsistencies. In particular, it will illustrate how the disconnection between rhetoric and 
                                                     
47 Payment for services in lira or dollars was banned under the sanction regime.  
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practice when it came to energy cooperation undermined the development of tangible new 
connections between the states.  
It became apparent in the AKP’s first term that energy relations with Iran would not be 
without issue. The price agreed for natural gas through the Tabriz-Ankara pipeline proved 
to be a topic of contention for the AKP almost immediately. In rushing through 
negotiations for the pipeline in 1996, and in light of projected economic growth, the 
Erbakan government agreed to pay above the market price for Iranian gas. Chapter three 
pointed out that the revision of Turkey’s energy requirements in the aftermath of the 2001 
economic crash meant that the state was contracted to purchase more energy that its 
economy required: financial analysts estimated that the disparity between Turkey’s 
contracted gas imports and gas demands would reach “disproportionate levels” by 2004 
(Oil and Gas Journal, 2003). Complicating the matter further was the inclusion of a “take-
or-pay” clause in the 1996 agreement that committed Turkey to buying at least 87% of the 
contracted volume of gas (Middle East Economic Survey, 2002). If Turkish purchases fell 
below that level then the state would be liable to pay the remainder of the gas costs. 
The AKP consequently set out to renegotiate energy trade deals with Turkey’s major gas 
suppliers. Negotiations with Russia will be discussed in chapter five, but it can be noted at 
this stage that Turkey suspended flows of natural gas through the Blue Stream pipeline - 
itself only initiated in early 2003 - for several months before renegotiating a new price and 
take-or-pay contracts. In June 2002, Turkey suspended supplies of Iranian gas imports, 
alleging that the quality of gas received was of a low quality (EIA, 2005). However, low 
demand and the desire for lower prices are more likely explanatory factors for the supply 
suspension. The renegotiation of both gas prices and take or pay criteria in November 2002 
without alterations to the quality of natural gas (Natural Gas World, January 2012) 
suggests that economic considerations were a central motivation. Further substantiation for 
that claim comes from Turkey’s decision to seek arbitration from the International 
Chamber of Commerce in 2004 for Iran’s perceived overcharging for natural gas exports 
(UPI, 2009b).48 Chapter one argued that energy consumers face substantial difficulties in 
substituting natural gas supplies during suspensions due to the fixed nature of natural gas 
                                                     
48 The court found in Turkey’s favour in 2009, and ordered an immediate price reduction of 18% and for 
Tehran to pay $800m for previously refusing to lower prices (Reuters, 2012a; UPI, 2009b). 
170 
 
trade with regards to both transport (that is, pipelines) and the long-term nature of pricing 
contracts. That Turkey was willing to suspend natural gas trade with Iran indicates that it 
either had access to alternative supplies or - more likely, given the state’s economic 
downturn at the time - it was unlikely to suffer energy security issues as a result of any 
Iranian shortfall. At the same time, the contentions in energy trade were at odds with the 
cooperative rhetoric that the pervious section of this chapter suggested dominated the new 
AKP era. 
This thesis therefore considers Turkey’s pertinacity on the pricing issue to be indicative of 
the AKP’s perception of its strength in energy negotiations with a major energy supplier 
and, accordingly, of its regional power status. Of the regional power typologies outlined in 
chapter two, Turkey’s actions in 2002 are most congruent with coercive hegemony: the 
suspension of both payments and gas flows can be conceptualised as a form of coercion 
facilitated by a high degree of self-interest. It should be pointed out at this stage that this 
was the only example this thesis found that is identified as coercive hegemony in Turkish-
Iranian relations. It does not, therefore, invalidate the argument that Turkey’s Iranian 
strategy corresponded on the whole to benevolent hegemony. Nonetheless, the episode 
contradicts the recurrent argument in the “energy in IR literature” (see chapter one) that 
the manipulation of energy projects is primarily the remit of producer states. This, it was 
argued, was particularly the case for natural gas agreements because of the difficulty faced 
by producers in finding substitutes for suspended supplies. The eventual renegotiation of 
the contract in Turkey’s favour in November 2002 indicates that Turkey’s policy was a 
successful one: so much so that, as chapter five will highlight, Turkey implemented a 
similar strategy in 2003 to force the renegotiation of natural gas supplies from Russia. The 
reasons for the success of the policy are less clear, but this chapter demonstrates how 
Turkey’s utility as a transit state for Iranian energy to international markets, for reducing 
Iran’s international economic and political isolation, and as Iran’s predominant gas export 
market, tilted the balance of power between the states in Ankara’s favour. It should be 
recalled at this stage that chapter two suggested that a preferential position in bilateral 
relations could endow energy poor states with leverage over energy rich states. That 
leverage would augment Turkey’s regional status. However, the next sections will show 
how the main threat to Turkey’s Iranian energy strategy stemmed from Iran’s relations 
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with other states. Those relations were crucial in preventing Turkey from incorporating 
Iranian energy into its strategy for benevolent regional hegemony. 
4.4.3 Iran in Turkey’s energy equations: the 2007 MoU and Nabucco 
Throughout the 2002-2014 period, Turkey and Iran repeatedly called for increased 
cooperation on energy projects. At one point, the Turkish environment minister alluded to 
the shared importance of Turkey and Iran in energy affairs by referring to the states as “an 
important axis for natural gas” (Anadolou Agency, 2003). Newspaper reports from 2003 
highlight Turkey’s interest in utilising existing pipeline infrastructure to transport Iranian 
gas to Europe (AFP, 2003a). In 2007 - the year in which, chapter two suggests, Turkey 
reached new levels of confidence in its ability to influence regional energy equations - the 
states signed a deal that looked set to cement energy cooperation and contribute to 
Turkey’s regional power. 
The 2007 Memorandum of Association (MoU) on cooperation in the natural gas sector 
endowed TPAO, Turkey’s national petroleum company, with the rights to develop three 
phases of Iran’s South Pars supergiant gas field and created a framework for the 
construction of a pipeline to carry gas from Iran to Turkey and on into Europe (UPI, 2007, 
Reuters, 2007). The MoU also planned to incorporate Turkmen gas into the new pipeline 
to be exported to Europe: Iranian Oil Minister Seyed Kazem Vaziri Hamaneh stated that 
the MoU would “allow the transit of Iran’s gas to Europe via Turkey and will let 
Turkmenistan’s gas be exported to Europe through Iran’s soil” (Reuters, 2007). Hamaneh 
also made clear in an interview with Iranian media that Iran more specifically intended the 
new pipeline to become part of the Nabucco project (UPI, 2007).  
Increased energy cooperation between Turkey, Iran, and Turkmenistan would contribute to 
the regional integration that chapter two suggested was important for regional powers. The 
use of Turkish territory to transport natural gas to Europe had the potential to increase 
Ankara’s geostrategic significance to Iran and Turkmenistan. However, the most important 
contribution of the 2007 MoU  to Turkey’s potential regional hegemony was the inclusion 
of a clause that would enable Turkey to re-export Iranian and Turkmen gas to Europe 
(Sholeri, 2013). Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Guler’s statement that Turkey needed the 
money it could gain “from buying and selling (the) project” (Tehran Times, 2008) 
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indicates that the AKP considered the deal to be a step towards the foundation of a Turkish 
energy hub. As chapter two noted, transit states or energy corridors do not have the right to 
export (or, in Guler’s terms, sell) energy products to third parties. Energy hubs, on the 
other hand, have the capacity to re-export energy, to set prices, and to determine the final 
destination of the energy project. The inclusion of a re-export clause in the MoU therefore 
had several important repercussions for Turkey’s energy and regional power agendas. 
Economically, the capacity to set prices and collect transit tariffs would reap the financial 
benefits that chapter two suggested were important in determining regional powerhood. 
Along with the ability to determine prices, engaging in energy bargaining with other 
importers and determining the trajectory of regional energy resources would endow 
Turkey with power more akin to an energy producer rather than an importing state. It was 
argued in chapter two that Turkey’s deficit of domestic energy reserves was detrimental to 
its regional powers agenda and status in a region dominated by energy affairs. The 
capacity to sell and direct energy supplies would not only emphasise Turkey’s geostrategic 
importance in regional energy flows, but it endow it with increased legitimacy as a 
regional power and regional energy “leader”. The incorporation of other regional states 
into the project in a way that facilitated both Turkey’s self-interest and regional integration 
is congruent with the benevolent hegemony depicted in chapter two. 
Yet as chapter three noted, the competing energy and geopolitical agendas of other states 
involved in the fourth corridor had the potential to stymie the realisation of Turkey’s 
energy agenda. The incorporation of Iran into any east-west pipeline was predicated on the 
willingness of European energy markets to accept Iranian natural gas. The situation was 
further complicated by the US’ vocal opposition to Iran’s role in regional energy projects 
(Pannier, 2008; UPI, 2009a) and by the growing international tension around the Iranian 
nuclear programme. Chapter two pointed out that the fourth corridor programme sought to 
exclude Iran from new east-west energy projects. According to various sources in the 
Turkish media, US officials objected to the 2007 MoU because of growing tensions 
between Iran and the US over the nuclear programme, arguing that it was “not the right 
time” for Turkey to be investing in Iranian energy (Jenkins, 2007). 
Regardless, Turkey continued to highlight the importance of Iranian supplies for the 
Nabucco project. At the height of the nuclear crisis in 2009, Erdogan insisted that the 
173 
 
exclusion of Iran from the project would mean that “Nabucco [would] come to a dead end” 
(Charbonneau, 2009). Iranian officials also enunciated the central role Iran could play in 
the project. Iran’s ambassador to Turkey, Bahman Hosseinpour, told Hurriyet Daily News 
in an interview that excluding Iran from the Nabucco project on account of “temporary 
political considerations” made the pipeline “impossible”. He pointed out that the “mutual 
interests and economic potential” of the pipeline for both the EU and Iran meant that 
“sooner or later, Iran (would) be part of Nabucco” (Hurriyet, 2009). 
European states appeared to be increasingly susceptible to growing US pressure to find 
alternatives to Iranian gas. The EU’s openness to Iranian participation in any east-west 
energy project varied quite significantly throughout the AKP’s first three terms in office. 
In the early 2000s, the EU Commission placed a similar emphasis on incorporating Iranian 
gas into the EU energy agenda as it did with other Caspian and Middle Eastern States. A 
2004 report by the EU’s Energy Directorate-General mapped potential pipeline routes for 
“priority projects” that clearly extend into Iran (European Commission, 2004b). By 2007, 
as US pressure to isolate Iran increased, EU officials were referring to Iran only briefly or 
not at all in speeches and policy documents (see, for example, Ferrero-Waldner, 2006, 
2007; Piebalgs, 2007). An exception was the EU’s Second Strategic Energy Review, 
which suggested Iran might joint the Southern Corridor at a future point “when political 
conditions permit” (European Commission, 2008c:4). In 2012, the EU not only fully 
implemented UN sanctions but imposed an oil embargo on Iran. Nonetheless, Turkey 
continued to press for the inclusion of Iranian resources in east-west energy projects. The 
attempt by Turkey to involve Iran in Nabucco at the height of nuclear tensions is 
representative of the AKP’s tendency to underestimate the broader geopolitical 
motivations behind pipeline projects that was highlighted in chapter three.  
These inconsistencies manifested elsewhere in bilateral energy relations. Section 4.4.3 of 
this chapter highlighted how the 2002 pricing dispute between Turkey and Iran was 
indicative of an early attempt by Turkey to influence the hierarchy of relations between the 
states. The episode was also a symptom of wider issues that plagued Turkish-Iranian 
energy affairs during the 2002-2014 period. This section highlighted a rhetorical 
commitment by each of Turkey and Iran to increased energy cooperation, yet no concrete 
new energy deals were concluded between 2002 and 2014. Though it was elaborated upon 
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and extended on several occasions, the 2007 MoU was never implemented. In 2010 the 
rights for phases 22, 23, and 24 of South Pars - those earmarked for TPAO under the MoU 
- were reallocated to a local Iranian consortium.  
Security and technical issues further affected bilateral energy affairs and contributed to 
multiple interruptions to natural gas trade. Chapter one noted that energy infrastructure 
could be the targeted by separatist and terrorist groups. The Tabriz-Ankara pipeline was 
closed on at least seven occasions - including twice in 2006, once in each of 2007 and 
2008, and twice in 2011 - after attacks by the PKK on essential infrastructure (BBC 
Monitoring, 2006; World Gas Intelligence, 2006; Shiraevskaya, 2007; Al-Jazeera, 2011). 
Iran’s mismanagement of its energy system and domestic shortfalls following the 
suspension of Turkmen natural gas to Iran also led to the suspension of gas exports to 
Turkey in each of January 2006, January 2007, and January 2008 (AFP, 2007a; Neft 
Compass, 2008).Suspensions aside, commercial problems continued to manifest in 
bilateral energy trade. After Iran refused a second request to reduce gas prices in 2012, 
Turkey referred Tehran to the International Court of Arbitration (ICA). Yildiz stated that 
the two governments “did not share the same view” on gas pricing, and that the decision to 
bring the case to arbitration was based on “just reasoning” (Reuters, 2012). The Iranian 
government remained resolute in its refusal to reduce gas prices, with NIOC spokesman 
Majid Boujarzadeh insisting that “both sides should remain committed to the (1996) 
contract” (Reuters, 2012). In 2016, however, the ICA ruled that Iran had been 
overcharging Turkey for natural gas and ordered it to reimburse Turkey with $1.9bn 
(Financial Tribune, 2017a).  
Iran’s unreliability during domestic surges and Turkey’s continuous contestation of 
contractually agreed prices added an element of contention to an otherwise amicable 
energy relationship. In addition, it highlighted again the dissonance between cooperative 
rhetoric and actual bilateral relations. Regardless of the commercial issues that plagued 
Turkish-Iranian energy affairs during the AKP’s first three terms in office, the two 
continued to refer to energy as a major source of cooperation. Despite the latest arbitration, 
for example, Ali Majedi, Deputy Oil Minister of Iran, stated in 2014 that Iranian-Turkish 
negotiations on increasing Iran’s gas supplies were on-going. This, he suggested, showed 
“that the current negotiations (were) not related to the two countries’ row” (Fars News 
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Agency, 2014). A similar case occurred in 2009 when Iran threatened to refer Turkey to 
the ICC for failure to adhere to buy-back conditions for failing to purchase the agreed 
volume of gas. Three weeks later, an agreement was made to extend the timescale for the 
implementation of the MoU for three months. 
Claims of cooperation on energy issues in spite of commercial dispute are reflective of the 
lack of consistency that plagued Iranian-Turkish energy relations and bilateral relations 
more generally. The AKP’s Iranian policy as a whole attempted to maintain an open and 
strategic dialogue despite dissatisfaction with Iran’s regional policies and frustration with 
existing energy engagement. Consequently, there was a significant disparity between 
Turkish-Iranian energy rhetoric and a tangible expansion of bilateral relations that predates 
the sanction era. While the lack of new energy projects was indicative of a lack of 
commitment by both states to expanding energy relations, there are several indications that 
that energy-related rhetoric served a purpose for Iran and Turkey. For Iran, the benefits of 
energy trade rhetoric were more obvious: it undermined the US’ containment policies, 
demonstrated the possibility of constructing a regional order that extends beyond the 
influence or remit of the status quo, and suggested to other potential consumers that 
Iranian energy was a desirable commodity.  
For Turkey, the benefits are less immediately obvious: there was a genuine necessity to 
diversify energy trade, and rhetorical posturing did little to reduce the influence of Russia 
in the Turkish gas sector. However, employing a regional powers framework sheds lights 
on the advantages of Turkey’s energy discourse with Iran. For Turkey, access to Iran’s oil 
and gas reserves was integral to realising its domestic energy security - and therefore 
ensuring continued economic growth - and the energy hub ambition that chapter two 
argued was part of Turkey’s regional power agenda. The focus on expanding gas (rather 
than oil) trade indicates a recognition by the AKP of the geostrategic advantages and 
limitations Turkey had in terms of energy transit systems. Iran has multiple routes and 
means through which it can transport oil. It is not reliant on the Turkish route to export oil 
to Europe and could find alternative consumers if relations between the states deteriorated. 
However, it is rather more reliant on Turkey when it comes to natural gas. Lack of LNG 
processing facilities and internal conflict in neighbouring states like Iraq, Turkey, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan limited Iran’s gas export options and positioned Turkey as 
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Tehran’s most viable gas export partner and route. Consistent energy engagement would, 
therefore, ensure Turkey maintained at least a rhetorical energy relationship with Iran to 
generate goodwill that chapter one suggested was beneficial to energy relations. It would 
also benefit regional stability and, more importantly, Turkey’s status and power capacity in 
the region in a manner correspondent to benevolent regional hegemony. 
Furthermore, engaging Iran in energy debates was important for augmenting Turkey’s role 
in energy markets more broadly. Section 4.5 will discuss the inclusion of Turkmen gas 
supplies in east-west energy projects like Nabucco and the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas 
Pipeline (TANAP). With the failure to demarcate the Caspian Sea prohibiting the 
construction of a trans-Caspian pipeline, the only viable route through which Turkmen 
supplies could reach Turkey was via Iran. Energy rhetoric with Iran therefore reasserted 
Turkey’s commitment to finding a route for Turkmen supplies, which in turn demonstrated 
Turkey’s desire to become a significant actor in regional energy equations. First, the next 
section will examine the Iranian nuclear issue because of its significance for Iran for most 
of the 21st century so far and its implications for Turkey’s energy agenda 
4.4.4 Turkey, Iran, and the nuclear issue 
Chapter one highlighted how advanced developing states are increasingly pursing nuclear 
power because it is relatively clean, reliable, and cheap in comparison to other finite 
energy sources. It asserted that while the weaponisation of nuclear fuel remained a 
concern, the right to nuclear development endowed by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
(NPT, 1970: Article IV) and the economic and energy security advantages of nuclear 
development saw many advanced developing states embark on nuclear programmes. Most 
states did so with little contention from the international community. Each of the three 
states studied in detail in this thesis pursued nuclear development to some degree during 
the period under examination: Turkey and Iran in working to construct their first nuclear 
power stations, and Russia as an established nuclear state and a preeminent actor in global 
nuclear power development (this last point will be discussed in more detail in chapter 
five). While Turkey and Russia freely developed nuclear energy strategies within the 
auspices of the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran’s nuclear 
programme became the subject of significant debate and controversy from the early 2000s. 
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International concerns originally rose because of the failure of the Iranian government to 
declare to the IAEA that it had begun enriching and processing domestic uranium 
resources (IAEA, 2003).49  Early IAEA reports admitted that there was no evidence to 
suggest that  Iran was weaponising or intended to weaponise uranium (IAEA  2006, 2007), 
and Iranian officials including Iranian President Mohammad Khatami and Supreme Leader 
of Iran Seyed Ali Khamenei repeatedly restated Iran’s opposition to nuclear weapons 
(Xinhua General News Service, 2003; Dareini , 2004; Khamenei, 2006; UN, 2010a). 
International concerns surrounding Iran’s nuclear agenda grew, however, and in 2006 the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) demanded that Iran suspend its uranium 
enrichment programme (UNSC Resolution 1696). The continuation of the programme led 
to the imposition of sanctions on individuals, companies, and trade related to Iran’s nuclear 
programme in late 2006 (UNSC Resolution 1737). Tensions escalated again following the 
publication of an IAEA report in February 2009 that highlighted several outstanding 
“concerns” regarding the programme that needed to be clarified in order to “exclude the 
existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme” (IAEA, 2009:4).  
Tensions reached their apex just as Turkey was successful in its bid to be elected by the 
UN General Assembly to the UNSC for the 2009-2010 term. Erdogan had suggested that 
the extent to which Turkey was supported its bid for a non-permanent UNSC seat50 was “a 
reflection of [Turkey’s] increasing weight in international politics” and of the” confidence” 
that the international community had in the state (Hurriyet, 2008b). It was noted earlier in 
this chapter that the nuclear issue had become increasingly prominent in Turkish-Iranian 
dialogue as the first decade of the 21st century wore on, with Turkey promoting itself as a 
potential mediator between the West and Iran. As tensions heightened, and Turkish self-
confidence grew, foreign leaders began suggesting there might be a role for Turkey in 
negotiations: US President Barack Obama suggested, for example, that Turkey could play 
an “important player” in ensuring Iran pursued nuclear power for peaceful means (Reuters, 
2009). Brazil, another advanced developing state that had also been elected to the UNSC 
                                                     
49 Iran did not have sufficient technical knowledge to build its first nuclear power station at Bushehr. Russia 
agreed to construct the Bushehr reactor and, as part of the deal (and to make Russia’s nuclear engagement 
with Iran more palatable to West), Iran agreed to purchase enriched uranium from Russia and return spent 
fuel rods to Russia for disposal (Kraemer, 2014). This limited the opportunity for Iran to use spent fuel rods 
or enrich uranium to the level necessary for weaponisation and thus led to concern when Iran began 
enriching uranium in secret. 
50 151 out of 192 UN members voted in Turkey’s favour 
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for the 2009-2010 session, was making overtures to both Iran and the status quo over the 
nuclear issue at the same time (Vieira de Jesus, 2011). When the UNSC began 
contemplating new actions against Iran in late 2009, Turkey and Brazil embarked on a 
series of high level negotiations with Tehran to resolve the issue (Barrionuevo and Arsu, 
2010; Charbonneau, 2010; Hafezi, 2010). The announcement by the states of an agreement 
on the nuclear issue in May 2010 appeared to indicate that the negotiations had been 
successful. For Iran - which rejected international hierarchies and repeatedly called for the 
global South to solve its own problems (Asefi, 2006; Ahmadinejad, 2006, 2009) - 
negotiations with other advanced developing states were preferable to continued 
negotiations with the P5+1. Regional powers theory suggests that representations of 
regional issues in international institutions and the recognition by other states in those 
institutions of the role of the state are two criteria that determine whether or not a state is a 
regional power. Turkey’s involvement in the mediation process, therefore, can be framed 
in terms of recognition by other states of Turkey’s regional power and - given the 
ideational nature of the process and the extent of self-interest on Turkey’s behalf - of its 
benevolent regional hegemony.  
Examining the Iranian nuclear programme through a regional powers prism highlights 
several implications for the delineation of the regional hierarchy in the Caspian. 
Weaponisation aside, the domestic enrichment programme had the potential to reduce 
Iran’s dependence on Russia for nuclear fuel. Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant runs on 
Russian-supplied fuel rods, and spent rods are returned to Russia for disposal. Chapter two 
argued that reliance on other regional powers for public goods - such as primary energy 
supplies - diluted the capacity of the state to implement its regional agenda. Domestic 
production would not only limit economic expenditure on importing enriched uranium and 
exporting used fuel rods, but it would decrease Iran’s dependence on a competing regional 
power. The production of domestic nuclear fuel would also help free up natural gas 
supplies being used in the domestic market, thereby increasing Iran’s export capacity and 
its role in regional energy markets. It would therefore augment Iran’s capacity to use 
energy as a tool through which it could accrue regional power. In addition, if Iran was 
embarking on a weaponisation programme - and it is worth repeating here that there was 
no concrete evidence in the  2000s that this was the case - then it would have significant 
repercussions for the balance of power in the wider Caspian region. Russia is currently the 
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only nuclear power in the region; the successful weaponisation of uranium by Iran would 
create a second - and more unstable - nuclear power. In both cases, Turkey would be 
disadvantaged in terms of its position in the regional hierarchy. 
It  is evident that the AKP’s agenda’s was prompted more by self-interest rather than a 
common regional good. This following paragraphs will outline some of the major issues 
contributing to Turkey’s eagerness to participate with respect to three conditions of 
regional powerhood outlined in chapter two: recognition, security, and material capacity. 
While looking briefly at military balances, the final aspect will focus predominately on the 
repercussion of any new sanctions or military action for Turkey’s energy agenda. Overall, 
it is argued that Turkey adopted a strategy towards the Iranian nuclear issue that was 
largely congruent with benevolent regional hegemonic power. 
Participation in the negotiation process offered the AKP an opportunity to demonstrate 
Turkey’s ideational power through mediation. Turkey’s position as a “central country” that 
had amicable relations with both the West and Iran was integral to the case for Turkish 
involvement in mediation. Gul noted that Turkey had the “capacity to help” because “on 
the one side” “they (Turkey) were members of NATO and had very good, strong 
relation[s] with America”, while “on the other side, Iran is our neighbour” (Gul, 2010). 
Applying the regional powers framework to these comments, this thesis argues that the 
extensive diplomacy towards Iran generated goodwill towards Turkish participation in 
negotiations. Similarly, chapter two illustrated how regional mediation initiatives were a 
central part of the AKP’s strategy to strengthen Turkey’s regional role. The UNSC 
negotiations can be framed as an extension of those mediatory efforts to the international 
sphere (albeit while simultaneously retaining a regional focus). Regional powers 
arguments suggest that by ensuring Iran could maintain its nuclear programme in line with 
the demands of IAEA and UNSC Turkey would improve its status among both its 
neighbours and the international community. Chapter two maintained that legitimacy in 
the international system engenders legitimacy among subordinate states in the regional 
system. An elevated status among international actors as the result of successful 
negotiations would, therefore, strengthen Turkey’s legitimacy within its region. 
Central to the conceptualisation of benevolent hegemony depicted in chapter two was the 
utilisation of ideational resources to solve or circumvent regional problems through 
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bargaining and representation of the region within international institutions and the 
framing of self-interested motivating factors as part of a common good. In this regard, the 
examples highlighted in this chapter of Turkey’s willingness to participate in negotiations 
(bargaining) under the auspices of the UNSC (international institution) with a high level of 
self interest (security, energy) to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue can be considered a 
benevolent hegemonic regional power strategy at the international level. It should also be 
noted at this point that the weaponisation of uranium by Iran would be detrimental to 
Turkey’s ideational agenda. Turkey has been a particularly strong advocate of the NPT 
since the treaty entered force in 1970, and it repeatedly restated its opposition to nuclear 
proliferation in its region (Gul, 2010). Consequently, this thesis suggests that the 
development of an Iranian nuclear weapon development would undermine Turkey’s 
ideational power on regional non-proliferation. 
There were also serious concerns among the AKP regarding the ramifications of a further 
escalation of tensions for stability throughout Turkey’s neighbourhood. The weaponisation 
of uranium posed a serious threat to Turkey’s security agenda in the region, and the AKP’s 
2005 National Security Policy Document referred to the Iranian nuclear issue as a “hot 
button topic” (Gurzel and Ersoy, 2001:40). The potential for a nuclear arms race between 
Iran, Israel, and possibly Syria risked instability in Turkey’s southern neighbourhood. 
Even within the Caspian region, a nuclear Iran would have consequences for Turkey’s 
position in the regional hierarchy. Chapter two noted that military capacity is a factor in 
determining regional powerhood. In the event that Iran did embark on a weaponisation 
programme. a more asymmetrical power relationship would emerge between the states and 
the regional balance of power would swing in Iran’s favour. Ultimately, a nuclear Iran 
would be detrimental to Turkey’s regional power. Russia’s possession of nuclear weapons 
similarly contributes to a military imbalance between Moscow and Ankara. A deal on the 
nuclear issue, then, would eliminate a major security concern for Turkey and ensure the 
balance of power remained - however slightly - in Turkey’s favour. 
Regardless of whether or not Iran did weaponise uranium, this thesis argues that possible 
external intervention in Iran as a result of suspected weaponisation presented a serious risk 
to Turkey’s stability. The invasion of Iraq on the basis of claims that Saddam Hussein 
possessed weapons of mass destruction set a precedent for international intervention 
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without a UN mandate. It has been stressed at various points in this thesis that that 
intervention created significant security concerns in Turkey. In the event of conflict in 
Iran, the collapse of Iranian state infrastructure or a prolonged military engagement would 
risk spilling over into Turkey and reigniting the Kurdish issue. Western military 
intervention in Iran would also undermine several of Turkey’s key foreign policies, 
including the zero problems with neighbours agenda and Ankara’s propagation of regional 
solutions to regional problems. Turkey’s attempt to engender a solution to the nuclear 
issue can therefore be framed as an effort by the state to ensure regional - and hence 
domestic - security in a manner congruent with benevolent regional hegemony. In 
addition, this thesis has highlighted how Turkey’s independent foreign policy and interest 
in limiting the influence of external powers in regional affairs were central to its regional 
power ambition in terms of asserting its power and engendering legitimacy among 
subordinate states. International intervention would therefore not only pose a security risk 
to Turkey, but would constrain its capacity to implement a foreign policy strategy that was 
crucial to its regional power. 
Applying the conclusions of the literature review on energy and conflict to the potential 
action against Iran - whether military or in the form of sanctions - illuminates the potential 
threats faced by Turkey’s energy agenda from new sanctions or military action. Turkey 
had previously experienced economic and energy security problems after the imposition of 
UN sanctions on Iraqi oil in the 1990s.51 Similarly, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 
internal instability that followed had had a significant impact on resources available to 
Turkey.52 In a statement that indicates the AKP was was eager to avoid a repeat of the 
impact of Iraqi sanctions on Turkey, the MFA pointed out in 2010 that Turkey had 
“suffered immensely” from the implementation of sanctions in the region in the past and 
“could well incur the biggest damage as a result of the sanctions or through the use of 
force” (MFA, 2010). A repeat of the Iraqi sanctions could both challenge Turkey’s energy 
security and would further limit the diversity of resources available to Turkey, thereby 
threatening the state’s energy security. By extension, it would impact on Turkey’s energy 
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hub ambitions: as chapter three argued, secure access to energy supplies and a stable 
neighbourhood were essential to the realisation of the hub agenda. 
The breakdown of P5+1 negotiations and the failure of the 2006 sanctions to have any 
meaningful impact on the Iranian nuclear programme meant that new measures against 
Iran were not only a significant possibility, but that any new measures were likely to be 
more comprehensive than previous rounds of sanctions. Chapter one pointed out that states 
and institutions place sanctions on energy producers to gain political concessions. 
Considering the extent to which hydrocarbons dominate the Iranian economy, targeting the 
energy system - either through further limitations on investment in Iran or a 
comprehensive embargo on Iranian energy trade - would maximise the impact of 
sanctions. Such sanctions also posed a risk to Turkey’s energy security. Even restrictions 
on cooperation with the Iranian energy sector would have an impact on Turkey’s energy 
agenda. Adherence to sanctions would further limit much-needed foreign investment in 
Iran’s energy sector, which would have a detrimental effect on the development of 
resources available to export. On one hand, then, Turkey would be more limited in 
sourcing Iranian resources for the domestic market. On the other, restricting Turkish 
investments in Iran would undermine the formulation of the interdependencies in the 
energy sector that, chapter two argued, are essential if Turkey wants to become a regional 
power.  
A total embargo when Iran supplied over 20% of Turkey’s energy imports would put 
serious strain on Turkey’s energy systems. Taking into account both the argument in 
chapter one that energy importers can more easily replace oil supplies than natural gas 
imports and Turkey’s relatively diversified oil import base in contrast to the limited 
diversification of its gas suppliers, this thesis argues that an embargo on natural gas posed 
a significantly greater threat to Turkey’s energy security than would an oil embargo. Based 
on the energy geography of the region and the discussion on energy forms and security in 
chapter one, this thesis proposes that Turkey would have several options in the event of a 
natural gas embargo. Firstly, it could make up the gas shortfall by importing LNG from 
other states. However, chapter one pointed out that LNG contracts are more short term 
and, therefore, less secure than traditional pipeline supplier. Furthermore, IEA reports 
suggest that in 2010 Turkey did not have sufficient infrastructure for storing or processing 
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large volumes of LNG (IEA, 2013), so the total volumes of LNG Turkey could be limited. 
Alternatively - or in addition to LNG imports - Turkey could request that Russia increase 
the flow of gas through the Blue Stream pipeline (both this chapter and chapter five 
highlight how Russia’s was frequently willing to supplement Blue Stream supplies when 
Turkey experienced shortages). Considering, however, that chapter three asserted that 
diversification of energy imports away from Russia was a major feature of the AKP’s 
energy strategy because of the perceived risks of over-reliance on a particular source, 
increasing Blue Stream flows would both contravene the energy strategy and heighten 
Turkey’s energy insecurity. In addition, regional powers theory indicates that increased 
Russian dominance of Turkey’s energy imports would heighten power asymmetry between 
the two, which would undermine Turkey’s capacity to enact an assertive, hegemonic 
regional powers strategy. In this regard, compliance with sanctions would have been 
incompatible with Turkey’s energy security strategy and would have harmed Turkey’s 
economic agenda and geostrategic position relative to that of Russia. 
When considered in conjunction with the conclusions of chapter three, it is clear that both 
forms of sanctions would also have longer-term implications for Turkey’s energy strategy 
and, particularly, the hub agenda. As section 4.2 pointed out, Turkey repeatedly stressed 
that the participation of Iran in east-west energy projects was important to the formation of 
a Turkish energy hub. Chapter three argued that the energy hub is an important element of 
Turkey’s regional power strategy in terms of the state’s incorporation into regional energy 
systems, in terms of the economic benefits associated with an energy trading hub, and with 
regards to Turkey’s geostrategic importance to both regional and external actors. The IEA 
has repeatedly pointed out that the impact of sanctions on Iran’s oil and gas sectors meant 
it would take considerable time to rebuild production and export capacity (IEA, 2006, 
2014, 2016). In other words, sanctions would restrict the development of the Iranian 
energy sector. The potential for Iranian participation in major east-west energy projects 
would therefore be limited. Sanctions would also reduce the competitive leverage Turkey 
had built up in Iran through intense diplomacy with its Iranian counterparts.  
Finally, chapter five will outline how Turkey was finalising plans with Russia to build 
Turkey’s first nuclear power station while Iran’s relationships with the UNSC and IAEA 
were deteriorating. While Turkey’s energy strategies did not include references to uranium 
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enrichment, the AKP made clear its intentions to develop nuclear power facilities and 
capabilities as part of its energy diversification agenda (MENR, 2009). The use of 
sanctions or military action against Iran without substantial proof of a weaponisation 
programme would set a precedent for Western and UNSC interference in the nuclear 
programmes of other developing nations, including Turkey. This, then, posed a potential 
threat to Turkey’s attempts to diversify its energy sources to ensure its energy security. 
Overall, this thesis argues that the implementation of sanctions by Turkey would be 
detrimental both to Turkey’s energy ambitions and its regional power credentials. It also 
highlights the degree to which energy and regional power - through resource accumulation, 
security, and regional balances of power in the Caspian - were connected for Turkey. In 
that way, it reaffirms the necessity to incorporate energy into the literature on regional 
power. Participation in the negotiation process not only had the potential to help avoid 
energy sanctions that would constrain Turkey’s regional power, but to create goodwill 
between Iran and Turkey that could be beneficial to Turkey in future energy negotiations. 
4.4.4a The failure of UNSC negotiations 
Despite concluding an agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme, Turkey and Brazil’s 
negotiation efforts ultimately failed. The Tehran Declaration (2010) was hailed as triumph 
by Turkey and Brazil, but rejected by the P5+1 and the UNSC. Two aspects of the 
agreement caused particular concern. Both were related to the stipulation that Iran would 
send 1,200 kilograms (kg) of enriched nuclear material to Turkey in exchange for 120 kg 
of fuel rods for use in medical research (Tehran Declaration, 2010). Both the BBC (2010b) 
and Washington Post (2010) point out that the quantity of enriched uranium in Iran’s 
possession was far greater than 1,200 kg. That the deal therefore left a quantity of enriched 
uranium in Iran did little to ally fears that Iran could construct a nuclear weapon. The 
agreement also enabled Tehran to demand the return of exchanged material if it felt the 
terms of the agreement were not being adhered to (Tehran Declaration, 2010). 
Additionally, Iran failed to agree to suspend uranium enrichment (BBC, 2010b), which 
was effectively a red line for the P5+1.  
In June 2010, the UN voted to impose new sanctions on Iran. Resolution 1929 
comprehensively expanded the 2006 and 2007 UN-implemented arms embargoes, and 
tightened restrictions on investment and financial activities related to “proliferation-
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sensitive activities” (UNSC, 2010a). The resolution also called upon the P5+1 to continue 
negotiations “with a view to seeking a comprehensive solution” to the nuclear issue that 
would “allow for the development of relations and wider cooperation with Iran” (UNSC, 
2010a). Of the thirteen members of the Security Council only Turkey and Brazil voted 
against sanctions (Lebanon abstained from the vote) (UN, 2010b). Subsequent EU 
sanctions imposed in 2011 and 2012 banned EU states from exporting equipment and 
technology needed for natural gas and oil production to Iran, excluded the Iranian banking 
system from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Telecommunications (thus limiting the 
capacity of Iran to accept payment for goods) and banned the purchase and transport of 
Iranian crude oil (World Bank, 2015).  
There was universal praise from other UNSC member states for Turkey and Brazil’s 
negotiation efforts. Susan Rice, the US representative, said that Turkey and Brazil’s hard 
work “reflect(ed) their leaders’ good intentions to address the Iranian people’s 
humanitarian needs while building more international confidence” (UNSC, 2010b). Mark 
Lyall Grant, on behalf of the UK, acknowledged the “good faith” efforts of Turkey and 
Brazil, while France “welcome(d) the commitment of the two eminent leaders” (UNSC, 
2010b). The dismissal of the Tehran declaration and the exclusion of both Turkey and 
Brazil from subsequent negotiations indicates, however, that the platitudes extended to the 
states in UNSC were merely rhetorical and did not translate into enhanced legitimacy in 
the international sphere for either actor.  It implied that neither had the capacity to 
influence international negotiations in its favour, and that major powers did not believe 
that they had the capacity to do so. Both, chapter two asserted, were hallmarks of regional 
powers. This episode therefore highlights the AKP’s overconfidence in its capacity to 
affect change and in the reciprocity of other states to Ankara’s self-conceived power. In 
this case, Turkey’s power to was restricted by limitations on its political capacity as an 
advanced developing state and non-permanent UNSC member attempting to implement 
change amid reluctance from major powers and permanent UNSC members to do so. 
Furthermore, the substantial decrease in oil trade between Iran and Turkey discussed in 
section 4.4.2 of this chapter confirms that sanctions did have a negative impact on 
Turkey’s energy resources. The EU ban on Iranian imports further restricted the possibility 
of Iranian involvement in east-west energy projects.  
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The necessity to find alternatives to the EU market forced Iran to turn to eastern energy 
markets. Chapter one suggested that an increasingly crowded consumer market was an 
impediment to the energy security of states at all levels of economic development. For 
advanced developing states, more limited financial and political capital restrained the 
capacity of states to access energy supplies. In Iran, Turkey faced competition for access to 
resources to advanced developing states like China, South Korea, and India, as well as 
from developing states like Pakistan. Those states were not only markets for Iran, but after 
the imposition of EU sanctions, represented major sources of revenue for the 
underdeveloped Iranian energy sector. Projections of sustained economic growth and 
increasing energy usage led to China and India in particular pursuing Iranian oil (Middle 
East Economic Survey, 2007; EIA, 2015f; EIA, 2016f). Energy diplomacy between China 
and Iran was particularly intense between 2002 and 2014. Chinese National Oil Companies 
(NOCs) and financial institutions negotiated multiple multi-million pound deals with Iran 
for upstream development and natural gas sector development with a view to increasing 
Chinese imports of Iranian gas. The extent to which negotiations translated into successful 
bilateral trade is open to some debate, however, and infrastructural projects fell by the 
wayside after the implementation of UN sanctions in 2010 (Aizhu and Buckley, 2011). 
While the commercial success of the Iranian-Chinese energy relationship may have been 
exaggerated, the political benefits for Iran were manifold. If the intention of both US and 
UN sanctions was to isolate Iran commercially and politically, then energy agreements 
with China - regardless of whether or not they are fully implemented -  not only 
undermines that agenda but reaffirms the Iranian belief that it needs neither Western 
financial support nor European export markets to be a successful energy exporting country. 
Indeed, in the aftermath of the 2011 sanctions Ahmadinejad was particularly vocal in 
insisting that the withdrawal of EU cooperation on energy issues would usher in a “new 
era” for Iranian gas, underlining that Iran “did not need the financial support of these 
(Western) countries” (Traynor, 2010). 
Iran’s cooperation with China on energy issues had repercussions for Turkish-Iranian 
energy relations. It demonstrated to Iran that it had alternative energy hungry markets to 
which it could sell its oil should relations with Turkey continue to be restrained by 
sanctions. This simultaneously removed any leverage Turkey may have had as a 
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significant potential market for Iranian oil, undermined Turkey’s claims to geostrategic 
significance in regional energy markets, and cast doubt on the construction of an oil hub in 
Ceyhan (see chapter three) that would incorporate Iranian oil. Each of these factors was 
inimical to Turkey’s regional status. However, the final section of this chapter will 
demonstrate how Turkey and Iran’s respective relationships with other regional actors 
skewered the regional balance of power firmly in Turkey’s favour. 
4.5 Iran and Turkey in the Caspian region 
4.5.1 Iran in the Caspian region 
The focus within Iranian foreign policy on exporting the Islamic Revolution was 
highlighted earlier in this chapter as an important ideational aspect of Iran’s Middle 
Eastern strategy. Tehran’s policies in Caspian region were rather more pragmatic. While 
the propagation of a common identity based on religious and historical affinities tended to 
be emphasised in diplomatic rhetoric, economic and infrastructural initiatives constituted 
the most comprehensive part of Iran’s regional strategy. This thesis has repeatedly drawn 
attention to how the former Soviet states of the Caspian region proved unreceptive to 
cultural overtures from potential regional powers in the immediate collapse of Soviet 
Union. During the 2002-2014 period, economic integration - whether bilateral in the form 
of energy trade or through multilateral forums like the ECO or proposed Caspian Sea 
Economic Organisation (Shana, 2007) - was at the forefront of Iran’s regional strategy. 
This section will argue that Iran pursued a strategy congruent with the benevolent 
hegemony conceptualised in chapter two, and that the limitations of that strategy benefitted 
Turkey’s position in the regional hierarchy. 
Just as chapter five argues that Turkey’s dependency on Russian energy imports 
constrained Ankara’s capacity to enact a more assertive foreign policy in the region, this 
chapter proposes that Iran’s agenda in the Caspian was constrained by its relationship with 
Russia in the military and energy sectors. In particular, Russia’s position as one of the 
largest supplier of arms to Iran (along with China) (SIPRI 2018a) endowed Moscow with a 
degree of leverage over Iran. Various reports and data indicate that bilateral military trade 
reached an apex between 2005 and 2007 with the sale of $700m of Russian-manufactured 
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missile defence equipment to Iran (CFR, 2006; Harding, 2007; SIPRI, 2018b). 53 In 
addition, it was noted earlier in this chapter that Russia played a significant role in the 
construction of Iran’s nuclear power plant at Bushehr. Iran was therefore reliant on Russia 
for two material resources: military arms and nuclear power. Based on the assertion in 
chapter two that dependence on other regional powers restricts the capacity of a state to 
impose a regional power agenda, this thesis contends that the asymmetrical nature of 
Russian-Iranian relations confined the latter’s capacity to adopt a more assertive or 
multidimensional regional policy. Given Russia’s continued interest in influencing former 
Soviet states (see chapter five), Iran had to balance its agenda in the Caspian region with 
the necessity to maintain good relations with Russia. In this way, both Iran and Turkey 
were subordinate actors to Russia within the Caspian regional system.  
However, a difference arises between the opportunities available to and the willingness of 
Ankara and Tehran to reduce their dependence on Russia and therefore limit constraints on 
regional power projection. Chapter three noted that diversifying energy dependency away 
from Russia was a major tenet of the AKP’s energy strategy and suggested that 
cooperation with a host of other states in the Caspian region had the potential to limit 
Turkey’s Russian energy dependence. In contrast, Iran’s international isolation and 
antagonism towards large military powers like the US or UK limited Tehran’s potential to 
diversify its military sources. A similar divergence is evident in the nuclear power sector: 
while Russia is building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, its second will be constructed 
by a Japanese-French consortium (Hurriyet, 2013b) and its third will be constructed by a 
Chinese-US partnership (Westinghouse.com, 2014). Russia, however, continued to be the 
only facilitator of Iran’s nuclear power ambitions between 2002 and 2014: Rosatom - 
Russia’s state nuclear agency - agreed to build a second reactor in Bushehr in 2013 (Press 
TV, 2016; World Nuclear Association, 2018).54 Iran therefore lacked Turkey’s capacity, 
opportunities, and willingness to counteract its dependency on Russia in a way that 
enabled it to enact a more proactive regional strategy in the Caspian region. At the same 
                                                     
53 The failure of both Russia and Iran to disclose all arms trade makes it impossible to definitively determine 
the total extent of bilateral arms trade (Borshchevskaya, 2017) 
54 Though it is outside of the timeline of this thesis, it is worth noting that Iran has pursued a closer nuclear 
relationship with China since 2015. That year, Salehi announced that Tehran and Beijing had agreed to build 
two small nuclear plants on Iran’s southern coast (Fars News, 2018; ISNA, 2015). No further detail has yet 
emerged on the construction of the plants.  
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time, the limitations on Iranian power projection by virtue of Tehran’s Russian 
dependencies opened up a further space for Turkey to expand its influence in the region. 
World Bank (2017b, 2017c) and OEC (2017a) data shows that Iranian trade with the 
former Soviet republics of the Caspian failed to gain any significant traction during the 
period under examination. Nonetheless, infrastructural programmes like the Kazakhstan-
Turkmenistan-Iran railway project that was inaugurated in 2014 (Gurt, 2014b) represented 
progress in regional integration. This section will argue that energy was one of the key 
features of Iran’s engagement with the Caspian region between 2002 and 2014. Tehran’s 
policies in the region variously complemented and contradicted Turkey’s energy strategy, 
but this section will show how a deterioration of Iran’s energy relations with most of the 
Caspian littorals drew attention to Turkey’s geostrategic importance in regional energy 
trade. The final part of this chapter will discuss Turkish-Iranian relations in the context of 
Iran’s energy engagement with the Caspian region and the implications for the regional 
power agendas of both states. 
4.5.2 The competition for Caspian resources 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union heralded a new era of competition for access to the 
resources of the energy-rich republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Chapter one 
highlighted how the majority of academic literature on energy competition in the region 
has focused predominately on that between Russia and the West (and, latterly, China). Iran 
tends to feature in the literature primarily as secondary or even tertiary actor; one to be 
avoided (see the fourth corridor) or as an impediment to the legal demarcation of the 
Caspian Sea. Yet chapters three and four demonstrated Ankara’s eagerness to involve Iran 
in regional energy equations, and Tehran itself was proactive in engaging in energy 
dialogue and trade with its Caspian neighbours. Like Turkey, Iran is located at a 
geostrategic junction between the landlocked states of the Caspian and global markets. Its 
overtures to other Caspian littorals regarding Iran’s validity as an energy trading partner 
had the potential to derail Turkey’s energy ambitions. However, this section will argue that 
constraints on the extent of energy engagement with other regional states - bought on by 
similarities in the market structures of Iran and the energy rich littorals, Russia’s influence 
in the region, and Turkey’s own preferential position in Iran’s export market - reinforced 
Ankara’s significance as the dominant export partner for Caspian littorals. In doing so, it 
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affirmed Turkey’s status above Iran in the regional hierarchy despite its lack of domestic 
energy resources.   
A key factor in endowing Turkey with a superior position in regional energy systems was 
the extent to which Iran engaged with its neighbours. Iran’s regional energy policy was 
both more limited than the ambitious fourth corridor programme promoted by Turkey, and 
primarily took the form of fuel swaps that failed to increase Iran’s leverage over its 
neighbours. Azerbaijani, Kazakh, and Turkmen oil was transferred to northern Iranian 
refineries in exchange for the delivery of Iranian oil of the same value to Caspian clients in 
the Persian Gulf. These oil swap deals were initiated in 1997 and suspended in 2010 
because of a dispute over the token price the littorals paid Iran as part of the swap. Energy 
was also an important tenet of bilateral cooperation between Iran and Armenia, with 
agreements signed between the states on cross-border cooperation in electricity (2003) and 
hydroelectricity (2009, 2011). 55 Of greater relevance for this thesis, however, was the 
2004 Treaty on the Construction of the Iran-Armenia Gas Pipeline (Armenian MFA, 
2017). The pipeline was inaugurated in 2008 (Tehran Times, 2008) and became 
operational in 2009 under a 20 year contract (Financial Tribune, 2017b). The natural gas 
pipeline is also part of a swap deal that means Iran receives Armenian electricity in return 
for Iranian gas (Financial Tribune, 2017b). 
Given Turkey’s non-existent relationship with Armenia, energy cooperation between 
Yerevan and Tehran represented an avenue through which Iran could extend its regional 
influence outside of Turkey’s sphere of influence. Yet there is little evidence that Iran’s 
preferential relationship with Armenia or its oil swaps with other Caspian states was a 
constraint on Turkey’s pursuit of regional hegemony. The swap deals did not generate a 
significant volume of income for Iran56 and, in many cases - including the Armenian one - 
Tehran remained reliant on its trading partners for the provision of essential services like 
electricity as part of the swap. The reciprocal nature of the swap deals also prevents Iran 
generating any leverage over its trading partners in the same way chapter three suggested 
                                                     
55 Iran and Armenia forged relatively strong relations after the fall of the USSR. The Armenian Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs lists 45 high-level diplomatic visits between the states between 1991 and 2011 and over sixty 
agreements, MoUs, and bilateral protocols covering economic, environmental, cultural, and legal cooperation 
(AMFA, 2017) 




Turkey did in Azerbaijan and Georgia. In other words, Turkey was more successful than 
Iran in using its geostrategic location and energy trade with the Caspian states to enhance 
its power in the region. Moreover, Iranian gas exports to Armenia and Azerbaijan are 
dwarfed by those to Turkey: BP statistics show that in 2016, Iran’s natural gas exports to 
Azerbaijan and Armenia combined were less than 10% of those to Turkey (BP, 2017c). 
Turkey, rather than one of the Caucasian states, remained Iran’s preferential gas partner.  
In addition, Russia again proved to be an impediment to Iran developing its regional power 
through its energy strategy. Chapter five will outline how, in the post-Cold War era, Russia 
created a strong bilateral relationship with Armenia in the military and energy spheres. 
Until the initiation of the Iran-Armenian natural gas pipeline, Russia was the sole provider 
of natural gas to Armenia (Socor, 2007). While the Iranian pipeline broke Russia’s 
monopoly over the Armenian energy import market, it did not represent any meaningful 
advance of Iran’s regional energy influence. A subsidiary of Russia’s Gazprom owns and 
operates the Armenian part of the pipeline (Stratfor, 2009), leaving Iran dependent on 
cooperation with Russia for the continued functioning of the pipeline. More importantly, 
Socor (2007) notes that Russia insisted on halving the pipeline’s diameter from 1,420 
millimetres to 700 millimetres, thereby precluding any opportunity to expand the pipeline 
to third countries in the future. 57 In any case, Armenia’s own geographical remoteness 
from European markets would necessitate the construction of either LNG refinement 
facilities in Armenia from which Iranian gas would be transported to Europe or the 
construction of a pipeline through Turkey to the Mediterranean. Given the continued 
antagonism between Armenia and Turkey, the latter was highly unlikely. Rather than 
undermine Turkey’s position, then, this thesis argues that the Iran-Armenia pipeline 
reaffirmed Turkey’s strategic utility as the only viable route for the exportation of Iranian 
gas to European markets. In doing so, it highlight how Turkey maintained the balance of 
power in bilateral energy relations despite its own hydrocarbon limitations. 
4.5.3 Cooperation and competition in Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan 
Chapter three noted that Turkey’s most substantial energy projects in the Caspian region 
involved cooperation with Azerbaijan and appealed to potential cooperation with 
                                                     
57 1,420 millimetres is the standard diameter of major exporting pipelines (Socor, 2007). 
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Turkmenistan. Both were important actors if Turkey’s energy diversification and hub 
agendas were to come to fruition. Both were also natural gas import and export partners 
for Iran. Playing particular attention to the TANAP pipeline, the final part of this chapter 
will highlight the role Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan played in the competition between 
Turkey and Iran in the regional energy system. 
Chapter two argued that regional integration was a key indicator of regional powerhood. 
Section 4.5.1 highlighted how Iran’s economic and cultural integration in the Caspian 
region was limited, but contended that infrastructural and energy projects did provide a 
measure of integration. Interdependence with Armenia by virtue of natural gas trade was 
highlighted in the last section, and this section indicates that small volumes of natural gas 
trade with Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan also facilitated limited Iranian integration into 
regional gas markets between 2002 and 2014. Iran is the sole supplier of natural gas to 
Nakhchivan, an autonomous region of Azerbaijan that is separated from the rest of the 
state by Armenia and which shares a border with Iran (EIA, 2016h). In return for Iran 
supplying gas to Azerbaijanis in Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan transports gas to Iran via the 
Soviet-era Hajqabut-Astata pipeline (EIA, 2016h). Gas began flowing through the pipeline 
in 2006 for the first time since Islamic Revolution. Considering that currently it uses only 
1 - 1.8bcm of its 9bcm capacity (EIA, 2016h), the pipeline has significant potential. While 
the construction of TANAP suggests Ankara is likely to remain Baku’s preferred energy 
partner for the foreseeable future, the spare capacity of the Hajqabut-Astata pipelines 




Figure 13: Azerbaijani energy infrastructure, including Iran-Nakhchivan pipeline (NIOC, 2018) 
Energy relation between Iran and Azerbaijan almost proved detrimental to Turkey’s 
regional ambitions during the 2009-10 natural gas pricing dispute between Turkey and 
Azerbaijan. Chapter three outlined how Azerbaijan threatened to find alternative consumer 
markets for its substantial energy supplies in response to Turkey’s request for lower gas 
prices and Ankara’s attempted rapprochement with Armenia. At the height of the crisis, 
Iran and Azerbaijan signed a MoU to transport at least an additional 500mcm/y to Iran. 
(Xinhua General News, 2010). In 2010, the states also signed an agreement to construct a 
new bilateral pipeline through which Azerbaijani gas could be exported to Iran (Stratfor, 
2010). While the pipeline did not come to fruition, the willingness of Baku and Tehran to 
cooperate on natural gas trade highlighted Turkey’s precarious position in the regional 
energy system. It demonstrated not only that Azerbaijan had alternatives to Turkish export 
markets (thus reducing Turkey’s leverage over Baku), but that Iran was willing to exploit 
the Turkish-Azerbaijani dispute in a manner that was incongruent with Turkey’s regional 
energy strategy. In other words, it highlighted how Iran - despite its strong relations with 
Turkey - could undermine Turkey’s regional power ambitions.  
Turkmenistan is Iran’s longest-standing energy partner in the Caspian. Iran began 
importing 8bcm natural gas per annum from Turkmenistan in 1997 through the Korpeje-
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Kurtkui pipeline, and in 2009 agreed to construct a second pipeline with a capacity of 14 
bcm (Fars News Agency, 2010a; EIA, 2015d). Ahmadinejad stated that the pipeline would 
be a “good stimulus for energy cooperation between Turkmenistan and Iran, as well as for 
delivery of Turkmen gas to the Persian Gulf and the world market” (BBC, 2010a). He also 
suggested that it would “pave the way for new energy equations in the region and the 
world”, and would play a key role in energy exchange with Europe and the Persian Gulf 
region (Fars News Agency, 2010a; Fars News Agency, 2010b). The implication that 
Turkmenistan and Iran, would, together, transport energy to Europe was substantiated by 
the attendance of Turkish Minister for Energy and Natural Resources Tanner Yildiz at the 
pipeline’s inauguration (World Bulletin, 2010). However, several issues restricted the 
incorporation of Turkmen and Iranian gas into east-west energy pipelines. Two of these 
issues - the imposition of international sanctions on Iran and the frequency with which pre-
existing supplies from Iran to Turkey were subject to disruption - are discussed elsewhere 
in this chapter. The following discussion on the TANAP pipeline highlights how Iran’s 
position regarding the delineation of the Caspian Sea and its relationships with Azerbaijan 
and Turkmenistan played an additional role in growing energy cooperation in the Caspian 
region.    
By 2012, Iran’s energy markets were beginning to suffer the effects of international 
sanctions. The EU oil embargo and the ban on financial transactions to the Iranian 
government not only restricted Iran’s resource development, but effectively curtailed the 
state’s capacity to participate in regional oil and gas projects in the Caspian. The sanctions 
were an impediment to attempts to forge energy trade and infrastructural relations with 
other Caspian states, and thus limited Iran’s regional integration and energy hub rhetoric in 
a manner that was detrimental to Iran’s status in the region. Yet at the same time, Turkey 
was succeeding in further embedding itself in regional energy equations. In 2011, Turkey 
and Azerbaijan signed a MoU to extend the BTE pipeline. Contrary to the other MoUs - 
including those with Iran - pipeline rhetoric became reality when the states signed an 
intergovernmental agreement to begin construction of TANAP in 2012.58  
                                                     





Figure 14: BTE, TANAP, and TAP routes (Offshore Energy Today, 2016) 
TANAP endows Turkey with several advantages over Iran in regards to the states’ relative 
positions in the regional hierarchy. Firstly, the pipeline strengthens Turkey’s integration 
with Azerbaijan and Georgia and embeds Turkey in the regional energy system in a 
manner congruent with regional power. That the deal was conducted without Iranian input 
highlights Tehran’s limited role in regional energy systems. Azerbaijan’s disinterest in 
engaging in energy affairs with Iran far predates the TANAP project: the 1994 “contract of 
the century”59  demonstrated that Azerbaijan’s energy interests lay to the west rather than 
to the south. That, this thesis argues, is Turkey’s primary advantage over Iran in the 
region: Nakhchivan aside, Azerbaijan simply does not need Iran. Given Azerbaijan’s own 
extensive energy reserves (EIA, 2016h), the limitations to Azerbaijani-Iranian trade are 
unsurprising. The states’ economies are competing rather than complementary. The small 
volume of energy trade between them can be attributed to the geographical isolation of 
Nakhchivan from Azerbaijan. Conversely, Turkey plays an essential role in the realisation 
of Azerbaijan’s ambitions by virtue of the access it provides to European markets.  
                                                     
59 In 1994, a consortium of IOCs signed an agreement with Azerbaijan for the production of 511 million 
tonnes (mt) of oil over a 30 year period. Turkey’s  TPAO was part of the consortium that signed what was 
called the “contract of the century” (AP, 1994; AFP, 1994). 
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Secondly, it is imperative to note that the scope of the TANAP pipeline goes far beyond 
that of the BTE. The project is related to the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor project and, 
when completed, will be linked to the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP)60 to deliver 
Azerbaijani gas to Europe for the first time. Turkey will thus become a key player in the 
transfer of natural gas from east to west, thereby increasing its geostrategic role between 
Europe and the Caspian region. Considering the argument in chapter two that Turkey’s 
geostrategic location was a strategic asset with regards to determining the state’s status in 
the Caspian, the realisation of TAP can be construed as a boost to Turkey’s regional status. 
It should be noted that the TANAP agreements were signed while strict sanctions were 
being imposed that would inhibit Iran from joining any pipeline aimed at the European 
market. TANAP, therefore, signified to Iran that Turkey has alternatives to Iran’s natural 
gas.  
Perhaps the most significant outcome of the TANAP project with regards to Turkey and 
Iran’s positions in the Caspian region was that it demonstrated to the Caspian littorals that 
Turkey was a viable energy partner. Chapters one and three pointed out that 
Turkmenistan’s substantial energy reserves - which were both underdeveloped and 
unexplored - were of substantial interest to advanced developing states both within and 
outside of the Caspian region, including Turkey, Russia, Iran, and China. China, in 
particular, pursed unprecedented energy cooperation with Turkmenistan during the period 
in the late 2000s.  
Turkmenistan’s energy reserves garnered significant international attention in 2012. 
Months before the TANAP agreement was signed, BP’s annual statistical review of world 
energy revealed that Turkmenistan’s proven gas reserves had been revised up from 
13.4tcm in 2010 to 24.3tcm in June 2012 (Peixe, 2012). More specifically, it proved to be 
the catalyst for the resumption of attempts by Turkey to integrate Turkmenistan into 
regional energy projects. At a meeting between representatives from Turkey, the EU, 
Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan in 2012, Yildiz stated that Ashgabat could not stay outside 
the “regional gas movements” (Hurriyet, 2012b). Erdogan underscored TANAP’s 
significance to Turkmenistan when signing the intergovernmental agreement for the 
                                                     
60 As of January 2018, TAP was two thirds completed and scheduled for completion in 2020 (Jewkes, 2017). 
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pipeline, noting that TANAP would enable Turkmenistan to export its gas to Europe via 
Azerbaijan and Turkey (Socor, 2012). Overtures to Turkmenistan were reciprocated, and 
Ashgabat signalled a willingness to engage with states to the west of the Caspian. In 2014, 
Baku hosted the first ever trilateral meeting of the foreign ministers of Turkey, Azerbaijan, 
and Turkmenistan (MFA, 2014b). A month later, Turkmen President Gurbanguly 
Berdymukhammedov signed an order for the establishment of an embassy in Tbilisi, and 
Turkey and Turkmenistan subsequently signed an agreement for the latter’s participation 
in TANAP (Gurt, 2014a). If, as chapter one argued, energy relations engender integration 
and closer regional relations, then TANAP was integral to strengthening relations between 
Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Georgia. In terms of regional powerhood it was, on 
one hand, be considered demonstrative of Turkey’s regional leadership; of its capacity to 
integrate peripheral regional states and to augment regional integration and (energy) 
security. Given the benefits of increased cooperation to Turkey, however, in terms of the 
recognition of its regional role, in facilitating Turkey’s hub and diversification agendas, 
and in potentially contributing to Turkey’s international reputation as a regional power, 
this thesis considers Turkey’s interest in Turkmenistan to be consistent with a benevolent 
hegemonic strategy. 
However, Turkmenistan shares borders with none of the states involved in TANAP. 
Examining the region’s geography indicates that there are three options for ensuring the 
inclusion of Turkmen gas in the project. The first is the construction of a pipeline from 
Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan via Kazakhstan and Russia. Aside from geographical distance 
rendering the construction of such a pipeline prohibitively costly, there are also 
geopolitical barriers to such a route: the reluctance of each of  Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the 
EU to involve Russia in fourth corridor projects (see chapters three and five) and 
Turkmenistan’s deteriorating energy relations with Russia (Pannier, 2008a, 2009; The 
Moscow Times, 2014) rules out a northern route. The second option, therefore, would be 
to transport Turkmen gas through Iran to Turkey. The EIA (2015d) notes, however, that 
infrastructure in the northern regions of Iran (through which a Turkmen-Iran-Turkey 
pipeline would be contracted) were limited. Of further concern was the occasionally 
contentious relationship between Turkmenistan and Iran. Turkmen-Iranian energy relations 
have not been without issue, and bilateral disagreements have negatively affected Turkey’s 
energy security. Turkmen gas supplies to Iran were suspended on several occasions due to 
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financial disputes (Pannier, 2008a). Iran subsequently reduced gas flows to Turkey to 
make up for domestic shortfalls (Pannier, 2008a). These disputes cast doubt on the ability 
of Iran to act as a conduit for Turkmen gas to Turkey and on the capacity of Iran to 
participate in east-west energy projects. 
The third option is the revival of the trans-Caspian project that was discussed in chapter 
three. It was noted that while Turkey repeatedly expressed its support for the trans-Caspian 
project, the failure to delineate the Caspian meant that such a project was not feasible. 
Iran’s insistence on dividing the sea into five equal sectors was in contrast to the sectorial 
division approach favoured by other littorals, and was a factor impeding the finalising of 
the sea’s legal status (PBS, 2010; EIA, 2013a). Based on the understanding in chapter one 
that transit states benefit from tariffs collected from the transportation of energy between 
producer and consumer states, and the assertion in chapter three that the construction of a 
trans-Caspian pipeline would omit the necessity for Turkmenistan to transport supplies to 
western markets through Iran, this thesis suggests that the construction of such a pipeline 
would deprive Iran of transit income. It would therefore have a negative economic impact 
on Iran and, at the same time, exclude Iran from a major regional energy project. Turkey’s 
desire to access Turkmen gas was therefore stymied on two accounts: firstly because of the 
limitations of Iran’s domestic market and pipeline system; and secondly, because of its 
opposition to the construction of a trans-Caspian pipeline. The importance that chapter 
three suggested Turkmen supplies held in Turkey’s energy agenda and the centrality of  
integration (including through infrastructural projects) to regional power, this thesis 
concludes hat Iran’s domestic and regional policies impeded the realisation of Turkey’s 
regional power agenda.   
4.6 Conclusion 
Examining Turkish-Iranian relations between 2002 and 2014 illustrates the shifting nature 
of Turkey’s regional power from a rare glimpse of coercive hegemony in the 2002 pricing 
dispute to a benevolent hegemony for much of the 2000s. Each was - perhaps inadvertently 
- facilitated by Iran’s regional and international politics. This thesis argues that constraints 
on Iran’s regional power offered an opportunity for Turkey to elevate its regional status. 
Acting as an emissary for Iran to the international community enabled Turkey to 
demonstrate its meditative power to major powers in the UN and EU, while recognition by 
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those powers - even if it was purely rhetorical - was important to elevating Turkey’s 
position among regional subordinates. Both those effects, chapter two argued, were 
essential to generating the legitimacy that facilitated regional powerhood. In addition, 
Turkey’s attempts to incorporate Iran into regional energy projects like Nabucco 
demonstrated Ankara’s integrative ambitions to other regional states that were seeking 
outlets to global markets. In other words, it highlighted both Turkey’s commitment to 
regional states and its geostrategic significance to regional energy producers. Chapter three 
argued that both these factors would elevate Turkey’s regional status. 
Nonetheless, Iran also played a role in constricting the AKP’s energy agendas in a manner 
that was inimical to the Turkey’s regional power status. Iran’s deteriorating relations with 
Europe on account of Tehran’s nuclear programme and the subsequent implementation of 
sanctions limited the viability of Turkey’s ambition to incorporate Iranian oil or gas into its 
energy hub agenda. This reinforced Turkey’s reliance on Azerbaijani resources, thereby 
limiting the leverage Turkey could assert over its Caucasian neighbours. Oil embargo 
aside, that the sanctions targeted investment in Iran’s energy sector limited the financial 
capacity available to develop Iran’s limited energy infrastructure and cast doubt on the 
construction of a Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey pipeline that could both enhance Turkey’s 
energy diversity and contribute to the AKP’s hub agenda. In any case, frequent 
disagreements between Turkmenistan and Iran over energy pricing mechanisms generated 
doubt over the reliability of supplies transiting through Iran. In effect, Iran’s relationship 
with other regional and international actors restricted Turkey’s energy agenda to the 
Caucasus region and thus reduced regional integration efforts - a key regional power 
strategy according to chapter two - to the western shores of the Caspian. 
In addition, Iran’s own energy agenda highlighted insecurities in Turkey’s regional 
strategy and demonstrated Iran’s willingness to undermine Turkey’s energy agenda. The 
most notable manifestation of this was with regards to the failure to delineate the Caspian 
Sea. Tehran’s willingness to pursue Azerbaijani gas during the 2009-10 dispute between 
Turkey and Azerbaijan was a clear example of Turkey’s vulnerability to Iran’s energy 
endeavours in the Caspian. This chapter argues, however, that these episodes did not 
impact on Turkey’s position in the regional hierarchy relative to Iran. It notes that 
Turkey’s attempts to assert itself as a regional hegemon in the context of its relations with 
200 
 
Iran failed primarily on account of the disparity between rhetoric and tangible energy 
cooperation between the states and Turkey’s underestimation of the extent of the 
discontent between Iran and the international community. However, it also suggests that 
attempts to act as an emissary on Iran’s behalf in the UNSC and Ankara’s conciliatory 
rhetoric with Iran were beneficial to Turkey’s benevolent regional  hegemony. It concludes 
that relations with Iran had a mixed impact on Turkey’s regional and energy agendas but, 
ultimately, the extent of Turkey’s relationship with other regional subordinates and strong 
rhetoric regarding energy cooperation with Iran overrode the negative implications of 
Iran’s own international and energy strategy for Turkey and contributed to a Turkey’s 




5. Energy in Turkish-Russian Relations 
5.1 Introduction 
The relationship between Turkey and Russia during the AKP era was characterised first by 
rapprochement and consequently by unprecedented levels of bilateral cooperation. Both 
countries experienced economic growth and relative stability in comparison to previous 
decades. This facilitated a convergence of domestic and foreign policy and generated 
increased confidence in the states’ respective abilities to influence the trajectory of global 
and regional politics. Disillusionment with the international status quo and a desire to limit 
external - and particularly American - influence in the states’ shared region engendered 
cooperation on regional security and political initiatives, while the search for non-Western 
allies led to a raft of bilateral agreements on everything from currency to naval cooperation 
to visas. At the same time, the states remained diametrically opposed on a number of 
regional issues, most notably regarding protracted conflicts in the Southern Caucasus.  
This chapter will argue that both the convergence on regional geopolitical issues and the 
flourishing mutual relationship between Turkey and Russia  were to a large extent 
attributable to the central role allocated to energy in bilateral relations and in the states’ 
respective regional power ambitions. Chapter three highlighted the relationship between 
energy and regional powers for Turkish administrators between 2002 and 2014. This 
chapter will expand on the central role occupied by Russia in Turkey’s energy strategy, 
and consider the ways in which Russia’s energy and regional strategies affected Turkey’s 
capacity to fulfil its regional agenda. While Turkey’s regional power ambitions 
undoubtedly clashed with Russia’s geopolitical ambitions, its energy strategy was entirely 
incongruous with Russia’s regional and strategic interests. Russia is an energy superpower: 
it is the second largest producer of oil and gas in the world, and is deeply embedded in 
energy systems in Europe, Central Asia, and the Caspian. Re-establishing control over 
energy resources in the former Soviet Union and maintaining dominance in European 
energy markets were pivotal to Russia’s strategy to reassert itself as both a regional and 
global power. During this period, therefore, it was impossible to extricate Russia’s energy 
policy from its geopolitical agenda and regional power strategy. Complicating matters 
further for the AKP was Turkey’s reliance on Russia as its dominant source of 
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hydrocarbon imports and Russia’s creeping influence in the development of Turkey’s 
domestic energy infrastructure. 
A central contention of this chapter is that the over-reliance on and continued pursuit of 
Russian resources contributed to an energy strategy that was replete with contradictions 
and detrimental to Turkey’s regional power ambitions. Detaching Turkey from its 
dependency on Russian energy resources was a core aim of the AKP’s energy strategy 
from at least 2003. Yet faced with a rapidly expanding economy and in light of the 
limitations in expanding energy relations with Iran that were highlighted in the previous 
chapter, successive AKP governments actively pursued energy cooperation with Russia in 
the oil, gas, and nuclear sectors. The incorporation of new Russian supplies into Turkey’s 
energy system was logical considering Turkey’s growing energy needs and the slow pace 
at which alternative projects - such as the Nabucco pipeline - were developing. 
Nonetheless, this strategy constrained the implementation of Turkey’s benevolent 
hegemonic regional strategy in four ways. Firstly, Turkey’s reliance on a competing 
regional power for essential resources hindered the implementation of a more assertive 
regional foreign policy that would have enhanced Turkey’s regional power credentials. 
Secondly, Turkey’s willingness to pursue Russia resources simultaneously to other non-
Russian east-west projects was counterproductive to attempts to act as a facilitator in 
integrating Caspian and Central Asian states into regional energy systems (which, chapter 
two argued, was instrumental if Turkey was to be perceived as a regional power in a region 
dominated by energy trade and politics). Thirdly, if Turkey’s status within the Caspian was 
to some extent predicated on its relations with Europe, then the adoption of an energy 
strategy that was incongruent with the EU’s energy diversification agenda was damaging 
to attempts to augment Turkey’s regional status. Finally, Russia’s desire to control energy 
export routes as part of its own regional power strategy was incompatible with a Turkish 
hub agenda that necessitated Turkish control over the re-exportation of resources that 
passed through its territory. 
 As a final point, it should be noted that the form of the states’ respective regional 
strategies played a role in determining Turkey’s response to regional developments in the 
energy sphere. Turkey’s strategy conformed with benevolent hegemonic approaches to 
regional power projection. Russia, however, adopted an increasing coercive hegemonic 
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strategy as the 2000s progressed and veered towards an imperial strategy on two occasions 
between 2008 and 2014. The variance in the two states’ strategies can partly be attributed 
to contrasting understandings of the purpose of regional powerhood: for Russia, regional 
hegemony was a stepping stone to regaining great power status at the global level. 
Chapters two and three contended that Turkey saw regional power in an end in itself. 
Considering the proposition in the introduction that regional power can be a means through 
which states accrue middle power credentials, and the assertion that Turkey sought to 
increase its influence in international forums, it can also be argued that the AKP perceived 
regional powerhood was a means through which Turkey could strengthen its middle power 
credentials. Russia’s more aggressive regional power approach, in conjunction with 
Russia’s economic and military superiority over Turkey and the latter’s dependence on 
Russian energy resources, must be taken into consideration in the analysis of the 
relationship between energy and regional powerhood for advanced developing states. 
This chapter will explore the above arguments in depth by examining the trajectory of 
Turkish-Russian relations between 2002 and 2014 as they relate to the wider Caspian 
region. The first section of this chapter will briefly examine bilateral and energy relations 
between Turkey and Russia in the pre-AKP years. The second section will focus on 
Turkish-Russian relations in the AKP era. It will argue that a closer alignment between the 
states’ regional and international geopolitical views drove increased cooperation in the 
economic sphere in particular. Considering Russia’s emphasis on energy as a means to 
regain its global status and Turkey’s desire to increase domestic imports and become an 
energy hub, it is unsurprising that energy was at the heart of bilateral cooperation in this 
era. To underline the overlap between energy and regional power strategies for both states 
in bilateral relations, the third section of this chapter will examine the trajectory of bilateral 
energy relations between 2002 and 2014. Cooperation on regional issues and competition 
in terms of access to regional energy reserves are the focus of the fourth section. After first 
considering the impact of Turkey and Russia’s respective alliances with Azerbaijan and 
Armenia, the final part of this chapter focuses on the 2008 South Ossetian war and its 
implications for Turkey’s energy and regional power strategy.  This chapter, then, 
addresses the central research question in considering the role of energy for advanced 
emerging states within a regional powers framework.  
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5.2 Turkish-Russian relations in historical context 
Turkey’s historical engagement with Russia revolved around imperial competition for 
territory and influence in the Black Sea, Caucasus, and Balkan regions. Russia’s forays 
into the Caucasus in the 1800s were instrumental to the decline of the Ottoman Empire in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Turkish 
War of Independence of 1919-1922 saw both states experience first political turmoil and 
then the emergence of new political, social, and economic systems. The establishment of 
the USSR in 1922 cemented Russia’s control in Turkey’s neighbourhood as the Caucasus 
and Central Asia were subsumed into the Soviet Union. While Turkey remained neutral 
during WWII, its alignment with the West during the Cold War was central to the hostility 
that defined the relationship between the two former imperial powers for most of the 20th 
century. However, the USSR began to develop energy relations with the West 
independently of geopolitical tensions from the mid-1960s, and in 1984 Turkey and the 
USSR signed an agreement for the construction of a natural gas pipeline from Russia to 
north-west Turkey. Known alternatively as the “Western Pipeline” and the “Trans-Balkan 
pipeline”, the project transports gas to Turkey via Ukraine, Moldova,  Romania, and 
Bulgaria. Natural gas deliveries began in 1987, and as of 2016 continues to deliver 14 
billion cubic meters per annum (bcm/a) to Turkey (Gazprom Export, 2016).  
The separation of energy trade and geopolitical antagonism  by Turkey and Russia 
continued into the post-Cold War era. While the states signed a treaty setting out new 
principles of bilateral cooperation in 1992 (MFA, 2017b), relations remained tense through 
much of the 1990s. The 1992 agreement committed the states to non-interference in the 
other’s internal affairs and to respect the other’s territorial integrity (MFA, 2017b). The 
early 1990s, however, were characterised by repeated accusations of indirect support by 
Russia for the PKK and for Chechen militants by Turkey (Onis and Yilmaz, 2016). In 
addition, chapter two pointed out that during this period Turkey actively pursued closer 
relations with and influence over the newly independent states of Central Asia and the 
Caucasus with which it had historical, cultural, and geographic ties (Aydin, 2004). 
Turkey’s policies in the region contributed to a zero-sum game in which both states 
attempted to implement competing visions of regional order in the former Soviet sphere. 
The implementation of the pan-Turkic strategy in the former Soviet Republics effectively 
205 
 
positioned Turkey against Russia just as a new great energy game was beginning in the 
Caspian region.  
Despite preliminary explorations providing evidence of extensive oil and gas reserves in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus, energy policy in the Soviet era had focused almost 
exclusively on the development of resources in Siberia and the far east of the country 
(EIA, 2013a). Post-Cold War, the extent of oil and gas reserves in former Soviet Union 
(FSU) states gradually became an important issue defining the geopolitical trajectory of 
the region (Kubicek, 2013). While Russia maintained sole ownership of existing pipeline 
infrastructure in what had been the USSR, cooperation between the West and the newly 
independent states on energy affairs offered an opportunity for external and local actors to 
delineate a new geopolitical reality in the region. Chapter two highlighted how energy 
cooperation with the West afforded the former Soviet states a chance to assert political and 
economic independence from Moscow and to reduce reliance on Russian energy supplies, 
systems, and expertise. As chapter three pointed out, engagement with energy rich 
Caucasian and Central Asian states was essential to developing a diversified stream of oil 
and gas supplies for the increasingly hungry European energy market. The US saw energy 
cooperation as a means to ensure energy security for its European allies and to assert its 
presence and dilute Russia’s influence in the former Soviet sphere (Kubicek, 2013). 
Turkey’s desire to prove its strategic utility to the West, boost its status in the Caucasus 
and Central Asia, and to diversify and increase its energy imports led to cooperation with 
Europe and the US on energy projects in the FSU (Winrow, 2014). Central to the West’s 
energy strategy in the region was the provision of support for regional governments and 
IOCs to develop Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field for the transportation of oil and gas to 
Europe (Kubicek, 2013). Turkey, strategically situated between the energy producing and 
energy consuming regions, was an indispensable partner in what became known as the 
fourth corridor project.  
The fourth corridor project was detrimental to Russia’s desire to maintain control over 
regional energy systems and, in turn, ensure a continuation of the hegemony had wielded 
in the region during the Soviet era. Consequently, Moscow repeatedly objected to and 
sought to hinder - often successfully - Western-sponsored regional energy initiatives. In 
1994, a consortium of IOCs including BP and Statoil signed the $4.7billion “contract of 
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the century” with Azerbaijan for the production of 511 million tonnes (mt) of oil over a 30 
year period (AP, 1994; AFP, 1994). Both Turkey and Russia had stakes in the contract by 
way of TPAO and Lukoil’s participation in the project.61 However, Russia’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (RMFA) objected to the pipeline and refused to recognise the 1994 
contract (Mursaliyev, 1994). Lukoil’s withdrawal from the consortium in 1996 slowed the 
development of new infrastructural projects in Azerbaijan and meant that it was not until 
1998 that the contract for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) project - the first east-west 
pipeline not to transit through Russian territory - was drawn up. Russia also sought to 
frustrate the realisation of other regional energy projects that would encourage regional 
integration at the expense of Russian dominance. In addition to raising concerns over the 
disputed status of the Caspian Sea (see chapter three), Russia reinvigorated the previously 
dormant Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) with Kazakhstan in 1999 and proceeded to 
buy up Kazakh oil that had been provisionally earmarked by the West for the trans-
Caspian pipeline. In any case, political disinterest among Caspian littorals regarding an 
off-shore pipeline, lack of investor interest, and disagreement on the delineation of the 
Caspian Sea meant that the trans-Caspian project remained a pipe dream. 
Turkey continued to engage in energy bargaining with Russia even as it actively advocated 
for the realisation of new east-west energy project. In 1997, as the fourth corridor 
continued to stall, the two countries signed an agreement to construct a 1,213 kilometre 
natural gas pipeline under the Black Sea. The contact was opposed by the US because it 
dealt a blow to the fourth corridor project. Yet the pipeline made strategic sense for Turkey 
at the time. Strong economic growth and rapid industrialisation was putting pressure on 
domestic energy systems and undermining Turkey’s energy security. With the 
development of any of the fourth corridor projects not immediately forthcoming, Turkey 
was forced to look elsewhere for new energy supplies. Russia, with its extensive oil and 
gas reserves and history of reliability in the delivery of supplies, was a natural option. 
                                                     




Figure 15: The Blue Stream (Caspian Barrel, 2014) 
The proposal to build a natural gas pipeline through the Black Sea was not without issues: 
the technicalities of constructing an underwater pipeline at a depth of two kilometres 
presented significant engineering obstacles and costs beyond those of conventional 
pipeline projects. These complications were arguably outweighed by the long-term 
security benefits of removing third party transit countries from the equation. To mitigate 
the technical difficulties of the project, Russia’s Gazprom entered into a joint venture with 
Italian IOC ENI for the construction of the offshore section of the pipeline (ENI, 2014). 
Construction began in 1999, and the Blue Stream became operational in February 2003. 
The pipeline has a capacity of 16bcm, and initial flows of 1.3bcm gradually increased to a 
high of 14.7bcm in 2014 (Socor, 2009b; Gazprom, 2017a). At $3 billion, the pipeline had 
proved expensive to build (Stratfor, 2003); and, as the incoming AKP government would 
discover, had translated into high costs for Turkish consumers. While Turkish disquiet at 
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gas prices through the Blue Stream will be discussed in more detail in section 5.4.2, this 
chapter will first consider the conditions under which tensions over natural gas prices 
manifested. For between the initial Blue Stream agreement and its inauguration, both 
Turkey and Russia had elected new administrations that prioritised regional power and 
energy: in Moscow, Vladimir Putin replaced Boris Yeltsin as president, while in Turkey, 
the AKP under Recep Tayyip Erdogan were elected to parliament for the first time.   
5.3 Turkey-Russian relations in the AKP era 
5.3.1 Bilateral relations under the AKP 
Rapprochement between Russia and Turkey in the early 2000s contributed to a 
normalisation of relations during the AKP’s first term. The willingness of the states to 
cooperate can be attributed to domestic and geopolitical changes that generated increased 
cooperation in political, regional and economic affairs. Domestically, the election of 
Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency in 2000 and of the AKP as Turkey’s ruling party 
in 2002 ushered in an era of strong and stable leadership in domestic politics. The relative 
political security that followed contrasted sharply with the tumultuous period both states 
had experienced in the 1990s. That stability enabled the states to focus on regional and 
international strategy to a greater extent than in previous years, which, in turn, facilitated 
increased bilateral cooperation. Regionally, a strong domestic economy in Turkey in the 
late 1990s coincided with a period of political and economic chaos in Russia. Kardas 
(2011) suggests, therefore, that Turkey both saw Russia as less of an existential threat than 
it had in previous decades and no longer felt that it needed Western support to deal with 
Russia. This not only facilitated the AKP’s more autonomous foreign policy agenda, but 
also led to a slight recalibration in the states’ balance of power to Turkey’s benefit. As 
chapter three highlighted, the AKP embraced a foreign policy that focused on regional 
solutions to regional problems. This policy was instrumental in encouraging cooperation 
with - and occasionally concessions to - Russia. The simultaneous cessation of support in 
2002 by Russia and Turkey for PKK and Chechen separatists in each other’s territory and 
Turkey’s ban on known Chechen separatists entering the country - declared an “important 
and responsible step” by Russian officials (RMFA, 2002) - was an example of the 
conciliatory and concessionary nature of relations early in the AKP’s first term.  
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The decline of Ankara’s pan-Turkic project also lessened the geopolitical competition 
between Russia and Turkey in the Caucasus and Central Asia and facilitated a new era of 
regional cooperation. A “Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia” in 2002  proposed 
a new era of economic and political cooperation to “reach a new and higher level in 
bilateral relations” and to “bring about peaceful, just, and lasting political solutions to 
disputes” in the Caucasus and Central Asia (MFA, 2017b). Regional challenges in the 
form of unstable governments and protracted conflicts like that in Nagorno-Karabakh 
fuelled cooperation on security and stabilisation initiatives. In addition, the AKP’s 
determination to assert its autonomy from Western foreign policy objectives signalled a 
closer convergence between the states’ geopolitical agendas (if not necessarily the 
motivations behind those agendas). After both states opposed the 2003 invasion of Iraq, 
Putin professed to being  “impressed by Turkey’s independent foreign policy” in Iraq, 
stating that  countries’ positions “share[d] a lot in common” (Putin,  2004b). The AKP’s 
divergence from its traditional foreign policy alignment with the US early in its first term 
therefore played an important role in strengthening its relationship with Russia. In 
addition, the initiation of gas flows through the Blue Stream in 2003 cemented the 
development of economic interdependence between Turkey and Russia: bilateral trade 
increased from $5.1 billion (bn) in 2002 to $11bn in 2004 (World Bank, 2017a). An almost 
three-fold increase in Russian imports to Turkey from $3.9bn to $11bn accounted for the 
majority of that increase. Turkey became Russia’s largest market for oil and gas combined, 
while Russia became by far Turkey’s dominant energy supplier (EIA, 2015a; EIA, 2015b). 
 It would be an overstatement to argue that energy was the primary driver of 
rapprochement in this era. If regional powerhood was an aspiration of the early AKP 
administration, then recognition of Turkey’s regional credentials by other major players in 
the region was essential. Adhering to US-sponsored energy initiatives like the fourth 
corridor project essentially pitted Turkey against competing powers like Russia, forcing it 
to forgo cooperation and recognition that would otherwise be beneficial to Turkey’s own 
regional power strategy. In a region in which energy plays a significant role in influencing 
geopolitical delineation and patterns of amity and enmity, failure to interact with a leading 
energy state like Russia would be detrimental to Turkey’s influence in regional energy 
systems. In this way, energy and foreign policy played a mutually reinforcing role in 
enhancing bilateral relations between Turkey and Russia in the AKP’s first term. Given the 
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extent of self-interest involved in engaging with Russia, along with the emphasis on 
material - rather than ideational - cooperation, this chapter frames Turkey’s engagement 
with Russia as part of a broader strategy to assert benevolent hegemony in the wider 
Caspian region. 
5.3.2 Bilateral cooperation in the AKP era 
Turkish-Russian relations between 2002 and 2014 were characterised by extensive levels 
of engagement between government and business elites that engendered a plethora of 
bilateral agreements on cooperation in economic, diplomatic, and regional affairs. The 
number of high-level meetings between Erdogan and Putin was a particularly 
distinguishing feature of Turkish-Russian relations in the period under examination. In 
2004, Putin became the first Russian president to visit Ankara in the history of the states’ 
bilateral relations. In the 18 months between January 2005 and June 2006, Putin held 
meetings with either Gul or Erdogan on six occasions (Erdogan and Putin, 2005; Joint 
Declaration, 2009). This section will look first at the measures implemented to enhance the 
political and strategic relationship between the sides and will briefly discuss the role 
played by the states’ contrasting relationships with NATO in bilateral relations. It will then 
note the growth of cooperation in the economic sphere before moving on in the next 
section to examine the centrality of energy to bilateral economic and political engagement. 
Chapter four argued that the relationship between Turkey and Iran between 2002 and 2014 
was dominated by the triumph of rhetoric over tangible cooperation. Turkey’s conciliatory 
Russia policy focused extensively on formalising relations through the institutionalisation 
of cooperative mechanisms, but as in the Iranian case rhetoric rarely translated into policy. 
During Putin’s 2004 Ankara trip, the states signed both a second joint declaration on 
cooperation in Eurasia and a “Joint Declaration on the Intensification of Friendship and 
Multidimensional Partnership Diplomatic” (MFA, 2017b). Engagement reached what 
Erdogan termed a “climax” in terms of “purposeful cooperation in political, economic, and 
defensive spheres” (Russia Today, 2010a) towards the end of the AKP’s second term. The 
formation of a High Level Cooperation Council in 2010 and Joint Strategic Planning 
Group in 2011 meant, according to Medvedev, that Russian-Turkish ties were reaching the 
level of a “full scale strategic partnership” (Medvedev, 2010). The purpose of the groups 
was to act as a “steering mechanism to further...multi-dimensional cooperation” on issues 
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ranging from energy investment to regional security and integration initiates to global 
nuclear disarmament (Joint Declaration, 2012; Koru, 2013). Two years after the formation 
of the Council, Putin declared that Turkey was Russia’s “important strategic partner” 
(Erdogan and Putin, 2012).Yet there was no tangible evidence of cooperation between the 
states on security issues, and one major security issue had the potential to drive a wedge 
between the states: the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the 
region. 
While Turkey and Russia participated in many of the same international organisations (the 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation organisation (BSEC) among them) and professed to 
have similar agendas and outlooks concerning regional and international systems, the 
former’s NATO membership had the potential to drive a wedge between the states. Turkey 
has been a member of NATO since 1952. In a 2004 interview Putin described how he had 
perceived  Turkey during the Cold War years as being “above all a NATO country” and 
“an opponent” (Putin, 2004a). Russia had begun to develop ties with NATO in the post-
Cold War years through participation in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative from 
1991 and the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) in 1997. The PJC was replaced with the 
NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002. In the early years of the AKP’s first term, Russia 
was relatively restrained in its criticism of NATO’s expansion eastwards to the Baltic 
states (Lavrov, 2004b). As NATO’s Individualised Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) scheme 
spread to the former Soviet territories, Russian-NATO relations deteriorated. The NRC 
was temporarily suspended for the first time in the aftermath of the 2008 South Ossetian 
war between Russia and Georgia (Oakley, 2008). After the NRC was suspended for a 
second time in 2014 following the annexation of Crimea by Russian forces, Russia’s 
permanent representative to NATO Alexander Grushko accused NATO of directing 
operations against Russia by conducting military activities on Russia’s “frontiers” 
(Grushko, 2014). His suggestion that Russia would take NATO’s measures into account in 
its own military planning was indicative of the extent of military tensions between NATO 
and Russia during the AKP’s third term. 
The antagonism between NATO and Russia had the potential to negatively influence the 
latter’s relations with Turkey. Even when relations with Russia were at their peak in the 
AKP’s third term, Davutoglu was unequivocal in declaring Turkey’s NATO membership 
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“an integral part of [Turkey’s] global identity” and a “fundamental pillar” of the state’s 
foreign policy (Davutoglu, 2012). He also stated that Turkey wanted to have “full 
solidarity” with NATO (Davutoglu, 2010). However, that Turkey’s membership seems not 
to have been a significant issue in bilateral relations can be attributed in part to the nature 
of  Turkey-NATO relations in comparison to earlier decades. In 2006, Turkey joined 
Russia in rejecting a US-proposed NATO-led operation in the Black Sea. In 2014, Ankara 
also refused to join in the sanctions against Russia after the annexation of Crimea despite 
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg publicly urging Turkish support (Roth, 2014). 
At the same time, Russia appears to have considered Turkey's NATO membership entirely 
separate to its own relationship with Turkey. In 2008, Russia’s minister for foreign affairs 
Sergey Lavrov stated that Russia felt “no restraining factors....within the framework of 
(Turkish-Russian) bilateral dialogue” on account of Turkey’s NATO membership and 
argued that Turkey fulfilled its obligations to NATO “without placing those commitments 
above its other international obligations” (Lavrov and Babacan, 2008). This thesis does not 
argue that Turkey sought to detach itself from the NATO coalition. Rather, it suggests that 
the focus on regional solutions to regional problems in the AKP’s foreign policy and the 
desire to demonstrate autonomy in policy formulation contributed to a Turkey’s 
disinclination to act as NATO’s base in the region in the same way as it had during the 
Cold War. Turkey’s diminished interest in facilitating new NATO operations or policy in 
its region and the concurrent extension of the state’s strategic relation with Russia 
mitigated potential conflict between Turkey’s two alliances and effectively enabled the 
states to compartmentalise bilateral cooperation from Turkey’s other alliances.  
While political relations between Turkey and Russia solidified in the AKP era, the 
economic sphere bore the most tangible results of the intensive diplomacy between the 
states. Over the course of the AKP’s three terms in office, bilateral trade increased rapidly 
from $4bn in 2002 to $31bn in 2014 (World Bank, 2017a; Turkish Statistical Institute, 
2018). Trade declined from a high of $38bn in 2008 to $23bn in 2009 – in part because of 
the decline in oil prices that accompanied the global financial crisis, and in part on account 
of the crisis itself – but returned to growth the following year. Such was the confidence in 
continued trade growth that, in 2012, Erdogan announced that the countries intended to 
increase turnover to $100 billion per annum (Erdogan and Putin, 2012). Dominating 
bilateral trade was the export of Russian oil and gas to Turkey.  
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The primacy of energy in bilateral trade contributed to a significant trade imbalance in 
Russia’s favour that was recognised by both states. Putin acknowledged the potential 
difficulties posed by the imbalance as early as 2004, and suggested the countries should 
diversify their relations (Putin, 2004a). Similarly, Gul suggested in 2011 that there was a 
necessity to ameliorate the trade imbalance though increased exports and services to 
Russia (Gul, 2011). Regardless of the focus on expanding relations beyond the energy 
sphere, Turkey’s Russian trade deficit grew to just over 80% in 2014 (Turkish Statistical 
Institute, 201). Russia was Turkey’s number one source of imports, with oil and gas fuels 
accounting for $16.5 billion of the $25 billion total (Turkish Exporters Assembly, 
2016:103; 106). If the balance of power between states is inimical to determining regional 
power status, and economic status is a key feature determining regional hierarchy 
(particularly in terms of its contribution to the attainment of other material capabilities), 
then the asymmetry between Russia and Turkey in terms of bilateral trade positioned 
Russia as the region’s dominant power. Though it falls outside the temporal parameters of 
this thesis, it is interesting to note that bilateral trade fell in 2015 at least in part due to the 
dispute over Turkey’s shooting down of a Russian reconnaissance plane (Turkish 
Statistical Institute, 2018) . However, that the decline in Turkish exports was much more 
extreme suggests that while energy prices are more sensitive to global market fluctuations, 
the long-term nature of energy trade means that non-energy trade is more likely to be 
affected by political disputes between energy producers and consumers.  
Nonetheless, expanding trade in other, non-energy sectors was essential to redressing the 
trade imbalance between Turkey and Russia. Yet despite official rhetoric repeatedly urging 
new trade deals, energy remained at the heart of bilateral trade. The next section, therefore, 
will look briefly at the ways in which Russia integrated energy into its own regional power 
strategy before examining in depth how energy retained its dominance in Russian -Turkish 
relations. 
5.4 Energy relations between Turkey and Russia, 2002-2014 
5.4.1 Russia: an energy superpower 
In contrast to the Iranian case, Russia’s energy production levels and position in the global 
energy hierarchy reflect its substantial supplies. Russia holds eighty million barrels of 
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proven oil reserves - the eighth largest in the world - and at 11 million barrels per day 
(mbbl/d) is the second biggest oil producer after the US (BP, 2017c). At 32.9 trillion cubic 
meters (tcm), Russia has the world’s largest gas reserves (BP, 2017c). It produced 280 
million cubic meters (mcm) in 2014, making it the second biggest producer in the world 
(BP, 2017c). Until the 2000s oil accounted for the bulk of hydrocarbon exports, but by 
2016 Russia had expanded its natural gas exports to 200 mcm per annum and become the 
world’s primary exporter of natural gas (BP, 2017c). It remains the second largest exporter 
of liquid petroleum products, with Europe (including Turkey) accounting for 70% of 
Russian oil and 90% of Russian gas exports (EIA, 2016g). Germany and Turkey were the 
largest individual importers of Russian hydrocarbons (BP, 2017c). Turkey imports Russian 
gas through two pipelines and oil via Black Sea tankers. 
After the economic turmoil and political instability that characterised the post-Soviet era, 
the implementation of a comprehensive energy strategy aimed at reasserting regional 
dominance and regaining great power status became a priority for the Putin administration. 
Energy was perceived as a tool to fund Russia’s geopolitical enterprises. While increasing 
domestic production to encourage economic growth was a major strand of this strategy, 
significant focus was also placed on maintaining control over existing pipeline networks in 
the former Soviet space, ensuring preferential agreements for Russian energy companies in 
the Caucasus and Central Asia, and expanding Russia’s European market. Encouraging 
energy dominance in the former Soviet states would ensure renewed Russian influence in 
its near abroad and limit the capacity of those states to export independently to Europe or 
the east. In short, it would cement Russia’s regional hegemony. Increasing European 
dependence on Russian gas would not only constitute a means through which Russia could 
enhance its role in the region, but would contribute to the saturation of European energy 
markets and render the realisation of the fourth corridor unfeasible. Unlike Turkey - for 
whom energy was used as a cooperative tool in engendering benevolent hegemony - 
Russia proved willing to use energy as a coercive tool to ensure hegemony and, 
conversely, utilised coercive regional power strategies to achieve its energy agenda. If 
energy is a strategic tool for Turkey to increase its power in the Caspian based on its 
strategic position as an export route to Europe, then Russia’s new energy strategy was 
detrimental to Turkey’s hegemonic regional ambitions. 
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5.4.2 Teething problems: the Blue Stream pricing dispute 
Section 5.2.1 of this chapter outlined the rationale behind the construction of the Blue 
Stream pipeline. It was noted that flows through the pipeline never reached capacity. 
Rather than imposing limitations on Turkish energy security, the pipeline’s spare capacity 
enabled Russia to increase flows when Turkey experienced shortages due to increased 
demand or on account of interruptions to supplies from other states. Chapter four 
highlighted how Russia provided additional volumes of gas through the Blue Stream to 
compensate for shortfalls in Iranian supplies on several occasions between 2006 and 2014. 
Russia’s willingness to increase gas supplies provided Turkey with the security necessary 
to maintain domestic economic activities essential to regional power. At the same time, 
however, it reinforced Turkey’s reliance on a competing regional player in a way that 
skewed the balance of power towards Russia. 
During the period under examination, there were no interruptions to supplies via the 
pipeline due to political disagreements. Indeed, Russian officials including Medvedev and 
Miller repeatedly highlighted the reliability of supplies when arguing in favour of 
increased energy trade between Russia and Turkey (Lavrov, 2007; Gazprom, 2014a).  As 
in the Iranian case, economic factors proved more disruptive to energy trade than did 
political disputes. The financial costs of the Blue Stream translated into prices that were 
higher for Turkish consumers than through the trans-Balkan pipeline (Stratfor, 2003). 
Considering that the Blue Stream became operational after the AKP’s 2001 election 
victory, concerns over the price of natural gas flowing through that pipeline proved to be 
one of the first tests to the new government’s energy agenda. As chapter one noted, 
affordability of energy supplies is a key tenet of energy security; chapter three 
subsequently highlighted the prominence attached to a conceptualisation of energy security 
within the AKP’s rhetoric that incorporated affordability. The 2003 price dispute therefore 
presented an early challenge to the AKP’s commitment to maximising energy security for 
its electorate. It also presented an opportunity for the state to assert its position as an equal 
partner rather than a subordinate state to Russia in the countries’ energy relations. 
Only a month after the initiation of gas flows, on 12th March 2003, Turkey halted supplies 
through the Blue Stream. The Blue Stream had been commissioned at a time when 
Turkey’s upwards economic trajectory was expected to continue, and energy demand was 
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therefore expected to increase. The economic slowdown in the aftermath of the 2001 
economic crisis meant that Turkey had an oversupply of natural gas, and energy Minister 
Hilmi Guler suggested that Turkey had lost $196 million by buying the more expensive 
Blue Stream gas (Lelyveld, 2003). Gazprom officials reported that Turkey had requested a 
price decrease similar to that which Russia imposed on supplies through the trans-Balkan 
pipeline the previous year and had proposed a renegotiation of take-or-pay agreements. 
The appeal to renegotiate the financial particulars of the Blue Stream contract was 
therefore an attempt by the Turkish government to save money on gas it did not need. It 
should be recalled that Turkey had successfully forced a recalibration of energy pricing 
mechanisms with Iran the previous year in a move that chapter four suggested had 
endowed the AKP with confidence in its capacity to influence energy producers. 
When assessed through a regional powers framework, the Blue Stream pricing dispute can 
be construed as an early attempt to affirm the AKP’s assertiveness in dealing with major 
regional rivals; in essence, to position Turkey - an energy consumer - on equal par to 
Russia as an energy producer. Turkey’s proposal in June 2003 to sell surplus Blue Stream 
supplies to Europe is therefore illustrative not only of an early indicator of the AKP’s hub 
ambitions, but its desire to elevate the state’s standing in regional power equations. As in 
the previous chapter, it can be framed as a hegemonic projection of power. However, 
Russia’s insistence that Gazprom decide the final export market scuppered any potential 
re-exportation deal, and highlighted the extent to which Turkey’s gas strategy - and, by 
extension, regional power strategy - was, at that stage, dependent on Russia. Russia’s 
control over the majority of Turkey’s natural gas flows and desire to utilise energy in its 
maximise regional hegemony – a key objective of the still relatively new Putin 
administration - therefore limited the effectiveness of energy as a tool in Turkey’s regional 
power strategy in the early years of the AKP’s first administration. Turkey had insufficient 
capacity to challenge Russia’s regional hegemony when it was so dependent on Moscow 
for the provision of essential resources. Nevertheless, an agreement was reached in July 
that would see Turkey pay the same price as other European countries (RIA Novosti, 
2003) and, in a minor victory for the AKP, Gazprom agreed to an easing of take-or-pay 
contracts. That Russia was willing to acquiesce to some of Turkey’s demands is indicative 
of the success of an early projection of hegemonic regional power by Ankara. The 
contentions and competition that defined the relationship between Turkey and Russia in 
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the 1990s thus carried over into the AKP era. Yet despite the AKP’s declaration in April 
2003 that it desired to reduce Russia’s share of Turkey’s energy import market to no more 
than 30% (Lelyveld, 2003), energy relations between the two continued to flourish under 
the first AKP administration.  
5.4.3 Increasing interdependence: Gazprom’s role in Turkey’s domestic energy 
markets 
Soon after his election to the presidency in 2000, Putin began to roll back the energy 
privatisation scheme initiated under Bois Yeltsin in the 1990s. By 2014, the Russian state 
controlled roughly 50% of total oil production and state-controlled companies were 
responsible for 90% of natural gas production (EIA, 2016g). Gazprom alone accounted for 
around 75% of domestic gas production (EIA, 2015g). Gazprom also has exclusive export 
rights for natural gas and is responsible for Russia’s external natural gas policies, making it 
central to the success of Russia’s energy export - and therefore regional power - strategy. 
While it is technically a semi-state body,62 Putin retains close ties to Gazprom. During the 
period under examination there was significant overlap between the senior positions in the 
company and Russian government. Dmitry Medvedev, for example, was Putin’s aide and 
prime minister prior to his appointment as Chairman of Gazprom’s board of directors; he 
remained in the position until his election to the Russian presidency in 2008 (CNN, 2017). 
Similarly, Viktor Zubkov - a political ally of Putin’s since the early days of the Russian 
Federation - was appointed by Putin to the position of prime minister in 2007, was first 
deputy prime minister under the Medvedev presidency, and has been chairman of 
Gazprom’s board of directors since 2008 (New York Times, 2008). Highlighting the extent 
to which Gazprom is embedded in Russia energy export policy, Zubkov was appointed 
Russian Special Presidential Representative for Cooperation with Gas Exporting Countries 
Forum (GECF) in 2014 (Gazprom, 2017d). 
The close association between Gazprom and the Russian state reinforces the argument that 
the company is a vehicle for the realisation of Putin’s energeopolitical vision for the 
region. It is also striking that Gazprom’s own energy strategy is congruent with that of the 
                                                     
62 Moscow has a 51% controlling stake in the company (Gazprom, 2017c) 
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Russian state. According to Eken (2013:465), Gazprom has three international energy 
goals: 
1. To gain almost full control over Central Asian gas  
2. To diversify routes to Europe, diminish the number of transit states between Russia 
and European consumers, and bypass all Russian alternatives 
3. To facilitate joint ventures and stakes in developing foreign reserves and 
infrastructure 
These goals serve to reassert Russian dominance over the former Soviet sphere and ensure 
influence in and leverage over European states. The third point also facilitates increased 
Russian influence over states - like Turkey - which have little expertise in developing 
energy infrastructure or reserves. All three can be considered part of a hegemonic regional 
powers strategy, and it is for this reason that this thesis considers the extent of relations 
between Turkey and Gazprom between 2002 and 2014 to be detrimental to Turkey’s 
regional power ambitions. 
Chapter three noted that the limited liberalisation of Turkey’s natural gas market in 2003 
had only a minimal impact on diluting the influence of the Turkish state in the natural gas 
sector. It did, however, contibute to Russia’s growing presence in the domestic market at 
the same time as Turkey was attempting to dilute its dependence on Russian resources. In 
2004, Gazprom Germania - a subsidiary of Gazprom - purchased a 40% stake in 
Bosphorus Gaz, a newly-founded gas private gas importer and distributor in Turkey. In 
2009, Kardas (2009) reports, Gazprom Germania raised its shares in the company first to 
51% and then to 71%.63 The deal between Gazprom Germania was a result of Gazprom’s 
pursuit of shares and joint ventures in the gas markets of other states. Gas market 
liberalisation, therefore, enabled Russia to gain a stronger foothold in Turkey’s domestic 
markets at the same time as it was becoming marginally less influential as an importer.  
Gazprom’s advance into Turkey’s domestic markets and the continuation of bilateral 
energy negotiations despite Turkey’s diversification agenda can partly be attributed to the 
high volume of meetings between high level Turkish officials and Gazprom’s major 
                                                     
63 It should be noted that at the time of writing (6 June, 2017), a deal has been announced to sell Gazprom’s 




players. Gazprom was quite proactive in seeking investment and trading opportunities with 
Turkey during the period under examination. While the high level of engagement between 
Turkish and Russian government officials has already been noted, successive Turkish 
energy ministers also repeatedly met with Gazprom representatives to discuss Russian-
Turkish energy cooperation. Throughout the period, Gazprom repeatedly reiterated that 
Turkey was an “extremely important” partner for Russia (Gazprom, 2007).  Turkish 
energy minister Hilmi Guler met with Alexey Miller - chairman of the Gazprom 
Management Committee - on several occasions during his tenure (Gazprom, 2009).  
Yildiz’s meetings with Miller variously discussed the shared “long term strategic interests” 
and “mutually beneficial basis” of cooperation in the natural gas sector, the creation of ties 
between Gazprom and private Turkish businesses, Russia’s role in Turkey’s energy 
security, and the role of natural gas in the wider strategic relationship between the states 
(Gazprom, 2011, 2013, 2014d). Yildiz and Miller met on at least three occasions in the six 
months leading up to the cancellation of the South Stream and concurrent announcement 
of the TurkStream project (Gazprom, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d). Turkey was openly receptive 
to Gazprom’s advances in a way that was simultaneously advantageous and detrimental to 
the regional power strategy. On one hand, investment was necessary if Turkey’s domestic 
infrastructure was to reach the necessary capacity to fulfil the hub ambition. At the same 
time, increased energy cooperation with Russia directly contravened the energy strategies 
of both European and Caucasian states that were seeking to reduce Russia’s influence in 
regional energy equations. If Turkey was seeking to enhance its reputation in those regions 
and to become - in MENR’s terminology - a “leader” in regional energy flows, then 
extending energy cooperation with Russia was counterproductive. Nonetheless, the 
necessity to ensure energy supplies for its own domestic market and the desire to realise its 
hub ambitions drove successive AKP administrations to sign agreements with Russia to 
enhance energy cooperation. 
The first of these was in 2004, when Gazprom and BOTAS signed a MoU with the aim of 
comprehensively enhancing cooperation in the gas sector. The agreement featured clauses 
on the provision of Russian gas to Turkey via both Gazprom and its subsidiaries, on supply 
and storage infrastructure, and permitted Turkey to re-export surplus gas supplies via a 
proposed pipeline to Syria and Israel (Gas and Oil Connections, 2004). It was therefore the 
only energy deal signed between Russia and Turkey in the period under consideration that 
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endowed Ankara with the export rights that chapter three suggested were essential to 
Turkey’s hub agenda. Moscow’s consent for the re-exportation of Turkey’s surplus 
Russian supplies to Syria and Israel rather than to the EU can be framed as an attempt to 
secure preliminary access to energy systems in the Levant for Russian supplies and to 
enhance the likelihood of the construction of anew north-south pipeline.  
Chapter three highlighted how the AKP repeatedly inferred during this period that its 
energy hub ambition and role as a transit state for non-Russian gas supplies was 
advantageous to Turkey’s application to join the EU. Diverting surplus gas south and 
agreeing to enhance its energy relationship with Russia when the EU was seeking to 
reduce its dependence on Russian resources was detrimental to Turkey’s attempt to 
position itself as a pivotal actor in EU energy equations: as chapters one and three pointed 
out, the AKP’s policy was at odds with the EU’s intension to limit its dependence on 
Russian supplies. It therefore highlights once again how Turkey’s energy strategy was 
replete with contradictions. At the same time, an argument was made in chapter three that 
the relationship between Turkey and Europe endowed Turkey with ideational power 
among the former Soviet Caspian states. Based on that assessment, this thesis contends 
that enhancing relations with Russia in a way that was detrimental to Turkey’s utility to the 
EU in energy terms had the potential to restrict the acceptance of regional states to 
Turkey’s claims of regional power . In any case, the MOU did not evolve into a legally 
binding international agreement, and subsequent MoUs between the states on bilateral 
energy affairs failed to include a clause for the re-exportation of surplus supplies. This 
illustrates an increasing unwillingness on Russia’s behalf to cede control of regional 
pipelines. The 2004 MoU was signed during a period of relative calm in regional energy 
and political relations. The escalation of energy tensions between Russia and Ukraine - and 
subsequently the EU - from 2006, regional instability in the aftermath of the 2008 South 
Ossetian war and, increasing political tensions between Russia and the West meant that 
Russia became increasingly assertive in utilising its energy policy to realise its geopolitical 
ambitions. In the face of coercive Russian hegemony (and occasionally regional 
imperialism), Turkey was simply incapable of exercising  power over Russia in later years 
as it had in 2002 and 2004. If ensuring control over regional energy systems was central to 
Russia’s regional power, then permitting Turkey re-exportation rights would have been 
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counter-productive to Russia’s strategy. Subsequent energy deals therefore contained no 
re-exportation clauses. 
Nevertheless, Turkey continued to pursue energy cooperation with Russia. That pursuit 
will be highlighted throughout the remainder of this chapter as an example of the 
inconsistencies inherent in Turkish energy policy: at once seeking to detangle itself for 
Russian energy dependency and simultaneously courting energy cooperation to strengthen 
bilateral relations. The AKP’s willingness to conduct new energy relations with Russia 
regardless of the implications for Turkey’s regional power strategy is most evident in the 
“grand energy bargain” of 2010. In a series of high level meetings between July 2009 and 
May 2010, Turkey and Russia announced a raft of new cooperative initiatives. The 
agreements made clear that bilateral cooperation would transcend merely economic 
objectives and contribute to strategic engagement in the diplomatic and security spheres 
(Medvedev, 2010; Koru, 2013). Both sides praised the deals roundly: Gul described the 
package as “clear proof of the advanced level of [our] relations”, while Medvedev 
suggested that the deal meant that Turkey and Russia were “strategic partners, not just in 
words but in reality” (Gul and Medvedev, 2010). Energy lay at the heart of the agreement.  
The states had made clear in 2009 that energy occupied “a strategically significant place in 
the Turkish-Russian relations”, and that they supported “the development as well as 
diversification of current relations and cooperation through concrete projects among 
relevant authorities/institutions in every aspect of the energy sector” (Joint Declaration, 
MFA 2009). The May 2010 agreement outlined what Kardas (2012:94) refers to as the 
“grand energy bargain” concerning increased cooperation in the energy sector. Worth £30 
billion, it incorporated wide-ranging collaborations in each of the oil, gas, and nuclear 
power sectors. The next section will examine provisions made for each of those sectors in 
the grand energy bargain and will consider their relationship to Turkey’s regional power. 
5.4.4 Energy as strategic engagement: the “Grand Energy Bargain” 
5.4.4a The Samsun-Ceyhan Oil pipeline 
Reflecting the primacy attached to natural gas in the AKP’s energy strategy, the majority 
of energy negotiations between Russia and Turkey in the years leading up to the grand 
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energy bargain focused almost exclusively on cooperation in the natural gas sector. As part 
of the 2010 deal, however, the states agreed to construct a pipeline via Turkish territory 
through which Russian oil supplies that had traditionally transited the Turkish Strait to the 
Mediterranean could be transferred. The environmental and security impact of tanker 
traffic through the Bosporus had been of concern to the AKP from its election to 
government in 2002. Russia, too, expressed a desire to reduce tanker traffic through the 
Turkish Straits, acknowledging that a serious accident in the Straits would be detrimental 
to its own energy transport policy (Lavrov, 2004a).  Despite Lavrov’s (2004b) suggestion 
that he was “carefully studying other schemes for the transportation of energy carriers in 
the Black Sea region”, Russia failed to produce any concrete plans for the construction of 
an oil pipeline through Turkey in the first decade of the 21st century. In the meantime, the 
AKP initiated negotiations with other actors on a Central Asia-Turkey-Europe pipeline. In 
2003, ENI and Turkish company Calik Enerji signed an agreement to transport Caspian oil 
between the Black Sea and Turkey’s Ceyhan port on the Mediterranean via a trans-
Anatolian pipeline (ENI, 2007). The trans-Anatolian line was central to Turkey’s intention 
to develop Ceyhan into an oil hub for the shipment of Caspian and Russian oil to Europe 
and, as such, would have contributed to Turkey’s regional hegemony. Until 2009, it was 
anticipated that Indian Oil Company would be the project’s tertiary partner (Times of 
India, 2006). That became less likely when, as part of the grand energy bargain, a MoU 
was signed that incorporated Transneft and Rosneft into the project and left little room for 
any additional partners to join. The trans-Anatolian pipeline became a Russian-Turkish 
project was renamed the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline.  
The pipeline had the potential to be beneficial in reducing transit traffic in the Turkish 
Straits. Erdogan went so far as to describe it as “an environmental project that will save the 
Straits” (Anadolu Agency, 2010). However, the decision not only to include Russian oil 
supplies in the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline but to make Russia a central partner in the 
construction and development of the project presented some problems for Turkey’s energy 
and regional power agenda. Firstly, the agreement contravened Turkey’s policy on 
diversifying its energy imports and instead heightened Turkey’s reliance on Russia not just 
for fuel, but for the technical expertise and financial capital necessary to develop the 
state’s domestic energy system. This dependence was exacerbated in 2013 after Ankara cut 
all ties with ENI over the company’s plans to participate in gas exploration in Cypriot 
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waters (Lehane, 2013). Considering the Russian state’s total ownership of Transneft and 
50% stake in Rosneft, the pipeline therefore facilitated a new role for and increased 
influence by the Russian state in Turkey’s energy strategy. Moreover, it is clear from 
Erdogan’s statement that the pipeline would enable Turkey to “reach out to the world from 
Ceyhan” (Arsu, 2010) that Turkish officials believed the project would contribute to 
Turkey’s energy hub agenda. Incorporating oil supplies from other Caspian states like 
Kazakhstan into the energy mix- something that was envisioned as part of the original 
trans-Anatolian pipeline line oil - would enable Turkey to simultaneously strengthen its 
relations with eastern states and aid both Turkey and Europe’s energy diversification 
agendas.  Chapter two, these outcomes would elevate Turkey’s regional status and 
facilitate its regional hegemony. The Russian deal, however, made no mention of either 
incorporating Kazakh supplies into the pipeline or of the re-exportation rights for Turkey. 
This thesis therefore considers Samsun-Ceyhan to be detrimental to both the 
diversification agenda and Turkey’s regional power agenda: in increasing reliance on 
Russia without benefits like the possibility of an oil hub, Turkey ensured Russia 
maintained a balance of power in bilateral energy relations. 
5.4.4b Expanding natural gas cooperation 
At the heart of the “grand energy bargain” was an agreement for the construction of a new 
natural gas pipeline. Blue Stream-2 had originally been proposed by Russia in 2005, but 
the project fell by the wayside as a result of disinterest from both parties. The 2010 
agreement revived Blue Stream-2, with reports suggesting that it would run parallel to the 
original Blue Stream pipeline under the Black Sea and could carry gas through Turkey to 
Syria, Lebanon, and Israel (Russia Today, 2010a). The deal was perceived by Turkish 
sources as a means through which the state could utilise energy to amplify Turkey’s 
geopolitical importance, with Erdogan stating the deal would enable Turkey to become a 
“transit base in natural gas”, thus endowing it with a “more important location” (Anadolu 
Agency, 2010). While the use of the phrase “transit base” is evocative of an energy hub, 
Medvedev’s suggestion that the Blue Stream-2 would open a new “energy corridor” 
(Strauss, 2010) suggests that Russia continued to view Turkey as a transit state rather than 
a potential hub. Similarly, Russian Energy Minister Sergi Shmatko said it was unclear 
whether Turkey would be a transit state on the route or would also have re-export rights 
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(Socor, 2009). The latter was essential for the realisation of the hub and for the position 
Turkey as a regional hegemon.  
In any case, the likelihood of the project progressing beyond the initial proposal came into 
doubt soon after the agreement was signed. Putin’s declaration that BOTAS and Gazprom 
would develop the project alone cast doubt on the technical viability of the project: section 
5.2.2 of this chapter highlighted how ENI’s technical expertise had contributed to the 
realisation of the original Blue Stream project. In addition, the discovery of significant 
quantities of primarily offshore natural gas from 2009 eradicated the necessity for Israel to 
import new gas streams (EIA, 2017a). Indeed, less than a month after the second deal was 
signed between Turkey and Russia in May 2010, Putin stated that the discovery of Israeli 
resources meant that Blue Stream-2 would be scaled back and only transport gas to Turkey 
and Syria (Russia Today, 2010b). However, the 2011 Arab Spring and subsequent civil 
war in Syria cast doubt on the economic necessity and feasibility - as well as the security - 
of any new infrastructural projects in either state. Additionally, the control established by 
ISIS in northern Syria contributed to insecurity that limited the viability of an extension of 
a second Blue Stream south of the Turkish border. Since 2010, neither state has 
commented on Blue Stream-2 nor does it feature in either state’s energy strategies. 
Despite, therefore, not having any impact on the balance of power between Russia and 
Turkey, the Blue Stream-2 example highlights the extent to which energy system 
development is predicated on regional security. For states like Turkey and Russia that 
incorporate energy into regional power strategies, securing regional stability is a necessary 
precursor to utilising energy as a power resource.  
5.4.4c Expanding energy cooperation: nuclear power 
The most tangible outcome of the 2010 deal regarded Russia’s involvement in the 
construction of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant. Chapter three pointed out that nuclear 
power had been part of Turkey’s energy policy agenda since the mid-1960s, and under the 
AKP was a key element of the AKP’s diversification. In 2007, Turkey passed a law 
concerning the construction and operation of nuclear power plants (NPP) in the country, 
and in 2008 a call for tenders for Turkey’s first NPP at Akkuyu. The only bid - from 
Russian company Atomstroyexport - was first accepted and later rejected in 2009 
following a legal appeal (World Nuclear Association, 2017). The Akkuyu tender was 
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subsequently awarded to Russia’s Rosatom as part of the grand energy bargain. The cost of 
the project was estimated at $20billion, with the first reactor envisioned to come online in 
201964 (Rostatom, 2014; Al-Jazeera, 2018). The NPP agreement was considered central to 
the development of a strategic partnership between Turkey and Russia, and was described 
in the 2009 Joint Declaration as standing “testament to the trust underlying [our] two 
nations’ growing ties” and “an important component of [the parties’] commercial and 
economic relations” (Joint Declaration, 2009). 
The NPP deal did fulfil some criteria of Turkey’s energy strategy. As chapter one pointed 
out, nuclear fuel is both cheaper and cleaner than other finite resources. The Akkuyu 
agreement therefore made economic, environmental, and strategic sense for Turkey in 
terms of its energy policy. At the same, time, it is important to note that Rosatom was 
granted an unprecedented level of control over the plant. The NPP is located on Turkish 
soil, but is also the world’s first build-own-operate nuclear plant. Russian companies 
agreed to fully finance the NPP, with Rosatom taking a 93% equity stake in the plant’s 
construction (Nuclear Engineering International, 2012). The agreement stipulated that 
Rosatom would also operate the plant, would own a 100% stake in the plant for the first 
five years, and would retain a majority stake in the plant thereafter (Strauss, 2010). 
Considering that the Rosatom subsidy responsible for the Akkuyu project is owned and 
operated by the Russian state, the move suggests a renewed Turkish dependence on Russia 
in the energy sphere. The agreement contradicted Turkey’s bid to diversify its energy 
producers. The project reaffirmed Turkey’s reliance on Russia for energy provision, 
effectively replicating the dependence on Russian gas in a new, nuclear sector.  
Indeed, the grand energy bargain as a whole contradicts the emphasis that the AKP had 
placed on diversification in its energy strategy. In its first eight years of governance, 
Turkey had emphasised the need to reduce energy dependency on imported hydrocarbon 
resources, and had pinpointed Russia as a state on which reliance was detrimental to 
energy security (see chapter three). Yet while diversification remained prominent in the 
AKP’s energy rhetoric in the aftermath of the 2010 agreement, there was no 
acknowledgement by the AKP as to the potential costs of increased energy dependence. 
                                                     
64 The plant’s operational date has since been revised back to 2023 (Al-Jazeera, 2018) 
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The 2010 deal not only facilitated an increase in imports from Russia, but also increased 
Russia’s influence in domestic markets. The limited liberalisation of Turkey’s natural gas 
market in 2003 had enabled Russia - through Gazprom - to gain a foothold in Turkish gas 
production and infrastructural development; the 2010 deal expanded that role beyond the 
gas sector to incorporate oil and nuclear development and operations. More worryingly for 
Turkey’s regional power ambitions, Erdogan and Gul’s remarks (quoted above) suggest 
that they believed that the Samsun-Ceyhan and Blue Stream pipelines would contribute to 
the realisation of a Turkish energy hub. If, as chapter two argued, dependence by a 
regional power on a competing power for the provision of essential material resources 
skewers the balance of power in favour of the latter, then Turkey’s reliance on Russia for 
energy supplies skewered the balance of power in favour of the latter and undermined 
Turkey’s regional position. The failure of the grand energy bargain to incorporate 
mechanisms to guarantee Turkish rights for the re-exportation of surplus fuel from the new 
pipelines also undermined the AKP’s hub agenda. Considering chapter three’s contention 
that the hub was intrinsically linked to Turkey becoming a regional hegemon, this thesis 
argues that the grand energy bargain undermined Turkey’s regional agenda.  It contends 
that the grand energy bargain amounted to either a miscalculation by the AKP of the 
relative balance of power between Russia and Turkey or an abandonment of the 
diversification and hub policies. Considering that the examination of primary 
documentation in chapter three found considerable continuity in hub and diversification 
rhetoric through the period under examination, and research carried out in chapters three 
and four highlighted how Turkey tended to underestimate regional geopolitical equations 
in relation to energy, this thesis concludes that the first explanation is more likely. 
Regardless, there was a clear dissonance between Turkey’s energy rhetoric and practice 
that undermined its capacity to implement a benevolent hegemonic regional power 
strategy. Completion of major pipeline projects during the AKP era demonstrated that 
Russia continuously pursued projects that undermined Turkey’s regional power agenda. 




5.4.5 Tangled pipelines: Nabucco, South Stream, and TurkStream 
For much of the period under consideration, the Nabucco pipeline was both at the heart of 
EU-Russian energy relations and central to the realisation of Turkey’s energy agenda. 
While the origins of Nabucco as part of the Southern Corridor were highlighted  in chapter 
one, Moscow’s role in determining the trajectory of the pipeline’s progression is relevant 
to the discussion on the role of energy in regional power relations between Russia and 
Turkey. It is worth repeating that Nabucco was part of the fourth corridor project, and was 
therefore  a countermeasure to Russian dominance of European energy markets. The 
project stalled several times in the early 2000s, and negotiations only began in earnest in 
2006 Russia’s suspension of natural gas supplies to Ukraine. The intensification of 
negotiations coincided with Russia’s 2007 statement of intent to construct a southern 
“sister” pipeline to the Nord Stream to Europe via the Black Sea and Bulgaria. Moscow 
insisted that the project was not a political one, but rather made good business sense 
because it would provide a new, more secure passage through which Russian gas could 
reach Europe. Putin suggested that objections by the EU to the pipelines on competition 
grounds65 were “against Europe’s economic interests”, with Lavrov insisting that the 
South Stream’s sole purpose was to strengthen European energy security (Lavrov, 2010; 
Korsunskaya, 2014). The timing and route of the pipeline, however, suggest it was at least 
partially motivated by Russia’s geopolitical agenda. Routing the pipeline through Bulgaria 
rather than Ukraine made little economic sense considering the relative technical 
complexities and associated financial burden of offshore pipeline construction. That the 
South Stream announcement came at a time of considerable tension in Russian-Ukrainian 
energy relations rather indicates that the project was an attempt to isolate Ukraine and 
reduce its transit leverage over Russia.  
                       
                                                     





Figure 16: South Stream and Nabucco routes (IEA, 2009) 
South Stream also dealt a blow to Turkey’s energy conduit ambition, circumventing 
Turkish territory entirely until it was rerouted as part of the 2010 grand energy bargain. 
The exclusion of Turkey from the original project therefore demonstrates the relative 
power capacity of energy producing states over transit states when multiple energy routes 
are available for the exportation of resources to international markets. The previous 
chapter argued that a lack of viable alternative transit routes contributed to redressing the 
power imbalance between Iran as an energy producer and Turkey as an energy consumer. 
For Russia, however, Turkey was one state on a multitude of potential transit routes. As 
well as the Ukrainian option on east-west routes, Russia also had the potential to export 
energy east. It has exported oil to China since the 1980s (and replaced Saudi Arabia as 
China’s single largest source of oil imports in 2016) and in 2014 signed two gas pipeline 
deals with Beijing. The first of these due to become operational in 2019 (EIA, 2017f). The 
leverage Turkey assumed as a key actor in Iranian energy export policy was more limited 
the Russian-Turkish relationship. 
Events in 2014 contributed to a recalibration of trajectory of east-west energy flows 
between Russia and the EU that once again drew attention to Turkey’s geostrategic 
location. The annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula by Russia had all the indications 
of the imperial power strategy depicted in chapter two. Though it will be argued below that 
instability in Ukraine led Turkey to play a more prominent role in Russia’s energy 
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strategy, the invasion itself posed an immediate threat to Turkey’s energy security. The 
trans-Balkan pipeline that carries 12.5% of Turkey’s gas supplies passes through Ukraine. 
Any conflict in the state therefore posed a risk to Turkey’s energy security (EIA, 2017d). 
Turkish officials downplayed the potential risk to security of supply, with Yildiz stating 
that he did not foresee any cuts to natural gas supplies via the trans-Balkan line (Yackley, 
2014). Nonetheless, the possibility of either Russia or Ukraine suspending transit contracts 
and the increased likelihood of damage to energy infrastructure by the conflict itself posed 
a threat to Turkish energy security. Bearing in mind the assertion in chapter one that 
energy supply suspension caused by conflict has negative economic consequences for 
producer states, Turkey’s apprehension regarding energy security should have been 
mirrored by Russian concern over the economic costs of pipeline closure or damage. Yet 
the failure of that potential energy insecurity to deter Russia from military conflict 
highlights several points regarding the entanglement of Russian-Turkish relations, regional 
power, and energy. Firstly, it indicates that the trans-Balkan pipeline occupied a more 
important position in Turkey’s energy security strategy than it did in Russia’s. Despite 
attempts to elevate Turkey’s position in regional power relations, the extent of the state’s 
energy dependence rendered it more susceptible to fallout from regional conflict than did 
its trading partners. Secondly, it highlights how all regional states - including Turkey - 
were incapable of restraining a Russia willing to utilise an imperial regional power 
strategy.  Consequently, this thesis argues that superior military capacity and the 
willingness to wield that power are central to the determination of hierarchies between 
regional powers. That is not to suggest that more cooperative relations with regional 
subordinates are not significant in conferring legitimacy on regional powers; but rather 
that, in cases like the Crimean annexation where regional states are insufficiently powerful 
to challenge the imperial regional power, the  opportunities for resource-poor benevolent 
regional powers can be restricted.  
The deterioration of the situation in Ukraine presented Turkey with an opportunity to 
market itself as a stable, reliable alternative to Ukraine in east-west energy transit systems. 
On one hand, it highlighted the necessity for energy routes that involved neither Russia nor 
Ukraine. On the other, Russian rhetoric in the aftermath of the Crimean annexation 
strengthened Turkey’s position as a stable alternative for Russian resources. While Putin 
made it clear that Russia would not discontinue supplies through Ukraine as a result of the 
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conflict, he also stated that the “only problem” in the energy supply systems was that of 
transit countries (Putin, 2014a; Putin, 2014b). The annexation coincided with an 
proliferation of Russian rhetoric concerning the security of transit supplies through 
Ukraine, with Putin postulating that “the most dangerous part...[was] transit via Ukraine” 
because there was a risk of  the “siphoning off [of] natural gas passing though Ukraine’s 
territory and heading to European consumers” (Putin, 2014b). This contributed to the 
perception that European energy supplies were at risk due to the geopolitical instability 
and deficit of pipeline security in Ukraine and, with the announcement of the TurkStream, 
effectively announced Turkey as Ukraine's successor as the primary east-west transit route 
for Russian energy hydrocarbons. Without access to non-Russian supplies, however, 
Turkey was unable to contribute to either its own or European energy diversification 
agendas.  
The cancellation of the South Stream project in favour of the TurkStream - which included 
Turkey in Russia’s energy routing plans in a way the South Stream did not - in 2014 is 
often attributed to the escalation of Russian-European tensions in the aftermath of the 
Crimean annexation and Gazprom’s difficulties in raising funds for the project in the 
aftermath of the imposition of international sanctions (Korsunskaya, 2012). According to 
energy minister Alexander Novak, Putin made the decision to cancel the South Stream in 
2014 on account of EU “intransigence” in November 2014 (Roth, 2014). Yet the first 
major sign that the South Stream was unlikely to progress had come a year earlier in 
December 2013, when Gazprom increased the projected price of the project by 50% to 
$22bn without explanation (Reed and Kanter, 2014). That the price increase coincided 
with the abandonment of Nabucco in 2013 adds credence to the argument that South 
Stream was effectively a counter-strategy to the EU’s energy diversification policy. In 
addition, the new figure was suggested at the same time as the EU intensified efforts to 
rein in Gazprom’s ownership of pipeline systems through new competition legislation that 
stipulated that energy pipelines had to be open to operational bids from all sources.  
The simultaneous announcement of the TurkStream project once again positioned Turkey 
as Russia’s preferred energy transit partner. Like the Blue Stream, the pipeline will run 
under the Black Sea between Turkey and Russia and will deliver 15.75bcm of natural gas 
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to Turkey per annum (Gazprom, 2017b).66 The project also made economic sense for both 
states considering that Turkey’s energy needs - and particularly gas - were growing, while 
Europe’s were stagnating. What is significant about the TurkStream is that the total 
capacity of the pipeline is 31.5bcm, more than twice the volume necessary to satisfy 
Turkish demand. Miller suggested that the new pipeline would be the same size as the 
South Stream with a fifth of the gas going to Turkey and the continuing to the border with 
Greece (Reed and Kanter, 2014). The project, therefore, effectively consists of three 
phases: the first to connect Russia and Turkey; the second to bring gas from Turkey to the 
Greek border; and the third to transport supplies west to Italy and north as far as Austria. 
Finally, Putin suggested that Turkey would receive a 6% discount on its gas imports from 
Russia for the following year and an additional 3bcm annually (Korsunskaya, 2012). 
Considering the heightened animosity between Russia and Ukraine at the time, it is likely 
the price discount was a means to signal to Ukraine that Turkey was now Russia’s 
preferred transit and trading partner.  
That all three pipelines were proposed by and either failed or manifested as a result of 
either EU or Russian influence illustrates Turkey’s impotence in facilitating large-scale 
energy projects in its region. In essence, Turkey became a passive part of a political power 
play between Russia and Ukraine and, on a wider scale in terms of the new pipeline 
project, between Russia and the EU. The episode demonstrates the extent to which 
Turkey’s energy strategy was reactive rather than demonstrating the regional energy 
“leadership” MENR’s Strategic Plan (2009) professed to attain. In this regard, Russia’s 
proactive and assertive regional hegemony  and Turkey’s willingness to facilitate Russia’s 
energy agenda played a significant role in limiting Turkey’s own capacity to influence 
regional energy flows. 
                                                     
66 Unlike most of the other MoUs on energy cooperation signed by Russia and Turkey during the AKP’s first 
three terms, the TurkStream project has progressed beyond the initial planning stages: intergovernmental 
agreements on the pipeline were signed in 2016, and construction of the Russian offshore phases of pipeline 
began in May 2017 
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Figure 17: TurkStream (Gazprom, 2017b) 
If, as chapter three suggested, diversification of suppliers was a central tenet of Turkish 
energy policy (MENR, 2004, 2009, 2014), then both South Stream and TurkStream were 
detrimental to Turkish energy ambitions. The exclusion of Turkey from the South Stream 
notwithstanding, both projects saw Russia pursue natural gas supplies in Central Asia that 
Turkey had envisaged would be incorporated into either Nabucco or a future trans-Caspian 
pipeline. TurkStream, on the other hand, not only reinforced Turkish dependence on 
Russian gas, but will limit future opportunities to develop new energy relations with other 
gas-rich companies. The failure to invest in domestic energy infrastructure that was 
highlighted in chapter three was not only detrimental to energy security, but inimical to the 
hub ambitions in limiting the state’s ability to store, transport, and re-export resources. 
Both the infrastructural and financial demands of TurkStream restrict the possibility of the 




In terms of Turkey’s regional power, therefore, TurkStream is far less beneficial than 
Nabucco. Previous chapters argued that Turkey sought to gain recognition as a facilitator 
of regional energy affairs. Complying with Europe’s own energy agenda - particularly in 
terms of enhancing security of supply and reducing dependence on Russian resources - 
were crucial to this strategy. TurkStream not only reaffirms Russia’s role as a primary 
supplier to both Turkey and southern Europe, but the limited capacity of Turkish energy 
systems highlighted in chapter two effectively curtails the possibility of future pipeline 
projects between Central Asia and Europe. In addition, energy analysts have expressed 
doubts as to whether the third phase of the project will have sufficient capacity to transfer 
natural gas from the Turkish-Greek section to Europe (Panin, 2015). The lack of certainty 
around phase three of the project means that, unless investment in LNG and reverse-flow 
technology increases, eastern Europe will remain dependent on gas flows through 
Ukraine.67 Tense relations between Ukraine and Russia and a history of suspension of 
supplies suggest a potential negative impact on Europe’s energy security and make it more 
likely Europe will focus on developing renewable resources and LNG trade, reducing 
demand for natural gas and Turkey’s energy hub potential. When considered in 
conjunction with the cancellation of Nabucco and Turkey’s limited domestic capacity, 
TurkStream can be framed as medium-term threat to Turkey’s hub agenda.  
Finally, it was argued early in this thesis that the successful integration of the Caspian 
region’s resource-rich states into east-west energy systems would boost Turkey’s status in 
a region dominated by energy affairs, enhance Turkey’s reputation in international energy 
affairs, and create leverage for Turkey over and closer ties with states that have 
traditionally been part of the Russian sphere of influence. The final condition is 
instrumental to Turkey achieving its regional power agenda. Since he was first elected 
president of Russia in 2000, Putin’s strategy for reasserting Russia as a global power has 
been tied to the control of energy supplies and infrastructure in its near abroad. That policy 
was also central to reasserting Russia’s regional power status after the instability of the 
Yeltsin era though the expansion of Moscow’s economic capacity and the pursuit of closer 
energy ties with former Soviet states. The failure in the 1990s of the pan-Turkic 
                                                     
67 Northern and central Europe’s reliance on energy flows through Ukraine has been somewhat reduced by 
the construction of the Nordstream pipeline in 2011, and will be further reduced on the completion of 
NordStream II in 2019/2020 (Nord-Stream.com, 2017; Financial Times, 2017) 
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experiment and Russia’s superior material capacity meant that Turkey was unlikely to gain 
influence in the region and challenge Russia’s dominance through ideological or economic 
initiatives. Offering the former Soviet states an alternative to reliance on Russian systems 
would simultaneously have lessened Russia’s role in the region and constrained Russia’s 
regional hegemony strategy to the benefit of Turkey’s own regional power agenda. 
Consequently, this thesis argues that TurkStream places new limits on Turkey’s capacity to 
enhance its significance in former Soviet states through energy cooperation and is 
therefore detrimental to Turkey’s regional power ambitions. As the next section will 
demonstrate, competition for influence in Turkey and Russia’s common region was, to a 
large extent, tied up in the states’ energy strategies. 
5.5 Turkey and Russia: competition for regional powerhood 
5.5.1 Competition in the South Caucasus 
The competition for influence in the South Caucasus that began in the imperial era 
continued to be a factor in Russian-Turkish relations under the first three AKP 
administrations. Unlike Iran - which chapter four suggested had limited integration in the 
region - Russia had maintained significant links with the FSU republics after the 
dissolution of the USSR. The three Caucasian states - Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia - 
had been part of the Soviet Union until their independence in 1991. Russia continued to 
exert influence in the region in the aftermath of the USSR’s dissolution by way of military 
alliances, economic agreements, and control over energy infrastructure. Not only were the 
South Caucasus crucial to Russia’s regional power ambitions, but ensuring stability was 
critical to prevent unrest in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia and between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh spilling over into Russia’s own unstable North 
Caucasus. Similarly, Turkey was proactive in applying its “zero problems with 
neighbours” (ZPWN) policy in the region in the hope that strong multidimensional links 
would enhance Turkey’s regional presence and its own border security. Chapter three 
highlighted how those policies were also were necessary to ensure access to Caspian 
energy supplies and Central Asian energy reserves. It argued that pipeline politics were a 
primary driver of the AKP’s Caucasian strategy, and the associated pipeline diplomacy and 
security cooperation between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia strengthened ties between 
three states to the detriment of Russian attempts to consolidate its status in the region. For 
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this reason, then, it can be argued that the South Caucasus were at the centre of the Russia 
and Turkey’s competing regional power strategies. 
Russia and Turkey’s energy relations were complicated by the countries’ respective 
alliances with Armenia and Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan strengthened 
bilateral relations with Turkey in the post-Soviet era on the basis of cultural, historical, and 
economic connections and a desire to assert independence from Russia. Armenia, on the 
other hand, remained closely allied with Russia, and was the only Caucasian state to 
continue to maintain Russian military and airbases.68  Russian troops have been 
responsible for patrolling Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Iran since 1995 on the basis 
of a collective security agreement (O’ Rourke, 2010). As chapter four noted, Gazprom is 
responsible for a majority of Armenia’s natural gas supplies and infrastructure. However, 
while Turkey has no relationship with Armenia, there is some cooperation between 
Azerbaijan and Russia in terms of bilateral trade. In 2015, Russia and Turkey were 
Azerbaijan’s joint highest trading partners, with each supplying 15% of Azerbaijan’s 
imports (World Bank, 2016). The states supply small volumes of oil to each other, and 
Azerbaijan also exports oil via Russia to the Black Sea through the Baku-Novorossiysk 
pipeline (EIA, 2016h).  
                                                     
68 It should be noted that the New York Times reports that Russia has also stationed  troops in Georgian 




Figure 18: Energy infrastructure in the Caucasus (The Independent, 2008) 
Russia’s military alliance with Armenia is important for understanding the balance of 
power and continued instability in the South Caucasus during the AKP’s first three 
administrations. Chapter three noted that Turkey has traditionally sided with Azerbaijan in 
the protracted conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia, 
on the other hand, has lent its political and military support to Armenia. If the resolution of 
regional conflicts is a condition of regional powerhood, then successful mediation in 
Nagorno-Karabakh would be a significant factor in elevating Turkey’s regional status. 
However, continued animosity between Turkey and Armenia and Azerbaijan’s suspicions 
concerning the Russian-Armenian military alliance militated against resolving the conflict 
during the AKP’s first three terms. At the same time, Azerbaijan’s willingness to trade 
with Russia proved problematic in terms of Turkey’s regional power agenda, and 
particularly in terms of its energy policy, in terms of undermining Turkey’s perception that 
it was the only viable energy partner for the states of the Caspian. The lack of consensus 
on Nagorno-Karabakh and the wider relationships between Turkey, Russia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan had played a role in determining the region’s energy geopolitics in the pre-
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AKP era: that the BTE and BTC pipelines transit Georgia rather than a shorter route 
through Armenia is on account of the hostilities between Armenia and each of Turkey and 
Azerbaijan. As chapter one pointed out, the political and economic situation in third-party 
transit states is also inimical to ensuring the viability of energy systems. For Turkey, 
ensuring stability in transit states was central to proving the viability of an energy hub, but 
political hostility between Turkey and Armenia prevented Turkey from having a facilitator 
role in mediating conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  
Regional alliances, protracted conflicts, and energy became increasingly intertwined 
during the second AKP administration. Chapter three highlighted how Turkey’s attempted 
rapprochement with Armenia in 2009 had negative ramifications for both Turkey’s energy 
agenda and its bilateral relations with Azerbaijan. Of particular relevance for this chapter 
is Ilham Aliyev’s threat to “re-orientate” Azerbaijan’s hydrocarbon trade to Russia 
(Aliyev, quoted in Abbasov, 2009). Capitalising on the discord between Azerbaijan and 
Turkey, Russia offered to sign a long-term contract to buy up Shah Deniz-2 gas. That 
Medvedev and Miller both travelled personally to Baku to negotiate the contract is 
indicative of the importance attached to the project by Russia; that they agreed to pay a 
higher than normal price of $350/tcm (RIA Novosti, 2009) implies that the agreement 
stemmed from political rather than economic factors. Buying up Azerbaijani gas would 
effectively invalidate the Nabucco project and reinforce European dependence on Russia. 
Abbasov (2009) suggests that Aliyev suspected the Turkish-rapprochement might lead to a 
deal on Nagorno-Karabakh, and saw increased cooperation in the natural gas sector as a 
means to convince Russia to encourage Armenia to make concessions or withdraw some of 
its troops from the region. Akdemir, however, argues that the negotiations were an attempt 
to play a “cat and mouse game” with Russia and the West to play one off against the other 
for the highest natural gas price (2011:75). In either case, Turkey was at a disadvantage.  
Chapter three argued that the 2009 dispute highlighted Turkey’s limitations with regards to 
the manipulation of regional energy trade and its capacity to assert leverage and hegemony 
over smaller regional energy producers. However, the dispute also reaffirmed Russia’s 
intent to reassert its influence in the energy markets of the former Soviet Union. If 
engaging in regional energy trade was pivotal to Russia’s regional power strategy, then the 
successful buy-up of Shah Deniz gas would be a major stepping stone to cementing 
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Russia’s regional hegemony. That Russia was evidently willing to exploit tensions 
between Turkey and Azerbaijan for geopolitical gain casts doubt on the strength of the 
relationship between the two, and illustrates again how bilateral relations were grounded 
primarily in rhetoric. The AKP was not unaware of the incongruity of its own energy 
strategy with those of other states: MENR had highlighted the danger posed by “the 
contradiction between the energy policies of other countries with the target of our country 
for becoming and (sic) energy hub” in the 2010-2014 Strategic Plan (MENR, 2009:9). The 
purchase by Russia of Shah Deniz gas would be a major impediment to the realisation of 
each of Turkey’s energy security, diversification, and hub agendas.  
However, it should be recalled that Turkey had spent almost two decades pursuing energy 
trade with the former Soviet states. Through participation in the fourth corridor project, 
Turkey sought to take advantage of those states’ desire to assert independence from 
Russian influence and to limit its own dependence on Russian supplies. This thesis 
considers the manipulation of regional energy geopolitics by Turkey and Russia for access 
to Azerbaijan’s resources to be part of the “great game” (Gokay, 2001:23) for Caspian 
resources debated in chapter one. The 2009 episode is therefore illustrative of a continuing 
competition for access to regional resources between Turkey and Russia that transcended 
the otherwise amicable relationship between the states. It indicates that the centrality of 
energy to both counties’ regional agendas contributed to a willingness to prioritise access 
to energy resources over bilateral relations. At the same time, the failure of either the 
competing pipeline projects or the 2009 Azerbaijani incident to negatively impact on 
Turkish-Russian relations suggests that the states effectively compartmentalised bilateral 
relations and regional energy equations. 
Finally, Azerbaijan’s role in facilitating or impeding Turkey and Russia’s regional energy 
agendas should not be discounted. Azerbaijan’s recommitment to Turkey despite Russia’s 
promise of higher prices for Baku’s natural gas lends credibility to the arguments in 
chapters one and two that strong bilateral relations and access to Europe provided Turkey 
with leverage over Russia in negotiating with energy producers in the former Soviet 
sphere. That Azerbaijan reaffirmed its commitment to energy trade with Turkey following 
the failure of the latter’s rapprochement with Armenia demonstrates how subordinate 
states may manipulate the agendas of regional powers both large (Russia) and smaller 
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(Turkey) in specific contexts. In short, the episode indicates that producer states that are 
considered subordinate within the regional hierarchy may assert their own power in 
situations where transit state regional powers are unwilling or unable to utilise a coercive 
hegemonic strategy.  
5.5.2 Georgia: stuck in the middle 
Russia’s motivations for maintaining influence in the South Caucuses after the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union were documented earlier in this chapter. It should be noted, however, 
that Russia’s interest in Georgia was partially driven by irredentism on the Georgian-
Russian border: Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov suggested in 2003 that Russia was 
concerned about instability in the semi-autonomous regions northern Georgian regions of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia spilling over into the already turbulent North Caucasus 
(Ivanov, 2003).  
 
Figure 19: The semi-autonomous regions of Georgia (Antidze, 2015) 
The “Rose Revolution” that replaced the relatively pro-Russian Eduard Shevardnadze as 
president of Georgia with the overtly pro-Western Mikhail Saakashvili in 2004 proved a 
catalyst for a serious deterioration in Russian-Georgian relations. Saakashvili’s decision to 
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extend Georgia’s partnership with NATO to full membership threatened Russia’s efforts to 
limit Western (and particularly US) influence in the South Caucasus. In order to counter 
Russian influence and increase its ties with the West, Georgia looked to its southern 
neighbour. Not only was Turkey the only regional member of NATO, but it also 
maintained strong links to the EU and US. Consequently, the period between Saakashvili’s 
accession and the 2008 war was characterised by extensive growth in cooperation between 
Georgia and Turkey on military, economic, and political affairs. The abolition of visa 
controls for Georgian and Turkish citizens enabled Turkey to become the second largest 
provider of FDI to Georgia, with Turkish businesses investing in major construction and 
infrastructural projects (Goksel, 2013). Turkey became Georgia’s primary trading partner 
in 2006, with total bilateral trade tripling from $240 million in 2002 to $750 million in 
2006 (World Bank, 2017a). A Russian embargo on Georgian products and a subsequent 
FTA between Georgia and Turkey that same year cemented Turkey’s place as Georgia’s 
dominant regional partner.  
Georgia was pivotal to Turkey’s energy ambitions. Both the BTC and BTE pipelines 
transit Georgia. Throughout the AKP’s tenure, all new pipeline proposals from the Caspian 
to Turkey - Nabucco, trans-Caspian, trans-Anatolian, and TANAP - had a transit stage 
through Georgia. The continuing hostilities between Armenia and Turkey and Azerbaijan 
amplified Georgia's strategic significance in regional energy equations. As chapter three 
explained, the lack of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia and the Armenia-
Azerbaijan dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh exempts the shorter, more economic pipeline 
transit route through Armenia from east-west energy corridor equations. With no 
alternative routes through which to transport plentiful supplies of Azerbaijani oil and gas, 
Georgia became strategically significant for the realisation of Turkey’s energy security, 
diversification, and hub agendas. Chapter one argued that the success of security, 
diversification, and hub agendas was contingent on stability in all states in the energy 
chain. Consequently, ensuring Georgian stability and territorial integrity was pivotal to 




Figure 20: Major pipelines in the South Caucasus (Socar Romania, 2017) 
Both the AKP and its predecessors took a number of measures to ensure stability in 
Georgia and the protection of essential energy infrastructure. Turkey signed a series of 
bilateral defence and military cooperation agreements in 1999 shortly after the BTC deal 
was signed. These committed Ankara to providing financial and technical assistance to the 
Georgian military over a five year period (Fuller, 1999). Under the AKP, Georgian 
soldiers continued to receive training in Turkish military schools, and Turkey supplied 
Georgia with military hardware (Saivetz, 2009). Turkey also participated in joint exercises 
with Georgia through NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. In all, the extent of 
military assistance loaned by Turkey to Georgia outweighed that of military and defence 
cooperation with any other state in the region. 
Chapters two and three contended that the former Soviet states in the Caspian region 
actively sought to limit reliance on Russia. Turkey’s preponderance of military and 
economic power relative to Georgia meant that it possessed the capacity to assist Georgia’s 
disentanglement from Russia dependency. Based on the arguments made in chapter two, 
Turkey’s commitment to NATO and relations with the West can also be perceived as a 
form of ideational power in the relationship with the increasingly westward-gazing 
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Georgia. Chapter three also argued that participation in the east-west energy corridor was a 
means through which independence could be achieved. For energy producers, the corridor 
meant new routes and pipeline systems through which energy could be exported to 
international markets; for Georgia, a diversification of energy imports, income from 
energy transit tariffs, and stronger security relations with other states within the energy 
system. This thesis argues that by supporting regional pipeline initiatives and actively 
promoting stronger economic interdependency between Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, 
Turkey effectively facilitated a minor reorientation of the regional status quo by reducing 
Georgia’s reliance on Russia. If strong multilateral relations with regional states and the 
propagation of and support for common values are, as chapter two proposed, inimical to 
regional powerhood, then Turkey’s Georgia strategy was congruous with a leadership form 
of regional power that was facilitated by regional energy equations.  
However, the extent to which self-interest prompted Turkish involvement in Georgian 
stability is more indicative of a benevolent hegemonic style of regional powerhood. 
Georgia was pivotal to Turkey’s energy agenda. Instability that threatened the closure of 
BTC or BTE constituted a major risk to Turkey’s own energy security: shortages would 
not only impact Turkey’s economic productivity, but would force the state to seek 
additional oil and gas from other sources. Aside from the added expense of paying spot 
prices for oil and LNG - which chapter one argued placed a significant economic burden 
on importing states - the only way for Turkey to replace Azerbaijani natural gas would be 
with supplies through existing Russian and Iranian pipelines. This, chapter three argued, 
would be harmful to Turkey’s position in the regional hierarchy. In addition, instability in 
Georgia would discourage investment in the new trans-Caspian pipelines that were integral 
to Turkey’s hub agenda. Consequently, this thesis argues that Turkey’s cooperation with 
Georgia on security and economic matters was facilitated by existing energy relations 
between the states and was in part a means to further advance energy ties within the 
context of east-west energy projects. Military conflict between Georgia and Russia 
therefore posed a serious threat to Turkey’s ambitions. 
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5.5.2a The South Ossetian war: implications for Turkey’s energy strategy and regional 
power 
The war that broke out between Georgia and Russia in South Ossetia in August 2008 
represented a major crisis for Turkey. Both Russia and Georgia had strategic significance 
for Turkey in terms of its energy ambitions, and both were major trade partners. The war 
undermined Turkey’s “zero-problems with neighbours” policies, and in seeking to reassert 
the regional status quo during and after the war, the AKP appears to have inadvertently 
lent its support to Georgia rather than Russia. Throughout the war, Turkey provided 
humanitarian aid to both Georgians and South Osesstians (MFA, 2008a; MFA, 2008b). At 
the same time, it  risked Russian ire by repeatedly reiterating support for Georgia’ s 
territorial integrity and  allowing the passage of two US warships through the Turkish 
straits to deliver humanitarian supplies to the Georgian coast (MFA,  2008c;  BBC 
Monitoring, 2008d). In response, Russian customs officials began delaying Turkish trucks 
at the Georgian-Russian border and significantly increased its searches of Turkish cargo 
vessels at Novorossiysk (BBC Monitoring, 2008d). After a tense period in Russian-
Turkish relations, the matter was resolved at the end of September with a renewed 
commitment by both states to simplifying export procedures (AFP, 2008b; AFP, 2008c). 
Nonetheless, the episode cost Turkey $1bn in export revenue (BMI Research, 2008) and 
demonstrated Russia’s willingness to use coercive measures congruent with coercive 
hegemony or imperialism in its relations with regional allies. 
The uncertainty and instability that arose during the South Ossetian war presented several 
conundrums for Turkey’s energy policy. Stability in Georgia, a pivotal player in the fourth 
corridor project, was essential for the realisation of Turkey’s energy hub agenda. Chapter 
one argued that interstate or civil war deterred IOCs and international financial institutions 
from investing in energy projects. Considering that the fourth corridor was contingent on 
support from IOCS (see chapter three), any large scale conflict had the potential to derail 
the east-west energy projects that were at the heart of Turkey’s hub strategy. Georgia’s 
part in diluting Russia’s influence over regional energy supplies - and, consequently, in 
elevating Turkey’s position in regional energy equations - should not be discounted. By 
participating in the BTC and BTE projects, Georgia had played in a role in restricting 
Russia’s access to Caspian and Central Asian energy reserves and contributed to diluting 
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Russia’s monopoly over supply routes between Asia and Europe. When war broke out in 
South Ossetia, negotiations on Nabucco were advancing after several years of minimal 
development and looked set to further diminish Russia’s influence over regional energy 
routes and, concurrently, Russia’s geopolitical influence. There was little doubt from the 
Georgian perspective that energy was a motivation for Russia’s actions: Saakashvili 
argued that Russia “need(ed)” to control energy routes from Central Asia and the Caspian 
Sea, and that Georgia’s position as a transit state threatened Russia’s monopoly over 
regional export routes (Barnard, 2008; Parfitt et al, 2008). To an extent, then, the South 
Ossetian conflict can be conceptualised in terms of the competition for energy influence in 
the Caspian region that was outlined in chapter three. Of more immediate concern to 
Turkey was the risk Russia’s military campaigns in Georgia posed to its energy security. 
Despite claims to the contrary by Georgian officials (The Sunday Times, 2008), there is no 
evidence that essential energy infrastructure was targeted by Russia’s air force during the 
campaign in South Ossetia (AFP, 2008a; Morningstar, 2008; Barnard, 2008).  Nonetheless, 
the discussion on energy security and warfare in chapter one argued that even if energy 
infrastructure is not directly targeted during a military campaign, conflict can still have a 
major impact on energy security. The bombardment by Russian air forces of road and rail 
networks restricted non-pipeline oil deliveries from Russia to Turkey and Armenia; 
similarly, the blockade of Georgian ports by the Russian navy restricted the transit of oil 
supplies across the Black Sea. Reuters also notes that the BTC and BTE pipelines were 
closed for the duration of the conflict (Fineren, 2008).69 War in Georgia also ran the risk of 
destabilising the entire region by spilling over and reigniting other protracted conflicts in 
Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh. The insecurity arising from the conflict therefore 
threatened the entire region’s energy security. 
From a Turkish perspective, the conflict was detrimental to domestic energy security. The 
closure of the BTC and BTE pipelines and restrictions to oil tanker transport through 
Georgia forced Turkey to seek alternative sources that contributed to Turkey’s energy bill. 
The conflict also posed a more long term threat to Turkey’s energy hub ambitions. As 
chapter one pointed out, conflict creates an unfavourable environment for investment and 
energy trade. The uncertainties surrounding the Georgia’s viability as a transit route had 
                                                     
69 Though it should be noted that the BTC had been closed for a week prior to the commencement of the war 
because of a fire on the pipeline (Fineran, 2008) 
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the potential to undermine investment in new east-west projects, which in turn would cast 
doubt on Turkey’s energy agenda. Turkish officials were evidently aware of the 
consequences of prolonged conflict on Turkey’s energy agenda. It is worth repeating here 
Gul’s statement on Turkey’s role in the Caucasus quoted in chapter three: 
          .... if you have stability in the Caucasus.... then you have the right climate for 
economic cooperation. And the Caucasus are key as far as energy resources and the 
safe transportation of energy from the east to the west. That transportation goes 
through Turkey. That is why we are trying to achieve an atmosphere of dialogue, 
so there is the right climate to resolve the problems. If there is instability in the 
Caucasus, it would be sort of like a wall between the East and West; if you have 
stability in the region, it could be a gate (Gul, in an interview with Newsweek, 
2008). 
Limiting the impact and duration of a war on Turkish borders between two of the country’s 
major partners was, therefore, in Turkey’s best interest both in terms of its domestic and 
economic security and in ensuring a continuation on energy trade though its territory. To 
this end, Turkey embarked on a proactive diplomatic campaign to encourage stability in 
the Caucasus in a strategy reminiscent with benevolent regional hegemony. It proposed the 
formation of a Stability and Cooperation Platform in the Caucasus (SCPC) that could 
“assume crisis management and seek solution (sic) in case of a problem of the region” and 
to “lead to cooperation on regional peace and security” (BBC Monitoring, 2008a). Such an 
organisation would also contribute to the security of energy supplies transiting the 
Caucasus. Despite proactivity on the behalf of the AKP hierarchy in promoting the 
organisation (Gul, 2008c) and claims as to the reciprocity of other regional states to the 
project (Gul, 2008b), it failed to get off the ground. Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister 
Arag Azimov’s statement in 2009 that the project could not be implemented without a 
resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh demonstrates the centrality of that conflict to 
Azerbaijan’s regional vision and was, as chapter three suggested, something that the AKP 
constantly underestimated. While there is little Turkey could - or was willing to - do in the 
face of Russian aggression in Georgia given the latter’s superior material assets and the 
unwillingness of regional subordinates to challenge Russia, the foundation of a security-
based institution had the potential to cement Turkey’s position as a benevolent regional 
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hegemon. Throughout this thesis, it has been argued the implementation of a benevolent 
hegemonic strategy by Turkey was restricted by constraints to its regional influence and 
the role other powers played in the Caspian. In this instance, the AKP failed to accurately 
assess the region’s geopolitical environment and overestimated  the reciprocity of other 
states to Turkish-led regional initiatives. In short, the SCPC was representative of the 
overconfidence in its regional power that this thesis suggests was prevalent in the AKP 
from the second administration on.  
The war therefore demonstrated that Russia was the primary driver of the regional security 
agenda. Russia’s Georgian campaign bore a close resemblance to the imperial style of 
regional power strategy outlined in chapter two, and illustrated Moscow’s willingness to 
utilise military power against subordinate states within the regional hierarchy. The failure 
of the SCPC and Russia’s economic retribution in the face of Turkey’s repeated 
affirmation of Ankara’s support for Georgia’s territorial integrity are illustrative of a 
regional system in which Turkey remained a secondary player to Russia. The discussion 
on regional power in chapter two suggested that ensuring security for the region 
contributed to an acceptance by others of the state’s regional power credentials. In this 
case, Turkey’s inability to act in the face of Russian regional imperialism in Georgia - a 
major ally and trading partner - demonstrated the limitations to its regional power in 
contrast to that of Russia. Significantly for this thesis, the suspension of energy flows 
through the BTC and BTE justified the AKP’s position on the relationship between 
regional security and domestic energy security but yet again undermined Turkey’s regional 
position. Turkey suffered an economic cost from supplementing suspended supplies and a 
geopolitical cost of purchasing those supplies from Russia. In the latter case, the South 
Ossetian war reaffirmed not only that Russia maintained an irreplaceable presence in 
Turkey’s energy equations, but that Turkey was dependent on Russia for ensuring Turkish 
energy security when security failed in other areas.   
The war over South Ossetia illuminated problems in the AKP’s approach to regional 
security issues and its assessment of the geopolitical risks to domestic energy security. 
Despite extensive military cooperation with Georgia in the years leading up to the conflict, 
despite a particular focus on securing energy infrastructure in that state, and despite the 
tensions that had been simmering between Georgia and Russia since the Rose Revolution, 
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Turkey was entirely unprepared for any serious escalation of tension. It had no recourse for 
the issues that affected the secure flow of energy through Georgia, and that the shortfall in 
energy imports that transited Georgia was compensated for through increased supplies 
though the Blue Stream merely reinforced Turkey’s dependence on Russian imports. That 
those supplies in turn increased Turkey’s reliance on Russian resources limited the AKP’s 
response to the crisis. If defining and influencing regional security issues and systems is a 
key criterion of regional power and - as this thesis argues - the AKP sought to utilise 
energy to achieve that status, then ensuring a stable environment conducive to secure 
regional energy flows was essential to Turkey’s agenda. The failure to pre-empt or 
influence conflict in a key transit state not only signalled a failure of Turkey’s ZPWN 
foreign policy strategy, but raised a series of questions over the effectiveness of its energy 
security/regional powers strategy.  
It is doubtful in any case that Turkey had the capacity and opportunity to affect regional 
affairs in its favour during this period. Both statements from relevant parties at the time 
and the application of the regional powers framework to the events of 2008 indicate that 
the energy-based power imbalance between Turkey and Russia restricted Turkey’s 
capacity to assert a more forceful hegemonic regional strategy. It is evident that Turkey’s 
limited restrained response to Russian aggression in its backyard was a product of the 
country’s dependency on Russian resources. In the aftermath of the war, Erdogan referred 
to the link between Russian energy imports and Turkey’s approach with varying degrees of 
ambiguity. On 31st August, he stated that Russia was “an important neighbour” and 
Turkey’s “number one trade partner” (BBC Monitoring, 2008b). More specifically, he 
pointed out that Turkey would be “left in the dark” if a new cold war began between 
Russia and the US on account of the Georgian war because of Turkey’s dependence on 
Russian energy supplies (BBC Monitoring Euope, 2008b). A day later, he said that he 
could not “ignore” the extent of energy dependence on Russia, reiterating several days 
later that  no external country could expect Turkey to ignore that Russia was Turkey’s 
“strategic neighbour” emphasising, once again, that it depended on Russian energy imports 
(AFP, 2008c; BBC Monitoring Europe, 2008e). Continued instability in Georgia and the 
unreliability of Iranian supplies during the previous winter meant that the AKP could not 
risk confronting Russia; to do so would have been detrimental to its own energy security. 
In short, then, the conflict created a predicament for Turkey. It forced Turkey to confront 
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its precarious balance between NATO membership and the Russian alliance and the 
tensions between energy relations with Russia as a major supplier, and Georgia as a central 
transit state in circumventing reliance on Russia. Consequently, it cast doubt on Turkey’s 
capacity to utilise energy as a means of achieving its regional power ambitions. 
Chapter two argued that the AKP’s proactive foreign policy was a product of a desire to 
strengthen ties with regional states and generate goodwill that would be advantageous to 
Turkey’s regional power agenda. However, on several occasions between 2002 and 2014, 
Turkey demonstrated an inability to utilise that leverage to its benefit in competing with 
Russia for regional influence. Conversely, Russia has proved not only willing and capable 
of wielding that leverage, but other states in the region - even those with close ties to 
Turkey - demonstrated reciprocity to Russia’s advances. This was, perhaps, most clearly 
highlighted in the South Caucasus. Turkey’s inability to capitalise on Russia’s relative 
regional isolation by strengthening relations with the South Caucasian states or 
implementing the SCPC after the South Ossetian war compares unfavourably to Russia’s 
successful exploitation of geopolitical tensions between Turkey and Azerbaijan a year 
later. Considering the instrumental role both Georgia and Azerbaijan played in Turkey’s 
energy strategy in terms of diversifying resources, the hub agenda, and accessing energy 
markets in Central Asia, it can be argued that the failure to utilise the goodwill earned 
through multidimensional engagement in the face of successful Russian power projection 
was damaging to both Ankara’s energy ambitions and the perception of Turkey as a 
benevolent regional hegemon. 
5.6 Conclusion 
In an era characterised by strong bilateral cooperation between Turkey and Russia, energy 
proved both a facilitator and detriment to the realisation of Turkey’s regional power 
strategy. On the plus side, increased energy flows from Russia to Turkey contributed to 
continued economic growth in Turkey, which, chapter one suggested was a key objective 
of the regional power agenda. Similarly, Russian investment in Turkey’s domestic energy 
systems was essential to the modernisation of the gas industry, and instrumental to the 
development of the nuclear sector. As a result, it contributed to Turkey’s energy security 
and fuel type diversification agendas. At the same time, closer ties between the states in 
the energy sphere came at the expense of Turkey’s capacity to strengthen relations with 
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states in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The centrality of energy to Russia’s own regional 
agenda meant it was reluctant to make concessions to Turkey on oil and gas issues if they 
were likely to enhance Turkey’s regional status. The continued dependence on Russia to 
fulfil Turkish energy needs was also an effective constraint on Turkey’s response to 
Russian foreign policy in the Caspian region. In addition, that rhetorical commitment to 
bilateral relations was unmatched by tangible policies undermined the supposed strength of 
those relations in a way that repeatedly undermined Turkey’s regional agenda. 
Moreover, increasing reliance on Russian resources was counterproductive to attempts to 
portray Turkey as an autonomous actor which, as chapter two argued, was a necessary 
precondition to the acceptance of Turkey’s regional power status by other states. It 
highlighted the inconsistencies inherent in Turkey’s energy agenda and illustrated the 
disconnect between Turkey’s energy rhetoric and the policies it actively pursued or 
implemented. Chapter two highlighted how Turkey’s location between east and west has 
been portrayed as key to its significance in the international system since the foundation of 
the Turkish Republic. However, Turkey has consistently lacked the capacity to utilise its 
preferential geographic location to realise its broader geopolitical agenda independently of 
major powers. During the Cold War, Turkey’s geostrategic relevance was predicated on its 
usefulness to the West as a NATO ally and buffer between the West and the Soviet Union. 
The failure of the state to develop a geopolitical strategy to utilise its location of its own 
accord was highlighted by Turkey’s diminished strategic significance after the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union. Turkey was forced to reassess the means through which it could best 
exploit its geostrategic location for its own gain, and with the advent of the fourth corridor 
project energy became Turkey’s preferred route to augment its status. As the AKP 
ascended to power, energy not only became a means through which Turkey could reassert 
its strategic significance to the West, but through which it could enhance its regional 
power. The limitations of the fourth corridor saw Turkey turn to Russia to realise its 
ambitions but, as in the Cold War era, the realisation of those ambitions is dependent on 
Russia’s own energy and geopolitical strategies. To that extent, rather than asserting 
Turkish autonomy from major powers, the AKP appeared to swap reliance on the US and 
West to facilitate Turkey’s geostrategic importance for a similar reliance on Russia. If, 
therefore, Turkey’s geostrategic significance in inimical to its regional power strategy, and 
energy is central to the augmentation of that geopolitical significance, then reliance on 
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Russia to fulfil the material requirements (i.e. hydrocarbons, infrastructure, , finance) for 
energy projects through Turkey undermines Turkey’s regional power agenda. In this 
regard, this thesis contends that the AKP underestimated the constraints imposed by its 
position in regional hierarchy relative to Russia: it could not overcome the imbalance in 
bilateral relations brought on by Russia’s superior material capacity and its willingness to 
adopt an imperial regional power strategy. As a result, its capacity to assert a benevolent 
hegemonic regional power strategy - one free from the constraints imposed by other states, 
and that would enhance its status among subordinate states - was limited. 
This chapter demonstrated that reliance on a competing regional power for energy plays a 
constraining role in the execution of regional power strategies for producer states. 
Consumer states may rely on producers for the necessary material resources to realise 
regional power strategies like the hub agenda. When the producer has a preponderance of 
energy reserves relative to the consumer, this can undermine the capacity of the state to act 
independently which undermines the regional power strategy. The effects of that 
dependence may be alleviated if there is relative parity between the states’ capacities in 
other policies areas or if an attempt is made to redress the balance of power through 
cooperation in other areas. In the Turkish-Russian example, however, energy proved the 
dominant factor defining bilateral relations. Russia’s assertiveness in carrying out its 
regional strategy and its willingness to wield its military power to achieve its geopolitical 
agenda was central to an imbalance between the states within the region. As a result, it 
should be noted that both the energy dependence and the form of the states’ respective 
regional power policies played a central role in determining Turkey’s capacity and 
willingness to respond to regional developments in the energy and political spheres in a 





Since Jim O’ Neill coined the term “BRICs” to describe the emerging economies of Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China in 2001, advanced developing states have become increasingly 
prominent in international relations (IR). Vast bodies of IR literature on rising, emerging, 
and middle powers have been generated in order to research the role these states play in 
international politics. Among these new sub-schools of IR is that on regional power. 
Though regional power literature can incorporate states at every stage of economic 
development, advanced developing states dominate both empirical and theoretical 
research. Special attention is granted to the regional context in these studies: to the 
advanced developing state’s relative preponderance of power within the regional system; 
to the state’s regional ambitions; and to the opportunities offered and constraints placed by 
regional dynamics (Nolte, 2010). Yet despite emphasising the role played by material 
factors in determining and exercising regional power, this thesis noted that the literature 
failed to consider the way in which energy affected regional power 
During the same period, energy scholars pointed to a reconfiguration of global energy 
geopolitics based on the increasing activism of advanced developing states in the field of 
international energy politics (Hayes et al, 2006; Gjelten, 2012). Nonetheless - and in 
contrast to the IR literature more broadly - examinations of advanced developing states in 
the international energy system are restricted by their limited scope and the dominance of 
the Western-focused narratives. To redress these limitations, this thesis sought to research 
the role of energy between advanced developing states. This thesis merged the regional 
power perspective of IR scholars to this new energy-geopolitical paradigm in researching 
advanced developing states. Consequently, this thesis’ central research question asked  
“what is the relationship between energy and regional power for advanced 
developing states?”.  
After highlighting the major issues in the literature on energy and regional powers in IR, 
the thesis adopted an empirical approach to understanding how energy politics are 
conducted in the non-Western world. It denoted a wider Caspian region consisting of the 
Caspian littorals, the states of the South Caucasus, and Turkey. A case study approach was 
applied to understanding the relationship between energy and regional power for Turkey in 
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the wider Caspian region. In-depth profiles of the nature of Turkish-Iranian and Turkish-
Russian energy relations were conducted in order to broaden the scope through which the 
research question could be addressed. 
In assessing the relationship between energy and regional powers in the Turkish context, 
this thesis contributes to an emerging research agenda on the power dynamics of emerging 
actors in international relations. Further studies on this particular region utilising a 
different set of material in Turkish, Russian, or Persian may generate alternative 
understandings of the role energy and regional power plays in the relationship between the 
three actors. Similarly, examining different regions where external great powers play a 
more dominant role (such as the Middle East) or where pipeline politics are limited by 
regions with significantly different geographical compositions (such as the more oceanic 
South East Asia) may contribute to further understandings of the relationship between 
energy and regional power for advanced developing states. Nonetheless, this thesis has 
made clear that in the Caspian region, energy and regional power are inherently 
interrelated for advanced developing states. 
The first section of this conclusion will summarise the empirical aspects of this thesis and 
highlight the ways in which energy and regional power are related for Turkey. The second 
section proposes four major arguments pertinent to answering the central research 
question. These proposals do not assume that all advanced developing states are - or aspire 
to be - regional powers, or that the energy relations of these states take place only within 
the regional context. Rather, it addresses the central research question in considering the 
ways in which energy affects the regional power of advanced developing states and, 
conversely, how regional power affects the way in which advanced developing states 
understand energy. The final part of this conclusion outlines the contribution of this thesis 
to IR literature and proposes areas of further study.  
Energy and regional powers in advanced developing states: Turkey and the 
wider Caspian region 
This thesis characterised Turkey as a benevolent hegemonic regional power. It positioned 
Turkey in a wider Caspian region comprised of two other regional powers (Russia and 
Iran) and five subordinates (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan, and 
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Kazakhstan). It argued that Turkey’s limited domestic hydrocarbon reserves placed it at a 
strategic disadvantage in a region dominated by energy producers. Nonetheless, the 
necessity to ensure domestic energy security and Ankara’s geostrategic location 
contributed to the AKP’s belief that the state could become a regional energy “leader”. At 
the heart of the state’s energy agenda was the desire to construct an energy hub that would 
elevate Turkey’s strategic significance to other regional states and in global energy 
systems. Regional integration, an emphasis on Turkey’s strategic (and geographical) links 
with Europe, and the propagation of a common regional security agenda were among the 
methods applied to realise these ambitions. This energy agenda was pivotal to enhancing 
Turkey’s legitimacy as a regional power in the wider Caspian region. An examination of 
AKP discourse demonstrated that the party believed that it could use its energy “leader” 
status to encourage cooperation and integration in a manner that would contribute to its 
regional power. Oil and gas took on an additional dimension as a tool for foreign policy in 
this era: not just as something essential for the economic and social functions of the state, 
but as a means to forge interdependencies, enhance regional integration, and accrue 
regional power. 
Chapters four and five looked in more detail at Turkey’s ever-closer relationships with Iran 
and Russia. The latter was characterised as detrimental to Turkey’s energy and regional 
power ambitions, while the former was considered more beneficial. The differences 
between the cases was attributed to the states’ relative positions in and power projection in 
the regional system, as well as to the relationship of those states with external powers.  
Chapter four contended that energy was the predominant focus of bilateral relations 
between Turkey and Iran. It was argued that while Turkey’s status as an advanced 
developing state and regional power facilitated Ankara’s participation in the 2010 UNSC 
negotiations on Iran’s nuclear agenda, Turkey’s willingness to participate was motivated 
by the necessity to mitigate international action that would limit its energy security and 
hub agendas. The Iranian study also highlighted the extent to which the AKP not only 
recognised Iran’s regional power limitations and the constraints imposed on Tehran by its 
relationship with external actors like the UN and EU, but sought to manipulate those 
relations to augment Turkey’s regional power. However, the AKP’s failure to account for 
how the geopolitical motivations of those actors affected regional energy equations limited 
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the extent to which Turkey could use its energy relations with Iran to the benefit of its 
regional agenda. Attempts to incorporate Iranian gas supplies into the fourth corridor 
despite such a policy contravening the US and EU’s energeopolitical agendas is a clear 
example of these limitations. Overall, chapter four argued that Turkey’s relationship with 
Iran generated only limited benefits in energy terms, but had the potential to augment 
Ankara’s regional status. It demonstrated to other states Turkey’s willingness to integrate 
all states into regional pipeline systems and to represent the region in international forums. 
Consequently, it enhanced Turkey’s regional legitimacy and contributed to Turkey’s 
regional power credentials.  
Energy also played a significant role in Turkey’s relationship with Russia. Despite 
articulating a desire to reduce dependence on Russian gas, Turkey facilitated the expansion 
of Russian influence in the Turkish energy system by awarding domestic energy contracts 
to Gazprom and giving Rosatom unprecedented control in constructing and operating 
Turkey’s first nuclear power plant. That these contracts were concluded despite interest 
from other actors in investing in Turkey’s domestic energy development indicates that the 
AKP attached greater prominence to closer bilateral affairs with Russia than it did to 
reducing energy dependency on Moscow.  These actions contributed to further skewering 
the balance of power between the states in Russia’s favour. Beyond elevating Russia above 
Turkey in the regional hierarchy, it also limited Turkey’s capacity to respond assertively to 
regional aggressions by Russia in a manner that would have augmented Ankara’s 
legitimacy among regional subordinates. This chapter therefore indicated that Turkey 
failed to accurately assess the regional balance of power or to take advantage of regional 
conditions in a way that would elevate its own regional status. Finally, it was argued that 
the pursuit of Russian natural gas was counterproductive to attempts to integrate Caspian 
and Central Asian supplies in the regional system and inimical to both Turkey’s energy 
agenda and its regional power status. 
Neither Turkey’s Iranian nor Russian energy strategies contributed in any meaningful way 
to the AKP’s energy agenda. The failure to develop new energy trade with Iran and the 
expansion of energy cooperation with Russia both contradicted the diversification agenda, 
while the lack of re-exportation clauses in natural gas contracts with the latter undermined 
the hub agenda. Where the cases diverge is with regards to their contribution to Turkey’s 
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regional power. Russia’s growing control over Turkey’s energy system consolidated the 
regional balance of power in Moscow’s favour. The willingness to compromise key 
elements of the national energy strategy in favour of stronger Russian ties highlighted 
Turkey’s material limitations in a regional dominated by energy producers. Conversely, 
broader Iranian policies that sought to incorporate Tehran into regional energy systems and 
to mediate the nuclear crisis augmented Turkey’s regional power credentials. These 
strategies had the potential to facilitate Ankara’s diversification, hub, and energy security 
agendas. Even in their failure they contributed to AKP’s ideational capacity as a regional 
integrator, a representative of regional interests in multilateral forums, and a proponent of 
the right of developing states to nuclear energy.  Despite a lack of tangible material 
returns, this thesis therefore considers Turkey’s energy strategy towards Iran to be more 
beneficial to the state’s regional power. 
The form of regional power adopted by each of Turkey, Russia, and Iran oscillated 
throughout the period under examination and were subject to different opportunities and 
constraints. Of the three, Iran adopted the least assertive form of regional power - one 
predominantly correspondent to leadership. As a state for which oil and gas dominated the 
national economy and international trade, energy should have formed the basis of regional 
engagement. Yet that Iran’s economy competed with - rather than was complementary to - 
those of the Caspian littorals limited Iran’s integration into regional trade systems. The 
compliance of those states with international sanctions against Iran further limited 
opportunities for Iran to engage with its neighbours. Finally, Iran’s dependence on Russia 
for nuclear power and arms and on Turkey for access to natural markets forced the state to 
adopt policies that did not undermine its regional rivals’ own strategies. Iran undoubtedly 
had the necessary material capacity and historical and cultural connections to be 
considered a regional power, but its limited capacity to influence regional security affairs 
or the geopolitical delineation of the region or to gain acceptance by other regional states 
by virtue of regional integration indicates that it should be conceptualised as an aspiring 
rather than actual regional power in the wider Caspian region. 
Russia was by far the most assertive of the three states. Its military superiority (and 
willingness to utilise its military power to achieve its regional agenda) and strong historical 
ties to the region facilitated a coercive hegemonic regional strategy that occasionally 
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veered into regional imperialism. At the same time, Moscow’s bid to enhance its regional 
power - and eventually regain the USSR’s great power status - through the control of 
Caspian energy systems was stymied by the opposition of almost all regional actors to 
Russia’s energy strategy. The hostility of subordinate states like Turkmenistan and 
Azerbaijan to Russia’s regional energy policies limited the success of this agenda, and the 
only meaningful example of energy negotiations between Russia and another Caspian 
littoral during this period manifested during the 2009 pricing dispute between Turkey and 
Azerbaijan - an occasion where, this thesis argues, Azerbaijan effectively used the spectre 
of negotiations with Russia to gain leverage over Turkey in Azerbaijani-Turkish energy 
affairs. Turkmen and Azerbaijani intransigence aside, interference by external regional 
states in regional energy affairs strengthened the capacity of other regional states to reject 
Russian advantages: China’s financial investments in Turkmenistan and the promotion of 
the fourth (and later Southern) corridor by the EU and US provided support to regional 
subordinates in rejecting Russia’s advantages. Despite being a competing regional power, 
Turkey was the only state (other than Armenia) to actively and consistently support 
Russia’s energy initiatives.  
 As a regional power, Turkey falls somewhere between Russia and Iran: neither as 
assertive as the former nor as restrained as the latter in regional affairs, it projected a form 
of benevolent hegemony that was strongly rooted in self-interest. It also occasionally 
ventured into more coercive territory when it came to renegotiating energy contracts. This 
thesis demonstrated, however, that the success of coercive hegemony for Turkey was 
limited to Russian and Iranian price adjustments early in the AKP’s first term; similar 
concessions were unforthcoming in later years. Energy was a potential strategic tool for 
the accumulation of hegemonic Turkish regional power. Turkey’s geostrategic 
significance, rising power status, and proactive regional policies all had the the potential to 
be advantageous to Turkey’s energy strategy in a way that could strengthen its regional 
power. However, three major constraints limited both the employment of energy for the 
accumulation of regional power and the use of regional power to realise Turkey’s energy 
agenda. 
Firstly, despite rhetoric that stressed Turkey’s autonomous foreign policy and geostrategic 
location to its energy rich neighbours, Turkey’s lack of energy resources remained a major 
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disadvantage. Dependence on regional energy resources limited Turkey’s capacity to enact 
a more assertive and proactive regional agenda that could strengthen its regional power. 
Turkey needed a secure, constant supply of energy to maintain the economic growth that 
had been a significant feature of its regional power in the first place; it simply could not 
afford to antagonise its neighbours. The dangers of doing so were highlighted in chapters 
three and five, where relations with key energy suppliers like Azerbaijan and Russia were 
Turkey’s threatened by attempted rapprochement with Armenia and support for Georgia 
during the South Ossetian war. Those incidences pointed not only to the risks of energy 
dependency, but to the incompatibilities between Turkey’s (regional) foreign policies and 
its energy requirements. Similar inconsistencies were apparent within the energy strategy 
itself. This thesis repeatedly pointed to contradictions within the AKP’s energy policy that 
undermined the potential to utilise energy for Turkey’s regional power. The diversification 
agenda with MENR’s Strategic Plans and rhetoric concerning Turkey’s necessity to reduce 
dependence on Russian oil and gas was at odds with the continued pursuit of and 
participation in Russian led energy projects. Russian collaborations were also incompatible 
with the AKP’s desire to contribute to Europe’s energy security - another key feature of 
the AKP’s energy discourse.  
These contradictions were part of the second key issue that this thesis contends constrained 
the AKP’s ambitions: Turkey’s failure to acknowledge how other states assessed the 
geopolitical motivations behind and ramifications of specific energy projects. Concurrent 
pursuit of Russian and fourth corridor projects was emblematic of this issue, but the same 
problem was also evident in attempts to incorporate Iran into east-west energy projects 
despite opposition from proponents of the project in the US and EU. This thesis therefore 
argues that ignoring the geopolitical implications of energy projects for other states limited 
the effectiveness of Turkey’s energy agenda and restricted its attempts to utilise energy as 
a tool for regional power.  
Finally, it is clear that the AKP overestimated Turkey’s power in regional energy and 
geopolitical equations to the detriment of both its energy agenda and regional power. The 
energy “leadership” and hub agendas were predicated on a power over regional 
subordinates that it simply did not posses. It lacked power to gain concessions over some 
subordinate states (particularly Azerbaijan), possessed insufficient financial resources to 
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compete for access to resources in others (see Turkmenistan), was incapable of ensuring 
regional stability (South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia), and could not challenge 
Russia’s superior position in the regional hierarchy. Ankara proved similarly incapable of 
gaining concessions congruent with the hub agenda (such as re-export rights) in energy 
negotiations with other regional powers. In attempting to manipulate regional geopolitics 
to its advantage, Turkey often overplayed its hand in a manner that threatened its energy 
security and sabotaged its regional power. Further undermining the solidification of 
Turkey’s benevolent regional hegemony was the AKP’s reactive position on most major 
regional energy projects: it had a tendency to bandwagon with energy initiatives 
announced and implemented by other actors rather than play any leading role itself. 
TANAP provides an exception to this rule, but all other major projects announced between 
2002 and 2014 - Blue Stream-2, South Stream, Nabucco, TurkStream among them - were 
initiated and facilitated by other actors.  
The realisation of TANAP and Iran’s continued eagerness to cooperate on energy projects 
with Turkey indicate that the intersection between energy and regional power was not 
entirely unsuccessful. The extent of Turkey’s regional integration, economic growth, and 
proactive foreign policy in line with the characteristics of regional powerhood contributed 
to increased energy dialogue with regional states between 2002 and 2014 that had the 
potential to contribute to Ankara’s energy agenda. Overall, however, this thesis contends 
that the constraints outlined above limited the successful execution of an energy agenda 
that could contribute to regional power. Consequently, it argues that while Turkey 
attempted to adopt a benevolent hegemonic regional power strategy to affect change in 
regional energy systems to its advantage, overconfidence on the behalf of the ruling party, 
coupled with a failure to properly understand the geopolitical motivations of other actors 
and the continued dependence on other regional states for the provision of essential energy 
requirements, confined the development of any effective relationship between energy and 
regional power in the AKP era. The next section of this conclusion will draw on some of 
the points raised in this section in outlining four key arguments for understanding the 
relationship between energy and regional power in advanced developing states. 
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Key arguments: energy and regional power in advanced developing states 
1. Advanced developing states can use energy as a strategic resource to establish and 
maintain regional power 
Chapter one highlighted how IR literature framed energy as a strategic asset for developed 
states. However, it was argued that scholars were limited in assessing energy’s potential as 
a tool for generating power and manipulating geostrategic relations in advanced 
developing states. Similarly, chapter two noted that energy was not incorporated into 
assessments of the material power capacity of regional powers; nor was it included in 
debates on regional power strategies either in its own right or as part of a wider economic 
power strategy. In portraying energy as a strategic asset through which advanced 
developing states can develop or consolidate regional power, this thesis has demonstrated 
energy’s importance as a material power resource similar to the economic or military 
power discussed elsewhere in the regional powers literature. Energy is a means through 
which the state can develop and consolidate its status in the regional system. If 
successfully integrated into a broader regional powers strategy, it can be a tool of foreign 
policy or statecraft: one to be manipulated by advanced developing states to engender 
advantage over regional subordinates. The previous section of this conclusion illustrated 
the limitations to Turkey’s capacity to use energy as a strategic regional powers tool. 
The way in which regional powers utilise energy as a material resource depends on the 
typology to which the regional power adheres. It can be used in both a cooperative or 
coercive manner to ensure a favourable position for the state in the regional hierarchy. 
Financing, facilitating, or leading cooperative energy initiatives like pipeline projects can 
create interdependencies that enhance the legitimacy of regional leaders or benevolent 
regional hegemons among subordinates. Coercive hegemons can manipulate energy 
relations to gain economic and strategic advantages in regional affairs - as a tool to either 
augment legitimacy or induce control over subordinates. For imperial regional powers, 
military attacks on essential energy infrastructure can be used to enforce power. 
The integrated nature of regional energy networks and the transnational nature of energy 
security threats enable regional powers to provide leadership in framing energy security as 
a common goal and promoting regional energy governance. By expressing a common 
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energy agenda, the state can influence regional norms in a way that is reflective of the 
characteristics of regional leadership or benevolent hegemonic regional power outlined in 
chapter two. This engenders cooperation advantageous to regional stability and, as chapter 
three highlighted, was a major objective of Turkey’s energy agenda. By propagating 
common energy norms, Turkey was utilising its ideational capacity to overcome 
limitations in its material (energy) capacity.   Finally, this thesis contends that technical 
knowledge regarding energy development can be an asset for advanced developing states. 
It was pointed out at several junctures that the desire of advanced developed states to 
develop nuclear power capabilities was restricted by those states’ limited technical 
knowledge on nuclear proliferation. Russia’s expertise in the area therefore endows it with 
an asset it can export globally to advanced developing and developing states. Within the 
Caspian region, it is notable that Russia constructed - and provided expertise for both Iran 
and Turkey’s first nuclear plants during the 2002-2014 period. 
However, the debate on the resource curse in chapter two offers a caveat as to potential 
constraints of energy as a tool for regional powers. Over-dependence on energy as both a 
means to generate income and to forge independences with and assume power over 
regional subordinates means that disruptions to energy productions or flows can threaten 
the position of the regional power within the regional hierarchy. This thesis contends that 
this is particularly the case for those states that pursue regional dominance through natural 
gas or oil pipelines. For states like Russia and Iran that are both major producers and 
regional powers, ensuring regional stability, limiting the influence of external powers in 
regional affairs, and ensuring a diversified domestic economy and is pivotal to successfully 
obtaining and maintaining regional powerhood. In other words, the capacity of the regional 
power to delineate regional geopolitics - a key characteristic of regional powerhood 
according to chapter two - is essential to ensuring the successful application of energy as a 
strategic tool. 
A further constraint stems from the geographic limitations of pipeline projects. It should be 
noted that the more adaptable nature of oil trade means that it is less limited by geographic 
factors than natural gas. Equally, the relative ease with which states can replace oil 
supplies in the 21st century in comparison to previous decades means it is less likely to be 
used in a coercive manner in regional geopolitics. Natural gas’ utility as a power resource 
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for producer states is determined by two factors highlighted in chapter one: firstly, the 
asymmetrical distribution of global resources, and secondly, the material necessity of 
energy for states at all levels of the economic spectrum. For natural gas rich states, 
transport to energy markets may require engagement with third party transit countries. The 
necessity to guarantee the security of these supplies may constrain the capacity of regional 
powers to affect a more coercive regional strategy depending on the form of regional 
power applied by the producer to the transit or consumer. This, in turn, is determined by 
the form of bilateral relations between the producer and transit and consumer. This thesis 
highlighted Russia’s strategies towards Ukraine and Turkey as diverging approaches to 
energy engagement with actors occupying relative similar positions in the energy chain. 
Both states are consumers of Russian gas and are potentially key states for the transit of 
Russian natural gas to European markets. Yet Russia adopted a significantly more coercive 
strategy towards Ukraine than Turkey primarily, this thesis argued, because of the 
disparate historical and bilateral relations and relative balance of power between Russia 
and the each of the two states. Assessments of the extent to which geography limits the 
capacity of the state to utilise energy as a strategic asset - or analysis of the form that 
utilisation adopts - must therefore take into account the bilateral relations between the 
energy producer and individual states in the energy chain. 
The dependence by some landlocked advanced developing producer states on energy for 
income and power projection offers an opportunity for strategically located consumer 
states to manipulate energy relations to their advantage. This thesis proposes energy hub 
development as a means through which energy poor but geostrategically significant states 
can accumulate and employ energy as a strategic tool. It has argued that energy hubs 
endow energy poor states with benefits in the energy system more commonly associated 
with producer states.  However, the necessity for the hub to ensure security of supply 
restricts the implementation of a coercive or imperial energy policy towards regional 
producer and transit states. That the AKP was unable to successfully manipulate regional 
geopolitical and energy relations undermined the potential for Turkey the use its 
geostrategically significant location to create an energy hub. 
Finally, the receptiveness of other regional states to the regional power’s agenda must also 
be considered when assessing the capacity of the state to utilise energy as a power 
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resource. The geographical limitations of pipeline trade and the geopolitical risks 
associated with energy trade in specific regions require a level of cooperation between 
producers, transit states, and consumers. It is for this reason that cooperative rather than 
coercive forms of regional power - those congruent with leadership or benevolent 
hegemony - are more likely to be conducive to the successful utilisation of energy as a tool 
to accumulate regional power.  
2. Energy can contribute to the balance of power between regional powers 
The notion that energy contributes to the balance of power between states is not, as chapter 
one demonstrated, a new one. However, the limitations in the energy literature on 
advanced developing states and energy relations between states in the global South, and in 
the regional powers literature on energy as a geostrategic resource, restrict debate on the 
role energy plays in power relations between advanced developing states in the regional 
context.  This thesis therefore provides insight into the significant role that energy can play 
in determining the balance of power between regional powers in a geopolitical system. It 
proposes that the way in which energy contributes to the balance of power between states 
is predicated on the producer-consumer relationship outlined in the first chapter. A key 
assumption within this argument is that the bifurcation of energy nations into producers 
and consumers is replicated amongst regional powers. Consumer states are dependent on 
producer states for the provision of energy, a key strategic good for economic and social 
development. Dependence generates leverage for the producer state. The greater the 
dependence - or the more limited the diversification by the consumer of its resources - the 
greater the leverage assumed by the producer. If the producer demonstrates a willingness 
to contribute additional supplies to the consumer during shortages or the suspension of 
imports from alternative producers, then the producer’s s dominant position in bilateral 
relations is reinforced.  
That this thesis is specifically concerned with advanced developing states has ramifications 
for understanding the contribution of energy to the balance of power between regional 
powers. While a major contention of this thesis is that IR literature understates the extent 
to which energy is a geostrategic resource for advanced developing states, it accepts that 
the political economic focus of most studies of energy in those states is not totally 
unmerited. Given energy’s primacy in the export strategies of advanced developing 
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producer states and import requirements of advanced developing producer states, it is 
unsurprising that the examination of the relationship between specific states in the Caspian 
highlighted energy’s preeminent position in bilateral trade between energy rich and poor 
states. Similarly, energy is essential to the continued economic and industrial development 
of advanced developing states.  Considering this thesis’ contention that economic affairs 
dominate relations between advanced developing states, then the predominance afforded to 
energy within those bilateral affairs demonstrates the centrality of energy to bilateral 
relations between powers within the regional context.  
The predominance attached to energy in bilateral relations can contribute to an asymmetry 
between producer and consumer states that further elevates the former above the latter in 
the regional hierarchy. In regional power terms, that leverage can constrain the capacity of 
the consumer state to advance a more assertive regional power strategy that contradicts the 
agenda of the producer. In the case of the wider Caspian region, this thesis argued that 
Turkey’s capacity to represent regional interests in multilateral institutions, its attempts to 
integrate Iran into the regional system, and its geostrategic significance relative to Iran’s 
natural gas strategy contributed to a recalibration of the economic imbalance generated by 
bilateral energy trade. Conversely, Turkey’s failure to assert regional power in the 
aftermath of the 2008 war in South Ossetia was portrayed by chapter five as the clearest 
example of the restrictive consequences of Ankara’s dependence on Russian hydrocarbons. 
However, this thesis also noted that this asymmetry can be somewhat alleviated if the 
consumer states possess a preponderance of resources in another sector relative to the 
producer state or offers to the state a service that cannot be obtained elsewhere.  
3. Engagement with other states in a manner congruent with the characteristics of 
regional power is advantageous to the energy agenda of the state 
Chapter two outlined nine conditions that determine regional power. Three of those were 
highlighted in this thesis as beneficial to the energy agendas of the state: delineation of the 
regional security complex, regional integration, and participation in multilateral 
institutions. In each of these instances, regional power strategies become conflated with 
energy diplomacy, a process that encourages political, economic, and security cooperation 
to facilitate a state’s energy agenda (Uludag et al, 2013). 
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The first condition pertains to the capacity of the state to influence regional security in a 
way that facilitates the energy agenda of the state. Chapter one highlighted how energy 
security was a significant concern for states at all stages of the supply system. Regional 
power producer states cannot utilise energy as a strategic asset unless it has access to 
energy markets; the security of supply of consumer states is predicated on ensuring stable 
transit from producers; and the capacity of transit states to develop energy hubs is 
dependent on stability in energy producers, markets, and other transit routes. Ensuring 
regional security was therefor imperative to energy security. The necessity to maintain 
regional stability to guarantee energy security may act as a constraint on more coercive 
security initiatives, particularly in regions where tangible connections are constructed 
through pipeline integration. 
However, manipulating regional security is also important to those states seeking to 
influence the development of regional energy systems. In contrast to the view propagated 
in the regional power literature (Nolte and Flemes, 2010), this thesis argued that there 
should be no assumption that the role of the regional power in determining regional 
security should be benevolent. Rather, this thesis postulated that states may influence 
regional stability either positively or negatively in order to engineer advantages in the 
regional energy sector. On one hand, encouraging and committing resources to cooperative 
security initiatives contributed to Turkey’s own energy security and enhanced the viability 
of the energy hub agenda. On the other, instability-inducing and aggressive Russian 
agendas in some states (like Georgia) had the potential to derail fourth corridor energy 
projects that had the potential to undermine Turkey’s regional energy agenda.  
Regional powers, chapter two argued, are states that are economically, politically, and 
culturally integrated in the region. This thesis proposes that both the integration of the state 
in its region and the facilitation of integrative processes can benefit the energy agendas of 
advanced developing states. The security initiatives mentioned above are one form of 
integration; economic initiatives like Turkey’s foreign direct investment in Caspian energy 
producing states, cultural initiatives like the Turkish-Iranian year of culture, and 
multilateral efforts through forums like the Economic Cooperation Organisation and the 
Turkic Council further contribute to integration. Integration and interdependence 
engenders legitimacy and goodwill that, in turn, endows the state with leverage in regional 
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energy negotiations. Turkey’s interdependence with most of the Caspian states was 
highlighted as an example of this integration throughout the period under examination. In 
contrast, chapter four indicated that Iran’s failure to integrate into the wider Caspian region 
limited its capacity to manipulate regional energy equations. 
Finally, the capacity and willingness of the state to represent regional interests in 
international forums was presented as a means through which states could elevate their 
regional legitimacy among subordinates and engender goodwill conducive to energy trade. 
Chapter four argued that this was a motivation behind Turkey’s willingness to participate 
in UNSC negotiations. The relationship between regional powers and external states will 
be discussed in more depth in the next section.  
4. The relationship between energy and regional power in advanced developing states 
cannot be considered in isolation from the international context 
In adopting a regional powers framework and emphasising relations between states in 
specific geopolitical regions, this thesis focused predominately on relations between 
advanced developing states. It was intended that this approach would contribute to 
literature on the nature of energy and power relations between states in the global South 
and counteract the Western-focused imbalance in IR literature. However, just as chapter 
two considered the recognition by external states to be a defining characteristic of regional 
power, so this thesis argues that the impact of external powers on the regional system 
cannot be excluded from examinations of the relationship between energy and regional 
power for advanced developing states. Even in highly regionalised context - such as 
pipeline projects - the relationship between energy and regional power cannot be studied in 
isolation from the international context. 
There are two factors to consider in assessing the contribution of extra-regional powers to 
the way in which we analyse the relationship between energy and regional power in 
advanced developing states. The first is the reciprocity of regional subordinates to 
advances from extra-regional powers. This thesis has highlighted several examples of how 
the acceptance by subordinates to energy-related overtures by external states affected the 
energy agendas of regional powers and, consequently, their regional status. Chapter three 
highlighted how Turkey’s energy “leadership” agenda was, to a large extent, tied to the 
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US- and EU-led fourth corridor programme. The willingness of key producer and transit 
states like Azerbaijan and Georgia to participate in the fourth corridor was a prerequisite 
for the implementation of the programme. Both states’ compliance was predicated in part 
on Western-focused foreign policies in Baku and Tbilisi, and in part on a desire to restrict 
Russian influence in the states’ respective energy sectors. Consequently, the reciprocity of 
Azerbaijan and Georgia to Western-sponsored initiatives simultaneously facilitated 
Turkey’s energy agenda to the benefit of its regional power and obstructed Russia’s energy 
strategy to the detriment of its regional power accumulation. Similarly, Turkmenistan’s 
openness to engaging in energy trade with China was construed as detrimental to the 
regional energy and power strategies of each of Russia, Turkey, and Iran. In both cases, the 
capacity of developed states (and China as an emerging great power) to invest in the 
energy sectors of regional subordinates highlighted the economic and political constraints 
of advanced developing states relative to their more developed counterparts. 
The political relationship between one regional power and external states can also affect 
the energy agenda of a second regional power. The US’ desire to restrain the influence of 
Iran and Russia in the Caspian by means of the fourth corridor project was characterised in 
this thesis as beneficial to Turkey’s energy agenda. Conversely, the relationship between 
Iran and the West was an impediment to Turkey’s energy strategy. Successive US 
sanctions restricted the development of the Iranian energy market, thus limiting the 
capacity of Turkey and Iran to extend bilateral energy trade. It was argued in chapter four 
that Turkey’s mediatory efforts during the 2010 UNSC negotiations were spurred by the 
threat posed by potential sanctions to Turkey’s energy agenda. That Turkey is an advanced 
developing state bears some relevance in this issue: it is notable that two advanced 
developing states (Brazil being the second) were selected to conduct the 2010 negotiations, 
and that the consequent Tehran declaration was rejected by the P5+1. The states had 
sufficient political capital to be considered viable mediators by the international status quo, 
yet were unable to convince the same actors that they had negotiated a viable solution to 
the crisis. Consequently, the rejection of the Tehran Declaration both undermined Turkey’s 
status as a regional representative and its capacity to extend its regional power through 
energy initiatives. The episode therefore highlights the opportunities and constraints 
available to advanced developing states in intervening between external and regional 
powers for energy benefits. 
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In acknowledging the impact external states have on a regional power’s regional energy 
ambitions and status, concession should also be made to the way in which regional powers 
engage with the international system in general. The introduction to this thesis noted that 
advanced developing states could be reformist, revisionist, or support the global status quo. 
Turkey’s relationship with the West and willingness to participate in established 
multilateral institutions was portrayed as something that would engender legitimacy 
among smaller states in the Caspian for Turkey and generate leverage for the AKP in 
regional energy negotiations. Conversely, Iran’s revisionist international agenda and 
increasing divergence from the status quo at the height of the nuclear crisis was a 
significant impediment to its energy agenda.  
On a related theme, this thesis stresses the necessity not to underestimate the geopolitical 
motivations behind and repercussions for external intervention in regional energy systems. 
The empirical chapters of this project repeatedly emphasised how the AKP’s tendency to 
support competing pipeline projects - like Nabucco and the South Stream - undermined 
both its own energy strategy and its regional power ambitions. The tendency by advanced 
developing states to compartmentalise energy from political issues or geopolitical 
competition in bilateral relations was also stressed throughout this thesis. In part, this 
thesis contends that this compartmentalisation stems from the economic necessity of 
energy trade for both producer and consumer advanced developing states. 
Contributions 
This thesis has demonstrated a connection between energy and regional powers for 
advanced developing states. In considering the relationship between Turkey’s energy 
strategy and its approach to regional powers in the wider Caspian region, it highlighted 
how the two concepts can be mutually reinforcing: energy strategy can shape and facilitate 
regional power ambitions, and regional power can contribute to the success of an energy 
agenda. Turkey’s status as an advanced developing state - as a country economically 
ascendant, with substantial resources relative to other states in the global South, and eager 
to play a more influential role in regional and global affairs - conferred it with the 
confidence and desire to augment its position in regional affairs. Its reliance on other 
regional actors for essential supplies of energy limited Turkey’s capacity to adopt a 
coercive hegemonic approach towards regional power. Rather, Turkey was framed as a 
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benevolent regional hegemon that presented policies grounded in self-interest as common 
regional objectives. This approach proved limited in dealing with a Russia that was 
increasingly coercive and which held a balance of power over Turkey. That that power 
imbalance was founded, to a large extent, on Ankara’s dependence on Russian energy 
supplies, highlights the importance of incorporating energy into assessments of the 
relationship between regional powers. Yet the same benevolent hegemonic approach 
proved advantageous in Ankara’s relations with Iran and with subordinate regional states 
like Azerbaijan and Georgia - all of which were pivotal to the realisation of the AKP’s 
energy agenda, and which were at least partly reliant on Turkey for the realisation of their 
own energy objectives. This thesis therefore demonstrated that for Turkey, regional power 
cannot be understood without understanding the role energy plays in both the regional 
strategy of the state and in regional politics more broadly. It consequently argues for the 
importance of incorporating energy as a material resource into explorations of regional 
power. 
This thesis therefore contributes to two fields of IR literature. To that on regional powers, 
it offers a new understanding of the relationship between a key strategic resource - energy 
- and regional power. Chapter two contended that energy’s exclusion from assessments of 
power capacity limited a more nuanced understanding of the resources available to 
regional powers and the ways in which they might integrate them into regional statecraft. 
Arguments one and two above highlight the ways in which energy, as a strategic resource, 
both facilitates and constrains regional power. That it can be employed as either a material 
or ideational resource highlights how the two forms of resources overlap. It was also 
argued in chapter two that the failure of most empirical regional powers literature to 
differentiate between different forms of regional power and the focus in the literature on 
cooperative regional power strategies further limits the scope for understanding how or 
why different forms of power manifest. By highlighting how different policies, strategies, 
and reactions correspond to various regional power typologies, this thesis has contributed 
an empirical account of the heterogeneous nature of regional power to the literature. 
The second field this thesis contributes to is that of energy in IR. Chapter one pointed to a 
dichotomy in the energy literature between developed and developing states that failed to 
account for the unique agendas and opportunities of advanced developing states. It argued 
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that the literature that did discuss energy in advanced developing states tended to adopt an 
IPE approach similar to that applied to developing states that limited understandings of 
how energy and geopolitical agendas were related for these states. In conceptualising 
energy as not just an economic necessity, but as a geostrategic asset for advanced 
developing states, this thesis contributes to a broader understanding of how energy was 
framed and utilised by states that are neither developed nor developing. In addition, the 
review of energy literature pointed to the significance of new, rapidly industrialising states 
within the global energy sector. Yet studies of the relations between these new actors are 
limited: most scholars focus on the implications of this new trade for developed or 
Western states. The focus on energy relations between advanced developed states in this 
thesis contributes to the study of South-South energy relations that the first chapter 
suggested was missing from contemporary studies of energy in IR and, by extension, to IR 
research on international politics within the global South. Given the proliferation of natural 
gas deals in the 21st century and the reconfiguration of energy geopolitics in recent 
decades, the focus on energy relations within a specific geopolitical space contributes to 
studies on the recalibration of the geopolitical nature of energy politics. That it does so 
specifically via a regional powers framework adds to the originality of the research. The 
exploration of the motivations and objectives of advanced developing states in this thesis 
therefore adds depth to the ways in which IR understands how energy and international 
politics are related. At the same time, it expands both our knowledge of the advanced 
developing states themselves and the ways in which they influence international energy 
trends. 
Finally, this thesis was eager to contribute to scholarly literature on advanced developing 
states. In drawing attention to the relationships between advanced developing states like 
Turkey, Iran, and Russia - as well as between those countries and developing states like 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan - it contributes to the study of both rising powers and 
between states in the global South more broadly. This thesis demonstrates the way in 
which these states interact within the regional system, and the way in which they 
incorporate energy into power and geopolitical strategies. In doing so, it provides insights 
into the opportunities advanced developing states have in comparison to developing states 
- particularly in terms of engendering access to essential resources and in engaging with 
developed states and multilateral institutions - and the economic and political constraints 
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that face them in comparison to developed states. By positioning energy as a tool through 
which advanced developing states can obtain, consolidate, and utilising energy in the 
regional context, and in demonstrating how regional power facilitates the acquisition of 
essential energy supplies, this thesis has provided insight into the ways in which advanced 
developing states affect and effect power. Turkey faced significant challenges in its 
attempts demonstrate energy "leadership” and regional hegemony in the Caspian. Yet as 
the empirical chapters demonstrated, even particularly energy-rich states like Iran and 
Russia failed to maintain consistent hegemony in a region dominated by energy politics: 
the former was limited to regional leadership, while the latter was limited in its application 
of coercive hegemony in states like Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. Nonetheless, this thesis 
demonstrated how factors associated with regional power - particularly regional 
integration - were essential for all three states to realise their energy agendas, and that 
energy was important to determining their roles in the regional hierarchy. Consequently, it 
concludes that energy and regional power are intrinsically related for the advanced 
developing states of the Caspian - including for energy poor states like Turkey. 
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